

# JINNAH PAPERS

THE STATES:  
Historical and Policy Perspectives and  
Accession to Pakistan



FIRST SERIES  
Volume VIII

*Editor-in-Chief*

Z. H. ZAIDI, S.I.

M. A., LL.B. (Alig.), Ph.D. (London)


QUAID-I-AZAM PAPERS PROJECT  
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**QUAID-I-AZAM  
MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH  
PAPERS**

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Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah  
1951 Pencil sketch by Dr. Ahmed Mirza Jamil, T.I.



# QUAID-I-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH PAPERS

## THE STATES: Historical and Policy Perspectives and Accession to Pakistan

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Volume VIII

Editor-in-Chief  
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*Frontispiece*

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

*Between pages 92 and 93*

Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur, who signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 3 October 1948

Jinnah and Fatima Jinnah with the Ameer of Bahawalpur, Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi, at Bahawalpur House, Karachi

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Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, in ceremonial dress

Picture shows (front row) Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, Jinnah and Fatima Jinnah

Group photo of ruling family of Chitral, 1935. (From L to R): Hissamul Mulk; Ghaziuddin Mulk; Saiful Mulk; Imadul Mulk; Muzaffarul Mulk; Shahabuddin Mulk; Amiruddin Mulk; Burhanuddin Mulk; Matual Mulk; Shujaul Mulk (Centre); Khusraul Mulk; Khushwaqtul Mulk; Khushamadal Mulk; Mubarakul Mulk; Khalilul Mulk; and Mohyuddin Mulk.

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Jinnah with Ahmed Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat

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Miangul Gulshahzada Abdul Wadood, Wali of Swat, signing the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 3 November 1947. Picture shows from L to R: Wali's guards; Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb, Wali-Ahad; Miangul Aurangzeb; Ataullah, Secretary to the Wali of Swat

*Between pages 409 and 410*

Mahabat Khan III, Nawab of Junagadh, the first State Ruler To have signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 14 September 1947.

*Between pages 424 and 425*

Ghulam Moinuddin Khan, Nawab of Manavadar, in ceremonial Dress.

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## Foreword

The Indian States comprised the native principalities which had entered into treaties and agreements with the British East India Company and later with the British Crown. The number of such States was around 565, which covered a total area equivalent to about one-third, and had a total population equal to about one-fourth, of British India in 1947.

Prior to the partition, all business between the States and British India, including inter-state relations, was dealt with by the Political Department of the Government of India, which was directly under the Viceroy qua Crown Representative. In 1921, a Chamber of Princes was set up, which served as a consultative body and liaised between the Political Department and the ruling princes.

The States enjoyed internal autonomy, by and large, while defence, foreign affairs and communications were controlled by the Government of India.

Most States were so located geographically that their accession to India was a foregone conclusion. The Indian leadership was interested in ensuring, with Mountbatten's all-too-willing assistance, that those States which were initially disposed to sit on the fence, acceded to India as well.

The Indian Independence Act 1947, phrased as it was, helped the Indian leadership, aided by Mountbatten, to fend off perfectly what Nehru had called the "balkanisation" of India, since as many as 514 States, out of a total of some 565, were to form part of the new India. The Act, by providing for the continuation of treaties and agreements between the States and the British Government, stultified the oft-repeated British position that, as a sequel to the end of British suzerainty, all such agreements would lapse until fresh arrangements were negotiated with the succession States. It was only after the partition that India invoked the principle of ascertaining the wishes of the people of certain disputed States with regard to their accession to one or the other Dominion. This principle had been conveniently overlooked in the case of some 514 States which had acceded to India before the partition. Only 14 States were located within the geographical limits of Pakistan, while Jammu & Kashmir, contiguous to Pakistan, was vital to the nation's economic and strategic interests.

This volume contains interesting and revealing historical evidence, some of it not published hitherto, about how Mountbatten, with the tacit support of the British Government, manipulated the accession of most States to India in collusion with Nehru and Sardar Patel.

Documents, numbering 251, have been arranged in two sections, viz. the Historical Perspective and the States acceding to Pakistan. The primary source material, including the *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, the *Governor-General Papers*, etc., contains significant strands of historical evidence garnered from a variety of sources, such as the Oriental and



India Office Collections of the British Library; the *Transfer of Power 1942-7*; the *Mountbatten Papers*; the unpublished *D. Y. Fell Memoirs*; the United States National Archives; the National Documentation Centre, Islamabad; the *Kalat Papers*; the Foreign Office Archives; the Official Records of the Security Council, 1948. Other sources include *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, and the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, etc.

Documents from the *Transfer of Power 1942-7* have been referred to, for example, as No. 242, TP, XII, 360-1, i.e. the document number, volume number, and page number(s). Others have been identified by quoting their source, viz. *IOR* or *Mountbatten Papers*. Cross-references to the documents included in the previous volumes of the *Jinnah Papers* have been given by mentioning the document number, volume number, and page number(s), e.g. No. 464, Vol. I, Part I, 842-5 or Appendix III. I, Vol. I, Part II, 32-42.

References to notes at the end of the documents have been identified by the document number, with the prefix PS (Pakistan States).

The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank David Blake of the Oriental and India Office Collections of the British Library and the Resident Representative of the U.N. at Islamabad for their valuable assistance in the facilitation of access to historical evidence. The permission given by Mrs. Virginia Darbyshire, heiress to D. Y. Fell, to his unpublished *Memoirs* being used is gratefully acknowledged.

Mention may also be gratefully made of the unstinting assistance received from Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Additional Secretary, and Fauzia Abbas, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who helped provide copies of documents required for the Project.

The dedication of the Project staff, particularly Mr. M. H. Khan who has worked conscientiously and indefatigably on this volume, is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are also due to Mr. A. A. Hanafi for his unremitting endeavours at finalizing the Introduction etc. Mr. Aftab Ahmad has also given unstintingly of his time and labour, and I am thankful to him as well.

Z. H. ZAIDI

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### THE STATES: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES

Following the decline and fall of Muslim rule in India, Britain emerged progressively as the paramount power, starting from the 18th century. The East India Company rule was supplanted by direct British rule under a Royal Proclamation of 1858. Most of Muslim India which had been subjugated by the British and the administration of which was assumed by the British Crown in 1858, came to be termed as British India. The remaining territories,<sup>1</sup> ruled by the native princes, were allowed to stay as autonomous units under the treaties and agreements entered into by them with the British Government. These units were known as Indian States.

On the eve of independence, the number of Indian States was around 565,<sup>2</sup> with a total approximate area equal to one-third of British India and a quarter of its population.

The States had assumed such obligations and accepted such restrictions as stemmed from their treaties with the British, the Paramount Power. Political Department directly under the Viceroy, in the capacity of Crown Representative, conducted all business between the States and British India as well as regulating inter-State affairs.

The relations between British India and the States were subsequently to be regulated in accordance with the Montagu-Chelmsford recommendations of 1918, regarding constitutional reforms in India, which underpinned the Government of India Act, 1919. In 1921, a Chamber of Princes was created, under a royal charter, as a consultative body, meeting ordinarily once a year under the chairmanship of the Viceroy with its own Standing Committee.

One of the proclaimed objectives of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 was the gradual democratization of the States with a view to their being fitted into a pattern of representative government in course of time, as the political process at work in British India could not leave the motley crowd of the states "untouched", and was "bound to affect even those whose ideas and institutions are of the most conservative and feudal character".<sup>3</sup>

In 1928, a three-member Committee headed by Sir Spencer Harcourt Butler was constituted to enquire into the relationship between the Indian States and the Paramount Power in view of the controversy then raging over the issue. The deliberations of the Indian States Committee generated considerable debate on the precise status of the States, whether they were inherently subordinate, their treaties with the British Government being in the nature of self-denying acts of the paramount power, or were inherently sovereign, albeit within the limits set by such treaties as they had entered into with the British Government.<sup>4</sup> The Government of India Act 1935 put an end to diarchy and introduced



responsible government in the provinces, but the States remained outside its orbit. They continued to enjoy autonomy in internal affairs, defence, foreign relations and communications being the responsibility of the paramount power. However, the Act divided the powers of the Viceroy into those of the Governor-General in relation to British India and of the Crown Representative in relation to the States, in line with the recommendations of the Butler Committee.

#### BRITISH POLICY 1946-47

The British Cabinet Mission in their Memorandum of 12 May 1946<sup>5</sup> on States' Treaties and Paramountcy postulated that paramountcy would lapse on the withdrawal of the British from India and would in no circumstances be transferred to an Indian Government. The void created by the lapse of paramountcy and the cessation of political and other arrangements between the States and the British Crown was "to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them".<sup>6</sup> In their statement of 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission pronounced<sup>7</sup> that Paramountcy could neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to any new Government in India. The States, released from the obligations of Paramountcy, would work out their own relationship with the Succession States, and it by no means followed that such relationship would be identical for all the States.

The intention not to "bring paramountcy... to a conclusion" earlier than the date of transfer of power was reaffirmed by the British Government in their Statement of 20 February 1947<sup>8</sup> declaring their intent to transfer power not later than June 1948. The Statement stipulated that it related only to British India and that the policy as regards the Indian States, outlined in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May 1946, remained unaltered.

These policy formulations were somewhat ambiguous in that they did not define the precise status of the States after the British colonial rule in India had come to an end. However, during discussions with the States Negotiating Committee, which comprised the Rulers or their representatives, the Viceroy observed that, in order that no administrative vacuum might result from the lapse of paramountcy, stand-still arrangements would have to be made for the interim period until fresh agreements had been made. He also confirmed that the accession of a State to one or the other Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice.<sup>9</sup>



Whereas the States had accepted the British plan for the transfer of power in so far as it concerned them, this was far from true of both the Congress and the Muslim League leadership. At a meeting between the Viceroy and the Indian leaders on 13 June, 1947<sup>10</sup>, Nehru reiterated the oft-repeated Congress stand that paramountcy would devolve on the Succession States upon the transfer of power. He claimed that the States had no right to declare independence and that the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946 did not permit of this. Conrad Corfield, Political Adviser to the Viceroy, observed that the States had the option of "entering into particular arrangements" with the Succession States as the alternative to a federal relationship.<sup>11</sup> Jinnah took the view that the States would regain sovereignty with the lapse of paramountcy and that their treaties and agreements with the British would cease to be valid until fresh agreements were concluded, on a voluntary basis, with the Succession States.<sup>12</sup> Nehru had to concede that "he was not intending to lay down that every state must join one or other Constituent Assembly; but if they did not come in, they would have to come to some other arrangement... which could not and should not be preceded by declaration of independence."<sup>13</sup>

Jinnah reaffirmed that, constitutionally or legally, the states could not be mandated by the British Government to join one Constituent Assembly or the other. If a state wished to come in, he said, it could do so by agreement.<sup>14</sup>

Jinnah's view concurred with that of the Nawab of Bhopal, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, who told Jinnah on 6 June that the Viceroy had been pressuring the States into joining the "existing" Constituent Assembly. He held that the States should be free to decide which Constituent Assembly to join and suggested that the All India Muslim League (AIML) offer liberal terms for future relationship with Pakistan to those States that might wish to associate with it.<sup>15</sup>

The Nawab urged that the States should be assured that "their sovereignty, integrity and autonomy are in no manner to be jeopardised."<sup>16</sup> He even resigned as Chancellor because of his intent to declare independence. He declined to attend the meeting of the States Negotiating Committee called for 25 July, protesting that the Rulers "have been invited like the Oysters to attend the tea party with the Walrus and the Carpenter".<sup>17</sup>

But even the Nawab could not disregard the groundswell of public opinion in favour of democratization and suggested that it be specified that "Pakistan would wish the Ruler of each State to democratise its administration on popular basis" and that the "States should so frame their constitution that they always rule as constitutional monarchs through



clearly defined constitutional channels."<sup>18</sup> He was, however, not in favour of the States entering into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, preferring "some form of alliance or treaty relations."<sup>19</sup>

Mountbatten took a dim view of Dominion status being conferred on any State because he feared that this might cause the balkanization of India. He thought as well that, however plausible such status might seem for certain of the largest States, the destiny of all, both large and small, must depend upon their relations with one or the other nation in the subcontinent.<sup>20</sup>

Yet he could hardly disguise his partiality for the Congress or act as an honest broker in the matter of accession of the States. He shifted his stance from time to time essentially to suit India's interest. On 22 April, for instance, he had declared that the States would be free to decide which Constituent Assembly to join, regardless of geographical compulsions.<sup>21</sup> However, in a *volte-face*, he subsequently suggested that the Rulers take into account "geographical compulsions" in deciding which Dominion to accede to.<sup>22</sup> This suggestion was scarcely compatible with the stated policy of the British Government. Referring to the deadline of 14 August Mountbatten had given the States for accession, Secretary of State Listowel reminded him: "We must... keep balance even" as "we gave categorical assurances [to the States] that we would exercise no pressure."<sup>23</sup> He said Mountbatten's statement was "inconsistent" with the thrust of the debate in Parliament on the Indian Independence Bill. He added that the States were "entitled to say that before deciding finally to adhere to one or other Dominion they wish to see constitutions of Dominions... as to what sort of structure they are joining."<sup>24</sup>

On 25 July 1947, Mountbatten formed a Negotiating Committee comprising ten Rulers and twelve Ministers of the States. Although not representing individual States, in the strictly legal sense, the Committee none the less was seen as "guardian of the interests of the States" generally and in the drafting of the Standstill Agreement and the Instrument of Accession particularly; it inspired confidence among the Rulers and carried considerable weight with them when they were asked to sign the documents it had approved.<sup>25</sup>

These were hammered out by two sub-committees between 26th and 31st July. The draft Standstill Agreement had originated in the Political Department before 3 June.<sup>26</sup> The draft Instrument of Accession was originated by the new States Department. Both were approved by the States Negotiating Committee in July 1947.<sup>27</sup> The Standstill Agreement provided for all existing arrangements as regards matters of common concern between the Crown and the signatory State to continue



until new arrangements were made. The Instrument of Accession took three forms, depending upon the existing status and powers of the various States. It had the 140 States with full power to accede to India only for defence, external affairs and communications, with no financial liability. For some seventy States in Kathiawar, Central India and the Simla Hills, which did not enjoy full powers, the Instrument restricted their future powers to those they already had. Finally, for over 300 States of sorts in Kathiawar and Gujarat, which actually were estates and *talukas*, an Instrument was devised that reserved all residuary powers and jurisdiction to the Central Government.

### CONGRESS POLICY

The Congress had taken the lead in pressing for responsible government in the Indian States through the development of representative institutions in the late 1920s. It helped to establish the All-India States' People's Conference (AISPC) in 1927. In its 1928 session,<sup>28</sup> the Congress assured the people of the States of its sympathy with and support for their legitimate and peaceful struggle for responsible government. At the 1938 session,<sup>29</sup> it demanded the same socio-political and economic rights and freedom for the States, as introduced under the Act of 1935 in the provinces of British India.

By 1946, the Congress had come to command substantial popular support from the States for their political programme in the rapidly emerging constitutional scenario leading to independence a year later.

The Congress policy towards the States was characterized by a progressive and pragmatic approach predicated on *realpolitik*. Its Resolution of 15 June 1947<sup>30</sup> unfolded a comprehensive political framework in respect of the States, its major elements being:

i. Speedy introduction of responsible governments by the Rulers in keeping with the aspirations of the people and with due regard to the impending constitutional and political changes in India.

ii. In any new political dispensation, the people of the States must have a dominant voice.

iii. The Congress could not concede the right of any State in India to independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India. All States had to join one or the other Dominion in line with the June 3 Plan.

The proposals of the Cabinet Mission<sup>31</sup> of 12 May 1946, as clarified on 16 May, regarding the future of the States had provoked sharp reaction from Jawaharlal Nehru who expressed serious apprehension about the "balkanisation of India" if the states were allowed to opt for independence following the lapse of paramountcy. He urged that administrative and other arrangements concerning matters of common interest,



especially in the economic and fiscal spheres, be made in time.<sup>32</sup>

In the course of negotiations between the British Government and the Rulers of the States, the Congress leaders, Nehru and Patel, adopted a stance bordering on intimidation and coercion of the Rulers as well as resorting to clandestine and crafty dealings. On 19 April 1947, speaking at Gwalior as President of the States' People's Conference, Nehru dared the Rulers to join the Indian Constituent Assembly or be treated as hostile.<sup>33</sup> On 5 July, Patel invited the Rulers and the people to the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of friendly cooperation. The States, he warned, should "bear in mind that the alternative to cooperation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which will overwhelm great and small in common ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum common task."<sup>34</sup>

Patel told Mountbatten, in a discussion on the future of the States, that "he need not bother about the States because after the transfer of power the States' peoples would rise, depose their Rulers and throw in their lot with the Congress."<sup>35</sup>

Conrad Corfield, a man with a strong sense of duty and moral obligation, believed that the States should act in concert in asserting their "theoretical" right to independence.<sup>36</sup> This would give them a bargaining ploy in dealings with the Congress. The Political Department viewed Mountbatten's policy of pressing for a settlement with the States prior to the transfer of power as an improper exercise of paramountcy inasmuch as it hampered the States in negotiating their political future, contrary to the thrust of the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946, which had been accepted by the Rulers as the basis for a final settlement. He held the view that the states should not sign anything before the date of transfer of power and lapse of paramountcy. At that point, he thought, they would be free as independent entities to act in unison and even dictate the terms of any merger with India.<sup>37</sup> Mountbatten, however, was impervious to this approach because of the Congress pressure. Corfield had flown to London with Ismay in May 1947 to seek direct support from the India Office. His trip, without Mountbatten's consent, provoked the Viceroy to dub his Political Adviser as 'son-of-a bitch'.<sup>38</sup>

"Although the right of the States to decide their own future had previously been announced in Parliament, the Viceroy overturned it by supporting the Congress plan to pressure them into accession before 15 August, 1947. This contradicted earlier promises, but Attlee and Listowel chose to reverse government policy rather than challenge their subordinate in New Delhi".<sup>39</sup> The Congress leadership regarded the objective and reasonable approach of Corfield at various



meetings as hostile policy of the Political Department.<sup>40</sup> Nehru even prevailed upon Mountbatten to retire Corfield and send him back home. This left the field open for Nehru to secure maximum political mileage for India.

#### MUSLIM LEAGUE POLICY

Although it was by and large in conformity with the British government's own policy with regard to the future of the princely states in India, as stated in the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946 and restated in the Plan of 3 June 1947, Jinnah's stance remained legalistic rather than pragmatic, as distinct from the Congress stand, based on *realpolitik*, that each state had to accede to one Dominion or the other and could not in any event opt for independence. There was a ground swell of public opinion in favour of democratization of the political dispensation in the states and of a radical change in the status quo.

A firm believer in constitutional processes and political fair play, Jinnah did not seem aware of the goings-on between Mountbatten and the Congress and the covert support of the Crown Representative to the Congress drive to get most States to accede to India through intimidation and threats.<sup>41</sup>

Jinnah's statement of 17 June 1947 reflected his basically legalistic approach, based on British announcements on the subject, when he declared that "constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign States on the termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like: it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent."

"The policy of the All India Muslim League," he clarified, "has been clear from the very beginning. We do not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of any State.... Such States as wish to enter the Pakistan Constituent Assembly of their free will and desire to ... negotiate with us, shall find us ready and willing to do so. If they wish to remain independent and ... to negotiate ... any political or any other relationship ... with Pakistan, we shall be glad to ... come to a settlement which will be in the interest of both."<sup>42</sup>

The Muslim League had evinced scant interest and taken little part in the affairs of the princely states until 1939 when the All India States Muslim League was formed. However, after the death in 1943 of Bahadur Yar Gunj, a dynamic leader from Hyderabad (Deccan), the States League went into relative limbo.

On the eve of announcement of the June 3 Plan, the Nawab of Bhopal



had complained to Mountbatten about the impending fate of the States. "The States could have joined the weak centre envisaged by the Cabinet Mission, but the 3 June Plan provided a 'tight centre' and whichever Dominion we join... will utterly destroy us."<sup>44</sup> His intent to keep out of the Constituent Assembly as an independent State could not be influenced and altered by Mountbatten.

Finally, the lack of pragmatic thinking on the part of All-India States Muslim League with regard to the future of the States following the termination of paramountcy could be discerned from a resolution adopted by its Working Committee, on 10 July 1947, endorsing the demand of Ch. Hamidullah's faction of Muslim Conference for an independent Kashmir.<sup>45</sup>

### STATES ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN

After India and Pakistan emerged on 15 August 1947 as two independent Dominions, over 500 of the princely States either acceded to or were integrated into the Dominion of India, while 12 States contiguous to Pakistan started negotiating accession to that Dominion.

Five States in Kathiawar, which each had a Muslim ruler but a Hindu majority, namely Dasuda, Vanod, Jainabad, Bajuna and Radhanpur, given their proximity to Sindh, were to join Pakistan, but could not actually do so in the face of vehement Indian opposition.<sup>1</sup> Two of the largest States, Kashmir and Hyderabad, preferred to sit on the fence mulling over their future course of action.

Pakistan was primarily interested in the accession of the States within or contiguous to it, including Jammu and Kashmir, which had an overwhelming Muslim majority. Two of the Kathiawar States, Junagadh and Manavadar, had formally acceded<sup>2</sup> to Pakistan, although they each had a Hindu majority. Their accession was implacably opposed by India.

Out of the 12 States within or contiguous to Pakistan, six were in or around the N.W.F.P., four in or adjacent to Baluchistan and Northern Areas (Hunza and Nagar) and one each in or bordering on the Punjab and Sindh. The process of accession had begun prior to August 1947 and concluded by March 1948.

### FRONTIER STATES

The North-Western Frontier Province, created in 1901, which comprised not only the frontier regions, known in common parlance as tribal areas, but also the six settled districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, D.I. Khan and Hazara, had an estimated population of 5.865 million in 1947. It was made a Governor's province under the Government of India Act, 1935. In July 1947, a referendum was held in NWFP and the people of the province gave a thumping verdict in favour of joining Pakistan.



Of the four Frontier States, namely Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat, three (Chitral, Dir, and Swat) were in the Malakand Agency, one of the six tribal agencies, where central or provincial laws did not apply.

#### AMB

The State was contiguous to Hazara district with a small population of 48,651. The Ruler, recipient of a purse of Rs. 15,300 per anum from British India, levied a toll on all timber leaving the State.

The Ruler of Amb accepted standstill arrangements with Pakistan in July 1947, the first among the NWFP states to do so.<sup>3</sup> Later, on 31 December 1947, he signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup>

#### CHITRAL

Chitral (population about 1 lakh) occupied a strategic position in the extreme north of Pakistan. Its proximity to Russia and a route from Kashmir to Chinese Turkestan were important factors, too. It is a region of deep valleys, lofty mountain ranges and rich pine forests. Before 1947, the British maintained a 973-strong militia of Chitral Scouts in the State.

The British had imposed the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir over Chitral, and its northern districts, Yasin, Ishkoman and Ghizar, were incorporated into Gilgit and given away to the Maharaja of Kashmir.<sup>5</sup>

The State declared its intent to join Pakistan in August 1947,<sup>6</sup> but formally signed the Instrument of Accession on 6 November, 1947.<sup>7</sup>

#### DIR

Dir, with a population of about 1.48 lakh, was a small State about 20 miles from Chakdara. The State's relations with the British Government were governed by the Agreement of 1925, which provided, inter alia, that the Ruler shall keep open the road from Chakdara to Chitral, allow trade to pass to Chitral free of tax, and recognise the State boundaries as fixed by the Government of India. He received a purse of Rs. 50,000 per annum from the Government, which also covered the cost of the 275-strong Dir Levies.<sup>8</sup>

The State was poorly managed and there were reports of maladministration against the Nawab. Sardar Nishtar's note of September 1947 to Quaid-i-Azam stated: "... I do not think he is friendly towards Pakistan. One of his brothers who has left the State and lives in village Hathian in the Mardan District is a supporter of the Muslim League. May be that this has something to do with the apathy of the Dir Ruler towards Pakistan. It is also possible that this attitude of Dir is due to the fact that his opponent, the Ruler of Swat, is staunch supporter of Pakistan."<sup>9</sup>



The Ruler of Amb informed Jinnah on 3 August 1947 that ... "the Nawab of Dir still persists in believing that the British power will never go from India and that even if such a thing miraculously happens he will be free to do what he likes on 16 August...". However, the Ruler of Dir signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 8 November 1947.<sup>10</sup>

#### SWAT

Swat (population approximately 6 lakh) was the richest, and better administered by far, among the States in the Malakand Agency.<sup>11</sup> The Ruler known as *Wali*, undertook to be loyal to Pakistan, to avert raids by outlaws and refuse them asylum, and accept "modified Government control of his forests." He was recipient of a token grant of Rs. 10,500 from the British Government. His total revenue was estimated at Rs. 50 lakh per anum. Annual allowances of Rs. 43,210 were also paid to the Dir tribes, Maliks, Khans and Headmen of Swat.

Swat signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 24 November 1947.<sup>12</sup>

#### BALUCHISTAN STATES

The political milieu in Baluchistan in 1946-47 had three major dimensions: First, the province was gravid with tribal ambitions and "day-dreams about an independent Pathan and Baluchistan States"<sup>1</sup>, which were easy to be exploited. Second, the lust for power amongst rival tribes manifested itself in growth of fissiparous tendencies. Third, there were hardly any effective, well-organised and popular political organisations. The Muslim League, led by Qazi M. Isa and patronized and bankrolled by the Khan of Kalat, had a sizeable "following in urban Quetta, Pishin and Zhob. Congress [Anjuman-i-Watan], organised by Khan Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, with a considerable following among Hindu merchants of the towns, besides the intellectual young Baluchs, worked for promotion of Baluchistan national aspirations".<sup>2</sup> The *Sardars* or the elite of the Province, who enjoyed enormous political leverage, largely kept aloof.

When the British plan envisaging the partition of India was announced on 3 June 1947, some form of popular choice was offered to grey areas like the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan—a choice between Pakistan and Hindustan. Baluchistan opted in favour of Pakistan by the unanimous vote of 54 members of the *Shahi Jirga* and the Quetta Municipality present. The decision to limit the vote to members of the *Shahi Jirga* (excluding the *Sardars* nominated by the Kalat State) and the non-official members of the Quetta Municipality was made by Mountbatten, both Jinnah and



Nehru having been persuaded to drop their pleas for a more representative vote, on the ground of delay that a broader franchise would entail.

The princely States in Baluchistan included Kalat and two other States, namely Las Bela and Kharan and the principality of Mekran, all sparsely populated and economically backward. Administered by the Agent to the Governor-General, these states enjoyed limited autonomy in accordance with agreements signed from time to time with the British Indian Government.

The combined population of the three States was hardly half a million, preponderantly staunch Muslims, steeped in ignorance and wallowing in grinding poverty. At the same time, Baluchistan held a crucial geo-strategic position between Iran and Afghanistan on the one hand and the Persian Gulf on the other. The area was potentially rich in mineral resources, waiting to be exploited for the economic uplift of the local people. Like other states, of course, British suzerainty over the Baluchistan States was to lapse on 15 August 1947.<sup>3</sup>

#### KALAT

The State of Kalat, including the territories it claimed were under its suzerainty, held a key position in Baluchistan. The Ruler was conscious of this position and aspired to complete independence. In a Memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission in March 1946,<sup>4</sup> he claimed that the Succession States would inherit only the treaty relationships with British India, not those with Whitehall. He declared that with the termination of the treaty of 1876, the Kalat State would regain complete independence and be free to determine its own future. "Kalat being an independent State, the Khan [of Kalat], his government and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Union"<sup>5</sup>. However, the Ruler desired a friendly and amicable relationship with the Succession States on the basis of reciprocity and recognition of Kalat's independence.

Jinnah had problems dealing with the Khan of Kalat who claimed that the State was neither a part of India nor indeed "an Indian State" but "an independent sovereign State"<sup>6</sup> by virtue of its treaties with the British Government.<sup>7</sup> In a letter sent in December 1946 to the Political Department, the Khan had demanded recognition of Kalat as an independent State, retrocession of the leased areas of Quetta, Nushki, and Nasirabad, and determination of the future of Las Bela, Kharan, and Marri-Bugti areas over which he claimed suzerainty.<sup>8</sup> On 19 July, negotiations were held by Mountbatten with a Kalat Delegation and the Pakistan States Department, the latter conceding Kalat's claim to independent



sovereign status once paramountcy had lapsed.<sup>9</sup> Mountbatten believed that the "British Government had been anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy would lapse and States would *de jure* become independent; but *de facto*, very few were likely to benefit from independence." He suggested as well that, although Kalat would have gained freedom, no practical course other than some form of association with Pakistan was open to it.

On 28 July 1947, H.A.F. Rumbold, Assistant Secretary, India Office, London, commented on the decisions taken on 19 July 1947 in these words: "...the Viceroy and the Pakistan representatives seem ... to be quite wrong in their facts in accepting the claim of Kalat to be regarded as a separate international entity".<sup>10</sup>

On 2 August 1947, Secretary of State Listowel also clarified the position with respect to the decision of 19 July that the Treaties of 1854 and 1876 did not imply that Kalat was to become an independent and sovereign State and that it had, in fact, always been regarded as an Indian State, figuring as such in Part II of the First Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. He had no doubt that Section 1(I) (b) of the Indian Independence Act applied to British treaties with Kalat pretty much as it did to treaties with other States. "Consequently," Listowel added, "the leased areas lapse to Kalat and the future is a matter for negotiation between the State and Pakistan. We have been at pains in Parliament to discourage claims by States to be regarded as separate international entities and to accept a claim by Kalat will surely encourage other states to press similar claims. There is, moreover, particular danger in admitting such claims by frontier states since it is easier for them to make their independence effective. Apart from the risk to the integrity of India and Pakistan, the emergence of new weak international entities is undesirable."<sup>11</sup>

The Khan of Kalat met with Mountbatten on 28 July and thanked him for "obtaining recognition of the Pakistan Government that his position was that of an independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government." He told Mountbatten that he had had a meeting with Jinnah, "at which both had said that they wished to be friends with each other, and it looked as though a suitable treaty or agreement could be drawn up between them."<sup>12</sup>

On 11 August 1947 a press communique was issued in which Pakistan "recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign State in treaty relationship with British Government, with a status different from that of Indian States".<sup>13</sup> This announcement also envisaged legal opinion to be obtained as to whether Pakistan would inherit the lease agreements. Discussions were also to be held at an early date for reaching decisions on Defence,



Communications and External Affairs. In the meantime, a Standstill Agreement was executed between Pakistan and Kalat State.<sup>14</sup>

It is surprising that even though the Indian Independence Act 1947 did not give the option of independence to any Indian State, Pakistan conceded such a status to Kalat. This recognition was incompatible with the policy adopted towards all other States and was to result in strained relationship and conflict between the Government of Pakistan and Kalat. However, in terms of Clause 8 of the Instrument of Accession, approved by the Crown Representative in July 1947,<sup>15</sup> the acceding States were recognized as "sovereign", subject to cession of three subjects: Defence, Communications and External Affairs.<sup>16</sup>

On 12 September 1947, Arthur Henderson, British Minister for Commonwealth Relations, stated in a Memorandum that the Khan of Kalat was "of course in no position to undertake the international responsibilities of an independent State." Mountbatten, who had been forewarned of the dangers of such a development, might have passed on the warning to the Pakistan Government. "The British High Commissioner in Karachi," Henderson added, "is being informed of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan Government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the State as a separate international entity."<sup>17</sup>

On 17 October 1947, Jinnah invited the Khan of Kalat to Karachi to arrive at decisions concerning accession and other matters spelt out in the 11 August announcement. The Khan agreed to "communicate his final decision after a month or two".<sup>18</sup>

Jinnah awaited the response of the Khan for a further few months. On 14 February 1948, he invited the Khan of Kalat for final negotiations at Sibi. The Khan signified his consent to accede to Pakistan on the basis of the agreed draft of Instrument of Accession.<sup>19</sup> He appeared to have changed<sup>20</sup> his mind, however, and probably malingered to avoid signing the document at the appointed time. Jinnah took a dim view of his "most disappointing and unsatisfactory"<sup>21</sup> attitude.

Not favourably disposed towards accession to Pakistan, the Khan was desirous of establishing relations with Pakistan on a treaty basis. He got the State Assembly to endorse this stance on 14 December 1947 and again on 25 February 1948.<sup>22</sup> A similar proposal from Hyderabad had been rejected<sup>23</sup> by India in the early stages of their negotiations. India had insisted on accession but the Nizam had, however, dithered and procrastinated until India invaded the State in September 1948.

D.Y. Fell, the Kalat Premier, believed that the "Khan had genuinely intended to come to an agreement with Jinnah but had at the last



moment succumbed to pressure from members of his family, especially his bother Abdul Karim".<sup>24</sup>

Earlier, the Khan rather surreptitiously got Sultan Ahmad, an eminent lawyer, to come over from Delhi to advise him on the substance of his negotiations with Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> Fell noted in his Memoirs: "I explained to him [Sultan Ahmad], as best I could, the progress of negotiations and the position that had been reached and I did my best to persuade him to be careful in advising His Highness to stick to what was practical and not to encourage His Highness to base his claims upon rights which were legal but not enforceable".<sup>26</sup>

In January 1948, Fell had been sent to England by the Khan to (i) appoint Brigadier Purves to command the State Forces; (ii) procure defence materials for the State Forces from surplus stocks in England; (iii) obtain legal advice with regard to the State's treaty status; (iv) arrange, if possible, for a marine survey of Pasni harbour; and (v) see whether any support for the State could be found in Britain.<sup>27</sup>

While in England, Fell sent out Brig. Purves, who was later appointed Chief of Police and Defence Minister, Kalat. He advised the Khan: "It was becoming difficult for Pakistan to continue to accept the presence upon its border of a large and important area [Kalat State] whose international status was dubious. So long as the Khan remained legally independent, the occupation of Kalat and its annexation could be made unassailable under international law provided the Khan's consent to such a step could be obtained. Any state within reach, including Russia and of course India, could take such a step at any moment".<sup>28</sup> Fell had also suggested to the Khan that "a legal flaw in the Instrument of Accession [with Pakistan] might be a useful card to have up our sleeves to use at a time when circumstances were more favourable than they were now".<sup>29</sup>

In the meantime, in March 1948 Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran, which constituted about half of Kalat's territory and the rulers whereof had long disputed Kalat's suzerainty, acceded to Pakistan. This development disconcerted the Khan and hardened his attitude. He tried unsuccessfully to muster support for resisting accession, "but only a few illiterate Jhalawan *Sardars*" answered his call.<sup>30</sup> He thought the key to accession of Kalat lay in Mekran where he could create problems for Pakistan. He sent his sister to Karachi to fetch his brother-in-law, Bai Khan, the ruler of Mekran, to force him to retract his decision to accede to Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> Khan's brother, Abdul Karim Khan, first tried to foment disturbances<sup>32</sup> in Mekran to embarrass Pakistan, which led Pakistan to line up army reinforcements, and then fled to Afghanistan to muster support. The Khan also sent the members of his family over to Afghanistan<sup>33</sup> to gather support. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan offered his good offices for placing the case of



Kalat before the United Nations if Kalat so wished.<sup>34</sup> The Khan also chose to withhold rations and transport from the Mekran Levy Corps with a view to exposing them to the danger of starvation.<sup>35</sup>

In view of the political and security situation following the Khan's intransigence, Pakistan was forced to take certain administrative and defence measures<sup>36</sup> to secure Jiwani, Turbat, Pasni and Panjgur areas. To ward off any incidents or disorder, the Kalat Premier was asked to hand over the administration in these and other areas to Pakistan along with the treasuries.<sup>37</sup>

The Khan of Kalat conferred with his advisers and religious leaders. Brig. Purves, the Defence Minister, had been mulling over possible action in case of a military invasion by Pakistan. Fell reported that "if the worse came to the worst, he [Khan] was in favour of evacuating lock, stock and barrel to Khuzdar".<sup>38</sup>

On 27 March 1948, Jinnah instructed his Foreign Secretary Ikramullah that "there should be no negotiations of any kind or any further discussion to create slightest impression that anything but accession is possible"<sup>39</sup> A.S.B. Shah, a Joint Secretary in the Foreign Office, and Ambrose Dundas, Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan, were also asked to "make it clear to Kalat to give us his answer whether he is prepared to accede as promised by him more than once or not".<sup>40</sup>

The same day, the Khan somewhat dramatically decided to accede to Pakistan<sup>41</sup> since Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran had already acceded. The decision, announced on 1 April 1948,<sup>42</sup> albeit belated, was "very welcome", the *Dawn* editorialized on 30 March 1948, "irrespective of the manner of its making and the preceding circumstances publicly known and unknown."<sup>43</sup>

This resolution of a potentially ugly situation, marked by sharp differences between Kalat and Pakistan and the anti-Pakistan goings-on of Khan's brother Abdul Karim Khan, were punctuated by an All India Radio broadcast, on 27 March 1948 claiming that Kalat had requested India to accept its accession two months ago.<sup>44</sup> Mountbatten, however, discounted this claim on 30 March 1948.<sup>45</sup>

On 2 April 1948, the Khan assured the Pakistan authorities that "Kalat is now part of Pakistan and it is the first duty of the State to help Pakistan and cooperate in every way, not only in the conceded subjects but in all other matters also".<sup>46</sup>

The political situation in Baluchistan had been vitiated during the preceding six months by those elements who talked of "Baluchistan for the Baluchi", and of "Baluch nationalism." This had envenomed the minds of the simple and ignorant tribesmen, and damage control measures were urgently indicated. The Khan was urged by the *Dawn*



to curb such tendencies strongly in consonance with his declaration of "one God, one religion, one people".<sup>47</sup> One and a half months later, the Khan denounced the activities of Abdul Karim<sup>48</sup> and asked his people to dissociate from him. He declared that those associated with his nefarious activities should be arrested and produced before the Kalat Premier. This was done on 12-13 July 1948 as a sequel to a brief military action against Abdul Karim by Pakistan.

Jinnah must have been exercised by the political situation that obtained in Baluchistan in the wake of the accession. The bitter conflict of interests among influential political factions, the *Shahi Jirga*, the Khan's Court itself, the Baluchistan National Party and the Provincial Muslim League, had to be resolved in the interest of the people of Baluchistan.

On 26 May 1948, Jinnah flew into Quetta, one of the aims of his visit being to marginalize the disruptive elements and introduce administrative and political reforms in Kalat with a view to creating conditions conducive to its integration into Pakistan.

#### LAS BELA

Las Bela (population about 1 lakh; area 7, 048 sq. miles) had, historically, occupied an important position in trade and commerce between Sindh and Persia through the Mekran coast. Before 1947, the central and southern Baluchistan was, virtually, feudatory to the Khan of Kalat. On 16 July 1947, the Jam of Las Bela expressed his wish to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.<sup>49</sup> After Kalat had signed the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan in August 1947, the Jam of Las Bela felt concerned over the future of his State, and met with Jinnah who assured him that Pakistan Government would examine the issue of his relationship with Kalat as soon as possible.<sup>50</sup>

On the other hand, Kalat insisted that Las Bela was a district of Kalat and the Jam owed allegiance to him as a vassal. Meanwhile, Las Bela agreed to sign Instrument of Accession as well as a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan.<sup>51</sup> As the question of Kalat's accession to Pakistan was not resolved till March 1948, Las Bela's case also hung in the balance. It finally acceded to Pakistan on 17 March 1948 along with Kharan and Mekran.

#### KHARAN

Kharan, a small princely state, with a population of 40,000 spread over an area of 18,553 sq. miles, had an utterly inadequate physical infrastructure. Although rich in date production, the population largely pursued livestock-rearing activities. The state came under British control in 1884; in 1940 it was recognized as being separate from Kalat but remained, nominally, under its overlordship.



After a conference of the leaders and *motabars* of Kharan, held at Nushki on 19 August 1947, the Ruler announced that the “state recognizes itself as an independent State as usual and joins Pakistan Dominion as it suzerin [*sic*] and promises to serve Pakistan upto its extent” [*sic*].<sup>52</sup>

Kalat did not recognise Kharan as an independent State and maintained that the latter was a part of its territories. For, the Chief of Kharan, as one of the Sarawan *Sardars* of Kalat, had a seat in the Kalat *Darbar* and enjoyed a measure of internal autonomy subject to the authority of Kalat.

The repudiation of Kalat’s supremacy by Kharan led to an explosive situation. Kharan had complained to Jinnah in November 1947 that Kalat was arming local elements in Kharan for an armed conflict and creating a law and order situation in the State as well as in the Pakistan-controlled areas of Baluchistan.<sup>53</sup>

In support of his claim to independence, the Chief of Kharan explained<sup>54</sup> to Jinnah, on 1 December 1947, that Kharan had accepted the paramountcy of the British Crown with all concomitant rights and obligations right up to 14 August 1947. On the other hand, Kalat had attempted to subjugate Kharan by force, and in 1939 it had committed aggression against the State but failed in its objective.

Kharan acceded to Pakistan on 17 March 1948.

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#### BAHAWALPUR STATE

Bahawalpur, stretching 150 miles along the left bank of the Sutlej River and extending 150 miles further down the Indus River to the Sindh border, was a predominantly Muslim State with a population of 15 lakh in 1947.<sup>1</sup> It occupied a strategic position because of its location along the border with India. The State comprised three strips:<sup>2</sup> (1) most fertile western section; (2) central section irrigated by Sutlej canals, with headworks at Ferozepur, Sulaimanki, Islam and Panjnad; and (3) eastern section, known as Cholistan, a desert area extending over some 13,000 sq. miles.

Bahawalpur’s lifeline was the canal system under the Sutlej Valley Scheme, fed by supplies from joint waters of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers, which had been completed in the 1920s and for which the State had contributed Rs. 14 crore.<sup>3</sup>

In 1947, the State received irrigation water for 50,000 acres of its land from the Eastern Grey Canal. The share of irrigation water from the Ferozepur headworks stood at 10,807 cusecs for Bahawalpur and only 2,720 cusecs for Bikaner.<sup>4</sup>

At the time of partition of the Punjab, the State faced the threat of stoppage of its share of water from the canals in eastern Punjab. In a Memorandum<sup>5</sup> presented to the Boundary Commission on 17 June



1947, the State demanded that:

- i. the boundary between the East and West Punjab should be so demarcated that West Punjab shall secure territorial jurisdiction over the headworks at Ferozepur and Sulaimanki;
- ii. the eastern Sadiqia and Fordwah canals as well as the entire canal railway should be brought under the territorial jurisdiction of West Punjab and that the boundary between the East and West Punjab should coincide with the irrigation boundary of that canal;
- iii. the Punjab should be so divided as not to prejudice the storage schemes on the Sutlej river and its tributaries, which benefited the Sutlej Valley canals taking off from Ferozepur, Sulaimanki and Islam headworks.

But the Boundary Commission perversely awarded Ferozepur and Zira *tehsils* to India in total disregard of the legitimate interests of Bahawalpur. This was done deliberately to meet the Indian defence needs,<sup>6</sup> on the one hand, and to please Hindu Bikaner, a far smaller user of irrigation water from Ferozepur headworks, which had threatened to accede to Pakistan if Ferozepur was awarded to that Dominion,<sup>7</sup> on the other.

Bahawalpur's fears came true when India stopped the flow of water from the Eastern Grey Canal for the *Rabi* season of 1947-48,<sup>8</sup> though supplies were briefly resumed at the intervention of Pakistan Government and Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>9</sup> Eventually, this vital source of irrigation water for Bahawalpur was cut off by India. This happened despite Mountbatten's assurance that the State "would retain its existing rights to the supply of water from the Sutlej river."<sup>10</sup>

Within the State of Bahawalpur itself, a vocal, if small, section of the population comprising *Ahrars* and other Congress supporters worked for its accession to India. A statement by a local leader, Makhdoom Mohamad Mohsan and 10 others, issued on 23 October 1948, recalled that hardly a year ago, Rifat group had openly "advocated the State's accession to the Indian Dominion."<sup>11</sup>

The State was haunted by the spectre of cessation of vital irrigation supplies as well as growing pressure from the pro-Congress group for accession to India. Mountbatten, citing geographical compulsion as a critical factor for accession of the State, informed the King, on 26 February 1948, that "a large State—Kalat—approached the Government of India for political relationship, but was refused; and unofficial overtures from Bahawalpur [for acceding to India] were similarly discouraged."<sup>12</sup>

In the event, on 5 October 1947 Bahawalpur acceded to Pakistan,<sup>13</sup> and was given due support for establishing a credible defence system



since the State actually bordered India, a none-too-friendly neighbour even at the best of times.<sup>14</sup>

#### MOVEMENT FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

Bahawalpur had had the tradition of curbing indigenous movements for representative government since 1939 and had taken draconian measures to marginalize the popular will.<sup>15</sup> After the establishment of Pakistan, this movement, supported by the State Muslim League but resisted by the State authorities, gained a new lease of life. In a note penned by Abdur Rab Nishtar on 2 November 1947, after he had met Manzar-i-Alam, President of the States Muslim League, it was recognised that resistance to political reforms was only to be expected. "An autocratic government never tolerates any movement which aims at the transference of power from the ruler to the people," Nishtar told Manzar-i-Alam. It was "but natural", he added, "that the State authorities should resent the interference of one who is the head of an organisation which demands establishment of a popular government in the State."<sup>16</sup>

To counter the movement for political reforms in the State, a pro-Ruler Muslim League was formed under Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, the State Premier, while dissidents attempted to organise their own faction of the League.<sup>17</sup> When Manzar-i-Alam made efforts to reorganise political activities at the grass roots level under the League banner, Nishtar had to advise him "not to take any step that may lead to disturbance of peace in these areas",<sup>18</sup> more so because the State bordered India.

#### KHAIRPUR STATE

Khairpur, with a population of 4.72 lakh, was the only princely State within the boundaries of Sindh. It had a rich and fertile alluvial land, irrigated by canals drawn off the Indus at the Sukkur barrage.<sup>1</sup>

Its Ruler, Mir Faiz Muhammad Khan Talpur, who had an unsound mind, was deposed by the Crown Representative in July 1947, and his minor son, Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur, was installed in his place.<sup>2</sup> A Board of Regency, consisting of five *sahibzadas* (members of the ruling family), was constituted under the Khairpur State Regency Act IX of 1947.<sup>3</sup>

On 9 October 1947 the Ruler, through the Chairman of the Board of Regency and President of the Executive Council, Khairpur, acceded to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup>

#### JUNAGADH, BABARIAWAD, MANGROL AND MANAVADAR

Junagadh was one of the more important among the Kathiawar States, with a population of 700,000 and an area of 3,500 sq. miles. It



was regarded by Hindus as the holiest place after Kashi, housing the famous temple of Somnath which was all but destroyed by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni in AD 1024.

“Kathiawar,” to quote Tudor Owen, “besides being the holy land of India, is the land of intrigue, consisting of several states, great and small; it has bred... political intrigues at these petty courts, renowned throughout India: even the ponies’ ears are not straight: the people of Jamnagar (Ranji’s State) wear their *pugris* crooked. The chief classes are the Nagars, No. 1 in the Brahman hierarchy, and the Jain-Bania (Gandhi’s caste): the Gujrati *Patidars* (Vallabhbhai Patel’s) are crafty and tough.”<sup>1</sup> Over 80 per cent of the Junagadh population was non-Muslim. It had 23 attached states and *talukas*.<sup>2</sup>

The State had a seaboard and several small ports, of which Vervana [now Veraval] was the most important by far. Apart from sea communications, it was completely surrounded by States which had acceded to India; moreover, right in the middle of Junagadh were whole pockets of territory that were part of the Indian Dominion.

On 15 September 1947 Junagadh acceded to Pakistan. The Agreement provided for the continuation of all subsisting agreements and administrative arrangements in matters of common concern between these States and the Dominion of Pakistan.

The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was bitterly opposed by India, which termed it as an arbitrary exercise of power by the Ruler against the wishes of the majority of his people. India launched a war of nerves against Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Babariawad, Bantwa and Sardargadh, which had offered to accede to Pakistan as well. Supplies of certain essential commodities were cut off by India within 24 hours of the accession by Junagadh. Pressure, intimidation, and demoralizing propaganda were resorted to as soon as the decision to accede to Pakistan was taken on 11 August 1947 in order to dragoon the State into succumbing to Congress machinations backed by the highest authorities in India.<sup>3</sup>

Nehru had warned Pakistan on 12 September 1947 that if the Ruler of Junagadh failed “to submit this issue [of accession] to a referendum and if the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and principles governing the matter, enter into an arrangement by which Junagadh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce to such an arrangement.”<sup>4</sup>

The Junagadh authorities reported to Pakistan that the situation was most critical, involving as it did a life-and-death struggle for Muslims of the State, since military action by India seemed imminent.



The State Premier, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, pressed Jinnah and Liaquat for immediate action.<sup>5</sup> On 18 September 1947, India massed troops on the borders of Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, etc. Deeply exercised by the worsening crisis, Jinnah telegraphed Mountbatten:

Any encroachment on Junagadh sovereignty or its territory would amount to hostile act. Kindly ensure that Indian Dominion troops or troops of States acceding to India do not violate Junagadh territory under any pretext whatsoever.<sup>6</sup>

Mountbatten, while denying concentration of troops, warned Pakistan on 22 September 1947: "Each acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty, and territory, and inconsistent with friendly relations that should exist between two Dominions."<sup>7</sup> Jinnah retorted: "India Dominion has no right of sovereignty, territorial or otherwise, over Junagadh."<sup>8</sup>

Ironically, while Mountbatten harped on friendly relations with Pakistan, he noted that Menon had "so ably formed" a provisional government of Junagadh under the leadership of Gandhi's nephew, Samaldas Gandhi, and "which I understood had that day arrived at Rajkot in a beflagged special train."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, India secretly planned an amphibious military operation in Kathiawar, particularly Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, etc., which their Defence Committee finally approved on 30 October 1947<sup>10</sup> in response to a call from the neighbouring States which had acceded to India.<sup>11</sup> Mountbatten and Nehru had, initially, to face an embarrassing situation when the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, and the Air Force and Naval Chiefs represented to Defence Minister Baldev Singh that "military action in Kathiawar may lead to war between the two dominions and, with bulk of the Indian army involved with internal duty, the army is in no position to wage war." They also pointed out that since the three armed forces' commanders were British officers, "it would be impossible for any of them to take part in a war... or to be the instrument of planning or conveying orders to others should the operations now contemplated result in such a war."<sup>12</sup> But just two days later, they were made to apologise by Mountbatten for their representation and agreed to assume responsibility for the military operation in Kathiawar.<sup>13</sup> In stark contrast, Gen. Gracey, commanding the Pakistan Army, had refused to comply with Jinnah's orders to send troops into Kashmir, both Auchinleck and Mountbatten backing him.

On 29 September 1947, Mountbatten told V.P. Menon that Sardar Patel had advised Nehru that "he intended to resign unless the Cabinet backed his aggressive policy against Junagadh." Even Mountbatten noted that "Sardar Patel, who had gone completely communal, was the embodiment



of the feeling of the Hindu/Sikh majority, and his stock was now higher than it had ever been and he alone could really hold the Cabinet".<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, "Nehru was very unpopular in his own country and had lost all his following and might not even get in himself if there were another election". Mountbatten's assessment of the political situation was that "if Sardar Patel resigned, Nehru would be unable to carry on for long successfully and would bring about the fall of the Government". But, he believed, "if Pandit Nehru resigned, Sardar Patel's extreme communalism would soon plunge India into an untenable position;... and that therefore every thing must be done to try and avoid a split between them".<sup>15</sup> Eventually, a compromise was reached between the two leaders on Patel's terms and the split in the Cabinet averted.

A Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet was promptly constituted to handle implementation of the military operation aimed at storming Junagadh and allied States. On 2 October 1947 a Kathiawar Force was raised under Brig. Gurdial Singh with active support of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force.<sup>16</sup>

While preparations for a military strike against Junagadh were proceeding apace during most of October 1947, India as a diversionary tactic involved Pakistan in an exchange of claims, counter-claims and protests to camouflage their real intentions. The ostensible Indian claim was that they wanted the will of the people to be ascertained through a plebiscite.

On 1 November, Indian troops forced their way into Babariawad and Mangrol, both tributaries to Junagadh state. A communique issued by the Government of India said they had received reports that the Junagadh authorities were taking "oppressive action" against the people of Babariawad, which had announced its accession to India; that attempts had been made to force Babariawad to repudiate the accession and to accede to Pakistan instead; that Nehru, on 22 October, had informed Liaquat Ali Khan that "it is impossible for us to tolerate any longer such acts of aggression..." and that they were "in honour bound"<sup>17</sup> to take measures to protect territories which had acceded to India; and that Indian troops had entered Babariawad and Mangrol under a flag of truce and occupied those territories peacefully. On 1 November, following the occupation of Babariawad and Mangrol, Indian troops entered and occupied Junagadh as well, ostensibly in response to a "request" by the Junagadh Executive Council.

The Ruler of Junagadh had arrived in Karachi on 24 October for consultations with the Pakistan Government. In a press statement issued on 10 November, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Dewan of Junagadh, explained that while no temporary or permanent agreement had been negotiated



with India, and Junagadh was still formally a part of Pakistan, the State authorities had asked India to assist in the maintenance of law and order which, he said, was being “threatened by aggressive elements outside the State.” As reported by the *Dawn*, the Ruler wished the Junagadh question to be decided constitutionally between the two Dominions.<sup>18</sup> The “aggressive elements” referred to by Bhutto were supporters of the provisional Government of Junagadh set up in Rajkot in September, which had proclaimed accession to India. From time to time, these elements had made incursions into Junagadh. After the occupation, they had indulged in orgies of murder, loot and arson against the Muslim subjects at will.

However, on 15 January 1948 the Indian Government announced that the question of accession of Junagadh, including Babariawad, Mangrol and other tributary States, would be decided by the “free expression of the wishes of their people”.<sup>19</sup>

In order to legitimize the forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Babariawad, Bantwa and Sardargadh, India got a referendum held, from 18 to 24 February 1948, under the Judicial Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States Region. In the polling in Junagadh, 190,779 votes were cast for India and only 91 for Pakistan. The plebiscite held in other areas as well yielded large majorities for India.<sup>20</sup>

According to Douglas Brown of the *Daily Telegraph*, London, the Muslim population voted for India for fear of their lives. There were instances galore of electoral rigging and malpractices. The plebiscite was far from free or fair. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan protested to the UN Security Council on 26 February 1948, during the debate on Junagadh question, that the plebiscite had been neither free nor fair.<sup>21</sup>

#### MANGROL AND BABARIAWAD

Mangrol, a small feudatory state of Junagadh with a population of 50,000 and a Hindu majority, had serious grievances against Junagadh but wished to join Pakistan.<sup>22</sup> On 20 September 1947, however, the Ruler was forced by V.P. Menon to renounce the supremacy of Junagadh and sign the Instrument of Accession to India, which was confirmed officially on 24 September<sup>23</sup> amid protests from Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan suggested to Nehru that the legal position of Mangrol and Babariawad might be referred to some independent forum with mutual consultation. “This would, I hope, pave the way for a satisfactory and amicable settlement of various outstanding questions relating to Junagadh.”<sup>24</sup> Liaquat also reminded Nehru to proceed with the appointment of a counsel on Babariawad and Mangrol.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless,



India occupied Mangrol and Babariawad on 1 November 1947.<sup>26</sup>

#### COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

While all this was happening in Junagadh, the accession of Kashmir was already in dispute. In January 1948 the Government of India took the Kashmir case to the Security Council.<sup>27</sup> Pakistan, however, had several complaints to make against India, and these cases, including the Junagadh dispute, were placed by Pakistan before the Security Council which debated them in February and March 1948.<sup>28</sup>

As the dispute involving Kashmir was of greater importance and constituted a more immediate threat to international peace, the Security Council adopted a resolution on 20 January 1948 under which a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was appointed to deal with the Kashmir question. The resolution also stated that the other complaints made by Pakistan against India be taken up when the Security Council so directed.<sup>29</sup>

#### MANAVADAR

Manavadar was a second-class Muslim State in north-southern Kathiawar, surrounded by the Junagadh State territory and the territories of Bantwa and Sardargadh *talukas*, with a Hindu majority.

The Ruler of Manavadar, Ghulam Moinuddin, declared his intention to accede to Pakistan,<sup>30</sup> and Pakistan accepted the accession on 24 September, 1947.<sup>31</sup> This caused a backlash in India as well as in the surrounding Hindu States of Kathiawar. India stopped supplies of essential consumer goods, like foodgrains, sugar and petrol, to the State. Postal and telegraphic arrangements were also paralysed and air services to and from Manavadar cut off.<sup>32</sup>

On 3 October 1947, India invaded and took over the administration of Bantwa Bara and Chhota Majmu *talukas*,<sup>33</sup> which had requested accession to Pakistan, through Manavadar, in August 1947. India also resorted to coercion and intimidation to compel the Ruler of Manavadar to rescind his decision to accede to Pakistan. Ghulam Moinuddin had warned Jinnah of the impending threats to Manavadar and sought diplomatic and military assistance to protect the lives and properties of his subjects.<sup>34</sup>

On 23 October 1947, the armed forces of India and those of Nawanagar, a Hindu State, invaded and occupied Manavadar.<sup>35</sup> Thus, India imposed its will illegally on the State which had acceded to Pakistan.

Despite the forcible and illegal occupation of a State which had freely acceded to Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan exercised extreme restraint in the interest of peace in the region. The occupation forces unleashed a



reign of terror in Manavadar and connected territories. They wantonly desecrated Muslim places of worship and plundered or burnt property. The local Muslims were ruthlessly disarmed, harassed, persecuted and incarcerated.<sup>36</sup>

The Ruler, who had to flee the State, reached Karachi late in October 1947, leaving behind a trail of devastation and massive abuses of fundamental human rights by the Indian occupation forces.

Z. H. ZAIDI

## Notes

### HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES

<sup>1</sup>The British policy towards the Indian States evolved in four phases. The first phase covered early period of East India Company rule when "British power did not pretend to any general suzerainty nor aim to extend its alliances with the indigenous monarchies beyond its military or territorial needs." In the second phase, Britain emerged as the paramount power throughout India, particularly by entering into subsidiary alliances with Indian rulers and posting of British Residents in the States concluding such alliances. In the third phase, fresh territory was conquered by the British and independent States annexed "on the excuse of maladministration or want of natural heirs (Doctrine of Lapse)." The fourth and last phase was ushered in by Queen Victoria issuing a proclamation in 1858. It declared: "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they as well as our own subjects should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government". See H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*, Karachi, 1985, 22-4.

<sup>2</sup>These included 232 Saluting and Ancillary States and 333 Estates and *Talukas*, located mainly in Kathiawar and Gujarat. See maps at the end of Vol. I, Part II.

<sup>3</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 27.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>5</sup>Cabinet Mission Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy, 12 May 1946, No. 2.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Statement at press conference by Stafford Cripps, 16 May 1946, No. 305, *TP*, VII, 597.

<sup>8</sup>Statement by British Government on India Policy, 20 February 1947, No. 1, Vol. I, Part I, 1-3.

<sup>9</sup>Viceroy's Meeting with Members of Negotiating Committee, 3 June 1947, Enclosure to No. 3.

<sup>10</sup>Viceroy's Meeting with Congress and Muslim League leaders, 13 June 1947, No. 5.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Note by the Ruler of Bhopal, 6 June 1947, No. 4.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>Ruler of Bhopal to Louis Mountbatten, 22 July 1947, No. 201, *TP*, XII, 296.

<sup>18</sup>See note 15 above.

<sup>19</sup>Confidential Note for Mr. Jinnah, 6 June 1947, Enclosure to No. 4.

<sup>20</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 358.

<sup>21</sup>Minutes of the Viceroy's Sixth Miscellaneous Meeting, 22 April 1947, No. 194, item 2, *TP*, X, 365.

<sup>22</sup>Press Communique on Mountbatten's Address to a Conference of the Rulers and Representatives of Indian States, 25 July 1947, No. 14.

<sup>23</sup>Listowel to Louis Mountbatten, 1 August 1947, No. 307, *TP*, XII, 459-61.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 370-1.



<sup>26</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>27</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>28</sup>O.P. Ralhan, *Encyclopedia of Political Parties: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh*, Vol. III, New Delhi, 1996, 1116.  
<sup>29</sup>Ibid., IV, 1457.  
<sup>30</sup>Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, 15 June 1947, No. 7.  
<sup>31</sup>See note 5 above. Also see note 7 above.  
<sup>32</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru to H. L. Ismay, 19 June 1947, No. 9. Also see Enclosure.  
<sup>33</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 358.  
<sup>34</sup>Sardar Patel's Statement on Indian States, 5 July 1947, No. 10.  
<sup>35</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 367.  
<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 360.  
<sup>37</sup>Patrick French, *Liberty or Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division*, London, 1997, 311.  
<sup>38</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>39</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>40</sup>See note 10 above.  
<sup>41</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 368.  
<sup>42</sup>The *Pakistan Times*, 18 June 1947. No. 8.  
<sup>43</sup>See note 15 above.  
<sup>44</sup>Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 361.  
<sup>45</sup>*Pakistan Times*, 12 July 1947, KR-333, Vol. IX, 179-80.

STATES ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix VI. 2, para 58, Vol. IV, 482. Also see Appendix VI, Para 41, Vol. V, 626.  
<sup>2</sup>Government of Pakistan, *Instruments of Accession and Schedules of States acceding to Pakistan*, 1949, 1-3 and 31-3.

FRONTIER STATES

Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat

<sup>3</sup>Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah, Telegram, 1 September 1947, PS-18.  
<sup>4</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 25-6.  
<sup>5</sup>Chitral had accepted the suzerainty of Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir in 1878 which was reaffirmed in 1914. See Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990*, Karachi, 1990, para 3, 31; 28; 29 and 48. Also see Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah, 3 August 1947, PS-35.  
<sup>6</sup>Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah 3 August 1947. P. S. 35.  
<sup>7</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 27.  
<sup>8</sup>Enclosure 1 to No. 282, Vol. V, 289.  
<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 300.  
<sup>10</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 28.  
<sup>11</sup>Enclosure 1 to No. 282, Vol. V, 290.  
<sup>12</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 29-30.

BALUCHISTAN STATES

Kalat, Las Bela, Kharan

<sup>1</sup>*Memoirs of D.Y. Fell*, 1949 (unpublished); MSS, Eur. D-971 / 1, 11.  
<sup>2</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>3</sup>Mohamed Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, London, 1967, 236.  
<sup>4</sup>*Kalat Collection*, S. No. 70, QAPP.  
<sup>5</sup>Selig Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Washington, 1981, 23. Also see Enclosure 3 to PS-49 for details.  
<sup>6</sup>Minutes of Viceroy's Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting, 19 July 1947. See PS-54.  
<sup>7</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>8</sup>Muhammad Aslam to Lancelot Griffin, 26 December 1946, Enclosure 1 to PS-49.  
<sup>9</sup>See note 6 above.



- <sup>10</sup>Minute of Viceroy's Meetings of 19 July 1947 and 28 July 1947, Annex to PS-54.
- <sup>11</sup>William Francis Listowel to Louis Mountbatten, 2 August 1947, PS-58.
- <sup>12</sup>Record of Interview between Louis Mountbatten and Ruler of Kalat, 28 July 1947, PS-55.
- <sup>13</sup>Press Communique on Situation between Pakistan and Kalat State, 11 August 1947, see Annex I to PS-66.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup>See Instrument of Accession, Enclosure 1 to No. 15.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup>Memorandum by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, 12 September 1947, No. 15. Also see Annex I to PS-66.
- <sup>18</sup>S. M. Yusuf to Ruler of Kalat, 4 March, 1948, PS-78.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup>Summary of Note by D.Y. Fell on consultations between M. A. Jinnah and Khan of Kalat, Annex to PS-77.
- <sup>21</sup>See note 18 above.
- <sup>22</sup>Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah, 4 March 1948, PS-76.
- <sup>23</sup>Nizam of Hyderabad to Louis Mountbatten, 8 August 1947, H-268, para 5, Vol. IX, 31.
- <sup>24</sup>See Fell, *Memoirs*, 84.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., 50.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., 51.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., 59.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., 88.
- <sup>30</sup>A.S.B. Shah to M. Ikramullah, 26 March 1948, PS-91.
- <sup>31</sup>A.S.B. Shah to M. Ikramullah, 25 March 1948, PS-87. According to A.G.G. Balochistan report, the Ruler of Kalat had summoned Bai Khan, Ruler of Mekran for consultations. See No. F. 14-GG/74. Not printed.
- <sup>32</sup>M. Ikramullah to A.S.B. Shah, 25 March 1948, PS-90.
- <sup>33</sup>See note 24 above.
- <sup>34</sup>See note 30 above.
- <sup>35</sup>A.S.B. Shah to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, 27 March 1948, PS-98.
- <sup>36</sup>M. Ikramullah to A.S.B. Shah, Telegram, 26 March 1948, PS-94.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup>Fell, *Memoirs*, 119.
- <sup>39</sup>M. A. Jinnah to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, 27 March 1948, PS-96.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup>D.Y. Fell to M. A. Jinnah, Telegram, 30 March 1948, PS-103.
- <sup>42</sup>Press Communique on Kalat's Accession to Pakistan, 1 April 1948, PS-107.
- <sup>43</sup>The *Dawn*, 30 March 1948.
- <sup>44</sup>Ruler of Kalat to Louis Mountbatten, Telegram, 27 March 1948, PS-101.
- <sup>45</sup>Louis Mountbatten to Ruler of Kalat, Telegram, 30 March 1948, PS-102. Two other versions on this issue are also available. In an Aide-memoire on Junagadh and Kashmir, submitted on 26 February 1948, para 6, Mountbatten informed the King that "a large State which had obvious geographical compulsion to accede to Pakistan—Kalat—approached the Government of India for political relationship but was refused". See Enclosure to PS-238. Abdus Samad Achakzai, Baluchistan Congress leader, had visited India about the end of November 1947. "I think ... he was urging the Khan to accede to India..." See Fell, *Memoirs*, 143.
- <sup>46</sup>See *Kalat Collection*, S. No. 51, QAPP. Paper on Baluchistan: Its Past and Present vis-a-vis the Kalat State and Feudatories, undated, 1962, 11.
- <sup>47</sup>The *Dawn*, 30 March 1948, PS-106.
- <sup>48</sup>Announcement by Ruler of Kalat, 24 May 1948, PS-119.
- <sup>49</sup>Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah to M. A. Jinnah, 16 July 1947, PS-134.
- <sup>50</sup>M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Las Bela, 28 July 1947, PS-137.
- <sup>51</sup>Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah, 5 September 1947, PS-141.
- <sup>52</sup>Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, Telegram, 21 August 1947, PS-128.
- <sup>53</sup>Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, 18 November 1947, PS-130.



<sup>54</sup>Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah, 1 December 1947, PS-131.

### BAHAWALPUR STATE

<sup>1</sup>Government of Pakistan, *The Partition of the Punjab*, Vol. I, National Documentation Cell, Lahore, 1983, 406-08.

<sup>2</sup>*The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. II, London, 1967, 1041.

<sup>3</sup>*The Partition of the Punjab*, II, 425.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 427.

<sup>5</sup>*The Partition of the Punjab*, I, 414.

<sup>6</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru persuaded the Punjab Boundary Commission through Mountbatten to unjustly award Ferozepur and Zira, Muslim majority *tehsils*, to India. A. N. Khosla, Chairman, Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission, India, prepared a note, which Nehru forwarded to Mountbatten on 9 August 1947, reasoning that the award of these two *tehsils* to Pakistan "will be disastrous from the point of view of East Punjab and Bikaner State from the irrigation point of view, and disastrous to India as a whole from the strategic point of view, because the only line of defence, that is the Sutlej, will have been pierced by the bridge at Ferozepur and between this and Delhi there is no natural barrier". See Pandit Nehru to Louis Mountbatten, 9 August 1947, Enclosure to No. 395, *TP*, XII, 619-20. Evidence of Mountbatten-Nehru conspiracy to deprive Pakistan of Ferozepur and Zira *tehsils*, which rightly belonged to this country, was made public forty-five years later by Christopher Beaumont, Secretary to Chairman, Punjab Boundary Commission, Cyril Radcliffe. In a press interview, Beaumont disclosed that Radcliffe had "yielded... to overwhelming political expediency by agreeing, after he had decided the line, to the transfer of Ferozepur and Zira sub-districts from Pakistan to India". He concluded that "Mountbatten interfered and Radcliffe allowed himself to be overborne. Grave discredit to both". The change in boundary award was made by Radcliffe at a lunch with Mountbatten on 10-11 August 1947. See the *Daily Telegraph*, 24 February 1992.

<sup>7</sup>Sardar Panikkar, Prime Minister of Bikaner, accompanied by Kanwar Sain, his Chief Engineer, Irrigation, met Mountbatten on 11 August 1947 and delivered the Maharaja's message that "if the Ferozepur Headworks and the Gang Canal were allocated to Pakistan, Bikaner would have no option but to join Pakistan." See No. 405, note 1, *TP*, XII, 638-9.

<sup>8</sup>See FOA, 1-14/348-II, undated. Not published.

<sup>9</sup>Zafrulla Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 June 1948. PS-32.

<sup>10</sup>See note 7 above.

<sup>11</sup>See Note by Abdur Rab Nishtar on Bahawalpur Muslim League, 2 November 1948, PS-33. Also see Joint Statement by Makhdoom Mohamad Mohsan Shah and 10 others, 23 October 1948, Annex to PS-33.

<sup>12</sup>Louis Mountbatten to King George VI, 26 February 1948, Enclosure to PS-238.

<sup>13</sup>Instrument of Accession of Bahawalpur State, 5 October 1947, PS-28.

<sup>14</sup>Frank Messervy to A.D.F. Dundas, 19 August 1947, H.L. Davies to Marden, 29 October 1947 and Minutes of Sixth Meeting of Pakistan Defence Council, 10 February 1948, PS-27, PS-29 and PS-31, respectively.

<sup>15</sup>*The Pakistan Times*, 9 January 1948, PS-30.

<sup>16</sup>See note 11 above.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

### KHAIRPUR STATE

<sup>1</sup>*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. XIII, London, 323.

<sup>2</sup>Mohamedali Talpur to M. A. Jinnah, 8 August 1947, PS-124.

<sup>3</sup>The Khairpur State Gazette, Extraordinary Issue, 14 July 1947, Annex to PS-126.

<sup>4</sup>Instrument of Accession of Khairpur State, 9 October 1947, PS-125.

### JUNAGADH, BABARIAWAD, MANGROL AND MANAVADAR STATES

<sup>1</sup>Tudor Owen to Louis Mountbatten, 21 November 1947, F. 200/90-D, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.



- <sup>2</sup>The small states and *talukas* attached to Junagadh included Manavadar; Thana-Deoli, Jetpur; Sardargadh; Suryapratapgadh; Anida; Hadala; Bhayavadar; Sanala; Manpur; Mayapadar; Khijadia; Alidhra; Akala; Sardarpur; Bantwa Bara Majmu; Bantwa Chhota Majmu; Jetpur Majmu; Amarpur and Lunagiri; Kuba and Vichhavat.
- <sup>3</sup>Shah Nawaz Bhutto to M. A. Jinnah, 11 August 1947, PS-154.
- <sup>4</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, 12 September 1947, PS-162.
- <sup>5</sup>S. N. Bhutto to Liaquat Ali Khan, 16 September 1947, PS-163.
- <sup>6</sup>M. A. Jinnah to Louis Mountbatten, Telegram, 18 September 1947, PS-165.
- <sup>7</sup>Louis Mountbatten to M. A. Jinnah, Telegram, 22 September 1947, PS-168.
- <sup>8</sup>M. A. Jinnah to Louis Mountbatten, Telegram, 25 September 1947, PS-171.
- <sup>9</sup>Notes by Louis Mountbatten on Junagadh Crisis, 29 September 1947, PS-186.
- <sup>10</sup>Minutes of 10th Meeting of Defence Committee, 30 October 1947, PS-217.
- <sup>11</sup>A Note on Junagadh by Prime Minister of India, Appendix A to Annex to PS-197.
- <sup>12</sup>Projected Operations in Kathiawar, 27 September 1947, Enclosure to PS-179.
- <sup>13</sup>R. M. M. Lockhart to Jawaharlal Nehru, 29 September 1947, PS-185.
- <sup>14</sup>See note 9 above.
- <sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*
- <sup>16</sup>Minutes of Seventh Meeting of Defence Committee, 23 October 1947, PS-215.
- <sup>17</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, Telegram, 22 October 1947, PS-212.
- <sup>18</sup>*The Pakistan Times*, 11 November 1947, PS-224.
- <sup>19</sup>Security Council Report on Junagadh, 15 January 1948, Annex to PS-236.
- <sup>20</sup>A.S.B. Shah to S.M. Yusuf, 24 February 1948, PS-237.
- <sup>21</sup>See note 19 above.
- <sup>22</sup>S. M. Nasiruddin to M. A. Jinnah, 3 August 1947, PS-153.
- <sup>23</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, 25 September 1947, PS-173. Also see G.S. Bajpai to M. Ikramullah, Telegram, 24 September 1947, PS-170.
- <sup>24</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Telegram, 5 October 1947, PS-199.
- <sup>25</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru, Telegram, 18 October 1947, PS-209.
- <sup>26</sup>M. Ikramullah to Liaquat Ali Khan, Telegram, 2 November 1947, PS-220.
- <sup>27</sup>Complaint to the U. N. Security Council, 15 January 1948, PS-236.
- <sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup>Security Council Draft Resolution of 20 January 1948, Annex II to KR-484, Vol. IX, 510-11.
- <sup>30</sup>Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah, 19 August 1947, See PS-241.
- <sup>31</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 31-3.
- <sup>32</sup>Not by M. H. Memon on Accession of Manavadar State to Pakistan: Its justification with a Resume of Events before and after 15 August, undated [April 1948], PS-251.
- <sup>33</sup>Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah & others, Telegram, 3 October 1947, See PS-244.
- <sup>34</sup>Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah, Telegrams, 4 & 5 October 1947, PS-245 & 246 respectively.
- <sup>35</sup>A.K. Quraishi to M. A. Jinnah, 24 October 1947, PS-249.
- <sup>36</sup>See note 32 above.



# Abbreviations

AGG	Agent to the Governor-General
AICC	All-India Congress Committee
AIML	All India Muslim League
AIR	All India Radio
APA	Assistant Political Agent
API	Associated Press of India
DIGFC	Deputy Inspector-General, Frontier Corps
DFS	Directorate of Food Supplies
EAC	Extra Assistant Commissioner
FOA	<i>Foreign Office Archives</i>
GOI	Government of India
GOP	Government of Pakistan
HEH	His Exalted Highness
HH	His Highness
HRH	His Royal Highness
HMG	His Majesty's Government
IGFC	Inspector-General, Frontier Corps
IOR	<i>India Office Records</i>
KR	Kashmir
MT	Motor Transport
PS	Pakistan States
PSV	Private Secretary to Viceroy
TP	<i>The Transfer of Power 1942-47</i>
WTA	Wireless and Telegraph Assistant
QAP	<i>Quaid-i-Azam Papers</i>

Note: Abbreviations usually given in the dictionaries have not been included.



CHRONOLOGY OF ACCESSION OF STATES TO PAKISTAN

<u>State</u>	<u>Name of Ruler</u>	<u>Date of Accession</u>
Junagadh	Mahabat Khan	15 September 1947
Manavadar	Ghulam Moinuddin Khan	24 September 1947
Bahawalpur	Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi	5 October 1947
Khairpur	Mir George Ali Murad Khan Talpur <sup>1</sup>	9 October 1947
Hunza	M. Jamal Khan	3 November 1947
Nagar	Shoukat Ali	19 November 1947
Swat	Abdul Wadood	24 November 1947
Amb	M. Farid Khan	31 December 1947
Chitral	Muzaffar-ul-Mulk	18 February 1948
Dir	Muhammad Shah Jehan	18 February 1948
Las Bela	Mir Ghulam Qadir Khan	17 March 1948
Kharan	Muhammad Habibullah Khan	17 March 1948
Mekran	Nawab Bai Khan	17 March 1948
Kalat	Ahmad Yar Khan	31 March 1948
Khairpur (Supplementary Accession)	Mir George Ali Murad Khan Talpur <sup>2</sup>	14 February 1948
Bahawalpur (Supplementary Accession)	Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi	4 October 1948

<sup>1&2</sup>Instruments of Accession were signed by Mir Ghulam Husain Khan Talpur, Member, Board of Regency, Khairpur State, on behalf of the minor Ruler.



# HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES



## 1

*Note of an Interview between Cabinet Mission,  
Archibald Wavell<sup>1</sup> and the Ruler of Bhopal<sup>2</sup>*

*L/P&J/5/337/42-7  
[Extract]*

SECRET

NEW DELHI,  
2 April 1946

*[Paras 1 and 2 omitted]*

The Chancellor, Nawab of Bhopal, referred to the long association of the States with Great Britain and said that the Princes were at the disposal of the Cabinet Delegation to assist in their task. The Princes recognized the demand for the independence of India and did not wish to stand in the way of its realization. But naturally the Indian States wish to survive and to continue their existence if this was possible consistently with the progress of India and the world as a whole.

The Princes consider, however, that they are entitled to be considered on a basis of equality with British India and what they would like would be the continuance of close alliance and friendship with Great Britain.

His Excellency the Viceroy said that the Delegation would like to know generally how His Highness envisaged the Princes fitting into the general picture of an independent India. His Highness said that it was difficult and premature to express definite views on this until it was known what the general structure of British India would be under independence. He would like to know what the Cabinet Delegation's views were as to the probabilities and with whom the Princes should negotiate in regard to their future position. He had seen Gandhi and Jinnah several times and had got nowhere. Mr Jinnah seemed quite recently to be just where he was some time ago, and Mr Gandhi seemed to feel that there was no scope for further negotiations with the Muslim League and Mr Jinnah, though that was a few weeks ago. There was no sign that Mr Jinnah was prepared to negotiate with Azad.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary of State<sup>4</sup> said that of course the Pakistan-Hindustan issue was unresolved and the Delegation were not any more informed than His Highness as to what the outcome would be. Sir Stafford Cripps thought that it would be helpful if His Highness would take the alternative possibilities of a United and Divided India and outline the



States' attitude in each case.

The Chancellor said that he could only do this in his personal capacity and not as a representative of the Princes. The States consider themselves as independent sovereign States. Their view was that they should retain the maximum degree of sovereignty and that any matters of common concern to be dealt with by British India and the States jointly should be very united [? limited] and dealt with by a body on which the States were represented as the Governments of Sovereign States. They might contribute to the general finance for such common purposes (e.g. defence) by means of indirect taxation. It had always been their policy not to interfere in the affairs of British India and they expected this to be reciprocal. There might be a sort of Privy Council of the States and British India on the lines contemplated in the Simon Report where joint problems could be discussed and due consideration should be given to the States' views in matters in which they are concerned.

If there were two States in British India then His Highness thought that the general view of the Princes was that there was no reason why a third India composed of the Indian States should not be recognized. The nature and constitution of this third India should be worked out by the States themselves. Then, if there were some loose federation between the two States of British India, the States might join in that loose federation.

His Excellency the Viceroy asked whether His Highness contemplated the continued separate existence of all the 565 States. His Highness the Chancellor said that it was his duty as Chamber representative to act on behalf of the interests of all the States represented in the Chamber and he did not wish to express any personal view on this particular point. He thought that the Chamber States would and could work out some kind of cooperative system which would enable them to present themselves for participation in an all-India Government as a joint body or at any rate as a very small number of component parts of the all-India structure.

The Secretary of State pointed to the necessity of the States coalescing if they were to have any strength in modern conditions, and His Excellency the Viceroy pointed out that the Rajputana States might be greatly strengthened by taking such steps.

Sir Stafford Cripps asked whether the Chancellor was contemplating a confederation of all the States or of the Chamber States only. His Highness the Chancellor said in reply that there were about 136 States in the Chamber and that all the big States including Hyderabad were formally members of the Chamber though they were not represented



in the Chamber itself but in the Committee of States Ministers. Travancore was the only large State not represented on the Ministers Committee. He would not be at all surprised if Hyderabad, if other arrangements which Hyderabad contemplated to which he did not wish to refer did not go through, joined such a confederation of States as he envisaged. He had, however, no authority from Hyderabad to express this view.

The Secretary of State said that of course there might be two or even three stages in the transition from the existing state of affairs to full independence. Had His Highness any views about the interim period? His Highness the Chancellor said that the States felt that in the interim period there should be a consultative Council for liaison between the States and British India and that some reasonable arrangement should be come [sic] to between the States and British India in regard to the Paramountcy system. By this he meant an arrangement agreeable to the States and to British India. The Secretary of State asked whether it was probable that there would be acceding as well as non-acceding States—in short, whether, if an arrangement were come to as to the future structure of British India, the States would act as a whole in relation to British India or whether they would act separately. His Highness said that no one wanted a set-up of the kind contemplated in the 1935 Act. If there were a very loose federation then one of two alternatives for States representation would succeed. These alternatives were:—

(a) One or two very large States will get individual representation in the all-India structure. The rest would form a Confederation so that out of, say, 9 States representatives on the Federal or Confederal Executive, there would be three for large States and six for a confederation of the rest.

(b) Regional groups of States would form confederations and each confederation would be represented at the Centre.

His Highness thought that one of these two alternatives would command general support and that the smaller States would not take isolated action.

In reply to a question by His Excellency the Viceroy, His Highness said that Paramountcy should be on a revised basis during the interim period. Some of the existing outstanding questions between the Crown and the Princes should be settled. The States considered that Paramountcy should not remain in an unmodified form because the Governor-General under an interim constitution would inevitably be more susceptible to the influence of the Government of India and the States fear that their interests would not be fairly treated in consequence. In



particular, they desire that matters of dispute between the States and the Crown Representative or British India should be arbitrated upon by independent tribunals set up *ad hoc*. At present the Crown Representative may allow a tribunal to be set up but the States claim that either party should be able to demand a tribunal as of right and that the tribunal's decisions should be binding. His Excellency the Viceroy said that he had discussed this point many times with His Highness and that he had told him that generally speaking in important cases an *ad hoc* tribunal will be granted, but that he does not feel able to grant an absolute right to demand arbitration.

The Secretary of State said that this question opened up a larger issue. The Delegation desired to make it quite clear to His Highness that neither in the interim nor in the ultimate settlement could there be any question of His Majesty's Government handing over Paramountcy powers to an Indian Government. His Highness said that the States would not, of course, agree to Paramountcy remaining in being under independence. He was only urging a readjustment of it in the interim period. He would be glad to submit a list of the respects in which he thought there should be readjustment to the point about arbitration. In the interim period the States would be prepared to have these cases taken to the Federal Court, if that was more convenient. In their opinion the departmental advice which His Excellency received on these cases was not in all cases impartial and tended to be unduly influenced by British India considerations. The Butler Committee had recommended that the States should have the right to claim arbitration by tribunal but this had not been accepted.

The Secretary of State then referred to the necessity of new agreements between the States and British India after the full transfer of power and suggested that in regard to financial and economic matters the ground might conveniently be cleared in the interim period. Any assistance that we could properly give to the States in those negotiations would no doubt be forthcoming. His Highness agreed that there would have to be negotiation[s] during the interim period but did not think there would be any great difficulty in settling these matters with British India. Much work had already been done on these matters.

Sir S. Cripps asked whether His Highness thought that these discussions would give rise to discussion of the internal political structure of the States. His Highness felt sure that this would be so. The Princes considered that the internal affairs of their States were their own concern. They had already gone a great way in encouraging the association of the peoples of the States with the administrations and they were now prepared within a specified period to arrange for comprehensive



association of the administration with the peoples of the States and to undertake that Rulers will act through constitutional channels and will always consult the representatives of the people. If he might say so, however, the Princes were not enamoured by the British Parliamentary system in Indian conditions.

The Secretary of State said that there was one matter which the Delegation wished to consult the Chancellor about. It had been represented to them that they should meet representatives of the people of the States. His Highness said he believed the States would strongly object to representatives of the States People's Conference being invited to give their views and that there would be no justification for it because the members of that Association, though many of them were good people, were self-nominated; they were not elected by the peoples of the States. Sir S. Cripps said that he understood that some of those associated with the States People's Conference were in fact elected representatives in their own States. He wondered whether the Rulers would be prepared to nominate three or four people who were elected representatives in their own States who the Delegation might see as representatives of the States, peoples. His Highness said if the individual Rulers concerned had no objection this might be acceptable.

His Highness said that he understood the Delegation had another interview now due. There were certain further questions he wished to raise with the Delegation which had not been discussed. It was suggested that these might be dealt with in the afternoon when His Highness was coming again. His Highness said it might be convenient if he gave a list of these points<sup>5</sup> before he left. These are attached on a separate sheet.

<sup>1</sup>No. 39, *TP*, VII, 83-7.

<sup>2</sup>Chancellor, Chamber of Princes.

<sup>3</sup>Abul Kalam Azad, President, Indian National Congress.

<sup>4</sup>Frederick Pethick-Lawrence.

<sup>5</sup>See Enclosure to No. 39, *TP*, VII, 87.

## 2

*Cabinet Mission's Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy*<sup>1</sup>

*F. 20/181-82*

*12 May 1946*

Prior to the recent statement<sup>2</sup> of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons an assurance was given to the Princes that there



was no intention on the part of the Crown to initiate any change in their relationship with the Crown or the rights guaranteed by their treaties and engagements without their consent. It was at the same time stated that the Princes' consent to any changes which might emerge as a result of negotiations would not unreasonably be withheld. The Chamber of Princes has since confirmed that the Indian States fully share the general desire in the country for the immediate attainment by India of her full stature. His Majesty's Government have now declared that if the succession Government or Governments in British India desire independence, no obstacle would be placed in their way. The effect of these announcements is that all those concerned with the future of India wish her to attain a position of independence within or without the British Commonwealth. The Delegation have come here to assist in resolving the difficulties which stand in the way of India fulfilling this wish.

2. During the interim period, which must elapse before the coming into operation of a new Constitutional structure under which British India will be independent or fully self-governing, Paramountcy will remain in operation. But the British Government could not and will not in any circumstances transfer Paramountcy to an Indian Government.

3. In the meanwhile, the Indian States are in a position to play an important part in the formulation of the new Constitutional structure for India, and His Majesty's Government have been informed by the Indian States that they desire, in their own interests and in the interests of India as a whole, both to make their contribution to the framing of the structure, and to take their due place in it, when it is completed. In order to facilitate this, they will doubtless strengthen their position by doing everything possible to ensure that their administrations conform to the highest standard. Where adequate standards cannot be achieved within the existing resources of the State, they will no doubt arrange in suitable cases to form or join administrative units large enough to enable them to be fitted into the Constitutional structure. It will also strengthen the position of States, during this formulative period, if the various Governments which have not already done so, take active steps to place themselves in close and constant touch with public opinion in their State by means of representative institutions.

4. During the interim period, it will be necessary for the States to conduct negotiations with British India in regard to the future regulation of matters of common concern, especially in the economic and financial field. Such negotiations, which will be necessary whether the States desire to participate in the new Indian Constitutional structure



or not, will occupy a considerable period of time, and since some of these negotiations may well be incomplete when the new structure comes into being, it will, in order to avoid administrative difficulties, be necessary to arrive at an understanding between the States and those likely to control the succession Government or Governments that for a period of time the then existing arrangements as to these matters of common concern should continue until the new agreements are completed. In this matter, the British Government and the Crown Representative will lend such assistance as they can should it be so desired.

5. When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Governments come into being in British India, His Majesty's Government's influence with these Governments will not be such as to enable them to carry out the obligations of Paramountcy. Moreover, they cannot contemplate that British troops would be retained in India for this purpose. Thus, as a logical sequence and in view of the desires expressed to them on behalf of the Indian States, His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers of Paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount power will return to the States.<sup>3</sup> Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India,<sup>4</sup> or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.

[NOTE IN ORIGINAL]. The following explanatory note was issued by the Cabinet Mission in New Delhi on the date of publication (22nd May, 1946).

"The Cabinet Delegation desire to make it clear that the document issued today entitled 'Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy presented by the Cabinet Delegation to His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes' was drawn up before the Mission began its discussions with Party leaders and represented the substance of what they communicated to the representatives of the States at their first interviews with the Mission.<sup>5</sup> This is the explanation of



the use of the words 'succession Government or Governments of British India' an expression which would not of course have been used after the issue of the Delegation's recent statement."

<sup>1</sup>See No. 262, *TP*, VII, 522-4. It contains three notes which have not been included. The Memorandum, addressed to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, was based on a draft by Stafford Cripps with amendments by Conrad Corfield, Political Advisor to the Crown Representative.

<sup>2</sup>Text of statement by Clement Attlee made on 15 March 1946 not traceable. However, see No. 533, para 2, *TP*, VI, 1201 Not printed.

<sup>3</sup>Paragraph 12 of the 20 February 1947 Statement by the British Government on Indian Policy stated: "In regard to the Indian States, as was explicitly stated by the Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under Paramountcy to any Government of British India. It is not intended to bring Paramountcy, as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted by agreement." See No. 1, Vol. I, Part I, 3.

<sup>4</sup>Paragraph 18 of the 3 June 1947 Statement by British Government on Indian policy read: "His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the decisions announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946 remains unchanged." See No. 1, Vol. II, 5.

<sup>5</sup>No. 1.

### 3

*Eric Mievile to M. A. Jinnah*<sup>1</sup>

*F. 10/48*

PRIVATE

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,  
5 June 1947

My dear Mr Jinnah,

I am sending you herewith for your private and confidential information a copy of the minutes of a meeting which the Viceroy held on Tuesday afternoon [3 June 1947] with the members of the States Negotiating Committee as I feel that you may be interested in what transpired.

Yours sincerely,  
ERIC MIEVILLE

<sup>1</sup>No. 27, Vol. II, 64.



*Enclosure to No. 3**Meeting of the Viceroy with Members of the States Negotiating Committee**F. 2/27-33**[Extract]*CONFIDENTIAL  
Copy No. 39THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,  
3 June 1947

## MINUTES

*[Paras 1-9 omitted]*

## THE LAPSE OF PARAMOUNTCY

[10] Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar<sup>1</sup> said that he wished to appeal to His Excellency that Paramountcy should be loosened or allowed to lapse in advance of the date of the transfer of power. Such a course would enable the States to negotiate on equal terms with the prospective Governments of the two Dominions. He felt that there might be States which were not likely to join up with either Dominion. It was even more essential for the bargaining powers of these to be improved.

[11] His Excellency the Viceroy said that, in his opinion, the fact that Paramountcy was about to lapse made possible negotiations by the States on a basis of complete freedom, even at the present time. His instructions were that Paramountcy should lapse on the transfer of power. He would, however, consider the premature lapse of Paramountcy in special cases if it could be proved to him that its continuation constituted a handicap to negotiation.

[12] Sir Conrad Corfield gave his opinion that a number of States would be glad to see Paramountcy continue to function until the transfer, even though it was relaxed before that date. The Nawab of Bhopal confirmed this view subject to any opinion expressed by the Standing Committee of the Chamber. Sir Conrad Corfield pointed out that Paramountcy was already in process of retraction.

## ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS, CLAIMS AND CONTRACTS

[13] Sir B. L. Mitter<sup>2</sup> asked what would happen to economic and commercial agreements when Paramountcy lapsed. His Excellency the Viceroy said that, in order that there might be no administrative vacuum, interim arrangements would be required for the period between the lapse of Paramountcy and the conclusion of fresh or modified agreements.



These interim arrangements could best be made on a stand-still basis with such modifications as were necessitated by the reversion to the States of the rights surrendered by them to the Crown. In negotiating these interim arrangements, he and the Political Department would give all the assistance they could during the short remaining period.

[14] The Nawab of Bhopal said that, apart from negotiations in regard to agreements, there were also certain claims which would have to be settled in advance of the lapse of Paramountcy. He suggested that an *ad hoc* organization should be set up to deal with these. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar<sup>3</sup> pointed out that the need for agreement to be reached in all these matters was essential from the point of view of the two new Dominions as from that of the States.

[*Paras 15 to 17 omitted*]

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE TWO NEW DOMINIONS

[18] The Raja of Bilaspur asked whether the entry of States into either Dominion Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice. This the Viceroy confirmed. The Raja of Bilaspur then asked whether constitutions were likely to be drafted by the respective Constituent Assemblies before or after the lapse of Paramountcy. His Excellency replied that the broad outlines of the Constitution drafted by the existing Constituent Assembly for Hindustan were likely to be ready before that date. In the case of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, he believed that Mr Jinnah had been working on Heads of a Constitution, but these would probably only be a guide and nothing concrete would have appeared before the lapse of Paramountcy. In any case Paramountcy would lapse as soon as the new self-governing Dominions came into being: these would be set up under the 1935 Act (amended for this purpose).

[19] The Raja of Bilaspur then asked what was likely to happen to States which decided to join neither Constituent Assembly. Did His Majesty's Government envisage further relations with them? His Excellency the Viceroy stated that, until it was known what shape the two Dominions would take, this was a hypothetical question which he was not prepared, at the present stage, to refer to His Majesty's Government; but it was clear that the first step should be for these States to enter into practical negotiations for administrative arrangements with one or other or perhaps both of the successor Dominion Governments of British India. Whether a State actually joined either Dominion or not, it was obvious for geographical and economic reasons that such arrangements would be essential.



[20] In answer to a further question, His Excellency the Viceroy said that it was intended to recommend to the respective Dominions that their Constituent Assemblies should act as their Parliaments. The existing Legislative Assembly would presumably be abolished; but he was not prepared to state whether the new Governments would in fact make these decisions.

[21] Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar asked whether, in the event of the Constituent Assemblies taking over legislative functions, the States' representatives could withdraw from them for legislative purposes and remain only for Constitution making. His Excellency the Viceroy said that the States were not committed one way or the other on this point. He emphasized that the question of any new functions for the Constituent Assemblies was still only in the proposal stage.

*[Paras 22 to 26 omitted]*

<sup>1</sup>Dewan of Travancore.

<sup>2</sup>Dewan of Baroda.

<sup>3</sup>Dewan of Mysore.

## 4

*Note<sup>1</sup> by Nawab of Bhopal*

*F. 1120/68-71*

TOP SECRET

BHOPAL,  
6 June 1947

Perhaps you (Mr Jinnah)<sup>2</sup> have come to know by now that the Viceroy is putting pressure, not quite openly but in an indirect way, on the States to join the existing Constituent Assembly of Hindustan. You should lodge a strong protest to the Viceroy and say that such pressure is extremely unfair to Pakistan. The States should be left absolutely free to take what action they like. It should be purely voluntary for them to join the one Constituent Assembly or the other. If they want to be independent, they can do so. No pressure should be brought to bear on them to join any one or the other Constituent Assembly. If they wish to join Pakistan, we can offer them suitable terms for doing so and then they can decide which way they are to go.

I [H. H of Bhopal] am strongly of the opinion and consider it extremely essential that without waiting for the Pakistan Constituent



Assembly to come into being, which will take at least 2 or 3 months, Mr Jinnah should appoint immediately—and the 9th of June when the Council of the League meets in Delhi will [be] a most appropriate occasion—a small committee of 4 or 5 persons—1 from each Province—to discuss and negotiate with such individual States or groups of States as may desire to be associated with Pakistan, terms of their future relationship with the new sovereign State of Pakistan.

Note: If Mr Jinnah comes into this Committee as president, as did Jawaharlal Nehru in the case of the negotiating committee, this will have a tremendous effect upon the States who would be inclined to associate themselves with the Pakistan State.

An announcement creating such a Committee should be made as soon as possible and this announcement should be very wide [*sic*] and sympathetic and should be made in far more generous and liberal terms [than] in any previous announcement.

It should give [an] impression to the States that their sovereignty, integrity and autonomy are in no manner to be jeopardized by this relationship. This relationship will only be confined to a very few matters of common concern and the subjects could be limited only to Defence, Foreign Relations, and Communications, with additions of only such other subjects as the States may freely and voluntarily wish to add to these 3 subjects.

Pakistan will not endeavour to over-tax or lay heavy burdens on the States who may wish to join it; and every endeavour will be made not to interfere with [*sic for in*] the fiscal and financial autonomy which the States have hitherto enjoyed.

As regards their internal matters, Pakistan has no desire to meddle or interfere with them; but it is natural that Pakistan would wish the Ruler of each State to democratize its administration on popular basis and it would also wish the States to legislate themselves for the protection of the rights of man. It would also desire that the States should so frame their constitution that they always rule as constitutional monarchs through clearly defined constitutional channels. Such democratization need not necessarily follow the line of the constitutions prevailing in Great Britain or any other Western democratic government. The plan is to suit local conditions and should preferably be indigenous. It is recognized, taking into consideration the prevailing conditions in the Indian States, that progress in this connection cannot be too hurried or haphazard, and if satisfactory progress is maintained, Pakistan will be satisfied if the goal set above is reached within a reasonable period, say 10 or 12 years.



To those States who may wish to associate themselves with the State of Pakistan, we shall have no hesitation in giving them the assurance that we shall deal with them with real sympathy and goodwill. There can be no intention of using threats or force in such matters. We shall always endeavour to protect the rights of all the States associated with us as our own.

I think such a general announcement should be made without loss of time before the other party has time to offer their [*sic*] for its own terms. An announcement on these lines, if made now and at once, will be immensely helpful to the cause of Pakistan. It will go a long way to stem the type of propaganda against Pakistan that has already started and will grow in force and intensity from day to day. It is with the object of counteracting such propaganda that I propose that an announcement on these lines, and with still more generous terms, if possible, be made without further loss of time. Mr Jinnah can obtain the sanction of his Council on the 9th instant for making this announcement.

This is just an outline of the plan that has occurred to me and if Mr Jinnah desires me to put it to him in greater detail and definiteness I shall be only too glad to do so, but it is definitely a matter which calls for Mr Jinnah's immediate and earnest attention.

<sup>1</sup>Dictated to his Political Secretary, H. M. Hayat, to be conveyed to Jinnah in Delhi.

<sup>2</sup>Jinnah has been addressed here in the second person and in the third person subsequently. The form of address in the original has been retained.

*Enclosure to No. 4*

*F. 1120/72*

CONFIDENTIAL NOTE FOR MR JINNAH

I have always appreciated the undesirability of associating too many Hindu States with large Hindu population, or even such Muslim States as have a large Hindu population, too closely with the Constitution of Pakistan. Because if that were done, it would disturb the Muslim preponderance in population. Therefore I suggest the offer to Indian States to associate with Pakistan to be based on some form of Alliance or Treaty relations rather than their entry through Constituent Assembly. Because if the suggestion of this form of association originates from Pakistan, it is likely to upset completely the applecart of Hindustan. The quicker this thing is done the better, otherwise it is feared that Hindustan or Congress would lose no time in upsetting our plan



by organized effort to set up the Hindu population in the States against this plan. Once the thing is done it will not be possible easily to undo it, more so if Pakistan continues to remain within the British Empire.

## 5

### *Minutes of Viceroy's meeting<sup>1</sup> with Congress and Muslim League Leaders* [Extract]

SECRET

NEW DELHI,  
13 June 1947

#### ITEM 1: THE STATES

##### INDEPENDENCE OF STATES

Pandit Nehru said that he fully admitted the principle that any States could, if they so wished, join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. But there was no trace in the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum<sup>2</sup> of any State being allowed to claim independence.

Sir Conrad Corfield read out an extract of this Memorandum which stated "The void will have to be filled, either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them".

Pandit Nehru said that in his opinion this did not signify the possibility of States becoming independent. Sir Conrad Corfield said that in his opinion the term "particular political arrangements" implied relations with autonomous units.

Mr Jinnah said that in his view the States were fully entitled to say that they would join neither Constituent Assembly. Every Indian State was a Sovereign State. Pandit Nehru said that he differed altogether. He spoke as a lawyer. Mr Jinnah said that he spoke as lawyer also. Pandit Nehru suggested that the opinion of the Federal Court on this point should be obtained.

Mr Jinnah reiterated that in his opinion Indian States were Sovereign States for every purpose except in so far as they had entered into Treaties with the Crown. British India could do nothing to them. The Crown was under certain obligations to them and they to it, according to the terms of Treaties and agreements which had been made. To say that the Governor-General or the British Parliament could lay down that every



Indian State was bound to enter one Constituent Assembly or the other, was not according to the law or to the Constitution. If the States liked to come in, they could do so by agreement, but there was no way of forcing them in.

Pandit Nehru asked what were the tests of sovereignty? One was the capacity for international relations. The States had no such capacity. Another was the capacity for declaring war. The States had no such capacity. There were 565 States. Of this number, there might perhaps be a few which could claim semi-sovereignty, but no more. The significance of every Treaty would have to be examined. It was impossible, in his opinion, to plan any general order. The Political Department had been run by money provided by the Government of India. Tributes obtained from States had not been sufficient to pay for this.

Pandit Nehru then read out several extracts from the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum. He said that, in his opinion, the whole background of this Statement was that the States should enter the structure of one or other Government.

Mr Jinnah reiterated his view that the Cabinet Mission had never laid down that every State was bound to come into one or other Constituent Assembly. They were free to decide themselves; but there were many matters which would require adjustments. These could only be made through the Crown Representative so long as he continued. It was in the interests of both the Muslim League and Congress that these adjustments should be made.

Pandit Nehru said that he entirely agreed with this. He said that he was not intending to lay down that every State must join one or other Constituent Assembly; but if they did not come in, they would have to come to some other arrangement. Such other arrangements could not and should not be preceded by declarations of independence. His Excellency the Viceroy said that he did not consider that the proposals put forward in the papers before the meeting violated Pandit Nehru's point. In fact, they were intended to secure his object.

#### THE MACHINERY FOR DEALING WITH QUESTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS IN BRITISH INDIA

It was with this in mind that he [the Viceroy] had arranged for a paper on the machinery for dealing with questions of common concern between the States and the successor Governments in British India to be written. This paper proposed two alternatives—that the States should be given the option of:



- (a) dealing with local representatives of the successor Governments, or
- (b) appointing their own representatives to the Headquarters of the successor Governments.

A draft letter to all Residents, putting forward the two alternative suggestions, was also circulated.

His Excellency the Viceroy said that he felt that the two alternative choices should be put before the States. He had discussed in London the question of the Government of India taking over the officers in the various States. His instructions had been that this was only to be done if the States agreed. Moreover, it was going to be very difficult to convince the States that Agents of the Government of India located in State territory would not continue to represent a Paramount power. In his opinion, the alternative that each State or group of States should appoint a representative or representatives to be located at the Headquarters of the appropriate Government would be the best arrangement. He had discussed this with the States Negotiating Committee, the members of which had agreed with him. He emphasized that he was not entitled to force a State to continue to accept an Agent of the Central Government in their territory.

Sir Conrad Corfield stated that he had discussed this question with a number of Dewans. It seemed to him that it would be a mistake to set up an organization with which the States were not likely to cooperate.

Pandit Nehru said that he considered that these suggestions proceeded from a wrong basis. Neither was a good idea. Present arrangements should continue.

To have representatives of the States at capitals would lead to very considerable delays. He did not understand how H. M. G could give a ruling in which the Government of India had not even been consulted. This ruling did not flow from the Statement of 12th May.

The Agents of the Government of India should continue in operation until they were withdrawn. The lapse of Paramountcy should not lead to independence. Only certain functions would cease to be exercised. Others would remain. It was essential to have a Department to continue to deal with the States. He suggested that the Political Department and the Residents should continue to function. The political and administrative aspects should continue in operation. The choice of what machinery should be set up lay with the Government of India. If any State took up a line of opposition to the policy of the Central Government, this would be considered as an unfriendly act, and all the privileges which those States enjoyed would cease.



His Excellency the Viceroy said that he recognized the rights of the two new Governments, each to set up a new Department to deal with States' matters, but he suggested that this should not be called a Political Department. A more acceptable name would be "States Department". It should be set up forthwith, divided into two sections, ready for the partition of the country. The existing Political Department would give all possible assistance and advice in the formation of this new Department.

His Excellency the Viceroy stated that, on the other hand, he was convinced that it was for the States to decide whether to send representatives to either capital or to receive representatives from the successor Governments. On His Excellency's instructions, the letter to Residents on this subject was amended in certain details.

#### FORMULA FOR STANDSTILL ARRANGEMENTS

A second letter to Residents, covering a draft formula for Standstill arrangements when Paramountcy lapsed, was then handed round<sup>3</sup>. It was agreed that the schedule attached to the draft formula should be amended to cover matters of common concern not specifically mentioned. Pandit Nehru said that he had not yet had time to analyse this draft formula. He had discussed it in the early hours of that morning with lawyers, who had raised many points of difficulty. He doubted whether the description that it covered only "administrative" arrangements was correct. Mr Jinnah gave his view that this was correct.

His Excellency the Viceroy suggested that both parties would wish a longer time to look into this draft in detail. He considered that the States should send representatives to negotiate and sign the agreement proposed. Negotiation[s] could be initiated through the States Negotiating Committee, but all States would have to send fully accredited representatives for the purpose of signature.

#### THE STATES' FORCES

Sardar Baldev Singh said that he understood that previously the Commander-in-Chief used to exercise control over the States' forces. Sir Conrad Corefield explained that this had not really been control, but more in the nature of a bargain and applied exclusively to units included by agreement in the Indian States' Forces Scheme. A State could have forces outside that Scheme but would have to pay for their arms and equipment, whereas arms and equipment for units included in the Scheme were supplied free.

Sardar Baldev Singh asked whether, when Paramountcy lapsed, the States would be free to obtain their arms from anywhere they wanted.



Sir Conrad Corfield said that his suggestion was that the Central Government should provide arms on payment for legitimate purposes. If a bargain was made in advance, there would be factual control.

<sup>1</sup>No. 175, item 1, *TP*, XI, 320-7.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix to Annexure II to No. 83, Vol. II, 159.

## 6

*Hamidullah Khan to Louis Mountbatten*<sup>1</sup>

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/143*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL,  
14 June 1947

Your Excellency,

I enclose for your consideration a note which contains some of my reflections on what I have described as the Mountbatten Plan. I can pretend to no knowledge of the motives or considerations which may have impelled His Majesty's Government to leave the States in the unhappy position in which they find themselves under this plan. I can only guess that they may have been actuated by the hope that they might thereby conciliate the present leaders of the Indian National Congress. If that was so, all that I wish to observe is that a very short passage of time will demonstrate only too clearly the futility of that hope. The Congress has so far, in spite of occasional internal crises, been able to maintain a united front vis-a-vis Britain in as much as all sections and groups inside it were actuated by an uncompromising hostility towards Britain. Of this, you have had ample proof and experience as Supreme Commander of the S.E.A.C.<sup>2</sup> How many times the burdens and anxieties of that very delicate and responsible position were multiplied by the open and secret activities of the Congress can be adequately known to you alone. You are also aware of the part that the States played in that life and death struggle. They at least did far more to protect their country against foreign aggression and domination than the Congress can ever lay claim to.

Now that the Congress is about to climb into the seat of supreme power in Hindustan, it will find it impossible to maintain a united front. The right wing and the left wing will not continue to hold together even during a space of months after the complete transfer of supreme power into the hands of the Congress. All indications point



to the early predominance of the left wing, and though that wing prefers to describe itself at present as the socialist wing of Congress, its socialism is only a thin veneer covering a mass of rank communism, a reality which H. M. G may not at present be prepared for obvious reasons to recognize, but which has not escaped the penetrating vision of Mr Summer Welles.<sup>3</sup> By what degree of affection, devotion, and love for Britain a communist Hindustan will be inspired, I am not competent to assess. That task I leave to statesmen possessed of the far sighted vision and experience of the British Prime Minister and his colleagues and advisers.

In the accompanying note<sup>4</sup> I have preferred to confine myself to the broad question of H.M.G.'s policy towards the States. I have not touched upon the concrete difficulties that have been created by the Congress in the way of the States taking part in the shaping of the future constitution of Hindustan. I have no doubt that you have studied with care the decisions already made by the Constituent Assembly on matters comprised within the Objectives Resolution, the list of Fundamental Rights and the list of Union Subjects. It seems to me that decisions and resolutions of that type leave very little incentive for the States to cast in their lot with Hindustan.

I have been privileged to enjoy your friendship for over 25 years now, and for this reason I have frankly given my views in the note, and written to you without reserve, in the confident hope that what I have said will not be misunderstood by you and will be read in the spirit in which it has been written. I shall be much obliged if Your Excellency will kindly arrange to transmit a copy of the enclosed note to the Prime Minister for his information.

Yours very sincerely,  
HAMIDULLAH

<sup>1</sup>Mountbatten forwarded this letter, along with its enclosure, to Earl of Listowel on 20 June 1947, with the remarks that "some of the States feel very unhappy, particularly of course Hyderabad and Bhopal, which have Muslim rulers with Hindu majority populations". See No. 273, TP, XI, 528.

<sup>2</sup>South-East Asia Command.

<sup>3</sup>US Under-Secretary of State, 1937-43.

<sup>4</sup>On 13 December 1946, Nehru moved a resolution on a "Declaration of Objectives" in the Constituent Assembly of India, declaring its firm resolve "to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic". See Annexure II to No. 420, Vol. I, Part I, 754-5.

*Enclosure to No. 6*

*Note on H.M.G.'s Policy towards States*

The portions of India that were conquered and subjugated by the



British and the administration of which was taken over by them became British India. Those parts, the sovereignty of which continued to vest in Indian rulers, who entered into alliance and treaty relations with the East India Company and later with the British Crown, have been known as the Indian States. These States have continued to be Sovereign States in all respects subject only to the restrictions and obligations which they accepted or undertook in pursuance of their Treaties. These have been comprehensively described as the Paramountcy of the British Crown. The point that needs stressing, in that connection, is that whatever restrictions were imposed upon the States and were accepted by them whether willingly or unwillingly and whatever subordination, in the case of some of the States, the relationship that was established between them and the British Crown, imposed upon the States, was a matter between the States and the Crown. The relationship between British India and the States was at all times only that subsisting between neighbours, some of whom were integral parts of the British Empire and the others were in alliance and treaty relationship with the Crown. There was at no time any implication of any kind of subordination whatever of British India to the States or of the States to British India in any respect. While British India was Crown territory and the people thereof were British subjects, the territories comprised within the Indian States were in no sense British and the people of the States were not British subjects but subjects of their respective Rulers.

In the nature of things, the relationship between the British Crown and the people of British India was not and could not have been intended to be a permanent one. British statesmen began early to describe the goals of British rule over the territories known as British India as being self-Government for British India. It was always visualized that sooner or later the stage would be reached when sovereign authority in respect of British India would be transferred into the hands of British Indians.

On the other hand, with regard to the States, no definite objective was at any time laid down as the goal of British policy. The reason was to be found in the nature of the relationship that subsisted between the British Crown and the Rulers of the States. That relationship was regulated by Treaty and could at any time be modified by Treaty which implied a mutual agreement to bring about a modification.

When certain sections of the people of British India began to develop a sense of political consciousness, it was assumed on all hands that India would ultimately emerge as a single independent international unit or entity, in the constitutional pattern of which adequate



room would somehow be found for the States without any manner trenching upon their Sovereign character except to the extent to which the States might themselves be willing to pool portions of their Sovereignty along with that of British India for common purposes and for the common good.

Though the communal division had always existed among the peoples of India, it was accorded recognition in the political and constitutional fields in British India alone. Even in British India, it was hoped that, in spite of the communal division, the vision of India as a single international entity would ultimately be realized. Had that hope been fulfilled, so far as British India was concerned, it would not have been beyond the resources of Indian statesmanship with such advice and help as might have been available from Britain to arrive at an equitable adjustment between British India and the States, for the purpose of setting up a common Federal Government entrusted with certain functions relating to the whole of India. Communal differences in British India, however, rendered impossible the achievement of the goal of a united India. His Majesty's Government as well as political parties in British India came ultimately, though in the case of some of them reluctantly, to accept the inevitability of a division of British India into what may broadly be described as Muslim India and Hindu India. What may, for the sake of convenience of reference, be described as the "Mountbatten Plan" proceeds evidently on the basis of this inevitable and unavoidable necessity. It must, however, be remembered that the problem of division on the communal basis arose only in British India and has throughout continued to be a British Indian problem.

This feature of British Indian constitutional development has placed the States in a very delicate position. The States have always been in complete sympathy with British Indian aspirations. While the Princes have throughout the period of their relationship with the British Crown faithfully adhered to the terms of their treaties and have fulfilled their obligations towards the Crown in the fullest measure and in the most generous spirit, they have not only never sought to impede the progress of British India towards its ultimate political destiny but have, at all stages, rendered such assistance to British India towards its achievement as lay within their power, but always on the basis of a united India. It was the declaration of the Princes in favour of an all-India Federation at the commencement of the First Round Table Conference in London in 1930 that made Responsible Self-Government for India a question of immediate practical significance. The Princes favoured the plan as it ensured a balanced all-India Legislature and Executive at the



Centre dealing with subjects of common interests to the whole of the country. Again they accepted the Cabinet Mission's Plan<sup>1</sup> of 16th May, 1946, because in as much as it proceeded on the basis of a United Federal India, thus avoiding the necessity of a division of British India on a communal plan.

Once the goal of British Indian political development became clearly defined and was recognized on behalf of the British Crown it became evident that with the attainment of that goal by British India the relationship between the British Crown and the Indian States would have to undergo a radical modification. Paramountcy and all its implications would, under the new conditions arising in British India, pass out of date. With a politically free British India the British Crown would no longer be in a position to be able to claim the privileges or to discharge the obligations of Paramountcy. With the cessation of Paramountcy the States would automatically become fully Sovereign entities. It would be open to them to enter into Constitutional or Treaty relationship with each other, with British India or with the British Crown or members of the British Commonwealth. Subject to the terms of any such relationship, they could enter into relationship with other Sovereign States at the international level.

There could be no possible question of any portion of the rights, privileges and obligations comprised within the conception of Paramountcy being transferred to any successor Government or Governments of British India for the simple reason that the States were Sovereigns in relationship with the British Crown and except in matters regulated by specific agreements owed no kind of obligation whatsoever to British India or any part of it. The British Crown has all along accepted this position as is clear from numerous pronouncements and declarations made in that behalf.

The peoples of the States profess and practise the faiths and creeds that are followed in the rest of India but fortunately these have not, in the State, formed the basis of political divisions or ideologies. The Governments of the States are based on the monarchical system but the States have fully recognized the need of securing the increasing association of their peoples with the Government and administration of the State through representative institutions of a democratic character. Several of them have already proceeded a considerable distance in that direction and others are making such progress as local conditions and circumstances permit. It may well be that the pattern of constitutional development may not be identical in all States or with that which British India may choose to adopt. Indeed it now appears that Hindu India and Muslim India may not themselves follow a uniform



pattern. Local needs and local conditions and tradition must play a large part in the shaping and determination of these patterns in this connection, however, it would be legitimate to point out that the Paramount Power has not always been eager to encourage and foster the growth of representative institutions in the States. The reason for this attitude was obvious. The setting up and successful working of representative institutions in the States would have demonstrated to incongruity of the exercise of political control by the British Parliament over British India and would have made the exercise of certain Paramountcy powers impracticable.

The Mountbatten Plan recognizes the political division of India into Hindu India and Muslim India. This cuts right across the principles to which the States have throughout adhered. As soon as His Majesty's Government found themselves compelled to accord their recognition, however reluctantly, to the division of India on a religious basis, they should have called the representatives of the States in consultation to discover how the proposed division of India would affect them, and whether it would be possible for all or any of them to find a place in the future Indian political and constitutional set up. This was not done, and the omission to do so has resulted in the States being placed in a very grave and delicate predicament. Many of the States view this default on the part of His Majesty's Government as a virtual repudiation of the guarantees and assurances that have been given to the States at various times by and on behalf of the British Crown.

Up to the date of the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan it has been recognized that the communal division was a domestic question affecting British India alone, and though the necessity of discovering a fair and equitable adjustment of communal interests and points of view inside British India was conceded, it was assumed as a basic condition of the adjustment between British India and the States that no communal considerations would be permitted to intrude themselves into that sphere. It was made perfectly clear, on behalf of the States at every stage of the political controversy between British India and His Majesty's Governments, that the States would not concern themselves with the communal conflict in British India and would resent any suggestion that in arriving at a settlement of their own future relationship with British India they should have any regard to the communal divisions and conflicts in British India. For the first time, in the history of the political struggle between British India and His Majesty's Government, recognition has been accorded to the principle that British India may be divided into Sovereign Independent States based purely upon the division between Hindu and Muslim. As



has just been pointed out, this decision has been announced without any prior consultation with the representatives of the States on the question as to how their own position may be affected by this decision.

Having recognized the principle of the division of British India on the communal basis, the Mountbatten Plan accords to each section of British India the choice to remain within the British Commonwealth as a full and equal member or to go out of it at its own unfettered option. The inevitable consequence of the recognition of a Hindu India and a Muslim India should have been to accord the same choice to the States, that is to say, that the States could, as individual States or as groups of States, become full and equal members of the British Commonwealth with the option to each Unit to go out of the Commonwealth when it chose to do so. While both Hindu India and Muslim India have been given this choice, it has, according to the interpretation of the Plan authoritatively put forward by H. E. the Viceroy in his Press Conference, been withheld from the States. The choice that they have been given is that of participating in the Constituent Assembly of Hindu India or the Constituent Assembly of Muslim India.

The consequences that must ensue from this arrangement are only too apparent. The first and obvious mischief is that the States are thereby not only compelled to recognize the division of British India into Hindu and Muslim, but are forced to identify themselves with one or the other section with the inevitable consequence that they themselves and their peoples must re-adjust their approach towards problems of an all-India character in terms of Hindu India and Muslim India. From this it would only be a short step to the disruption of the States and their peoples in terms of Hindu and Muslim, a consequence which the States can view only with unmitigated abhorrence.

For it is plain that adhesion, by any State, to one of the Constituent Assemblies, for reasons of contiguity, religion or race, must inevitably tear asunder the firm friendship which has hitherto existed between that State and another which, in its turn, feels itself bound, for like reasons, to attach itself to the other Constituent Assembly. Nor would this dissension be limited to the States and to their Rulers. It must automatically react on the peoples of the States. For example, the Muslim population of a Hindu State, influenced as it is by recent propaganda, would be bound to feel that it was losing all the advantages derived over many years from the non-sectarian government of their Ruler and that their interests were being sacrificed, to political expediency by the State henceforth being attached to a large body inspired indisputably by religious or racial motives contrary to their own. Precisely the same sentiments could be expected from the converse



proposition of a Muslim State joining Pakistan. A part of this consideration may apply to sections of British India also after the Mountbatten Plan has been put into force but this would be British India's own seeking. The States have not desired to bring about any such state of affairs and there is no reason why they should be subjected to these dangers.

Surely, it is not the desire or intention of His Majesty's Government to sacrifice the feelings and loyalties of the Rulers and peoples of the States and to spread communal disorder throughout their territories, as the outcome of their otherwise laudable desire to grant self government to British India. His Majesty's Government would be shocked to realize that this would be one result of their plan and perhaps the truth is that this aspect of the matter, in its full import, has not been fully considered by them.

One of the principal elements of Paramountcy was that the States had committed the conduct of their foreign policy into the hands of the Paramount Power. Had India remained united after the lapse of Paramountcy, the States would have been quite willing to become partners in an All-India Union which could safely have been entrusted with the conduct of foreign policy on behalf of the whole of India, including the States together with the defence of India. A ministry responsible to a legislature representing all sections of the people of the country, including Hindus, Muslims and the minorities and also including the representatives of the States, could be trusted to view the problems arising in these spheres against their proper perspective and to come to decisions on a wide and comprehensive basis. With Afghanistan and Iran as India's immediate neighbours on one side themselves in their turn overshadowed by Russia and having close relations with the Muslim States and peoples of the Middle East and North Africa, and Tibet, China and Burma [now Myanmar] abutting on to India on the other side with Siam [now Thailand], Malaya [now Malaysia], Indo-China [now Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam], Indonesia and the Philippines stretching away towards the far East, the settlement and conduct of India's foreign policy would be a task requiring great delicacy and a farsighted vision. Even a United India may not have found it easy to adjust itself to the constantly shifting conditions around it and great wisdom and a delicate sense of balance would have been required to enable it to set and steer a safe course. A Hindu India and a Muslim India would find themselves in a far more difficult position in these respects than a United India would have found itself. The approach of each section to these problems is bound to be coloured by its own predominant complexion namely that of being Hindu or Muslim.



How is it to be expected then that the States either individually or as groups should find it possible to fit themselves into either of these patterns?

One or two illustrations will make this clear. Assume that Iran and Afghanistan are compelled for reasons, some of which may easily be imagined, to subordinate their foreign policy to that of the U.S.S.R. and, in turn, invite Muslim India to do the same. If it decides to do so, what will be the position of the States that may have, under the Mountbatten Plan, chosen to enter into constitutional relationship with it? They will have no option but to submit to the choice made by Muslim India.

Again, assume that the Communists gain the upper hand in China and then invite Hindu India to line up with it and the latter decides to accept the invitation. The States that, under the Mountbatten Plan, go into the constitutional parlour of Hindu India must perforce submit to the decision made by Hindu India and range themselves along with it on the Communists' side.

These are not idle fancies nor even remote possibilities. Either or both of these contingencies might become bitter realities during the course of the next few years.

It may be urged that the States in constitutional relationship with Hindu India and with Muslim India will themselves participate in helping to settle the foreign policy of the section with which they are in relationship. The conditions under which they are left to make their terms with Hindu India or Muslim India will not, to begin with, ensure them adequate representation in the machinery that may be set up in each section to deal with these matters. The States possess no means which they could employ to secure such representation. Those that chose to join either of these sections must do so on the terms that the particular section may choose to prescribe. They will have no choice in the matter. Even assuming, however, that they may be accorded adequate representation, they will only be in the position of junior partners. They will have no choice but to accept and to give effect to the decisions made by the senior partner. The enormous mischief that might result from the proposed arrangement is thus obvious.

The question may also be looked at from another angle. Hindu India and Muslim India will start as Dominions with the option in each case to go out of the Commonwealth whenever either of them chooses to do so. The States are expected to enter into constitutional relationship with one or the other. If the States that are in relationship with Hindu India desire to go out of the Commonwealth, while Hindu India desires to remain within the Commonwealth, the States



must also remain tied to the Commonwealth as unwilling partners. On the other hand, if the States in relationship with Muslim India desire to remain within the Commonwealth but Muslim India decides to go out of it, the States must also forsake that fellowship however unwilling they may be to do so. The choice in each case will be made by the British India section and the States in relationship with it must give effect to the decision. This in effect amounts to subordinating the foreign policy of the States to the foreign policy of the British India sections and would to that extent be a virtual transfer of Paramountcy, a contingency against which repeated assurance have been given to the States. These assurances have thus in practice been violated, while they are still being verbally repeated.

As soon as His Majesty's Government discovered that a division of British India on the communal basis had become inevitable, they should have expressly accorded the same choice to the States as they were willing to accord to Hindu India and to Muslim India, namely that the States as individual States or groups of States would be welcome to become full and equal members of the British Commonwealth with the option to each unit to go out of the Commonwealth when it might choose. This would still have left such of the States as might choose to do so free to enter into constitutional or treaty relationship with whichever section of British India they might prefer. In any case, it would not have placed them in a position of subordination to British India in which the Mountbatten plan, as interpreted by the Viceroy in his Press Conference, has placed them.

It has been suggested that to admit individual States or groups of States to membership of the Commonwealth would amount to balkanisation of India. This suggestion is the result of an insufficient consideration of the consequences of the Mountbatten Plan. This Plan purports to leave the States in the position which was accorded to them by the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of 12th May, 1946. This means that after the lapse of Paramountcy the States would be completely sovereign and independent in every respect. If the States cannot be admitted as members of the Commonwealth without associating themselves with Hindu India or Muslim India, such of them as may desire to keep aloof from both communal sections of British India, would have to proclaim their independence as has already been done by Hyderabad and Travancore, and would have to adopt suitable measures to safeguard their independence and integrity. This state of affairs would indeed amount to Balkanisation of the country but it would be the direct consequence of the Mountbatten Plan as interpreted by his Excellency the Viceroy in his Press Conference.



Another objection that may be taken to the States being given the choice of becoming members of the Commonwealth in their own right is that this might mean hundreds of Dominions being created in India, which would be impracticable and therefore is not to be thought of. The academic reply to this objection is that this would be no more impracticable than the independent existence of so many Sovereign States. But to this the rejoinder is made that a vast majority of what are called the States would not be able to maintain in practice an independent existence and must form themselves into groups even with reference to some aspects of internal administration. The same would be the reply to the objection that so many States could not be admitted to membership of the Commonwealth in their own right. A vast majority of them would have to group themselves together in any unit whether they desire to enter into constitutional relationship with Hindu India or Muslim India or desire to become Dominions or desire to carry on an independent existence.

The treatment accorded by H.M.G. to the States under the Mountbatten Plan is so incomprehensible that the only charitable assumption that can be made in H.M.G.'s favour is that this consequence of the Mountbatten Plan was not sufficiently appreciated during the hurried consideration of the Plan by H.M.G. and that it was not deliberately devised or intended. The Opposition had even less time to consider the Plan before Mr Churchill bestowed upon it his own and his party's *prima facie* blessing. The only merit of the Plan upon which attention has so far been concentrated is that it has elicited the consent or approval of the political parties in British India, though such consent or approval is in each case qualified and grudging. Nobody appears to have paid any attention to what the reaction of the States might be. In fact, the States have in this connection been as completely ignored as if they formed no part of India at all. His Majesty's Government appear to have been concerned only in devising a scheme for British India and have as a postscript to the scheme added that the States might enter the Constituent Assembly of one section or the other as they choose.

HAMIDULLAH

<sup>1</sup>Appendix III. 1, Vol. I, Part II, 32-44.



## 7

*Resolution of the All India Congress Committee  
(A. I.C.C) on the States<sup>1</sup>*

15 June 1947

The A.I.C.C welcomes the association of many Indian States in the work of the Constituent Assembly. The Committee hopes that the remaining States will also cooperate in this building up of the constitutional structure of a free India in which the State units will be equal and autonomous sharers with the other units of the Federation.

2. The position of the States in the constitutional changes that are taking place was defined in the Memorandum presented by the Cabinet Mission on May 12, 1946,<sup>2</sup> and the statement of the May 16, 1946. The recent statement of June 3, 1947, has not added to these in any way. The position, according to these papers, was that the India Union would consist of the Provinces and the States, that Paramountcy would lapse on the transfer of power, and that in the event of any State not entering into a federal relationship with the Union, it will enter into other political arrangement with it.

In the Memorandum it was further stated that the British Government had been informed by the Indian States that they desired in their own interests and in the interests of India as a whole both to make their contribution to the framing of the structure and to take their due place in it when it is completed. Hope was also expressed that the various State Governments which had not already done so would take active steps to place themselves in close and constant touch with public opinion in their States by means of representative institutions. It was suggested that existing arrangements as between the States and the Government of India should continue in regard to matters of common concern until new agreements were completed.

3. While recognizing that some progress has been made in some States towards representative institutions, the A.I.C.C regrets that during this past critical year, since the Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission, this progress has been very limited both in its extent and quality. In view of the changes that are going to take place in India within the next two months, resulting from the complete transfer of power to Indian hands, it is of vital importance that progress leading to responsible government should take place rapidly in the States. The A.I.C.C trusts that all the States will initiate these changes so as to keep in line with the fast-changing situation in India and at the same time produce contentment and self-reliance in their people.



4. The Committee does not agree with the theory of Paramountcy as enunciated and interpreted by the British Government; but even if that is accepted, the consequences that flow from the lapse of that Paramountcy are limited in extent. The privileges and obligations as well as the subsisting rights as between the States and the Government of India cannot be adversely affected by the lapse of Paramountcy. These rights and obligations have to be considered separately and renewed or changed by mutual agreement. The relationship between the Government of India and the States would not be exhausted by lapse of Paramountcy. The lapse does not lead to the independence of the States.

5. Both from the point of view of the spirit underlying the Memorandum of May 12, 1946, and the statement of May 16, 1946, as well as the acknowledged rights of the people all over the world today, it is clear that the people of the States must have a dominating voice in any decisions regarding them. Sovereignty, it is admitted, resides in the people, and if Paramountcy lapses, resulting in the ending of the relationship of the States to the Crown, the inherent rights of the people are not affected thereby for the worse.

6. The arrangement made under Paramountcy in the past dealt, *inter alia*, with the security of India as a whole. In the interest of that security various arrangements were agreed to limiting the power of the States authorities and, at the same time, granting them protection. The question of the security of India as well as other matters are as important today as at any time previously and cannot be ignored in deciding the future of the States.

7. The A.I.C.C cannot admit the right of any State in India to declare its independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India. That would be a denial of the course of Indian history and of the objectives of the Indian people today.

8. The A.I.C.C trusts that the Rulers of the States will appreciate fully the situation as it exists today and will, in full cooperation with their people, enter as democratic units in the Indian Union thereby serving the cause of their own people as well as of India as a whole.

<sup>1</sup>A. M. & S.G. Zaidi, ed., *The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress, 1946-1950*, Vol. XIII, Delhi, 1981, 112-4.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.



## 8

STATES CAN CHOOSE TO BE INDEPENDENT<sup>1</sup>

Option not Limited to Hindustan or Pakistan, Paramountcy will Terminate but cannot be Transferred. Jinnah Clarifies Muslim League Viewpoint

With the termination of Paramountcy, Indian States would be free either to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or to remain independent, declared Mr M. A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, in a statement today.

Mr Jinnah said, "There is a great deal of controversy going on with regard to the Indian States, and I am, therefore, obliged to state the position of the All India Muslim League so that there should be no misunderstanding as to what the Muslim League stands for and what our policy is with regard to the Indian States.

"Constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent Sovereign States on the termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like: it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent. In the last case, they enter into such arrangements or relationship with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose.

## LEAGUE POLICY

"The policy of the All India Muslim League has been clear from the very beginning. We do not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of any State, for that is a matter primarily to be resolved between the rulers and the peoples of the States. Such States as wish to enter the Pakistan Constituent Assembly of their free will and desire to discuss or negotiate with us, shall find us ready and willing to do so. If they wish to remain independent and wish to negotiate or adjust any political or any other relationship, such as commercial or economic relations with Pakistan, we shall be glad to discuss with them and come to a settlement which will be in the interest of both.

## NO LIMITATION

"I am clearly of the opinion that the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of May 12,<sup>2</sup> defining the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Indian States, does not in any way limit them, as it is often wrongly repeated, that they have no option except to join one or the other Constituent Assembly. In my opinion, they are free to remain



independent, if they so desire. Neither the British Government, nor the British Parliament, nor any other power or body, can compel them to do anything contrary to their free will and accord; nor have they any power or sanction of any kind to do so.

“The British Government have made it clear that Paramountcy will not be transferred to any Government or Governments or authority that may be set up in British India, and that itself shows that Paramountcy cannot be transferred, but is going to terminate. On its termination the full sovereign status of the Indian States emerges.”<sup>3</sup>—API.

<sup>1</sup>The *Pakistan Times*, 18 June 1947.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.

<sup>3</sup>In contrast to the Muslim League, the Congress held the view that notwithstanding the lapse of Paramountcy, “Sovereignty” would continue to “reside in the people.” The Congress could not “admit the right of any State in India to declare its independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India.” See No. 7.

## 9

*Jawaharlal Nehru to H. L. Ismay*<sup>1</sup>

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/143*

SECRET

NEW DELHI,  
19 June 1947

Dear Lord Ismay,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th June<sup>2</sup> sending me a note by the Dominion Office on the structure of the British Commonwealth.

2. Thank you also for sending me a note<sup>3</sup> on the decisions taken at the so-called Leaders' Conference with the Viceroy when the States question was discussed.

3. I am having the summary sent to the Cabinet Office about the formation of the States Department of the Government of India, as decided upon at that Conference. I hope this will take shape soon.

4. We have been examining the Draft “Standstill” Agreement between the Government of India and the States. I have consulted in this matter the lawyers of the Government of India as well as some of our constitutional officers and we are preparing another, and probably briefer, draft which I hope to send soon. This draft of ours will also, I hope, be circulated among the rulers. The previous draft contained many lacunae.

5. The position in regard to the States has become a very confused



one, largely owing to various statements made on behalf of [His Majesty's Government] during last year without any reference whatever to us. The Leaders' Conference the other day was the first occasion when we discussed the States question as between the Government of India and the Political Department. It seems to me essential that there should be clarity about this matter and that our views should be fully known, so that there might be no reason for misapprehension in the future. This is particularly important from the point of view of the parliamentary legislation that is being undertaken. I do not know if there is going to be any reference to the States in this parliamentary legislation. If there is such a reference I hope it is of the right kind and does not introduce unnecessary complications.

6. Also, that in the event of any answers being given in Parliament regarding the States in India, our point of view will be kept in mind.

7. You will appreciate that it is of the highest importance to us that the States should fit in properly into the picture of India. It is bad enough that India has to be partitioned. It would be disastrous if this process went further and resulted in the "Balkanisation" of the country. That would certainly lead to conflict till some suitable equilibrium was arrived at. We might well have to go back a hundred years when the East India Company was consolidating its power in India and emerging as the dominant authority.

8. I do not wish to challenge statements made on behalf of H.M.G. regarding the States, though I do wish to make it clear that some of these statements were unfortunate and not in line with the facts of the situation. Even accepting these statements, certain facts emerge. One is that it has been the firm intention of H.M.G. that the States should join the Union of India or one of the two Dominions. In case they do not become federal units of these Dominions, nevertheless, they are associated with them in a number of ways. It is quite inconceivable that a State can become independent in the legal sense of the term, which means having external relations and the power to declare war or peace and controlling its defence and communications. That would be a challenge to the security of India which the Indian Union could never agree to. If any foreign power encouraged such independence of a State this can only be considered as an unfriendly act by the Indian Union.

9. All this has little to do with Paramountcy in the limited sense of the word. That Paramountcy is not being transferred by the British Government to an Indian Government, but the facts of geography cannot be ignored and the dominant power in India will necessarily exercise certain control over any State which does not choose to come



into the Union. If a State comes into the Union, then it becomes an equal sharer in that dominant power's position. If not, it has to function within certain limitations.

10. I am enclosing a note on this subject which might help in clarifying the position. I would add that any trade pact between a State and a foreign Government would definitely affect our external reactions. Foreign trade is essentially a part of foreign relations. Therefore, foreign trade must be conducted through, or with the concurrence of, the Principal Authority in India. I mention this specially, as it might be thought that trade is something apart from other relations. It is, in fact, intimately connected with the foreign relations of the country and it might well result in creating vested interests which affect the security and vital interests of that country.

11. I trust that the States Department of the Government of India will soon be constituted, so that it can deal with all these matters satisfactorily and uniformly. There has been enough delay already and further delay might lead to greater confusion.

Yours sincerely,  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

<sup>1</sup>Chief of the Viceroy's Staff.

<sup>2&3</sup>Not traceable.

*Enclosure to No. 9*

*Note by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru*

In the Memorandum<sup>1</sup> on States' Treaties and Paramountcy presented by the Cabinet Mission to His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes on the 12th May, 1946, it was stated:

*[Sub-paras a, b and c omitted<sup>2</sup>]*

2. The Plan announced by H. E. the Viceroy on June 3rd shortens the interim period referred to in extracts (a) and (b) to a few weeks. Continuance, for a period of time, of the arrangements now existing as to the matters of common concern mentioned in extract (b) thus becomes a matter of urgent necessity. These matters, it may be noted, relate mainly to the economic and fiscal fields. A Draft Standstill Agreement for this purpose has been prepared and circulated by the political Department to the Indian States. But, as regards "political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other", which will be brought to an end when His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the power of Paramountcy, no action has been taken by the Political Department, although the extract in para 1 (c) recognizes



that this "void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them."

3. Both with States which have joined the Constituent Assembly and those which have declared their intention not to join it, the Government of India are most anxious to arrive at a "regulation of matters of common concern, especially in the economic and financial fields", and at particular political arrangements to take the place of Paramountcy. But this desirable consummation cannot be achieved by the single will or effort of the Government of India. Unless the States show an equal desire for a mutually beneficial and honourable settlement, there may be a void both in respect of administrative arrangements and of political relations.

The facts of geography, which are as paramount as Paramountcy itself, make it necessary, however, that if the security and well-being of India are to be assured, there shall be no 'void', and both kinds of arrangements must be made. Otherwise, in the absence of what might comprehensively be described as administrative arrangement, such matters of common interest as railway, telegraphic and postal communications and other services of common benefit to India as well as the States may come to an end. And, without political arrangements, States may establish relations with foreign countries, even with countries unfriendly to India, raise large armies, and take other measures which may be a menace to the security of the new Dominion of India. The territories of the Dominion will be so interlaced with the territories of the States in geographical contiguity to it as to render a complete isolation of the administrative and economic life of the Dominion from that of the States or the conduct of its foreign relations and defence independently of the foreign relations and defence of the States impossible.

4. India does not desire the continuance of any relationship between herself and the Indian States now exercised by the Paramount Power from motives of prestige. Nor is it India's desire to offend the dignity of Indian States by the use of any such term as "subordinate cooperation" to describe her relationship with the States. But, "to safeguard the interests of the community as a whole"—the phrase is quoted from paragraph 29 of the Report of the Butler Committee—the new Dominion of India must broadly retain the right to continue, in the administrative and economic as well as in the political field, the same relationships as have always prevailed between the States and the Paramount Power. The only matters which, *prima facie*, do not appear to affect



“the interests of the community as a whole” are dynastic ones; these may be excepted from the scope of the proposed relationship if the States so desire.

5. In paragraph 39 of the Butler Report, the following passage occurs: “It is not in accordance with historical fact that when the Indian States came into contact with British Power they were independent, each possessed of full sovereignty which no modern international lawyer would hold to be governed by the rules of international law. In fact, none of the States ever held international status”. It would be a strange commentary on the facts of modern government if the creation of two States, successors to British Power in India, were to result in the conferment on Indian States of an international status which they never enjoyed before, to the almost certain detriment of one or both successor States and without any apparent commensurate benefit to the people of the States. Such a sequel to the withdrawal of British Power from India, no successor government, conscious of its responsibilities to its own people, could accept.

<sup>1</sup>No.2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., paras 2, 4 & 5.

## 10

*Statement by Sardar Patel on Indian States*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/143*

NEW DELHI,

5 July 1947

It was announced some days back that the Government of India had decided to set up a department to conduct their relations with the States in matters of common concern. This department has come into being today and the States have been informed to this effect.

2. On this important occasion, I have a few words to say to the Rulers of the Indian States, among whom I am happy to count many as my personal friends. It is the lesson of history that it was owing to her politically fragmented condition and our inability to make a united stand that India succumbed to successive waves of invaders. Our mutual conflicts and internecine quarrels and jealousies have in the past been the cause of our downfall and our falling victims to foreign domination a number of times. We cannot afford to fall into those errors or traps again. We are on the threshold of independence.



3. It is true we have not been able to preserve the unity of the country entirely unimpaired in the final stage. To the bitter disappointment and sorrow of many of us, some parts have chosen to go out of India and set up their own governments. But there can be no question that despite this separation, the fundamental homogeneity of culture and sentiment, reinforced by the compulsive logic of mutual interest, would continue to govern us. Much more would this be the case with that vast majority of States which, owing to their geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties—economic, cultural and political—must continue to maintain relations of mutual friendship and co-operation with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these States, as well as of India, demand unity and mutual co-operation between its different parts.

4. When the British established their rule in India, they evolved the doctrine of Paramountcy, which established the supremacy of British interests. That doctrine has remained undefined to this day, but in its exercise there has undoubtedly been more subordination than co-operation. Outside the field of Paramountcy, there had been very wide scope in which relations between British India and the States have been regulated by enlightened mutual interests. Now that British rule is ending, the demand has been made that the States should regain their independence.

5. I do not think it can be their desire to utilize this freedom from domination in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which militates against the ultimate Paramountcy of popular interest and welfare, or which might result in abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that has developed between British India and the Indian States during the last century. This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that the great majority of Indian States have already come into the Constituent Assembly. To those who have not done so, I appeal that they should join now. The States have already accepted the basic principle that for defence, foreign affairs and communications they would come into an Indian Union. We ask no more of them than accession on these three subjects, in which the common interests of the country are involved. In other matters, we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence.<sup>1</sup>

6. This country, with its institutions, is the proud heritage of the people who inhabit it. It is an accident that some live in States and some in British India, but all alike partake of its culture and character. We are all knit together by bonds of blood and feeling, no less than of self-interest. None can segregate us into segments; no impassable barriers can be set up between us. I suggest it is, therefore, better for us to make laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties as aliens.



7. I invite my friends, the Rulers of the States, and their States and their people to the Councils of the Constituent Assembly in this spirit of friendliness and co-operation in a joint endeavour inspired by a common allegiance to our Motherland, for the common good of us all.

8. There appears to be a great deal of misunderstanding about the attitude of the Congress towards the States. I should like to make it clear that it is not the desire of the Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic affairs of the States. They are no enemies of the Princely Order but, on the other hand, wish them and their people, under their aegis, all prosperity, contentment and happiness. Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would be that of our mutual interests and welfare. We have no ulterior motive or selfish interests to serve. The common objective should be to understand each other's point of view and come to decisions acceptable to all and in the best interests of the country.<sup>2</sup>

9. With this object, I propose to explore the possibility of associating with the administration of the new Department a standing committee, representative of both the States and British India.

10. We are at a momentous stage in the history of India. By common endeavour, we can raise this country to new greatness, while a lack of unity will expose us to fresh calamities. I hope the Indian States will bear in mind that the alternative to co-operation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which will overwhelm great and small in common ruin if we are unable to act together in minimum of common tasks.

11. Let not future generations curse us for having had the opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. Instead, let it be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually beneficial relationship which would raise this sacred land to its proper place amongst the nations of the world and turn it into an abode of peace and prosperity.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1&2</sup>In his telegram No. 1788-S of 6 July to Listowel, the Viceroy commented on the fifth and eighth paras of Patel's statement: "Though I doubt whether Nehru would go as far as Patel, this may be taken as an official statement on behalf of the Congress and it is likely to have a valuable effect. It also may be useful to you in Parliament". See F. 200/143, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

<sup>3</sup>This statement, though issued by Vallabhbhai Patel, had been drafted by V. P. Menon who was complimented by Mountbatten on 7 July 1947, for its terms, which Mountbatten considered "quite excellent". Ibid.



## 11

*Record of Interview Between Louis Mountbatten and Sardar Abdur  
Rab Nishtar and Akhtar Hussain<sup>1</sup>*

*[Extract]*

*Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy's Interview No. 167<sup>2</sup>*

*18 July 1947*

*[Para 1 omitted]*

2. There followed a discussion about Kalat. Sardar Nishtar agreed that Pakistan would not want the States to accede on more than three closely defined subjects (Defence, External Affairs and Communications). Pakistan would not have a policy of accepting all States that wished to accede. They would consider requests on their merits. Pakistan had no wish to coerce any State, but they would be embarrassed if States within their sphere of influence wished to join the Indian Union, and would have to consider their attitude.

3. Sardar Nishtar added that the League had always opposed the 1935 scheme of federation, and might not agree to the Act being adapted so as to use Part 2 for the Pakistan Constitution. Their position, therefore, about the accession of States, is still a little uncertain. In any case, they would be prepared, if necessary, to enter into treaty relationships with the States, if the States preferred that.

4. Sardar Nishtar asked that for the forthcoming meeting with the States, there should be separate representation of those States which were included in groups of which the majority wished to join the Indian Union, but did not wish to do so themselves. H.E directed PSV to take this up with Political Adviser.

*[Para 5 omitted]*

6. There was some discussion on the question of tariffs, and whether they would have to be included under Foreign Affairs, and H.E directed Mr Akhtar Hussain to get the Draft Instrument of Accession on which Mr Menon was working, and arrange that H.E. should have a brief before the meeting indicating the League's attitude about the points covered by the Instrument of Accession.

*[Paras 7 and 8 omitted]*

G.E.B. ABELL

<sup>1</sup>Deputy Secretary, States Department in the Provisional Government of Pakistan.

<sup>2</sup>No. 159, *TP*, XII, 221-2. The record was prepared by George Abell.



## 12

*Abdur Rab Nishtar to Louis Mountbatten*<sup>1</sup>

R/3/1/138

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS,  
26 FERROZESHAH ROAD, NEW DELHI,  
20 July 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am leaving tomorrow for Karachi and will probably return on Wednesday.<sup>2</sup> I am sending you a suggestion in connection with the States Conference which is to be held on the 25th instant. I understand that at the Conference you propose to discuss with the representatives of various States *inter alia* the question of their accession to one or the other Dominion and the Standstill Agreement. As you know these are matters of vital importance and can be successfully dealt with only if the representatives of the two future Dominions are present at the Conference. Therefore, I think it would be better if those members of the Congress and Muslim League who normally attend the Partition Council are invited to attend the Conference. In their absence I believe the discussion may not prove very fruitful because occasions may arise when an authoritative declaration on behalf of the Dominion concerned on certain points arising out of discussion becomes necessary. So far, I do not know whether you propose to invite the two members who represent the State[s] Departments of the present Government of India, namely Sardar Patel and myself. But even if we are present as Members in charge of State[s] Departments, we could speak only on behalf of our respective sections of the present Government of India and not on behalf of the future Dominions of India and Pakistan; and I hope you will agree with me that it is the concern of the representatives of the future Dominions to negotiate with regard to the important matters that will be discussed at the Conference.

I had pointed out to you during our discussion on the 18th instant that at present representations are arranged by Political Department on the basis of set groups but in view of the fact that the States put together in certain groups have adopted different attitudes on the question of joining the Indian Constituent Assembly, it is essential that those States who have not joined the said Constituent Assembly are given separate representation because representatives belonging to the States who have decided to join the Indian Constituent Assembly cannot properly represent the views of the others. As a matter of fact



one of the main objects of the Conference, if I have correctly understood it, is to persuade those who are keeping away so far, therefore, their representation is more needed than that of others. You were pleased to direct your Private Secretary<sup>3</sup> to bring the matter to the notice of Sir Conrad Corfield. I hope necessary steps have been taken in that direction.

Yours sincerely,  
A. R. NISHTAR

<sup>1</sup>No. 186, TP, XII, 276-7.

<sup>2</sup>23 July 1947.

<sup>3</sup>George Abell.

## 13

*Louis Mountbatten to Abdur Rab Nishtar*<sup>1</sup>

R/3/1/138

No. 592/89

22 July 1947

Dear Mr Nishtar,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th July<sup>2</sup> about the States Conference.

It is my intention to meet the representatives of the States separately in my capacity as Crown Representative. I am sure this is the right course. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel will not be present at the Conference.

If I cannot obtain from the representatives of the States those terms which the two States Departments want, I may find it necessary to put them in direct touch with you, and with Sardar Patel, and if necessary with the Partition Council.

In regard to the point raised in the second paragraph of your letter—individual representation of States included in Groups—there appears to be some misunderstanding. For purposes of States' representation in the Constituent Assembly set up under the Cabinet Mission Plan, it was necessary to distribute among States on a population basis the 93 seats available to them. The method of distributing these seats was one of the main questions which the States' Negotiating Committee, appointed by the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes, had to decide in consultation with the corresponding Committee set up by the Constituent Assembly. Agreement was reached in regard to the allocation of these seats, and most of the individual States or groups of States which have decided to participate in the



proceedings of the Constituent Assembly have already sent their representatives to that body. This grouping of States was however solely for the purposes of representation in the Constituent Assembly, and it does not bind States in any way in regard to the Conference<sup>3</sup> on July 25. I enclose a copy of an express letter sent by the Political Department to all Residents on June 21, 1947,<sup>4</sup> (before the States Department had been formed). This will show that, for the purposes of the Conference, every State is asked to send an accredited representative to the meeting. As many States as possible are asked to combine to send a joint representative, but there is absolutely no suggestion that the grouping adopted for purposes of the Constituent Assembly should be followed for purpose of the Conference.<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

<sup>1</sup>No. 217, *TP*, XII, 312-3.

<sup>2</sup>No. 12.

<sup>3</sup>No. 14.

<sup>4</sup>No. 287, *TP*, XI, 546-7.

<sup>5</sup>The States Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes and the States Committee of the Constituent Assembly both agreed that not less than 50 per cent of the total representatives of States were to be elected by the elected members of legislatures or, where such legislatures did not exist, of other electoral colleges. See No. 485, *TP*, IX, 855.

## 14

*Press Communique' of an Address by Louis Mountbatten to a Conference of the Rulers and Representatives of Indian States<sup>1</sup>*

R/3/1/139

[*Extract*]

25 July 1947

A conference of the Rulers and representatives of Indian States was held at 3.30 p.m in the Chamber of Princes on Friday, the 25th July, 1947, His Excellency the Viceroy presiding.

Addressing the Conference, H.E the Viceroy said:  
Your Highnesses and Gentlemen!

It is a great pleasure and a great privilege for me to address so many Rulers, Dewans and representatives of the States of India in this historic Chamber of Princes. It is my first and my last occasion that I have the privilege of addressing you as Crown Representative.

I would like to begin with by giving you a very brief history of the negotiations I have conducted since I have been out here and the line



that I have taken up about the States.

There were two distinct problems that faced me. The first was how to transfer power to British India and the second, how to fit the Indian States into the picture in a manner which would be fair and just to all concerned.

I dealt first with the problem of British India, because you will realize that until that problem was solved it was quite useless to try to start on a solution of the problem of the States. So I addressed my mind to that.

Here I digress. There was a universal acceptance among the States of the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum of May 12<sup>2</sup> and when the parties accepted my Statement of June 3rd<sup>3</sup> they fully realized that withdrawal of Paramountcy would enable the States to regain complete sovereignty. That gave me a starting point from which to try and deal fairly with the States.

But before I got down to dealing with the States, there was one other thing that I clearly had to do. I had to address myself to the problem of the mechanics of partition—a plan against my personal desires. As you all know, it took three years to separate Burma from India, in spite of the fact (as I can testify, as also His Highness of Bundi and others) that there are no roads running between India and Burma. Nevertheless, it took three years to arrange that partition. It took two years to separate the Province of Sind from Bombay. It took two years to separate the Province of Orissa from Bihar. Gentlemen, we decided that in less than 2.5 months we shall have to go through the partitioning of one of the biggest countries in the world with 400 million inhabitants. There was a reason for the speed, I was quite certain that while the British overlordship remained, no satisfactory conclusions could be reached psychologically between the parties. So once we got the two Governments set up and separated, they would be able to try and finish off the details in an atmosphere of goodwill.

Now, the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all their obligations to the Crown.<sup>4</sup> The States have complete freedom—technically and legally they are independent. Presently, I will discuss the degree of independence which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States. But there has grown up during the period of British administration, owing to the fact that the Crown Representative and the Viceroy are one and the same person, a system of co-ordinated administration on all matters of common concern which mean[s] that the sub-continent of India acted as an economic entity. That link is now to be broken. If nothing can be put in its place, only chaos can result, and that chaos, I submit, will hurt the States first—the bigger



the State the less the hurt and the longer it will take to feel it—but even the biggest of States will feel herself hurt just the same as any small State. The first step was to set up some machinery by which it was possible to put the two future Governments of India—the Dominion of India and [the Dominion of] Pakistan—into direct touch with the States. So we conceived the scheme of setting up two States Departments<sup>5</sup> within the future Governments. Please note that these States Departments are not the successors of the Political Department. They have been set up simultaneously and side by side. While the Political Department exercised functions relating to Paramountcy on behalf of the Crown Representative, the State[s] Departments are to take over those subjects gradually which have nothing to do with Paramountcy but which will be concerned with relations with neighbouring States and also provide the machinery to negotiate in such matters. In India the States Department is under the admirable guidance of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel with my own Reforms Commissioner, Mr V.P Menon as Secretary. In Pakistan the Department is under Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar with Mr Ikramullah as the Secretary. It was necessary to set up two States Departments, one in each Government, because the States are theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care. But when I say that they are at liberty to link up with either of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded. Out of something like 565 States, the vast majority are irretrievably linked geographically with the Dominion of India. The problem, therefore, is of far greater magnitude with the Dominion of India than it is with Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, the States, although important, are not so numerous, and Mr Jinnah, the future Governor-General of Pakistan is prepared to negotiate the case of each State separately and individually.<sup>6</sup> But in the case of India, where the overwhelming majority of the States are involved, clearly separate negotiation with each State is out of the question.

The first step that I took was to suggest that in the Bill before Parliament—the Indian Independence Act—a clause should be put in which would enable certain essential agreements to continue until renounced by either side. That was only done to ensure that there should be some continuity and to see if in the short time available it was not possible to get the agreement through with every State representative. It does not replace the need for Standstill Agreements; it gives a very slight breathing space.

Now, I think it is no exaggeration to say that most Rulers and Dewans were apprehensive as to what their future would be when



Paramountcy lapsed. At one time it appeared that unless they joined the Constituent Assembly and accepted the constitution when it was framed, they would be outside the organization and left in a position which, I submit, if you think it over carefully, no State could view with equanimity—to be left out having no satisfactory relations or contacts with either Dominion Government. You can imagine how relieved I was, and I am sure you will yourselves have been equally relieved, when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on taking over the States Department made, if I may say so, a most statesmanlike statement of what he considered were the essentials towards agreement between the States and the Dominions of India.

Let us turn for one moment to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16th May 1946. In this Plan the proposal was that the States should surrender to the Central Government three subjects—Defence, External Affairs and Communications.<sup>7</sup> That was a Plan which, to the best of my belief, every Ruler and every State accepted as reasonable, fair and just. I talked with so many Rulers and everyone felt that Defence was a matter that a State could not conduct of itself. I am not talking of internal security but of defence against external aggression. I submit, therefore, that if you do not link up with one or the other of the Dominions, you will be cut off from any source of supplies of up-to-date arms or weapons.

External Affairs is inextricably linked up with Defence. External affairs is something again which is outside the boundaries of India in which not even the greatest State can operate effectively. You can hardly want to go to the expense of having Ambassadors or Ministers or Consuls in all these foreign countries; surely you want to be able to use those of India and Pakistan. Once more, I suggest that External Affairs is something that you have not dealt with since the formation of the East India Company. It would be difficult to operate and will also be a source of embarrassment for you to have to take it up and it can only be managed by those who manage the Defence of the country. I submit that if you take it up it will be a liability and not an asset.

The third subject is Communications. Communications is really a means of maintaining the life blood of the whole sub-continent. I imagine everybody agrees that the country has got to go on. The continuity of Communications is already provided for to a certain extent in the Indian Independence Act; and most of the representatives here have come to discuss it as item 2 on the agenda.

Therefore, I am sure you will agree that these three subjects have got to be handled for you for your convenience and advantage by a larger organization. This seems so obvious that I was at a loss to



understand why some Rulers were reluctant to accept the position. One explanation probably was that some of you were apprehensive that the Central Government would attempt to impose a financial liability on the States or encroach in other ways on their Sovereignty. If I am right in this assumption, at any rate so far as some Princes are concerned, I think I must dispel their apprehensions and misgivings. The Draft Instrument of Accession<sup>8</sup> which I have caused to be circulated, as a basis for discussion and not for publication, to the representatives of the States provides that the States accede to the appropriate Dominion on three subjects only without any financial liability. Further, that Instrument contains an explicit provision that in no other matters has the Central Government any authority to encroach on the internal autonomy or the sovereignty of the States. This would, in my view, be a tremendous achievement for the States. But I must make it clear that I have still to persuade the Government of India to accept it. If all of you would co-operate with me and are ready to accede, I am confident that I can succeed in my efforts. Remember that the day of the transfer of power is very close at hand and, if you are prepared to come, you must come before the 15th August. I have no doubt that this is in the best interests of the States, and every wise Ruler and wise Government would desire to link up with the great Dominion of India on a basis which leaves you great internal autonomy and which at the same time gets rid of your worries and cares over External Affairs, Defence and Communications.

The whole country is passing through a critical period. I am not asking any State to make any intolerable sacrifice of either its internal autonomy or independence. My scheme leaves you with all the practical independence that you can possibly use and makes you free of all those subjects which you cannot possibly manage on your own. You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible. Whatever may be your decision, I hope you feel that I have at least done my duty by the States.

His Excellency then proposed [a 22—member] Committee for a detailed consideration of the items on the agenda:

*[Names omitted]*

His Excellency stated that the idea was to have a compact body to save time. They could split into two sub-committees, one to discuss the Draft Instrument of Accession and the other to discuss the Standstill Agreements and other matters. He sincerely trusted that the other State representatives would not leave Delhi and that they would maintain



daily contact with the members of the Committee to make sure that the Committee are conversant with the majority feelings in the States.

<sup>1</sup>On 23 July 1947, V.P. Menon forwarded to George Abell a draft of a speech for the Viceroy's use at the conference scheduled for 25 July 1947. See No. 234, *TP*, XII, 347-51.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.

<sup>3</sup>No. 1, Vol. II, 1-6.

<sup>4</sup>See Enclosure 1 to No. 1, Clause 7 (1) (b), Vol. III, 8.

<sup>5</sup>The proposal to set up a States Department in the future Dominion Governments was taken up by Mountbatten at a meeting on 13 June 1947 and accepted by both Nehru and Jinnah. See No. 5. Vallabhbhai Patel in his statement regarding future of the Indian States also announced the Government of India's decision "to set up a department to conduct their relations with the States". See No. 10. Following the King's assent to the Indian Independence Bill, the Interim Government was reconstituted into two groups, one for India and the other for Pakistan. See No. 170, *TP*, XII, 257-8.

<sup>6</sup>Nishtar had asked for "separate representation of those States which were included in groups of which the majority wished to join the Indian Union, but did not wish to do so themselves." See No. 11, para 4.

<sup>7</sup>See Appendix III, Vol. I, Part I, 32-42.

<sup>8</sup>For the amended final copy of the Instrument of Accession, see Enclosure to No. 15.

## 15

### *Memorandum by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations* *PRO, FO 371/F. 12773*

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,  
KING CHARLES STREET, LONDON S.W 1,  
12 September 1947

CABINET

INDIA AND BURMA COMMITTEE

ACCESSION OF INDIAN STATES TO THE DOMINIONS  
OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The India and Burma Committee may like to have the following summary of information about the progress of negotiations for the association of the Indian States with the Dominions of India or Pakistan. It is derived partly from Lord Mountbatten's reports<sup>1</sup> up to 15th August and partly from what the U.K. High Commissioners in India and Pakistan have since reported.

#### A. DOMINION OF INDIA

2. All Salute States (that is to say all but the petty States) within the orbit of the Dominion of India have been invited to accede and, except



Hyderabad and Junagadh, have acceded to the Dominion of India for the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. The numerous matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may consequently make laws for these States are detailed in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession.<sup>2</sup> This Instrument, devised by the Government of India States Department, closely resembles in form the Instrument proposed by Lord Linlithgow for accession to Federation under the 1935 Act. All the above States, except, we gather, Hyderabad and Junagadh, have also entered into "Standstill" Agreements with that Dominion whereby, until new agreements have been made between the parties, all agreements and arrangements on matters of common concern existing before 15th August between the Crown and each State remain in force, so far as appropriate, between the Dominion of India and the State. A copy of this Agreement is annexed.<sup>3</sup> The matters, mainly of an economic character, to which it particularly applies, are detailed in the Schedule referred to in the Agreement. The terms and form of the Standstill Agreement were suggested to the Government of India by the Political Department of the Crown Representative before his functions ceased.

3. The Nizam of Hyderabad would have been ready to accede to a United India; but the division of India on a communal basis has put him in a dilemma. If he accedes to the Dominion of India he will have trouble with the Muslims in his State which, although only 13% of the population, are regarded as the most forceful element in the State. If he accedes to Pakistan, he would be going counter to the compulsions of geography, the Hindu majority in the State would be stimulated by the Congress Party into rebellion, and the State would probably be subjected to considerable economic pressure from the Dominion of India. The Hyderabad Government, therefore, wants to enter into a treaty, rather than federate, with the Dominion of India. In particular, it is anxious to be free of any obligation to participate on the side of India in the event of war between India and Pakistan, and claims the right to secede from the Dominion of India in the event of that Dominion leaving the Commonwealth. Hyderabad stands in a separate category from any other Indian State, being larger and more populous than several of the Provinces of the Dominions and probably more wealthy. Negotiations between the State and the Dominion of India are in progress and Lord Mountbatten has agreed to continue to represent the Dominion in the negotiations. Hitherto, the Dominion of India have declined to consider any settlement short of Hyderabad's accession for Defence, External Affairs and Communications. There are Press reports that the Nizam declared<sup>4</sup> on 21st August that he had



assumed independent sovereign status on 15th August and that he had taken the title of "King".

4. Junagadh is a State situated on the sea coast of Kathiawar, with Muslim Ruler and a population, mostly Hindu, of about 600,000. The Ruler has announced his intention<sup>5</sup> of joining Pakistan. The State can maintain sea communications with Karachi through its ports, but in other respects, is economically linked to neighbouring States which have joined India.

5. There are many petty States in Kathiawar and Gujrat which enjoy very limited, or no jurisdictional powers. Four years ago, some 327 of these States were, by our mediation, attached for administrative purposes to large neighbouring States such as Baroda and Nawanagar, with which they have economic and in some cases dynastic associations. The effect of Section 7(1) (b) of the Indian Independence Act was to remove from these small States, the limitations on their internal authority imposed by the British authorities and continued by the "attaching" States. It was expected that in practice the "attaching" States would retain their influence over them. The Dominion of India have however decided to assume the jurisdiction exercised by the Crown Representative in these petty States before their attachment, and they claim in this to be acting with the general agreement of the Chiefs and *Talukadars* concerned. They have offered to allow these "Rulers" to sign Instruments of Accession, conceding this jurisdiction. The object of the Government of India in assuming this jurisdiction is said to be mainly to obtain a vantage ground from which to observe the activities of the Maritime States of western India whose sea-borne trade with the interior might escape Indian customs duties.

6. The U.K. High Commissioner in India has also reported information from confidential sources indicating that certain other States, besides the petty attached States in Western India, are in the process of accepting the Paramountcy of the Dominion of India. The Maharaja Holkar of Indore is stated to have sought the Government of India's recognition as his heir, of the son of his present American wife, which has been refused, but to have accepted advice to dismiss his Prime Minister, a retired British Police Officer, who had not been in favour of Indore's accession to India. Balasinore, a small State in Gujrat, appealed to the Government of India and neighbour States about the time of the transfer of power for help on account of internal troubles. An officer of the Bombay Government with provincial police has restored order there. A new Dewan has also been appointed on the advice of the Government of India. The present Ruler of Rewa has also appealed to the Government of India for help against the intrigues of



his father, the late Ruler, who was excluded from the State some years ago by the Crown Representative under suspicion of grave charges but has now re-entered Rewa. Sir Terence Shone suggests that these instances go to show that after 100 years and more of Paramountcy by the British Crown, some States, for all that they may say about their independence, are, by their own actions and the force of past habit, straightaway recognizing a new Paramountcy of the State Department of the Government of India. The High Commissioner further suggests that, if elected representatives of the States in the Constituent Assembly decide that the States should extend their accession to the Indian Union to all Central subjects under the new Indian Constitution, it may be difficult for the Rulers to resist such pressure. It appears that the Congress organizations in the States are now hinting that within 12 months every Ruler will have to give his people self-government. The State of Cochin has just given a lead in making this concession.

#### B. [DOMINION OF] PAKISTAN

7. Pakistan is moving more slowly than the Dominion of India in negotiations with the States in its orbit. Mr Jinnah appears to have made attempts to attract States in the orbit of the Dominion of India away from accession to that Dominion by offering, on behalf of Pakistan, to accept a treaty rather than a federal association with them, and it was only under strong personal persuasion from Lord Mountbatten that the Maharaja of Jodhpur, a State adjoining Pakistan, (whose example it was thought would have been followed by other States of Rajputana) was induced to accede to the Dominion of India and to refuse Mr Jinnah's offer.<sup>6</sup> The Pakistan Government have set up a Negotiating Committee to deal with each State separately. So far, no States appear to have concluded an arrangement with Pakistan, but besides Junagadh, Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Chitral, the principal States adjoining the Dominion, have declared their intention to become associated with it. Bahawalpur has also concluded a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan.

8. Kashmir has concluded Standstill Agreement with both Pakistan<sup>7</sup> and the Dominion of India. The main economic interest of the State is to preserve a treaty right under Paramountcy to import goods from abroad free of customs duty. The Maharaja is a Hindu, while the population is mainly Muslim, although there is an influential Brahmin ruling class. The State is dependent on Pakistan for its communications with the outside world, although it has a common frontier also, though in difficult country, with the Dominion of India. The Maharaja has not disclosed



his hand but has spoken of holding a referendum.

9. Pakistan has entered into negotiations with Kalat on the basis of recognizing the State's claim to independence and of treating the previous agreements between the Crown and Kalat providing for the lease of Quetta and other areas, which would otherwise lapse under Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian Independence Act, as international agreements untouched by the termination of Paramountcy. The Khan of Kalat, whose territory marches with Persia, is of course in no position to undertake the international responsibilities of an independent State, and Lord Mountbatten, who before the transfer of power, was warned of the dangers of such a development doubtless passed on this warning to the Pakistan Government. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pakistan is being informed of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan Government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the State as a separate international entity.<sup>8</sup> One consequence might well be that the Pakistan Government would be obliged to concede to Kashmir a similar recognition, although Kashmir has certainly never been independent, having been created by the British for the present dynasty on the conclusion of the Sikh wars<sup>9</sup>, and is hardly equipped to maintain the international responsibilities of an independent State *vis-a-vis* its neighbours, Russia and China.

A[RTHUR] H[ENDERSON]  
[Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations]

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix VI. 2, paras 26, 32 & 34, Vol. III, 943-9, Appendix VI. 4, paras 15-26, *ibid.*, 955-9 and Appendix VI, paras 41-3, 47-9 and 51, Vol. V, 626-8.

<sup>2</sup>Enclosure 1.

<sup>3</sup>Enclosure 2.

<sup>4</sup>The *Firman* was issued by the Nizam declaring himself as having "assumed Independent Sovereign status". See the *Pakistan Times*, 23 August 1947.

<sup>5</sup>The Governments of Pakistan and Junagadh State had signed a formal Standstill Agreement on 9 September. See the *Pakistan Times*, 12 September 1947.

<sup>6</sup>See Appendix VI. 2, paras 58-60, Vol. IV, 482.

<sup>7</sup>In fact, the State of Jammu & Kashmir had signed a Standstill Agreement only with Pakistan on 26 August 1947. See the *Pakistan Times*, 28 August 1947.

<sup>8</sup>See Annex I to PS-66. The agreement of 11 August 1947 recognized "Kalat as an Independent Sovereign State in treaty relationship with the British Government, with a status different from that of Indian States."

<sup>9</sup>The First Anglo-Sikh War was fought in 1845-6, and the Second in 1849.

### *Enclosure 1 to No. 15*

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION<sup>1</sup> OF .....

WHEREAS the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from



the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as India and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of India;

AND WHEREAS the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor-General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof:

NOW THEREFORE

I.....  
Ruler of .....  
in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State Do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of ..... (hereinafter referred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule<sup>2</sup> hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State.

4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary



to this Instrument.

6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion, for the purposes of a Dominion law which applies in this State, deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expenses or if the land belongs to me, transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future constitution.

8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.

9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this ..... day of August, Nineteen hundred and forty seven.

I do hereby accept this Instrument of accession.

Dated this ..... day of August, Nineteen hundred and forty seven.

.....  
(Governor-General of India)

<sup>1</sup>Annexure I.

<sup>2</sup>Annexure II.

### *Annexure I to Enclosure 1 to No. 15*

The Instrument of Accession, as adapted by Pakistan, incorporated the following changes.<sup>1</sup>

Para and Line as in text

As adapted in Pakistan

1 line 3-India

Pakistan

1 line 6-Dominion of India

Federation of Pakistan

3(1) line 1-Dominion of India

Federation of Pakistan



3(1) lines 2, 3-Dominion	Federal
3(1) lines 4, 6-Dominion	Federation
3(1) line 9-Dominion of India	Federation of Pakistan
3(3) line 2-Dominion	Federal
3(4) line 1-Dominion of India	Federation of Pakistan
3(4) line 5-Dominion Legislature	Federal Legislature
3(6) line 1-Dominion Legislature	Federal Legislature
3(6) line 4-Dominion	Federal Government of Pakistan
3(6) line 9-India	Pakistan
3(7) line 3-India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India	Pakistan or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreement established with the Government of Pakistan
3(8) line 4-authority and rights Last line-Governor-General of India	authority, rights and jurisdiction Governor-General of Pakistan

<sup>1</sup>See Government of Pakistan, *Instruments of Accession and Schedules of States Acceding to Pakistan*, Karachi 1949.

## *Annexure II to Enclosure 1 to No. 15*

### SCHEDULE<sup>1</sup>

#### THE MATTERS WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE DOMINION LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE LAWS FOR THE STATE

##### A. DEFENCE

1. The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other armed force raised or maintained by the Dominion; any armed forces, including forces raised or maintained by an Acceding State, which are attached to, or operating with, any of the armed forces of the Dominion.

2. Naval, military and air force works, administration of cantonment areas.

3. Arms; fire-arms; ammunition.

4. Explosives.

##### B. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's dominions outside India.

2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from India, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are not British subjects domiciled in India or subjects of any acceding State; pilgrimages to places beyond India.



### 3. Naturalization.

#### C. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication.

2. Federal railways; the regulation of all railways other than minor railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers; the regulation of minor railways in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods, and passengers.

3. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.

4. Port quarantine

5. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the constitution and powers of Port Authorities therein.

6. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and organization of air traffic and of aerodromes.

7. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety of shipping and aircraft.

8. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.

9. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force belonging to any unit to railway area outside that unit.

#### D. ANCILLARY

1. Elections to the Dominion Legislature, subject to the provisions of the Act and of any Order made thereunder.

2. Offences against laws with respect to any of the aforesaid matters.

3. Enquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the aforesaid matters.

4. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the aforesaid matters but, except with the consent of the Ruler of the Acceding State, not so as to confer any jurisdiction or powers upon any courts other than courts ordinarily exercising jurisdiction in or in relation to that State.

<sup>1</sup>In the Schedule to the Standstill Agreement, as adapted by Pakistan, the word 'Pakistan,' wherever appearing in the text, was substituted for 'India'.



*Enclosure 2 to No. 15*AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF... AND THE  
DOMINION OF INDIA

Whereas it is to the benefit and advantage of the Dominion of India as well as of the Indian States that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in the matters of common concern, should continue for the time being between the Dominion of India or any part thereof and the Indian States:

Now, therefore, it is agreed between the...State and the Dominion of India that:

1. (i) Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern now existing between the Crown and any Indian State shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of India or, as the case may be, the part thereof, and the State.

(ii) In particular, and without derogation from the generality of sub-clause (i) of this clause the matters referred to above shall include the matters specified in the Schedule to this Agreement.

2. Any dispute arising out of this Agreement, or out of the agreements or arrangements hereby continued, shall, unless any provision is made therein for arbitration by an authority other than the Governor-General or Governor, be settled by arbitration according, as far as may be, to the procedure of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899.

3. Nothing in this Agreement includes the exercise of any Paramountcy functions.

[Signature of Representative of]... State  
[Signature] Secretary to the Government of India

## Schedule

1. Air Communications
2. Arms and equipment
3. Control of commodities
4. Currency and coinage
5. Customs
6. Indian States Forces
7. External Affairs
8. Extradition
9. Import and Export Control
10. Irrigation and Electric Power
11. Motor vehicles



- 
12. National Highways
  13. Opium
  14. Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.
  15. Railways (including police and other arrangements in Railway lands)
  16. Salt
  17. Central Excises, relief from double income-tax and other arrangements relating to taxation
  18. Wireless



STATES ACCEDING TO PAKISTAN



AMB STATE



## PS-16

*Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah**F. 7-GG/3-5*

SHERGARH,  
P.O. OGHI,  
3 August 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

*[Paras 1 to 3 omitted]*

4. A wrong impression is being widely created in the tribal areas that, with the lapse of Paramountcy on 15th of August, everybody will be his own master and there will be no power to restrain them from flying at each other's throats, and some preparations with that end in view have also been in progress. I and my Adviser, K.B Major Rana Talia Moh[amma]d Khan, B.A., O.B.E, I. P (Retd.), have been trying to contradict this false propaganda but without much effect. In a private letter to Sir Rob Lockhart, the present acting Governor, who is an old friend of his, he has laid stress on the great necessity for a local official declaration on the subject. People in tribal areas do not read newspapers and very seldom hear wireless broadcasts, otherwise your recent pronouncements could have made them understand the true position. My Adviser named above and another representative will come to Karachi as soon as possible after the 15th of August and will submit to you a number of local problems which deserve your consideration. The Standstill formula is not known to many and has not so far been officially discussed. I have accepted the continuance of the present political control till fresh agreements are made with the Pakistan Government, but my friend, the Nawab of Dir, still persists in believing that the British power will never go from India and that even if such a thing miraculously happens, he will be free to do what he likes on 16th of August, which means that he will clash with Swat or vice versa. This will draw other neighbouring tribes into the conflict. I may hold out for some time but in the end may have to fulfil the friendly pacts and agreements that have existed between his and my forefathers. I will do my best to smoothen matters but in Pathan countries *[sic]* sudden spates of this nature leave one helpless.

5. The above is for your personal information. You may talk over things with Sir George Cunningham when he is passing through. The prompt enforcement of *Shari'at* laws throughout Pakistan is also being



used as a lever to cause disruption. The Hazara Dist[ri]ct which has done so much in the League's cause has started feeling that they are being ignored by the more powerful Peshawar clique.

6. I apologise for taking so much of your valuable time but, as you were not able to come for a long time, I felt I must let you know privately what people feel here. I hope you will not mind if I let you have my views occasionally on such matters that may be exercising the minds of people of these parts.

7. With best wishes for you and your esteemed sister's long life and health,

Yours sincerely,  
M. FARID KHAN

PS-17

*Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 7-GG/6-7*

SHERGARH,  
P.O. OGHI,  
13 August [19]47

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

*[Paras 1 to 3 omitted]*

4. It seems necessary that some programme was made for the discussion and conclusion of future agreements with the Frontier States and with the large number of tribes in the tribal belt. Peshawar would perhaps be the best venue for such discussions and conferences. The tribal representation will have to be much larger and the population basis standard as applied to British India will have to be very much relaxed. The rule of one representative per million of population will give only three representatives to the whole of the tribal belt and one representative to all of the Frontier States. For obvious reasons it will be impossible to work this. You have already hit the nail on the head when you announced that the Pakistan Government will be prepared to negotiate with each State individually.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
M. FARID KHAN



## PS-18

*Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 7-GG/11*

SHERGARH,

P.O. OGHI,

1 September 1947

Amb State was first amongst NWFP's States to agree to a Standstill Agreement with and subsequent accession<sup>1</sup> and allegiance to Pakistan. Unreservedly placed all personal and State resources at disposal of Pakistan Government in my telegram dated eleventh July<sup>2</sup> addressed to Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi. Pakistan Radio Service inadvertently omitted Amb State while announcing accession of Frontier States of Dir, Chitral and Swat. Pray announce Amb State's previous decision<sup>3</sup> to rectify radio omission.

M. FARID KHAN

<sup>1</sup>The Ruler of Amb signed the Instrument of Accession on 31 December, 1947, which was accepted by the Governor-General Pakistan the same day. See *Instruments of Accession*, 25-6. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>3</sup>See PS-46.

## PS-19

*Ruler of Amb to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*F. 10 (6)-PMS/6*

*[Extract; original in Urdu]*

DARBAND, AMB STATE,

17 February 1948

Respected Brother Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan,  
*Salamat Bashad,*

I hope this letter finds you in good spirits. I look forward, very anxiously, for a meeting with you and the Quaid-i-Azam.

In the meantime, I consider it necessary to invite your immediate attention to the current dangerous state of landlords-tenants confrontation, which had been instigated by Hindus before partition, with the support of the local miscreants. This movement in NWFP appears to be gaining momentum and a state of civil war conditions, leading to anarchy



and bloodshed, might ensue. The anti-landlord elements are obviously guided by nefarious motives of self-interest, designed to uproot the established social order. Undoubtedly, depriving the lawful owners of land through violent means is an act against Islamic injunctions as well as law of the land. The ongoing confrontation if not checked, will, I am afraid, lead to terrible consequences both for NWFP and Pakistan.

Respected Sir, these forebodings also reflected the views of the experienced people endowed with foresight and love for Pakistan.

I beseech you, Sir, that this movement should be curbed by an iron hand under emergency laws or promulgation of an ordinance. I am sure both the elite and the common man will equally cooperate with the Government in resolving this vital issue of social unrest.

With the prayers, Pakistan *Paindabad*. Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad.

Yours sincere brother,  
MUHAMMAD FARID KHAN  
*Major*

## PS-20

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Amb*

*F. 7-GG/29*

*18 March 1948*

My dear Nawab Sahib,

Thank you for your letter dated the 14th of March 1948.<sup>1</sup>

I have already replied to your letter dated the 5th of March,<sup>2</sup> but it seems to have crossed yours. You will observe from the programme sent by me that I am going to Peshawar on the 4th of April and propose to stay there until the 11th. Perhaps it will be more convenient for you to come and meet me there than to undertake a long journey by road, as you propose to do, to Karachi.

With best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>F. 7-GG/26. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>F. 7-GG/25. Not printed.



## PS-21

*Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah**F. 7-GG/30*

DARBAND, AMB STATE

29 March 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am very grateful for your kind letters of 17th<sup>1</sup> and 18th<sup>2</sup> March 1948. The prospect of meeting you so soon has made me really very glad. I have written to H.E. Sir George Cunningham for information regarding your stay in Peshawar and will go down to Peshawar to pay my respects to you and Miss Jinnah.

It has been a great disappointment to me that there has been no indication of any hope of your visit to my State during the week that you will be in these parts and so near too and for which I had been so eagerly looking forward during the last two years. This omission may perhaps be due to other pressing official engagements that are likely to be crowded into your one week's tour of the Province. I had however always hoped that you will be able to find sometime to fulfil your kind promise of visiting my State whenever you have any opportunity of coming this way.

I am still desirous of visiting Karachi which I have never done before and to see you there in the new capital of the newly born Pakistan State and this I propose doing as soon as possible after your return to Karachi. I will now come by train from Lahore. Although the journey through south western Punjab and Sind plains may be a bit hot but I hear Karachi will be very pleasant and nice.

With kind regards to Miss Jinnah and with the very best of wishes,

Yours sincerely,

M. FARID KHAN

<sup>1</sup>F. 7-GG/27. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>PS-20.



## PS-22

*Ruler of Amb to M. A. Jinnah**F. 7-GG/32-4*

DARBAND (AMB STATE),  
P.O. KIRPLIAN HAZARA DIST.,  
N.W.F. PROVINCE,  
2 June 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

Excuse me if this adds up to your voluminous correspondence, but there are things which needs must be told and to none but yourself. You are the pivot of Pakistan and just as your personal devotion has made it a reality, similarly the same personal devotion and nothing else, representing the Nation's concentrated faith in your guidance and leadership, will bring us nearer to our ideal of making Pakistan the greatest and strongest State of the world. It is for this reason that all eyes turn on you, despite the pitiless calls on your time and energy. Excuse me therefore for addressing you this rather lengthy letter, but I do feel that the points it raises deserve a priority attention and if it were not for my physical ailments with which I am suffering at the moment, I should have asked for your indulgence to place them before you personally. I am looking forward to that opportunity also when my health permits. Here are the points in brief:

## PATHANISTAN STUNT

The Pathanistan stunt, less aggressive now in outward bearings, still forms the nucleus for all anti-Pakistan activities of our enemies on the north western border. It has serious potentialities of catching the imagination of the wild ignorant Pathans, specially when some mysterious powers on the other side of the border with the active aid of the fifth columnists amongst us are blessing it with all their resources. You and your Government must certainly have hit on some plans to curb the mischief but may I, on the basis of my traditional knowledge of the Pathans and the country, suggest a measure for your consideration.

I propose that an influential tribal *Jirga* of all the *Azad tribes* of the NWFP should be organized very secretly, consisting of the real representatives of all the main sections of the tribes. This *Jirga* should independently go to Kabul and impress on the Afghan Government the anti-Islamic designs of the Hindu Indian Government, the genocide of the Muslims in the East Punjab, its intention to swallow Kashmir and



Hyderabad and its ultimate objective to raise [sic] the Muslims to the ground and create a dominant Hindu State throughout Asia. They should reveal to the Afghan Government that they according to the tribal customs have waited upon them as a representative *Jirga* of *azad* tribes with the request that they should be given open military help just as Egypt has done with Arabs from a very far off distance. The obvious place of Afghanistan is with Pakistan and not with its enemies. If the *Jirga* carries its way, as it should and Afghanistan openly identifies itself with Pakistan, well and good; if the *Jirga* comes back disappointed the result will be that a deep gulf of resentment will be created between Afghanistan and the *azad* Frontier tribes bringing the latter in closer embrace with Pakistan. The "Pathanistan cry" will then meet its burial so far as these tribes are concerned and these will then constitute a formidable bulwark against any mischievous action that may be launched by Afghanistan Government. Such a *jirga* should be arranged forthwith even though it may cost considerable money, it is bound to yield fruitful results. The whole matter should remain a top secret.

#### KASHMIR

I beg to repeat that I wrote to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in my letter to him of the 2nd January 1948 that the Kashmir case should be brought to a successful end without engaging into open warfare with the Indian Dominion. But if the military strength of the Pakistan Army and its resources can induce a sure confidence, that we can hold our own in a long-drawn-out battle for at least five years and we can win, it will be much better to strike now, without giving the Indian Govt. time and opportunity to build up its power which it is doing at an accelerated speed. There can be no doubt about the sinister designs of India on Pakistan and the ultimate armed conflict between the two.

#### TRIBAL LASHKAR

I suggest that tribal *lashkar* consisting of eight to nine *lakhs* of able bodied tribesmen be immediately raised under cover of recruitment for the regular forces of the Frontier states of Chitral, Dir, Amb and Swat. Tribal people are born marksmen and they can be fully trained in modern warfare in a comparatively short time. These people can provide their own weapons which can be supplemented by the Government. The Government of course will have to give them pay, ammunition and rations so long as the *lashkar* is in the making; the *Mujahidin* already engaged on the Kashmir front should fight a defensive battle, striking about whenever feasible, without involvement of big risks. When this *lashkar* is made ready it can form the vanguard, with the



regular Pakistan Army flanking behind for defence. This will be a much better military organization than the National Guard battalions on which a good deal of money is being expended. This *lashkar* will, in addition, be a cementing link between the Pakistan Government and the tribal people. This *lashkar* can take on and continue the Kashmir battle as the State forces of the Frontier States.

#### POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN PAKISTAN

As you have repeatedly observed, a grave emergency confronts the Muslim nation. It is of the utmost importance that we must stop [*sic*] all our differences and put our resources for a united front. All enemy organizations must be uprooted mercilessly without giving them any quarter. Even the Muslim League is becoming a hot bed of internal strife and power politics and people are using it handy to attain their selfish ends. With the establishment of Pakistan there is hardly any need for rival political parties. All loyal Pakistanis must be knit together in one ideal, one leader and one organization viz "The State of Pakistan".

Worthy Quaid-i-Azam, these are just some of my ideas on what I consider to be important problems needing immediate attention.<sup>1</sup> I had ventured to write to you before also, but I did not dare ask what reaction my views have on you. Needless to assure you that my submissions to you are saturated with my love for you and Pakistan for which I am prepared to do all I can.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,  
RULER OF AMB

<sup>1</sup>Acknowledging the letter on 20 June 1948, F. Amin assured the Ruler that the points made by the latter would receive Jinnah's consideration. See . F. 7-GG/35. Not printed.

PS-23

*Sardar Bahadur Khan to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*F. 10 (5)-PMS/1*

ABBOTTABAD,  
[10] July 1948

My dear Nawabzada Sahib,

I hope my letter will find you in good health. As promised by me in my interview on 4 June 1948 before I left Karachi, I enclose herewith a



sketch note giving a picture of the Amb State. I hope you will kindly give the matter your due consideration, for I fear there are influences at work interested in securing a position of advantage for the Nawab to the detriment of Pakistan. I addressed the Assembly office on this subject some 8 months back but no action seems to have been taken in the matter.

I hope to be in Karachi on 14 July and will meet you to discuss the Assembly session programme personally.

Yours sincerely,  
SARDAR BAHADUR KHAN  
MLA

*Enclosure to PS-23*  
*Note by Sardar Bahadur Khan*

*F. 10 (5)-PMS/2-3*

AMB STATE,  
HAZARA DISTRICT, NWFP

A. Amb is a small State situated on the border of the Hazara District in the N.W.F.P. It has got an area of about 400 sq. miles, and a population of about 35000 souls. Its approximate income is about 5 lakh per annum.

B. The position of the State is a peculiar one, and it will be a misnomer to call it a State in the true sense of the word particularly the area which is known as Feudal Tanawal which lies on cis-Indus.

C. The position of its Ruler can be dealt with under three heads:

1. *Ilaqa Kula Badnak*

This tract is a part of the Hazara District and the Nawab is assigned the land revenue, in other words his position here is that of a *Jagirdar* of the Frontier Province. The land revenue is collected by the Revenue Authorities of the Haripur Tehsil, and is remitted to the Nawab by the Collector, Hazara.

2. *Feudal Tanawal*

This tract lies between the *Jagir* tract and the River Indus. It has been declared as an excluded area under the Government of India Act 1935. This area is governed under the Upper Tanawal Regulation. The Nawab enjoys certain privileges over this area, but cases of serious nature are investigated and tried by the Hazara District Administration, and the general laws are applicable in all such cases. In all other petty criminal and civil cases the decisions of the Nawab are subject to revision by His Excellency the Governor N.W.F.P.



The proprietary rights in this tract are vested in the Nawab. For all intents and purposes this tract is part and parcel of the administrative unit of the settled district, and as such is the property of the Pakistan Government. It was declared as an excluded area with a view to keep the prestige of the Nawab by the then British Government. As the State has acceded to Pakistan and the Constituent Assembly has to determine the future of this area, whether or not it is going to be treated as an excluded area or incorporated in the settled district. The Government of Pakistan shall have to consider before accepting the Instrument of Accession all its implications so that it may not make a commitment which may be inconsistent with the above facts. The question should be thoroughly examined by the authorities concerned.

*C. Trans-Indus Tanawal*

In this area the Nawab enjoys absolute rights. The Government of Pakistan and the Constituent Assembly are at the present concerned with the Feudal Tanawal, and I fear there are influences at work which may succeed in putting an incorrect position before the Government, resulting in a decision adversely affecting the interest of Pakistan.

SARDAR BAHADUR KHAN

*Govt. Whip*

## PS-24

*Ruler of Amb to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*F. 10 (6)PMS/8-11*

*[Extract; original in Urdu]*

SHERGARH, AMB STATE,

*16 August 1948*

Respected Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister, Pakistan *Assalaamo 'Alaikum*

I have had the privilege of sending my recommendations on some national issues in the past as I have always considered it my religious and personal duty to serve the cause of Pakistan with sincerity and dedication. Motivated by this sentiment, both before the establishment of Pakistan and after independence, I have unflinching faith in the selfless struggle of Quaid-i-Azam for an independent Pakistan and had placed all my State resources at his disposal. The State of Amb was one of the first States to accede to Pakistan, and I also motivated other N.W.F.P States to follow suit. I submitted my views on such important issues as Kashmir,



Communism, landlord-tenants confrontation etc. to you and the Quaid-i-Azam; these may be available in the official files.

Sir, I would like to invite your attention to the imminent danger of political dissension, disunity and intrigues currently encouraged by those Congressite elements who had earlier failed in their nefarious designs of thwarting the creation of Pakistan. Their objective, after independence in 1947, was to drive a wedge between the Muslim League rank and file, between the government and the people and between the States of Pakistan. They are working hard to fan the fire of Pathanistan and weaken it by instigating the people of tribal agencies against Pakistan. Many Congress-supported persons of dubious character have been able to infiltrate the Muslim League to sabotage Pakistan. Similarly, some people of my State, like Sher Muhammad, Muhammad Aslam and Alam Zeb, *Wazifa* holders, with long association with Congress have been fielded to form a dubious Amb State Muslim League, located outside the territory of my State, at Mansehra. The so-called Amb State Muslim League party 'leaders' were indulging in propaganda against me. They were able to participate in the recently held Karachi session of Pakistan States Muslim League and were successful to obtain recognition from Manzar-i-Alam. During the session they made malicious and baseless statements to defame me.

I have informed brother Abdul Qaiyum, Prime Minister, Sarhad, about it with the request to inform you of the correct position. Let us pray [to] God to save Pakistan from the mischief of these hypocrites, exploiters and "anti-Pakistan" elements in the garb of Amb State Muslim League. I advise you to be careful of the real intentions of these people.

With prayers for your health and security.

Your sincere friend  
MUHAMMAD FARID KHAN

PS-25

*A.D.F. Dundas to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*F. 10 (5)-PMS/7*

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,  
NATHIA GALI,  
23 August 1948

My dear Prime Minister,

I see a report that three or four persons calling themselves the Amb



State Muslim League have been visiting you to expound on the alleged unsatisfactory condition of affairs in the State. I am extremely glad that they have done this, as they have been hitherto approaching quite irresponsible persons who believe, or pretend to believe, everything that they say without waiting to hear the other side.

2. Generally speaking there is not much wrong with Amb State. It is as well off as any other backward part of Pakistan. In fact, better off than many. The persons who call themselves the Amb State Muslim League are merely three or four relatives of the Nawab for whom the latter has been unable to find employment either inside or outside the State. However, it is too long a story to represent on paper, and the main object of this letter is to say that the Nawab himself is hoping to visit Karachi in September or October, and make your acquaintance and that of other members of the Pakistan Government. In the meanwhile I am doing my best in my own way to smooth out the differences within the family.

Yours sincerely,  
A.D.F. DUNDAS  
*Governor, NWFP*



BAHAWALPUR STATE



## PS-26

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Bahawalpur**F. 691/3**3 August 1947*

My dear Nawab Sahib,

I received your letter of 3rd July 1947,<sup>1</sup> written from London, only a few days ago and I hasten to reply and thank you for it.

It is very very kind of you to make such glowing personal references. Whatever I have done and the part that I have played in the final achievement of Pakistan is nothing but pure selfless service and I hope that I will be able to contribute my share in the building of Pakistan as one of the best sovereign states in the world.

With very kind regards and my deep appreciation of your proposal which we shall discuss when I am in Karachi.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-27

*Frank Messervy to A. D. F. Dundas**F. 691/6*

SECRET

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, PAKISTAN,  
RAWALPINDI,  
*19 August 1947*

SUBJECT: BAHAWALPUR STATE FORCES

1. After talking to H. H of Bahawalpur, I had a discussion with his Premier.<sup>1</sup>

2. Bahawalpur State is very keen on improving its forces and of organizing and equipping them on modern lines.

3. The composition of the formation, which the State Forces would be willing to maintain, is suggested as follows:

B[rigade] H.Q and Sig[nal]s

1 F[ield] Reg[imen]t (25 p[oun]d[e]r)

3 Inf[antry] B[attalio]ns

1 G[eneral] T[ransport] Co[mpany]



4. To maintain the above there will also be a Training Centre, Supply and Ordnance detachments, and a Military Hospital

5. The political agreement as to the use of State troops by Pakistan must be arrived at by the Government of Pakistan, but the Premier assured me that the troops would be available either for internal defence anywhere in Pakistan, or for cooperation with the Pakistan Army in case of external aggression.

6. I suggested, and it was agreed, that this B[riga]de Group should form the third B[riga]de Group of 8th Division (Sind Area) and should take part in all forms of training with the Division. In return for this, vacancies at all military schools and training establishments would be allotted to the Bahawalpur State Forces.

7. I strongly recommend this arrangement and consider that it would be of great advantage to Pakistan. I request, therefore, that, as soon as political agreement has been reached, I may be given permission to deal direct with the Bahawalpur State Government and Military Headquarters with regard to the organization and equipment of the State Forces.

8. It is also agreed that inspection by 8th Division (Sind Area) or by Army Headquarters, Pakistan, would be welcome.

[F. MESSERVY]

*General, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army*

<sup>1</sup>Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani.

## PS-28

### *Instrument of Accession of Bahawalpur State<sup>1</sup>*

KARACHI,

5 October 1947

Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947,<sup>2</sup> provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as Pakistan, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of Pakistan;

And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the Governor-General, provides that an Indian state may accede to the Federation of Pakistan by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof:

Now, therefore,

I, Sadiq Muhammad Khamis Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur State,



in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State, do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession, and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Federation of Pakistan with the intent that the Governor-General of Pakistan, the Federal Legislature, the Federal Court, and any other Federal authority established for the purposes of the Federation shall, by virtue of this, my Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Federation, exercise in relation to the State of Bahawalpur (hereinafter referred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of Pakistan on the fifteenth day of August 1947 (which Act as so in force is hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to the provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession.

3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule<sup>3</sup> hereto as the matters with respect to which the Federal Legislature may make laws for this State.

4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Federation of Pakistan on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of the State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Federal Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly.

5. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Federal Legislature to make any law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Federal Government of Pakistan for the purposes of a Federal law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense or if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan.

6. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to this Instrument.<sup>4</sup>

7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future Constitution of Pakistan or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreement with the Government of Pakistan established under any such future Constitution.



8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority, rights and jurisdiction now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State.

9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors.

Given under my hand this Third day of October, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Seven.

SADIQ MUHAMMAD ABBASI

*Ameer of Bahawalpur*

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.<sup>5</sup> Dated this Fifth day of October, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Seven.

M. A. JINNAH

*Governor-General of Pakistan*

<sup>1</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>No. 164, *TP*, XII, 233-49.

<sup>3</sup>See Enclosure 2 to No. 15.

<sup>4</sup>Annex.

<sup>5</sup>On 8 October 1947, Jinnah wrote to Sadiq Muhammad Khan Abbasi saying he was happy to countersign the Instrument of Accession and hoping that Bahawalpur and Pakistan would be staunch and sincere friends and that the Ruler would make his fullest contribution towards the welfare and greatness of Pakistan. See F. 1605-GG/22. Not printed.

### *Annex to PS-28*

#### *Supplementary Instrument of Accession Bahawalpur State<sup>1</sup>*

[4 October 1948]

Whereas Bahawalpur State has acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan and the defence of Pakistan including that of Bahawalpur State is the sole responsibility of the Government of Pakistan;

And whereas it is essential to the overall defence of the Dominion of Pakistan that there should be the closest co-ordination between the Governments of Pakistan and Bahawalpur State on matters relating to Defence or having a bearing thereon:

Now, therefore,

I, Sadiq Muhammad V Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur State, agree that:

1. The Bahawalpur State Forces except the units of my Bodyguard shall be attached to and operate with the Pakistan Armed Forces.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army should be the Commander-in-Chief of Bahawalpur State Forces and shall exercise full operational, administrative and financial control over them under the direction of the Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan.



3. A sum to be determined by agreement between myself and the Government of Pakistan shall be paid by the Government of Bahawalpur every year in two equal installments to the Government of Pakistan for the maintenance of the State Forces.

4. In order to enable the Government of Pakistan to discharge effectively its responsibility in respect of acceded subjects the following additional clauses shall be inserted in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession of Bahawalpur State;

i. Under the heading "A.—Defence"—

"5. All matters relating to Defence or having a bearing thereon."

ii. Under the heading "B.—External Affairs"—

"4. All relations with other Dominions or countries and all matters relating thereto or having a bearing thereon."

5. The Government of Pakistan may entrust to the Prime Minister of my State such duties relating to the administration of acceded subjects within the State as it may deem necessary. In the discharge of such duties the Prime Minister of my State shall be under the direct control of and responsible to the Government of Pakistan and shall carry out its directions issued to him from time to time.

Given under my hand this First day of October, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Eight.

S. M. ABBASI

*Ameer of Bahawalpur*

I hereby accept the above Supplementary Instrument of Accession.  
Dated this Fourth day of October, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Eight.

K. NAZIM-UD-DIN

*Governor-General of Pakistan*

<sup>1</sup>*Instruments of Accession*, 7.

## PS-29

*H. L. Davies<sup>1</sup> to Marden<sup>2</sup>*

*F. 691/7*

No. 1345/11/SDI

RAWALPINDI,  
29 October 1947

### BAHAWALPUR STATE FORCES

Reference meeting held on 22nd October at Army Headquarters regarding Bahawalpur State B[rigade] G[roup].



### Item C of Agenda

It is recommended that the following rules should govern mutual aid:

- a. If Bahawalpur B[rigade] Group or any part of it is required for operations outside the State,<sup>3</sup> the Pakistan Government will ration and maintain it in all respects but the State will remain responsible for pay.
- b. If Bahawalpur State Forces (other than the B[rigade] Group) are employed for more than 30 days on internal security duty outside the State, the Pakistan Government will meet all expenses. Similarly, if Pakistan Forces are required for internal security within Bahawalpur State for more than 30 days, the State will meet all expenses.
- c. If Pakistan Forces operate within Bahawalpur State for the defence of Pakistan, the Pakistan Government remains responsible for all maintenance and expenses of their own troops.
- d. If Bahawalpur State Forces including the B[rigade] Group are employed for more than 30 days at the request of the Pakistan Government for protection of Federal Railway, Irrigation Works and other Federal Works, the Pakistan Government will be responsible for the cost of rations.

The above have been approved by the Ministry of Defence and D.C.G.S. Will you please obtain approval of Bahawalpur State<sup>4</sup> and Ministry of Finance, Pakistan, respectively?

[H.L DAVIES]

<sup>1</sup>Major-General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup>Lt. General, Commanding Bahawalpur State Forces.

<sup>3</sup>PS-27.

<sup>4</sup>Approval of Bahawalpur State was conveyed by the state Premier. See F. 691/8, QAP. Not printed.

## PS-30

### DESPOTIC RULE CONTINUES IN BAHAWALPUR STATE:

#### *Government Attempts to Crush Popular Movement<sup>1</sup>*

Bahawalpur, Jan. 8. It is common knowledge that the Indian states are the creation of imperialism in India. In the pre-partition days, the States peoples enjoyed some semblance of freedom, but the advent of freedom from foreign yoke and the carving out of India into Pakistan and India [dominions] has placed the States and their subjects in an unenviable position.



On the one hand, the Indian Government holds out open threats to the State Rulers to accede to the Indian Dominion, "failing which," as Pandit Nehru in his speech said, such States as do not join it would be treated as enemy countries.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the Pakistan Government seems to have studiously kept themselves aloof from this question of accession by its declaration that the Government of Pakistan "shall not interfere in the relations existing between a ruler and his subjects". This significant declaration of policy has encouraged certain States within the orbit of Pakistan to continue their despotic rule.

#### POPULAR MOVEMENT

In 1939, the people of Bahawalpur raised their voice for the first time for a responsible Government. Having failed in its machinations and maneuvering to disrupt the ranks of the people through the agency of the reactionaries, the State Government launched a frontal attack on the people's movement and clamped the leaders of the movement in prison. This gave great impetus to the movement and the Government soon realized its folly and arrived at a compromise with the leaders and promised to introduce reforms. Unfortunately the war broke out and the question of reforms was again shelved. Moreover, the State Government set its machinery in full gear to strike at the root of civil liberties of the people. First, the Public Security Act was promulgated which virtually turned the entire State into a big prison house. Hundreds of people were hurled into prison who dared to raise their voice against the Government's repressive policy.

The *zamindars* and the people of Khairpur, Hasilpur and Bahawalnagar were prisoned at Qila Dera, which became for all practical purposes a vast concentration camp.

#### LAWLESS LAW

Although under the State Security Act a person could not be detained for more than two months without trial, there were scores of instances in which the authorities infringed it. Bail was refused even in cognizable offences. Not content with such shock tactics, the Government appointed special judge whose authority exceeds the power of even the judges of the legally constituted State High Court. He is practically an illiterate man who puts his thumb impression on his pay bills. The only qualification of the Sahibzada [Qadir Baksh] is that he is related to the Ruler of the State. His is the highest court of appeal in the State.

The military and police have been encouraged by the Government to set up a reign of terror in the State. Some of the methods adopted by the police to strike terror into the hearts of the people are: to attack the people with bayonets and to suspend them in the wells upside down.



Their bodies were punctured with date thorns and they were made to stand for hours together.

#### BAN ON MEETINGS

It is illegal to form any organization in the State whether political, social or religious without the previous sanction of the Government. Meetings are banned within the State territory. Complete censorship has been imposed on the press and even the Holy *Qur'an* cannot be printed without the sanction of the State Press Adviser.

Despite the conciliatory attitude of the press here, attempts are being made to gag it with the result that most of the papers have stopped publication for two months under protest.

In spite of the fact that Bahawalpur is a border State, the number of arm licences issued does not exceed 1,000. Permission on securing licences and those for pistols and rifles are not granted at all.

Since Bahawalpur has acceded to Pakistan, we think it is the duty of Pakistan Muslim League and the President of the West Punjab Muslim League to take up this matter into their hand. They should forthwith take steps to see that (a) civil liberties are fully restored in the State, (b) a responsible Government is formed in the State, (c) censorship is withdrawn from the press, (d) Sahibzada Qadir Baksh's court is dissolved, (e) conditions regarding the issuing of licences for arms are relaxed, and (f) all the political detainees are released unconditionally. - API.

<sup>1</sup>The *Pakistan Times*, 9 January 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Nehru's speech at Gwalior, 19 April 1947. See Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 358.

## PS-31

### *Minutes of 6th Meeting of Pakistan Defence Council*

F. 691-9

[Extract]

[KARACHI,]

10 February 1948

### 3. Progress Reports

The Council took note of the C-in-C's Progress Report on items still outstanding. The following points emerged:

1. Appointment of Commander, Bahawalpur State Forces



Giving his impressions of the recent visit to Bahawalpur, the C-in-C said that it was of vital importance to place the command of the State Forces immediately into efficient hands. The present Commander-in-Chief, Lt. General Marden, who was a private employee of H[is] H[ighness], had practically no military knowledge. He had commanded a territorial battery in the 1st World War and knows very little of modern warfare and equipment. General Marden, who was going away in March and did not propose to return, had himself agreed that a change was necessary. H.H. also wished to replace General Marden but insisted that the new Commander must be a retired officer. The C-in-C, however, felt that it would be very difficult to get hold of a retired British Officer of the requisite type and had suggested that General Cawthorne should be appointed C-in-C, Bahawalpur State Forces. His Highness' initial reaction seemed favourable and he had promised to give a definite reply in a few days. However, in reply to a reminder, H.H. has now said that he did not see any reason why there should be an immediate change in the Command of his Forces. This could not be accepted and the C-in-C suggested that we should make it quite clear to the Bahawalpur *Darbar* that Pakistan could not supply modern equipment for his Army and would even ask for all the equipment that has so far been supplied to be returned unless Bahawalpur agreed to appoint either General Cawthorne or a Pakistani Special Service officer of the rank of Brigadier to command his Forces. General Gracey thought that the reluctance of H.H. Bahawalpur to accept the C-in-C's nominee as the Commander of State Forces was probably due to the fact that Bahawalpur did not wish to honour his obligations to provide the third brigade for the 8th Division. The Defence Secretary mentioned that the Bahawalpur *Darbar* had recently asked that all British officers serving with their Forces should be in the direct employment of the State and not seconded from Pak. army.

After some discussion H[on] M[inister] directed that the Chief of Staff should proceed to Bahawalpur immediately to discuss this question further with His Highness and that he should make it quite clear that Pakistan could not continue to supply modern equipment to the State Forces unless an agreement was reached. As H.H. Bahawalpur would be proceeding to the U.K. in March for six months, it is essential that this should be fixed before His Highness' departure.



## PS-32

*Zafrulla Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru**Telegram, FOA, F. 1-14/348-II*CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 2312KARACHI,  
19 June 1948

Your telegram No. Primin-1342 dated the 18th June.<sup>1</sup> I am no less anxious than you to resolve at the earliest possible date the difficulties with which we are both faced in this serious matter. I am confident that we shall reach a just solution provided we leave no room for misunderstanding. The problem immediately before me is the restoration of confidence in all those in East [*sic* for West] Punjab who were shocked by threat to the lives and prosperity of millions by the arbitrary stoppage of water supplies without warning at the beginning of April. Quite apart therefore from the administrative problem of dealing with the impending calamity, they thought it essential to take all measures possible to prevent this complete loss of confidence developing into a serious threat to the maintenance of peace between the two dominions. Fortunately the restoration of water supplies, although delayed and on terms inconsistent with our rights, removed the immediate danger. It however in no way restored confidence.

*[Paras 2 and 3 omitted]*

The supply of water in the Eastern Grey Canal to Bahawalpur is an entirely separate matter. The invalidity of the right of East Punjab to recover seigniorage charges from West Punjab extends also to Bahawalpur whose contention is that their rights derive from capital participation in the construction of the system and are guaranteed by the terms of their agreement. They are clearly entitled to 375 cusecs at the point of entry to the State. However, in deference to your views I am again consulting the Bahawalpur Government. Meanwhile, I greatly appreciate your offer to restore supplies to the State pending settlement of respective rights and would, in view of the approach I now make, request you to put it into immediate effect.

I agree that a meeting should be held at the end of June to consider all these matters and shall suggest details in a few days.

[ZAFRULLA KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.



## PS-33

*Note by Abdur Rab Nishtar on Bahawalpur Muslim League*

*F. 251-GG/7-9*

KARACHI,

2 November 1948

The other day Mr Manzar-i-Alam, President of the All Pakistan States Muslim League saw me. I had sent for him through the Secretary, States Ministry. He discussed the affairs of the States Muslim League with me for about two hours. Although the Secretary of the States Muslim League and a representative of the Amb State Muslim League accompanied him to my house, but they stayed downstairs and only Mr Manzar-i-Alam came up to my room to discuss matters with me because I was confined to bed. I informed him that I had received copy of a statement issued<sup>1</sup> by some Muslims of Bahawalpur State alleging that certain people who in the past were in alliance with the Congress and advocated the accession of the State to India are now in possession of that organization which is recognized as States Muslim League by the central office of the organization. I also told him that if this allegation is correct, it is very unfortunate because these people who, in spite of being Muslims, advocated accession of Bahawalpur State to India<sup>2</sup> cannot be trusted. He said that two sections are trying to gain control of the Bahawalpur State Muslim League. One is known as Gurmani Muslim League which he alleged is under the thumb of the present Prime Minister of the State and under his instructions is doing its utmost to prevent democratization of the State. The other section consists of those who belonged to Congress and Ahrar parties before Partition and are now trying to capture the States Muslim League. Their objective is stated to be the democratization of the Government of Bahawalpur State. He further said that in view of this complicated position the central office did not recognize either of the two Leagues because one consists of people of doubtful loyalty and the other, according to him, is composed of the hirelings of the Premier of Bahawalpur State and therefore, he went to Bahawalpur State and set up organizing committees. He began from smaller villages rather than towns wherein the above mentioned two parties are generally concentrated. He said that the work of the enrolment of the members of the



State Muslim League has now been entrusted to the branches set up by him. He complained that the attack that was made on him was engineered by the Premier and the pro-Premier persons because they did not like the existence of the State Muslim League at all. He alleged that the Sec[retary] of the States Muslim League was also treated badly and the recent statement issued by him, (the Sec[retary] of the States Muslim League), was due to the effect of the recent events on him. He himself did not approve of the statement because he did not like any criticism of the policy of the Pakistan Government. That was not his *modus operandi*. He also informed me that he had had discussions with the Hon'ble Prime Minister on this point. In support of his attitude he stated that although in accordance with programme, Mr Mahmud, the Sec[retary] of the States Muslim League, was to proceed to Frontier States, he recalled him at the instance of the States Ministry. The discussion that I had with Mr Manzar-i-Alam left this impression on my mind that he is prepared to fully cooperate with Pakistan Government and I hope will not act in a way prejudicial to the interests of Pakistan. I think it will be better if the States Ministry keep contact with him. I explained to him the special position of the Frontier States and told him that it was not desirable for him or his organization to interfere in these States at present. I advised him not to take any step till the Hon'ble Prime Minister who is incharge of this portfolio, returns and that he should act in accordance with the advice given to him by Hon'ble Prime Minister. He accepted my advice. He also appreciated the special position of the Frontier and Baluchistan States and said that he would proceed with regard to these States in accordance with the advice given to him by the Hon'ble Prime Minister.

The Sec[retary] of the States Ministry had stated in his note that the Bahawalpur Govt. resents interference of Mr Manzar-i-Alam in the affairs of the State. This is no surprise to me. An autocratic government never tolerates any movement which aims at the transference of power from the ruler to the people and, therefore, it is but natural that the State authorities should resent the interference of one who is the head of an organization which demands establishment of a popular Govt. in the State. I don't want to give any interactions about the policy matters, because I am required to dispose of only day to day matters, but if I were to administer this portfolio, I would never encourage the State authorities in their efforts to kill the popular voice. This is not only against the spirit of the times, but totally against the principles on which the democratic state of Pakistan is based. I am sure the Hon'ble



Prime Minister has this aspect before him. In spite of these feelings, I have told Mr Manzar-i-Alam that however objectionable may be the attitude of the authorities of Bahawalpur and Khairpur States, he should not take any step that may lead to disturbance of peace in these areas, particularly for the reason that those States happen to be on our border adjoining India. In the circumstances, every body should proceed very cautiously with regard to them. I impressed this aspect of the case upon him and he appreciated it. I also warned him against the agents of Indian Congress getting control of the popular organization of the State, because in the present circumstances they are more dangerous than the alleged hirelings of the State authorities. As I have already stated, he assured me that he won't do anything against the instructions of the Pakistan Govt. When the Hon'ble Prime Minister returns, this matter may be placed before him. I am sure he would like to discuss the matter with Mr Manzar-i-Alam and give him such advice which he feels to be most useful in the interest of Pakistan and people of the State.

A. R. NISHTAR

<sup>1</sup>Annex

<sup>2</sup>On 26 February 1948, Mountbatten submitted an *Aide-Memoire* to the King on Junagadh and Kashmir. Citing geographical compulsions as a decisive factor for accession of a State to either India or Pakistan, Mountbatten said, "unofficial overtures from Bahawalpur [for acceding to India] were similarly discouraged". See Enclosure to PS-238, Para 6.

### *Annex to PS-33*

*Joint Statement by Makhdoom Mohammad Mohsan Shah and Ten others*

*F. 251-GG/2-4*

[BAHAWALPUR,]

23 October 1948

The latest ukase of Messrs. Manzar-i-Alam and Mohammad Mahmud, banning the six stalwarts of the All Bahawalpur State Muslim League, the only representative political organization in the State, has come as a veritable bolt from the blue, shattering the foundations of popular faith in the so called leadership of outside persons in regard to the internal politics of the State. Whatever the credentials of these worthies in the political set-up of the Pakistan States, it is an incontrovertible fact that their appreciation of the depth and magnitude of popular feeling in regard to group



alignment and party affiliation is palpably wrong. The so-called Rifat Group is a pack of political chameleons, the notorious axe-grinders and self-seekers who are known to change their coat at the slightest temptation and to barter their national integrity and honour for mess of pottage. Hardly a year ago, this group openly advocated the States accession to the Indian Dominion in the hope of getting easy supplies of cloth and sugar, and heaped opprobrious epithets on Quaid-i-Azam's name (may his soul rest in peace). The *Ka-i-nat* issues (the mouth piece of the party) dated 12.8.47 and 20.8.47 are an eloquent testimony on the point. During the stormy days of communal riots the party in question was in close liaison with Maulana Habibur Rahman, the pro-Congress leader, who stayed at Bahawalpur in their midst and whose sons are still staying here as protege of certain leaders of the party. Even as late as the 4th August 1948, they have refused to surrender their claim to separate identity in regard to their relations with the neighbouring non-Muslim States in as much as a deputation headed by Mr Rifat has pressed upon *Ali Janab Sahibzada Wali Ahad Bahadur* the clear demand of their party for the maintenance of the distinct entity of the State vis-a-vis external relations. This is nothing but a prelude to their ultimate ambition to cut adrift from Pakistan and join over to the Indian Union (vide *Ka-i-nat* dated the 4th August, 1948).<sup>1</sup> Indeed, a party posed [*sic* for composed] of such patent political predilections cannot be expected to metamorphose into a Muslim League organization in a matter of days. Their present *volte face* is a subterfuge to gain political ascendancy. Once in power, they would throw Pakistan overboard, and make a bid for retrocession to the Indian Dominion. Bahawalpur being at once a border territory and the life-line of the inter-provincial communications of Pakistan, the dire consequences of this disastrous move can be well appreciated. It will thus be seen that Messrs. Manzar-i-Alam and Moh[amma]d Mahmud's alliance with such arch enemies of Pakistan is a direct disservice to Islam.

The Bahawalpur public are in no illusion about the bona fides of these mercenaries of the Indian Congress and have absolutely no faith in their leadership. At the same time, they repudiate in most emphatic terms the banning orders passed by the aforesaid two dignitaries against their accredited and cherished leaders Nur Moh[amma]d Nutkani, Peerzada Moh[amma]d Salim Aslam, Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sahrahi, Syed Abdul Wahab Shah, Munshi Abdul Hamid Khan, Hayatullah Khan Tareen, who are the *persona-grata* of the people and have constituted



the vanguard of the League Movement in the State, kindling the flame of Pakistan at the darkest hour in its history. This flame has been kept ablaze in the tempestuous days that have followed, and bids fare to remain a beacon-light for generations to come. Pakistan have been built on the indomitable will and unflagging zeal of its leaders; there can be no room for turn-coats and changelings within its domain. We appeal to the Government of Pakistan, the League High Command and every right-thinking Musalman of Pakistan to save their country and nation from the catastrophic consequences of this disastrous move on the part of certain purblind politicians.

MAKHDUM MOHAMMAD MOHSAN SHAH,  
*Rais and Sajjada Nashin, Ahmadpur  
East, and 10 others*


<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.





*Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi, Ameer of Bahawalpur, who signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 3 October 1948.*





*Jinnah and Fatima Jinnah with the Ameer of Bahawalpur,  
Sadiq Muhammad Abbasi at Bahawalpur House, Karachi.*



CHITRAL STATE



## PS-34

*Muslims of Chitral State to M. A. Jinnah**F. 990/130-31*CHITRAL,  
22 March 1947

Sir,

Most humbly and respectfully we beg to submit as under:

That Chitral is a small State. The people of this State are all Muslims. But the Ruler of the State, Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, is a cruel and dishonest man. He counts himself as one of the members of the Muslim League Party. On account of his cruelty, all the people of the State hate the Muslim League Party.

Therefore, we (public of Chitral) respectfully apply to you as you are the great leader of the Muslim League and proud [*sic for pride*] of the Muslim nation the world over, but we are also Muslims.

Therefore, this is your duty to help us and to prevent the cruel Ruler from bad actions.

This is also open to the world that he has arrested the Governor of Drosh, Prince Hissam-ul-Mulk, without any crime. This innocent man is a prisoner at Loralai (Baluchistan) for a year. He was arrested without any law. We apply to you that you will do mercy upon us and our innocent Prince Hissam-ul-Mulk. If he [Hissam-ul-Mulk] would be arrested under any law, in that case we would be happy.

Now, you are a great leader and a Muslim and we are your brothers by religion. You must make free us [*sic*] from the paws of this cruel man for the sake of *Qur'an*.

We beg to remain, Sir,  
Your most obedient,  
Muslims of Chitral State

SHER  
Subedar  
MIR ZALA KHAN  
Jamadar  
ANONYM  
Quartermaster Havildar  
SAIDAN KHAN  
Havildar



## PS-35

*Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah**F. 5-GG/1-2*CHITRAL STATE,  
3 August 1947

My dear Friend,

First of all, I wish to offer my heartiest felicitations on the formation of the new Muslim State of Pakistan. We should thank Almighty *Allah* for putting you at the helm of the Muslim cause, and for gratifying [*sic*] the aspirations of the Indian Muslims.

The decision of Chitral State to join Pakistan has already been communicated to you telegraphically.<sup>1</sup> Although I am conscious that your precious time, now-a-days, might be occupied with too important matters to be encroached upon with affairs of Chitral, yet the rapid political changes bring us with some pressing problems, which I think it expedient to acquaint you [with] in proper time.

Chitral State, as you know, occupies a strategic position in the extreme north of NWFP. Historically it has been an independent State since time immemorial, and through centuries had maintained this independence against odds.

Just before the establishment of our existing relations with British Govt., Chitral had friendly connections on equality basis with Afghanistan. In the time of my grandfather, when Afghanistan became aggressive to its neighbours, he sought the protection of the British Empire. In those days, other routes being more or less under Afghan influence, Kashmir was the only way through which Chitral State could contact the Britishers, so friendship with Kashmir was indispensable. To maintain this friendship mutual presents were exchanged annually.

Our first relations with the British Government were established on our own initiative in 1885. Later on, Kashmir State, for reasons still incomprehensible to us, began claiming suzerainty over Chitral. Worst still for Chitral, it got the support of the British Government. Chitral State, as can be imagined, had no power to resist this combination, and my predecessors, though they never acknowledged the Kashmir suzerainty, had to sign agreements under pressure. The Kashmir suzerainty was always considered such a great shame that all, except very few of the State people, are kept ignorant of it to avoid violent repercussions.

Not only was this Kashmir suzerainty forced upon us, but large



parts of the State in the North and South were detached from it and given to Kashmir and Afghanistan, respectively. In the North, the Districts of Yasin, Ishkoman and Ghizur were incorporated in Gilgit Agency and given to Kashmir in spite of our repeated protests and entreaties. These three districts formed an integral part of Chitral State. Their people are kith and kin of my people having common religious, cultural and linguistic tendencies.

Now, as the end of paramountcy coincides with the emergence of Pakistan, Chitral State exultantly joins Pakistan with full confidence and hope of redeeming its honour by shaking off the Kashmir suzerainty, of recovering the Gilgit Districts ceded to Kashmir, and finally of concluding a new honourable agreement with Pakistan in due course.

There is one more point which also I wish to bring to your kind notice. It is the financial position of Chitral State. Excepting the Government subsidy (which hardly meets our requirements) the State has no other important source of income. Without this subsidy, the very administration of this State will not be possible. Chitral State is believed to have great resources in minerals and forests, but owing to the communication difficulties and the State's financial weakness, these are hardly tapped. I earnestly hope that the Pakistan Government would help this State in the development of its communications and natural resources, so that it may cease to be a financial liability to Pakistan, as early as possible.<sup>2</sup>

I end this letter with prayers for the consolidation of Pakistan.

With best wishes and sincere regards,

Your sincere friend,  
MUZAFFAR-UL-MULK

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable. However, Chitral acceded to Pakistan on 6 November 1947.

<sup>2</sup>On 9 August 1947, the Ruler had requested a meeting with Jinnah to discuss the problems identified by him. See F. 5-GG/3. Not printed.

PS-36

*Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 5-GG/4*

CHITRAL STATE,  
20 September 1947

My dear Friend,

Since the joining of Chitral State with Pakistan, I have been most



anxious to contribute our due share towards the success and consolidation of Pakistan State.

Financially, Chitral is not a rich State and cannot afford at present to make a befitting contribution in money. But it has natural resources, chiefly in minerals and forests. Considering that vast building programme is in hand in Pakistan, and that timber is an essential building material, I take the pleasure of offering five thousand green *deodar* trees standing in the State forests (worth about three lakhs of rupees) and convertible to approximately twenty five thousand timber logs, free of cost, to the Pakistan Government. It is requested that felling and transit by river may kindly be arranged by the Government.

Besides forests, this State has various minerals still remaining to be developed, the extent and value of which may be assessed by proper surveying. I offer these minerals also for exploitation to the Pakistan Government at special concession. This will meet some of the mineral requirements of Pakistan and at the same time will prove helpful to the State as well.

With best wishes and sincere regards,

Your most sincere friend,  
MUZAFFAR-UL-MULK

PS-37

*M.A. Jinnah to Ruler of Chitral*

*F. 5-GG/5*

KARACHI,  
7 October 1947

My dear Mehtar of Chitral,

Many thanks for your letter of the 20th September, 1947.<sup>1</sup> I deeply appreciate your solicitude for Pakistan and I am delighted to hear that you have decided to join it. I note all that you have stated about the economic position of your State and sincerely thank you for your offer of 5,000 green *deodar* trees standing in the State forest. I have no doubt that your accession to Pakistan will work out for our mutual advantage. The exploitation of the mineral resources of Chitral will also prove advantageous to both the States.

May I request you to send your representative to Karachi, if you



can, to go through the formalities of your accession to Pakistan?

Thanking you once more.

With best wishes and sincere regards,

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>PS-36.

## PS-38

*M. Ikramullah to George Cunningham*

*Telegram, F. 5-GG/7*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. 4648

KARACHI,  
8 October 1947

Quaid-i-Azam received a letter<sup>1</sup> from Mehtar of Chitral offering to accede to Pakistan. In reply,<sup>2</sup> Quaid-i-Azam has expressed his willingness to accept the accession and has asked the Mehtar to send his representatives to Karachi in due course. This is not intended in any way to cut across the negotiations which you are conducting with Chitral and other Frontier States in accordance with the decisions reached at the meeting recently held at Rawalpindi. The intention is that when your negotiations have been concluded the representatives of the various States can come to Karachi with the Instrument of Accession, duly signed by the Ruler for the Governor-General's signature. I am sending to you by air mail a copy of the Instrument of Accession.<sup>3</sup>

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-36.

<sup>2</sup>PS-37.

<sup>3</sup>The Mehtar signed the Instrument of Accession on 6 November, 1947, which was accepted by the Governor-General on 18 February 1948. See *Instruments of Accession*, 27. Not printed.



## PS-39

*Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah**F. 5-GG/9*CHITRAL STATE,  
29 October 1947

My dear Friend,

Thank you very much indeed for Your Excellency's kind letter No. 1683-GG/47, dated the 7th October 1947.<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for your kind appreciation of what little I have been able to do for Pakistan.

I also thank Your Excellency for inviting my representative to Karachi to go through the formalities of Chitral State's accession to Pakistan. I have been considering the question myself, and I think it is much better if instead of sending a representative, I come to Karachi myself, so that besides going through the Accession formalities personally, I may have the pleasure of paying my respects to you.

I was intending to pay a visit to Peshawar, and had asked the Governor, NWFP, to arrange air passage for me from Peshawar to Karachi, but I was informed that there is great difficulty these days of arranging air passages as well as finding accommodation in Karachi itself. Meanwhile, owing to bad health, I had to postpone my visit to Peshawar for the time being. However, I am looking forward to some other opportunity of seeing you.

I am, as every Muslim must be, deeply grieved by the atrocities committed on Muslims in East Punjab and India. Owing to this State's limited income, I have so far been able to contribute only Rs. 30,000 to the Quaid-i-Azam's Relief Fund. I am also collecting warm cloth[es] for the refugees and will forward these through the P.A. [Political Agent] in due course.

With best wishes and sincere regards,

Your Excellency's sincere friend,  
MUZAFFAR-UL-MULK

<sup>1</sup>PS-37.



## PS-40

*Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah**F. 5-GG/15*CHITRAL STATE,  
20 February 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I had written to Your Excellency once before also about the development of the mineral resources of my State, which I have offered for exploitation to the Pakistan Government on special concession.

My State, though poor in other respects, has several essential minerals, such as iron, copper, sulphur, antimony, orpiment, lead, silver and gold. There may be other undiscovered minerals beside these.

As the State has no other big source of revenue, it is on the development of these resources that the progress of this State depends. I, therefore, request Your Excellency to kindly order proper surveying of these minerals as early as possible. The income from these resources [sic] half will be spent by the State in improving road communications, education and general development of the State, and the other half will go to Pakistan Government.

With best wishes and sincere regards,

Your Excellency's most sincere friend,  
[MUZAFFAR-UL-MULK]

## PS-41

*Ruler of Chitral to M. A. Jinnah**F. 693/1-5*CHITRAL STATE,  
24 March 1948

Your Excellency,

Chitral which was the first state to accede to and avow its loyalty to Pakistan, has had a long-standing territorial claim on the outgoing Government of India dating as far back as 1895. This claim is now being placed before Your Excellency for decision in the light of radically changed conditions and circumstances bearing on the issue.



2. It relates to the territories originally belonging to Chitral State, namely Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman, now forming part of the Gilgit Agency. To explain clearly the reasons for this claim the history of the country as far as it concerns this claim will have to be related.

3. Authentic history has it on record that the State of Chitral comprising Chitral, Mastuj, Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman in the North East and the territories to the North-West extending as far as Asmar were originally governed by one ruler Muhammad Beg. At a later date Shah Muhtaram Shah appointed his younger brother Shah Khushwaqt to govern Northern Chitral comprising the districts of Mastuj, Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman. This arrangement continued in force for a long time. The Mehtar of Chitral gave his full support to the heirs of Shah Khushwaqt and the latter continued to rule their portion in the name of the Mehtar. In the year 1880, Pahlawan Bahadur was involved in the murder of a British Officer in Yasin and tried to invade Kashmir without first consulting Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, whose relations with Afghanistan were rather strained at the time and he was looking for an ally elsewhere. As a result Pahlawan was removed and exiled from the country and Aman-ul-Mulk appointed his own son Nizam-ul-Mulk as Governor of the four districts. Thus Chitral once again became united under one Chief, Aman-ul-Mulk and its territorial integrity was also restored by a combination of events narrated above.

4. The death of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk in 1892 again seriously disturbed the peace of Chitral, but the details of this civil war are not very relevant to our purpose except to show how it led to the loss of above territories by Chitral.

5. In the winter of 1892-93 a mission was despatched to Mehtar Nizam-ul-Mulk by the British Government. It returned to Gilgit the following summer leaving behind a political officer in Chitral. After the siege of Chitral in 1895 the ruler Shuja-ul-Mulk, then being only 14 years of age, the State went through a process of vivisection. The once Khushwaqt districts of Mastuj and Laspur to the west of Shandur Pass were taken away from the new Mehtar and placed under Governors over whom he had no authority, though they still formed part of Chitral Agency. The districts of Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman east of Shandur were included in the Gilgit Agency and were to be governed by separate governors under the control of the Political Agent, Gilgit, with the Maharaja of Kashmir as the Suzerain power.

6. In the year 1914, however, the districts of Mastuj and Laspur were returned to the Mehtar under an agreement but territories further east continued to form part of Gilgit Agency in spite of numerous representations on the subject.

7. Chitral also lost the districts of Bashgal and Narsat to Afghanistan at



the same time as it lost the above territories to Kashmir. As a demand for the return of territories ceded to Afghanistan was bound to lead to complications too difficult to manage, Chitral has never pressed it in the past though it has never relinquished its claim to the vast tracts of land which were part of Chitral and still belong to it by right. [It] feels that conditions on that border are far from favourable to the reopening of the question today and thus would not embarrass the Pakistan State with such a claim.

8. On the other hand, a reference to old records will show that the return of its north-eastern territories namely Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman has always been in the forefront of its demands made on the Paramount Power from time to time. Their not infrequent representations have always been turned down on the plea that nothing extraordinary had happened to justify a departure from the course adopted long ago.

9. The recent great change which has altered the very face of the map of the sub-continent of India resulting in the emergence of the great Muslim State of Pakistan is much more than the extraordinary which had stood between Chitral and its old dominions.

10. It therefore feels that now that everything is in the melting pot, and the whole structure of the new State is in the process of re-organization, it is time to consider and decide finally Chitral's claim to its northern territories of Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman.

The main features of the case stated briefly are as follows:

- i. It cannot be denied that the territories were part of Chitral before 1895, when they were forcibly separated by the British Government;
- ii. That the Paramount Power had entered into agreement with Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk in 1885 through Col. Lockhart which was later confirmed by Col. Durand, Secretary Govt. of India Foreign Department, on behalf of the Viceroy whereby territories then held by Aman-ul-Mulk were to remain with him and go down to his heirs. The districts in dispute i.e. Yasin, Ghizar and Ishkoman were positively ruled by Aman-ul-Mulk at the time this agreement was concluded;
- iii. That with the end of paramountcy, Gilgit Agency should have returned to its rightful owners but the territories have been wrongly handed over to Kashmir;
- iv. The legitimacy of Chitral claim cannot be contradicted. Ethnologically too, the claim is irrefutable. The people of Ghizar, Yasin and Ishkoman are all of the race known as 'Khow' and all speak Khowar, their native tongue. The inhabitants of the rest of Gilgit Agency speak either the Dara [*sic* for Dard] language Shina, of a completely different linguistic group, or the even further removed language of Burushaski in Hunza and Nagar. The reunification of Khowar speakers with one state having cultural and linguistic ties would therefore give added



order and strength to this most important strategic border of Pakistan;

v. That even in case Kashmir accedes to Pakistan in the near future, for which we all devoutly pray and hope, the ethnical and linguistic bonds existing between Chitral and Gilgit are so close and strong that it would not be either equitable or expedient to tie them up to an alien people;

vi. If Kashmir succeeds in keeping out of Pakistan, it would not be easy for the latter to keep its hold on Gilgit at such distance. Chitral would, however, be in a position to keep these territories intact for Pakistan due to its contiguity in spite of Kashmir;

vii. Acting upon the advice of the representative of the Pakistan Government, Chitral refrained from embarrassing the Government by putting its claim into practice during the recent political upheaval on the border.

We, however, hope that, in the light of the above facts and owing to the impending changes on the Kashmir border, our claim will be given an official recognition by the Government, and Chitral will be permitted to re-occupy the districts of Ghizar, Yasin and Ishkoman.

If the Government has any doubt about the attitude of the people of those districts, that may be ascertained by means of a free plebiscite of those people under the auspices of Pakistan Government and in presence of a Chitral State representative.

I am,

Your Excellency's most sincere friend,  
MUHAMMAD MUZAFFAR-UL-MULK

<sup>1</sup>Jinnah was to receive the Ruler on 14 April 1948. See Annex.

*Annex to PS-41*  
*Note for M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 693/5*

The Quaid-i-Azam receives His Highness the Mehtar of Chitral on Wednesday the 14th of April.

His Highness will mention the following:-

(1) That Yasin, Ghizar, Ishkoman and Punial (Gilgit Agency) be amalgamated with Chitral.  
(2) That Chitral State Forces may be allowed to attack Kashmir via Gilgit or defend Gilgit.

Suggested Reply

(1) It is an important matter and needs very careful consideration.  
(2) Necessity for this action does not seem to exist.



(3) That after his son has completed his course at the Pakistan Military Academy, he may be appointed the Quaid-i-Azam's A.D.C.

(4) That his position among the Frontier States should remain as before, i.e. senior-most State (11 guns salute).

(3) This will be considered in due course, but it would be better if his son, after passing from the Academy spent some time with an active unit.

(4) His position will remain as it has been in the past.

## PS-42

*Haji Khan Munuhi Homib and others to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 216 (Part III-B)-GG/152-3*

MASTUJ,  
14 April 1948

His Excellency Quaid-i-Azam,

The people of Yasin, Koh Ghizar and Ishkoman welcome Your Excellency to the North Western Frontier Province and pray for the prosperity and well being of Pakistan. We have submitted petition to Your Excellency through our representative for reunion with Chitral of which state we formed part for over two hundred and fifty years. We were separated under the British rule and have remained so for about fifty years. Our reunion with Chitral will not only redress our grievances but will give us new strength to serve Pakistan, for it would right a great injustice and humiliation suffered by the people of this area in being separated from their own kith and kin, the Chitralis, and put under Kashmir by inclusion in Gilgit Agency. We request Your Excellency to very graciously grant interview to our representative and give kind consideration to our petition for reunion with Chitral which is based on historical and racial facts.

PIRZADA HAJI KHAN, MUNUHI HOMIB, MOH[AMMA]D  
KHAN, MOH[AMMA]D ALI KHAN LAL  
*Representatives of Yasin*

WAZIR MOH[AMMA]D AKBAR HAKIM, MOH[AMMA]D  
YAKUT SHAH, HYDER KHAN  
*Representatives of Koh-Ghizar*

WAZIR DARABSHAH CHARVELU, MOH[AMMA]D  
AZIZ KHAN SHU SHU,  
*Representatives of Ishkoman*



## PS-43

*Prime Minister, Chitral to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 216 (Part III)-GG/151*

CHITRAL,  
14 April 1948

His Excellency Quaid-i-Azam

The people of Chitral with one voice welcome Your Excellency to the Frontier. The people request Your Excellency to kindly approve application<sup>1</sup> of inhabitants [of] Koh-Ghizar, Yasin and Ishkoman for amalgamation with Chitral as before the British era.

PRIME MINISTER, CHITRAL

<sup>1</sup>PS-42.

## PS-44

*Khwaja Nazimuddin to Ruler of Chitral*

*F. 5-GG/21*

[KARACHI,]  
7 April 1949

My esteemed friend,

I am glad to send to Your Highness my personal congratulations and also to convey the recognition of the Government of Pakistan to your accession to the *gaddi* of Chitral. I was gratified to receive a report from His Excellency the Governor of the N.W.F. Province that Your Highness was publicly installed by the Political Agent. It gives me very great pleasure to confirm the installation by means of this *Kharita*. I hope that the ties of friendship and loyalty which exist between Pakistan and Chitral will be still further cemented during your rule and that the State will prosper and progress under your guidance.


I shall always take a personal interest in the welfare and prosperity of your people and Government.

I remain with much consideration,

Your Highness' sincere friend,


K. NAZIMUDDIN  
Governor-General, Pakistan






*Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, in ceremonial dress.*





*Picture shows (front row) Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral,  
Jinnah and Fatima Jinnah.*





*Group photo of ruling family of Chitral, 1935.*

*(From L to R) : Hissamul Mulk, Ghaziuddin Mulk, Saiful Mulk, Imadul Mulk, Muzaffarul Mulk, Shahabuddin Mulk, Amiruddin Mulk, Burhanuddin Mulk, Matul Mulk, Shujaul Mulk (Centre), Khusraul Mulk, Khushwaqtul Mulk, Khushamadul Mulk, Mubarakul Mulk, Khalilul Mulk and Mohyuddin Mulk.*



DIR STATE



## PS-45

*Ruler of Jandul to M. A. Jinnah**F. 30-GG/328**[Original in Urdu]*

SARHAD, AZAD  
DIR STATE, MALAKAND AGENCY,  
VIA CHAKDARA,  
28 August 1947

Most respectfully I offer *Assalaamo 'Alaikum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuhu*. I feel great happiness on the establishment of Pakistan. The carnage committed in Punjab by the Sikhs grieved me deeply. However, I congratulate you, and may God bless you with the gifted State of Pakistan. The shackles of slavery have been broken. On this great achievement, every Muslim may rightly feel proud. I am a true soldier of Islam. I can raise an army of one lakh *mujahideen* from the State of Jandul in order to serve Islam and fight against Sikhs and *mushrikeen*. This would need instructions from you. I am the Wali of Jandul and my father is the Wali of Dir.<sup>1</sup> This letter must not go to the press. I am not a hypocrite but there are some political implications involved in it. However, if there are any instructions for me these might be conveyed to me through a messenger or through the Frontier Ministry verbally. I hope you will accept me as a soldier of Islam and provide me with a chance to serve the cause of Islam. However, I do not vouch for any of my relatives.

I beg to remain a true servant of Islam and yourself,

NAWABZADA MUHAMMAD SHAHABUDDIN KHAN  
SON OF NAWAB OF DIR

<sup>1</sup>Muhammad Shah Jahan.



## PS-46

*S. M. Yusuf to M. Ikramullah**F. 124 (11)-GG/1*

KARACHI,  
*8 October 1947*

My dear Ikramullah,

Quaid-i-Azam desires that since the States of Swat, Amb, Dir and Phulra have expressed their willingness to join Pakistan, they may be requested to send their representatives to Karachi to go through the formalities of signing the Instrument of Accession.<sup>1</sup> As these States have been in correspondence with you in this matter, the invitations might issue from your office.

Yours sincerely,  
S. M. YUSUF

<sup>1</sup>The Ruler of Dir signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 8 November, 1947, which was accepted by the Governor-General on 18 February, 1948. See *Instruments of Accession*, 28.



# HUNZA & NAGAR STATES



## PS-47

*Ruler of Hunza to M. A. Jinnah**Telegram*<sup>1</sup>CAMP GULMIT,  
3 November 1947

Quaid-i-Azam, Governor-General Pakistan,

I declare with pleasure on behalf of myself and my State accession to Pakistan.

[M. JAMAL KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Original with Margaret Brown. See William A. Brown, *The Gilgit Rebellion 1947*, Ibex, 1998, 177.

## PS-48

*Liaquat Ali Khan to George Cunningham**Telegram, FOA, SA (4)-6/2*MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 380-GLAHORE,  
6 November 1947

You must have seen message from Gilgit addressed to Premier North-West Frontier Province. Please send Political Agent to Gilgit immediately with instruction to take over charge of Administration.

Hunza and Nagar States have decided to accede to Pakistan and we are willing to accept their accession. Please send simplified Instrument of Accession used for Frontier States to Hunza and Nagar<sup>1</sup> for their signature and forward it to us for signature of Governor-General.

Dir, Swat and Chitral should be asked not to send any troops into Gilgit and to see that no border incidents take place.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Annex



*Annex to PS-48**Instrument of Accession of Nagar State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[7 December 1947]

[I] Ruler of Nagar State in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession and I do hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of Pakistan and promise full loyalty to Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

I accept that in respect of External Affairs, Defence and Communications, as specified in the schedule attached hereto, the Government of Pakistan has full control and authority, both legislative and executive.

Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuances of my sovereignty in and over this State or save as provided by, or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me in regard to the internal administration of my State.

I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and my heirs and successors.

SHAUKAT ALI  
*Mir of Nagar State*  
 19-11-47

I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession dated this 7th day of December Nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

M. A. JINNAH  
*Governor-General of Pakistan*

<sup>1</sup>The Mir of Nagar presented a copy of the signed Instrument of Accession to the Editor-in-Chief, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project.

<sup>2</sup>On 14 April 1948, the Maharaja of Kashmir confiscated the *jagirs* of Mir of Hunza and Raja of Punial as a sequel to their accession to Pakistan. See *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/4-1648. Not printed.





*Shoukat Ali, Mir of Nagar State in ceremonial dress.*



KALAT STATE



## PS-49

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 34/19*

AMBASSADOR HOTEL, BOMBAY,  
19 March 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

In connection with my yesterday's conversation with you, I enclose for your information the following papers:

1. My *Wazir-i-Azam's* demi-official letter of December 26th, 1946,<sup>1</sup> to Mr Griffin, Political Secretary to the Government of India, based on the conversation that the *Wazir-i-Azam* had with His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal.
2. A note<sup>2</sup> based on this letter, prepared by some legal adviser.
3. A draft memorandum,<sup>3</sup> prepared by Mr Chundrigar,<sup>4</sup> to be forwarded to the Government of India.
4. A printed copy<sup>5</sup> of the relevant Treaties of Kalat.

Yours very sincerely,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Enclosure 1.

<sup>2</sup>Enclosure 2.

<sup>3</sup>Enclosure 3.

<sup>4</sup>I. I. Chundrigar was engaged as a lawyer by the Ruler of Kalat.

<sup>5</sup>(i). Treaty of 1839. See C.U. Aitchison, comp., *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring countries*, Vol. XI, Delhi, 1933, 350-1. Not printed.

(ii). Treaty of 1841. See *ibid.*, 351-2. Not printed.

a. Treaty of 1854, Enclosure 4 to No. 155, Vol. I, Part I, 298-300.

b. Agreement of August 1862, *ibid.*, 300.

c. Treaty between the British Government and the Kalat State, 1876, *ibid.*, 301-3.

d. Agreement of June 1883, *ibid.*, 303-5.

e. Agreement of July 1899, *ibid.*, 305-6.

f. Agreement of May 1903, *ibid.*, 306-8.



*Enclosure 1 to PS-49*  
*Muhammed Aslam<sup>1</sup> to Lancelot Griffin<sup>2</sup>*

*F. 34/7-12*

MAIDEN'S HOTEL, DELHI,  
26 December 1946

My dear Mr Griffin,

I returned from Bhopal in the evening of the 22nd December and called at your office on the 23rd afternoon, but was told that you had gone out. I, however, saw Mr Wakefield and gave him a brief account of my meeting with His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes at Bhopal. I now write this letter to give you a more detailed account of my aforesaid meeting, and at the same time apologise for this encroachment on your time.

2. I explained to His Highness the Chancellor that the Kalat State had three major problems before it, namely:

- a. the future place of the State in the world and its relations with India after the British Government has handed over the reins of the Government of India to the Indians;
- b. the return of the leased areas of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad to the Kalat State after the termination of His Highness' treaty with the British Government; and
- c. the future of other Baluch tribal areas, such as Kharan and Las Bela, the two feudatory States, Marri and Bugti territories, etc.

3. Taking 2(a) first, what I submitted to His Highness the Chancellor is more or less as follows:

- i. The Kalat State is not, and has never been, a part of India. It is not an Indian State. Before the advent of the British Government, Baluchistan, which name then only applied to the land inhabited by Baluch tribes (which term includes the Brahuis), led an independent existence under its own Ruler, the Khan of Kalat, who in those days was known as the Khan of Baluchistan. There exists documentary evidence to show that the Khans of Baluchistan, the great ancestors of the present Ruler of the Kalat State, mostly ruled over their territories independently of any foreign interference and were held in high esteem and regard as such not only by the neighbouring Rulers of Afghanistan and Persia but by the Caliph of Islam himself, who was even pleased to bestow the title of *Beglar Begi* (Turkish words, meaning the "Khan of Khans") on the Khan of Baluchistan.
- ii. The first British contact with the Kalat State takes place in the



year 1838, in connexion with an expeditionary force sent by the British Government to Afghanistan via Baluchistan, in support of the exiled Afghan King, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, who some time before had taken refuge in Kalat State. The Khan of Kalat's co-operation was sought in the matter, which was freely given. Subsequent history of British relations with the Kalat State and its Rulers has been one of friendly alliances and treaties of mutual friendship and amity throughout.

- iii. These Treaties were concluded in 1841, 1854 and 1876, and they are based on mutual friendship and alliance as between two independent and sovereign States. Besides these, several Electric Telegraph Agreements were also concluded with the Kalat State and the feudatory State of Las Bela, which throw further light on the nature of the relations maintained between the British Government and the Kalat State. These relations are consistently described in the aforesaid Treaties and Telegraph Agreements as those of "friendship and amity between the two Governments" and the Khan of Kalat is held to be an ally—"a firm ally"—of the British Government, and "Ruler of the Sovereign State of Kalat".
- iv. A reference is invited to the Treaty of 1876, which is the Treaty in force at present time. The Treaty begins with the following words:  
Whereas it has become expedient to renew the Treaty of 1854... and to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship and amity between the two Governments....

Article 3 of this Treaty, while binding the Khan to faithfully observe his undertakings, binds the British Government "to respect the independence of Kalat".

Article 4 provides for the British Agents to be "accredited by the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan" and, "on the other hand", for His Highness "to accredit a suitable representative" to the Government of India. The reason for this exchange of representatives is given in the first sentence of this Article, which is "for the further consolidation of the friendship herewith renewed and reaffirmed between the two Governments". (I also explained to His Highness the Chancellor that His Highness the Khan of Kalat had recently appointed me as his Representative with His Excellency the Crown Representative, under this Article of the Treaty, and that I had already had the honour of presenting my credentials to His Excellency on the 18th of December 1946.)

In Article 6, the British Government "in recognition of the intimate relations existing between the two countries" accords its assent to the



request of His Highness for the presence in his country of a detachment of British troops.

Article 7 provides for the construction by the British Government, "by previous arrangements between the British Government and the Government of His Highness", of such lines of Telegraph and Railway "as may be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments".

- v. Thus it will be seen that the relations between the British Government and the Kalat State have [all] along been based on mutual friendship and amity as between two independent countries, and have no other basis for their existence.
- vi. It is true that the Government of India Act of 1935 holds the Kalat State as situated in India, but the State was never consulted in the drafting of this Act, nor was the State, in any way, a party to it, and, as such, in view of the clear treaty relations existing between the countries already explained, an Act passed by one Government for the administration of its own territories can have no legal effect, one way or another, in respect of the territories of the other Government. Were it not so, then it would be equally "legal" for the British Government to include Persia and Afghanistan within the borders of India by introducing a clause to that effect in one of its Acts. Nevertheless, the Khan of Kalat lodged a protest in proper quarters against what he considered to be an infringement of the Treaty of 1876. His Highness, however, got a reply in the form of a personal letter from His Excellency the Crown Representative, dated the 10th of June 1939, assuring His Highness that such reaffirmation was unnecessary and that His Excellency recognized the Treaty of 1876 as fully valid in every respect and that it would henceforth form the basis of relations between the British Government and the Kalat State.
- vii. His Highness the Khan, therefore, maintains, and he is supported in this respect by the unanimous will of all his subjects (a) that the Kalat State is an independent sovereign State whose relations with the British Government are based on the Treaty of 1876; (b) that its Indian associations are merely due to its connexions under the Treaty with the British Government and nothing else; (c) that the Kalat State being an independent State, His Highness can never agree to its being included in any form of an Indian Union; (d) that with the termination of the Treaty with the British Government, the Kalat State will revert to its original position and will be free to choose its own course for the future; and (e) that future relations between the Kalat State and India will depend entirely on the kind of treaty, if any, that may be entered into between the two countries.



- viii. His Highness, however, is most anxious to continue his friendly and amicable relations with India and will always be glad to enter into a treaty of friendship with any Government that succeeds the British Government in India, so long as the position of the Kalat State as an independent and sovereign State is fully recognized and respected by the other party to the Treaty.
4. As regards 2(b) above, the question of the Leased Territories, I refer to the Agreements under which these territories have been leased to the British Government:
- i. Under these Agreements, the Kalat *Niabats* of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad are held by the British Government from H.H the Khan on quit-rent. In addition, the Khan has also transferred to the British Government his rights to levy dues or tolls on trade travelling through the Bolan, in return for which the British Government has agreed to pay to His Highness the sum of Rupees 30,000 per annum. The salient features of these Agreements are as follows:
    - a. First, the Agreements are between the Khan of Kalat and the British Government and were entered into by "common consent" for the "advantage of both Governments".
    - b. Secondly, while one party to these Agreements is "His Highness Mir Khudadad Khan on behalf of himself and his heirs and successors", the other party is British Government alone and not also its successors, etc.
    - c. Thirdly, according to the terms of these Agreements, they hold good, and the British Government is liable to pay the stipulated quit-rent, only so long as the territories in question are administered by the British Government.
  - ii. In view of these clear stipulations in the Agreements, it requires no subtle argument to show that legally as well as morally the British Government is bound to restore the territories in question to the State as soon as it finds itself unable any longer to carry out its own part of the Agreement.
  - iii. It may be repeated that the very first and foremost condition on which each Agreement is based is that the Leased Territory shall be held by the British Government and shall be administered on behalf of the British Government by an officer or officers appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council for the purpose.
  - iv. These Areas belong to His Highness the Khan. They are held by the British Government on lease from the Khan on certain conditions. The Agreements in regard to the said Areas were made with the British Government and with that Government alone.



When, therefore, the British Government relinquishes charge of the Leased Areas, justice will demand that they are restored intact to the Khan of Kalat, their lawful and rightful owner. The Khan also anxiously awaits a formal pronouncement by the British Government to this effect.

5. Regarding 2(c), the future of other Baluch tribal areas, I explained to His Highness the Chancellor that:

All these Areas originally formed part of Kalat State, and were later on, by mutual agreement with the British Government, separated from the State on grounds of administrative expediency. To the best of my belief, the majority of the people of these Areas desire to see some sort of Kalat State Union formed, which should include their territories. Already, some of their leading *Sardars*, notably the *Sardars* of Marri and Bugti Tribes, and Sardar Mir Jamal Khan Laghari speaking for the Laghari tribal territory of Dera Ghazi Khan (Punjab), have approached His Highness the Khan with a formal request—the Marri and Bugti *Sardars* have even executed a writing to this effect—that His Highness should guide their destinies regarding the future and that their best interests lie in a union of all Baluch tribal territories under the hegemony of His Highness the Khan, who is already the recognized head of the Baluch Confederacy and is the suzerain of the Kharan and Las Bela States. His Highness the Khan, while sympathetically disposed to the overtures of the tribal chiefs and others who have approached him in this matter, is looking to the British Government for friendly advice. His Highness knows it for a fact that all Baluch tribes, whether living in or outside the Kalat State, are one in their desire to preserve their national existence and heritage and to keep themselves out of any form of Indian Union, and he is deeply anxious to see that they get a treatment which accords with their just and natural aspirations.

6. This was, more or less, the substance of my talk with His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. His Highness, whom I found to be one of the most charming persons I have ever come across, and who listened to everything I said with the closest attention, asked me first of all if I had discussed all these matters with Sir Conrad Corfield.<sup>3</sup> I replied that I had done so but not in so much detail. His Highness then told me in most sympathetic and kind terms that he entirely appreciated the position of the Kalat State and was in full agreement with the views of His Highness the Khan as explained by me. His Highness asked me to assure His Highness the Khan that he had the fullest sympathy of the Chancellor of the Princes' Chamber and would get every possible support from him. His Highness further asked me to write to him an informal letter stating all that I had



verbally explained to him. His Highness appreciated the view of the Kalat State that it could not be a party to any formal negotiations conducted by the Negotiating Committee of the Chamber of Princes with the Constituent Assembly without compromising its position as an independent State as recognized and accepted by the Treaty of 1876, but advised that His Highness the Khan should keep in informal touch with him during the course of their negotiations with the Constituent Assembly. I told His Highness that His Highness the Khan would be glad to do that.

7. I returned from Bhopal with my heart full of gratitude for His Highness the Chancellor for the very kind, hospitable and courteous treatment which I received during my two days' stay in Bhopal.

8. I will write the letter called for by His Highness the Chancellor on my return to the Kalat State.

Yours sincerely,  
MUHAMAD ASLAM

<sup>1</sup>Prime Minister, Kalat State.

<sup>2</sup>Secretary to the Crown Representative.

<sup>3</sup>Political Adviser to the Crown Representative.

*Enclosure 2 to PS-49*

*F. 34/13-5*

[NOTE BY A LEGAL ADVISER]

I have carefully studied the relevant provisions of the various Agreements and Treaties bearing on the relations that have subsisted between the British Government on the one hand and the Kalat State on the other.

I have also gone through the contents of the letter addressed to Mr Griffin, Secretary to the Government of India, in the Political Department, New Delhi. This letter embodies, in a most lucid and appropriate language, all that was required to be stated on behalf of the Kalat State with respect to the three major problems, namely:

- a. the future place of the State in the world, with special reference to its relations with India, as they have so far existed, and as the State is entitled to maintain them, after the British Government has handed over the reins of the Government of India to Indians;
- b. the return of the Leased Areas of Quetta, Nushki and Nasirabad to the Kalat State after the termination of His Highness' Treaty [Treaties] with the British Government; and
- c. the future of other Baluch tribal areas, such as Kharan and Las Bela, the two feudatory States, [besides] Marri and Bugti territories, etc.



I have nothing very important or material to add to the points already embodied in the letter to Mr Griffin referred to above, except the following, some of which appear to be partly covered by that letter. The points now being suggested may also be incorporated, wherever appropriate, in the final Despatch or Memorandum which may ultimately be decided upon by the authorities of the Kalat State. These points are suggestive rather than exhaustive.

Having regard to the clear terms of the provisions of the various Treaties and Agreements, and more particularly those of 1854 and 1876, which are mutually supplementary, and constitute the final basis of the relations between the British Government and the Kalat State, as being two independent and sovereign States, it could be established beyond any manner of doubt or ambiguity that:

- i. Kalat has never been, and is no more, a part of Indian India than Afghanistan or Persia.
- ii. Its geographical position near the N.W.F boundary of India could no more make it a part of Indian India than any other foreign country similarly situated.
- iii. Its customs, social institutions, language, culture, modes of thought and living, etc., have nothing in common with British India or Indian India.
- iv. The various Treaties, Engagements and Agreements made and reaffirmed with the Kalat State from time to time ever since the year 1838, when the first British contact with the State began, were concluded not by the Government of India as constituted from time to time, but by the British Government, as represented by the Crown Representative for the time being in India.
- v. The mere fact that the Political Department of the Government of India, and not the Foreign Department of the British Government, has been dealing with the Rulers of the Kalat State does not make it one of the Indian States. The relations of the Indian States with the Paramount Power are determined and regulated by an entirely different set of treaties and mutual obligations.
- vi. Even if some of the terms of the Treaties with the Kalat State happened to be, or were regarded as, similar to those contained in the Treaties of the Government with the Indian States, they should not be interpreted as detracting from the fundamentally different position guaranteed to the Kalat State by the Treaties of 1854 and 1876, which, between them, form the only basis of the relations of mutual friendship and alliance between the British Government and the Kalat State.
- vii. If, as stated in para 14 of the British Cabinet Delegation's proposals



of May 16, 1946,<sup>1</sup> "Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government" after the relationship hitherto existing between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown is terminated, the stronger would be the claim of the Kalat State to revert to its original position of an absolutely independent sovereign State unfettered by any of the commitments which formed part of its Treaties with the British Government as made from time to time.

- viii. When the Indian States, each separately governed and possessing individual relationship with the British Crown, are left free to decide their future course of action in regard to their relations with the Government of India by mutual negotiations, Kalat, being essentially a separate sovereign entity, cannot, by any accepted canon of justice or equity, be asked to forego its inherent and inalienable right of complete independent existence.
- ix. Having regard to the declaration of the British Government contained in the British Government Delegation's Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy of May 12, 1946,<sup>2</sup> that the "British Government could not and will not in any circumstance transfer paramountcy to an Indian Government", and the apprehensions expressed by the Delegation in para 5 of their Memorandum that "H.M.G.'s influence with a new self-governing Indian Government or Governments coming into being in British India will not be such as to enable them to carry out the obligations of paramountcy, the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the States, thereby bringing to an end the political arrangements between the States on one side and the British Crown and the British India on the other", the position claimed by the Kalat State can at once be appreciated as eminently just and reasonable.

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix III. 1, Vol. I, Part II, 32-42.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.

*Enclosure 3 to PS-49*

*F. 34/16-17(a)*

DRAFT MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY I. I. CHUNDRIGAR

India is on the eve of great constitutional changes. The Cabinet Mission and His Excellency the Viceroy have issued a statement on the 16th of May 1946<sup>1</sup> recommending the basic form of the Constitution for British India. In para 14 of this statement, they say that "before



putting forward our recommendation, we turn to deal with the relationship of the Indian States to British India" and then they proceed to state that "Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government." It is clear, first, that the Cabinet Mission and His Excellency the Viceroy dealt with the Indian States in their statement and Kalat is not an Indian State and will not, therefore, be bound to join a "Union of India" and, secondly, that they clearly decided that paramountcy will neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government.

I may further mention that Kalat, which is not an Indian State and which was brought in relation with the British Government on account of its geographical position on the borders of India, is just like Afghanistan and Persia. Now that the British Government intends to transfer power and help India to attain her freedom, the Kalat State must become independent. According to Article 3 of the Treaty concluded between the British Government and the Kalat State in 1876,<sup>2</sup> the British Government has engaged to respect the independence of Kalat and after it surrenders its sovereignty over British India, the Kalat State automatically becomes fully independent.

The British Cabinet Mission have further declared in their statement of the 23rd May [*sic* for 12 May] 1946<sup>3</sup> that "When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Governments come into being in British India, His Majesty's Government's influence with these Governments will not be such as to enable them to carry on the obligations of paramountcy. Moreover, they contemplate that British troops would not be retained in India for this purpose. Thus as a logical sequence and in view of the desires expressed to them on behalf of the Indian States, His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship with the Crown will no longer exist and that the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the States. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successive Government or Governments in British India or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or with them".

My State has no intention of entering into a federal relationship with the successive Government or Governments in British India and I have, therefore, to request Your Excellency to declare the independence of the Kalat State.

II. My ancestor, His Highness Meer Khudadad Khan of Kalat, by an agreement dated the 8th June 1883,<sup>4</sup> made over and entrusted the entire management of the Quetta District and *Niabat* to the British



Government with effect from the 1st April 1883 on the terms and conditions set out therein. My ancestor, His Highness Meer Mahmud Khan of Kalat, by an agreement dated the 1st July 1899, made over and entrusted the entire management of the Nushki District and *Niabat* with effect from the 1st July 1899<sup>5</sup> on the terms and conditions set out therein and by an agreement dated 14th May 1903<sup>6</sup> made over and entrusted the entire management of the *Niabat* of Nasirabad with effect from the 1st April 1903 on the terms and conditions set out therein. These agreements were entered into by my ancestors with the British Government and they had entrusted the management of these districts and *Niabats* to the British Government having implicit faith in their honesty and powers of management. These rights of management which were made over by my ancestors to the British Government, which was then paramount power in India, must return to my State, as rightly declared by the Cabinet Mission. I have, therefore, to request Your Excellency to hand over the management of these districts and *Niabats* to me at the time of handing over the charge to the new Government or Governments, which may be established in British India.

III. My ancestor Meer Khudadad Khan, Khan of Kalat, had further, by agreement dated the 8th June 1883, transferred to the British Government with effect from 1st of April 1883, all his rights to levy dues or tolls on the trade travelling through the Bolan Pass to and from British India and Afghanistan, as well as to and from Kachhi and Khorasan, as provided by the Treaty of 1854 or on the trade travelling to and from British India and the Districts of Sibi, Quetta and Pishin on the terms and conditions set out therein. In order to facilitate the arrangements of the British Government for the collection of tolls on its own behalf in the Bolan Pass, my ancestor Meer Khudadad Khan further ceded to the British Government full civil and criminal jurisdiction and all other powers of administration within the limits of the said Pass and within the land purchased by the Government at Rindali for a railway station and other buildings. These rights surrendered by my ancestor to the British Government as the paramount power in India must also return to my State, as declared by the Cabinet Mission. I have, therefore, to request Your Excellency to make a declaration to that effect and hand over their charge to the officer, who will be appointed by me, at the time of handing over the charge to the new Government or Governments which may be established in British India.

IV. The *Sardars* of Las Bela and Kharan were under me and they will be under me hereafter.

V. The Marri-Bugti tribal area will be similarly under me.



VI. As to the agreements about the telegraph lines, the new Government or Governments can negotiate with me and enter into fresh agreements on terms acceptable to both parties.

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix III. 1, Vol. I, Part II, 32-42.

<sup>2</sup>See Enclosure 4 to No. 155, Vol. I, Part I, 301.

<sup>3</sup>No. 2.

<sup>4,5 & 6</sup>Enclosure 4 to No. 155, Vol. I, Part I, 303-8.

## PS-50

*Qazi M. Isa to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 302/153-4*

DELHI,  
15 April 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I arrived last evening from Quetta. I had to deliver the letter to you from H. H the Khan of Kalat. I would not like to inconvenience you now but would meet you after a couple of days. I am now going to Nainital to see my son who is in school there and, being his birthday, I would like to be there. In the meantime you would read the letter and H.H's declaration. It is on this subject that I seek your elucidation.

I do hope you are in best of health.

With all the regards,

Yours sincerely,  
ISA

*Enclosure to PS-50*  
*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 699/21*

AIWAN-I-KALAT, QUETTA,  
14 April 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I returned to Baluchistan on the 29th of last month. Before I say anything, I wish to convey to you grateful thanks from my people and myself for the kind and very affectionate thoughts you expressed in respect of our aspirations and for the sympathetic view with which you regarded the Kalat case. Your conversations still pervade my



thoughts, and they have had very benevolent effect on my feelings. It was due to this influence that I, at the very first opportunity, made in unequivocal terms a public announcement giving all my support to your demand for Pakistan—not your demand but rather a demand of the ten [*sic* for hundred] million Muslims of India.

I enclose for your perusal a copy of the announcement<sup>1</sup> which is in Urdu. Kalat, I believe, is the first and so far the only State which has publicly thrown its lot with Pakistan and has promised its fullest support therefor. The attitude that the opposite camp will consequently adopt in respect of Kalat and its demands is quite evident. At this juncture, I request you to do me a favour by giving a short public statement in support of my announcement. This will have at least a soothing effect on the feelings of the pro-League public here, which at present are very much prone to be swept by the Congress propaganda: it is this thought that tempts me to request you for a statement in support of the Kalat Government announcement which would otherwise seem inopportune.

I hope this letter finds Miss Jinnah and you both in good spirits. I wish you both good health and long life to serve the cause of the Muslims of India. In the end, I must once again thank you both for the kind hospitality you showed me while I was last at Bombay.

With kindest regards to you both,

Yours very affectionately,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Annex

*Annex to Enclosure to PS-50*

*F. 699/22-9*

*[Original in Urdu]*

# GOVERNMENT OF KALAT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT CEDED TERRITORIES

PRIVATE SECRETARY, THE COURT OF KALAT,  
11 April 1947

Now that the ceded territories of Kalat are about to be returned to the State, a number of rumours are floating among the people. To dispel misunderstanding and to remove the current restlessness of the people, I have been directed to issue the following statement about future policy of the Government of Kalat:



1. By the Grace of *Allah*, nearly all the population of Kalat is Muslim. It is the desire of Khan of Kalat that the future constitution of the Government of Kalat should be Islamic and in accordance with the jurisprudence preached by the Holy Prophet and that the State be ruled by a constitutional and Islamic ruler.
2. The present practices and way of life would continue wholly unaltered even after the restoration of the ceded territories to the State. However, if it is found absolutely essential to make any changes in the current practices, the changes would be implemented only after their approval by the majority of the State's people and their representatives.
3. The day the ceded territories are returned to the Government of Kalat, an advisory board will be constituted in every area which will consist of representatives of all classes, religions and groups to enable people to advise the Government of their country and to serve their country by participating in the affairs of the Government.
4. The Government of Kalat wants to make it perfectly clear to all of you that the position of the Government would be that of a group of persons serving the cause of Islam, the people and the motherland. It will be the duty of the Government to associate people's representatives in the conduct of the State affairs. The Government of Kalat is not a Government of aliens but that of the natives of this State itself, which is fully sympathetic to the people and strives for their well-being. It will be the duty of the State to continue to serve the cause of Islam, to eradicate illiteracy, to promote industry, to teach modern industrial and professional skills to the labourers and artisans, and to eliminate unemployment with a view to improving the economy of the State; ending poverty, promoting commerce to international level, and raising the living standards of the cultivators by modernizing agriculture.
5. The question of natives and non-natives is being hotly discussed. This question will be resolved as soon as possible. The best solution in this connection is to establish an Advisory Board on the restoration of the ceded territories which will include representatives of all classes, religions and sects.

This Board would interview the out-of-State people to ascertain if they were willing to regard Baluchistan as their motherland and whether they agreed to being called Baluchistani on being given citizenship of Baluchistan. If they expressed their readiness to integrate themselves with us, to regard Baluchistan as their own land and to



identify themselves with our interests and way of life, we would unequivocally accept them as our brethren and our equals. As for religion, all people will be free to practise their own religion. In case they did not accept the above-mentioned conditions and wished to return to countries of their origin, we would guarantee security of their lives and property and would make suitable arrangements for their return to their original lands, without any harm to their persons or belongings.

6. In future the Government of Kalat will be a fully free and independent government in all internal and external affairs. It will, through treaties, establish friendly relations with neighbouring Muslim countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and especially Pakistan. In addition, it will enter into treaties and friendly relations with India and the rest of the world also.
7. As for the ideology of Pakistan, Muslim League Party and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Government of Kalat is in complete agreement with them and is ready to render any sacrifice for establishing Pakistan.

The Baluch people should also remember that the policy of Khan-i-Kalat is the same as that of Quaid-i-Azam. Indeed the Khan of Kalat has been consulting the Quaid-i-Azam in all important matters and the Quaid-i-Azam fully approves of the restoration of all the ceded territories and their assimilation in Kalat and has assured the Khan of Kalat of his full support in this context, for which the Khan of Kalat and the State Government are most grateful to him.

## PS-51

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat*

*F. 34/20*

*20 May 1947*

My dear Khan Sahib,

I thank you very much indeed for having sent two of your men to serve me, which was really very kind of you. I received the letter that they brought to me as to the arrangements you have made, but owing to rush and pressure of work, I was not able to reply earlier and now I cannot lay my hands on that letter. I am still looking for it but I shall feel obliged if you will let me have a copy of that so that we can act according to it with regard to your men.

I hope that you are well and look forward to meeting you very soon.



With very kind regards from Miss Jinnah, and myself to Begum Sahiba and yourself and our love to children,

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

PS-52

*M. Zia-ud-Din to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 472/15-7*

5 QUEEN'S ROAD, QUETTA,  
8 July 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I have been in Baluchistan for about eight months now, and consider it my duty to bring to your notice some important problems of this Province, particularly at this juncture. The Province, as you are aware, consists of the British districts of Sibi, Pishin and Duki [Dombki], etc., the tribal areas of Marris, Bugtis, Nushki and Zhob,<sup>1</sup> and the leased territories of Quetta, Bolan<sup>2</sup> and Nasirabad. According to the provisions of the Independence Bill, which is now pending before Parliament, only those districts are coming into Pakistan which are being administered by the Chief Commissioner of "British Baluchistan" and that all agreements with States and Tribal Areas lapse from 15th August. This means that Quetta, which is the heart of the Province and the only town with large and extremely important military installations, will not become a part of Pakistan, and that the area of Nasirabad which is the only food and revenue producing portion of Baluchistan will also be lopped off from it. The Tribal Areas will become independent and all the Leased Areas including the Bolan Pass will revert to the Kalat State.

2. Those portions of Baluchistan, which are described as British Baluchistan in the Independence Bill and which are coming into Pakistan, are in reality mountain areas and quite useless. They are isolated from the rest of Pakistan. Baluchistan as a province will in any case be a liability for Pakistan, but disintegrated and shorn of the Leased Areas, it will become a millstone round its neck. At the present juncture, if Pakistan loses Quetta it loses one of the most important military stations, and the strategic and trade routes to Persia and Afghanistan. The people of Quetta are also horrified by the thought of coming under Kalat State, and there is great consternation. The Muslim League has been promising these people a



place in Pakistan, and that is why the *Sardars* voted unanimously for it ten days ago.<sup>3</sup> They could never dream of reversion to Kalat State.

3. According to the present arrangements of the Bill, on 15th August, all the courts in Quetta will cease to have any jurisdiction and the whole headquarters of the Province will no longer function legally. Somehow, I cannot visualize the scene on that day, but it will be a tragedy if while on the one hand the attainment of Pakistan is being celebrated, on the other hand one of our prize cities will be passing into a medieval state. The disintegrated, isolated and poor districts of British Baluchistan cannot possibly exist as a province without Quetta and Nasirabad, and they will become hotbeds of intrigue for the neighbouring countries and ambitious tribesmen. Ninety per cent of the population of Quetta will leave the place if it reverts to Kalat. It will perish as a town and the railway, roads, aerodromes and military installations will be impossible to maintain. We shall also lose the cantonments of Loralai and Fort Sandeman.<sup>4</sup>

4. The potential mineral wealth of Baluchistan exists in the Tribal Areas only. Coal is found at Mach which is Leased Territory. Chrome is found in Hindubagh<sup>5</sup> which is Tribal Area. Sulphur and copper are found only in Tribal Areas. Therefore, all the potential sources of Baluchistan's wealth also go out under the present scheme.

5. You know, Sir, that I belong to Peshawar and am here for a case only. I shall return to my own province in a couple of months. But from the point of view of Pakistan, I am naturally interested in Baluchistan. I have had the unique advantage of visiting all the districts and many of the villages of this province and I feel for its people and their future.

6. I am not making any suggestions as to what should be done. That is a matter of high policy which you will determine yourself, but I beg you to take steps to prevent the loss of very valuable areas by Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,  
M. ZIA-UD-DIN  
*Bar-at-Law*

<sup>1</sup>These areas, forming part of Kalat State, were separated for administrative and political reasons by agreement with the British Government.

<sup>2</sup>The territories of Quetta and Bolan were leased to the British Government under Agreement of 1883 and Nasirabad under Agreement of 1903. See PS-49, note 5, items d and f respectively.

<sup>3</sup>On 29 June 1947, all members of the *Shahi Jirga* and the Quetta Municipality present voted to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.

<sup>4</sup>Now called Zhob.

<sup>5</sup>Now called Muslimbagh.



## PS-53

*Francis Mudie to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/138*

D.O. NO. 2-S/F

SIND GOVERNOR'S CAMP, ZIARAT,  
9 July 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

*[Paras 1 to 4 omitted]*

[5] I had a long talk with the Khan of Khelat [Kalat] on the day that the Afghan demand on HMG for the rendition of certain territory was announced over the wireless. He had not heard it over the BBC, but knew all about it as the claim had been broadcast from Kabul, to which he apparently listens, for about three weeks. To me, of course, he professed his desire to keep on good terms with Pakistan and to have nothing to do with the approaches of the Afghans, but his wife belongs, I believe, to the Afghan Royal family and I imagine that he would side with those that frighten him most. And I don't blame him. He attributed the Afghan move to the Russians, but that may merely be a bargaining counter with Pakistan. If the Afghans follow up their claims, the result will almost certainly be unrest on the western border of Sind.

[6] On the eastern border, there has been no further propaganda by Jodhpur<sup>1</sup> for cession of part of Tharparkar District to Jodhpur. This is attributed to the death of the Maharaja. I doubt, however, whether the claim will be allowed to die. Speeches of certain Congress leaders in India indicate fairly clearly that they at least would like to advance the frontiers of that Dominion. I have warned my Premier of both these dangers and also of the danger that, if he gives them a handle, the Congress outside will try to make trouble among the Hindus of Sind to weaken his Government. I have again reminded him of Hitler and the Sudeten Deutsch. He is perfectly willing to give the Hindus a fair deal. The trouble is to get the idea into the heads of some of his colleagues and supporters.

*[Paras 7 to 9 omitted]*

Yours sincerely,  
F. MUDIE

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix IV. 1, Vol. II, 849-51.



## PS-54

*Minutes of Viceroy's Twentieth Miscellaneous Meeting<sup>1</sup>*

R/3/1/166

SECRET

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,  
19 July 1947, 3.30 pm

## PRESENT

Louis Mountbatten

Abdur Rab Nishtar

Conrad Corfield

Mohammed Aslam Khan

E. B. Wakefield

Sultan Ahmed<sup>2</sup>

Erskine Crum

Akhtar Hussain

## HIS EXCELLENCY'S OPENING REMARKS

His Excellency welcomed the Kalat delegation.<sup>3</sup> He explained that it was his desire, as Crown Representative, to settle all matters of potential dispute between the States and the two new Dominions by 15th August.

## UNDISPUTED AREAS OF KALAT

His Excellency said that he understood that the districts of Kalat, which all concerned acknowledged to be directly administered by the Khan, were Mekran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi, Dombki and Kaheri.

## DISPUTED AREAS

His Excellency said that he understood that the status of Kharan and Las Bela was disputed to the extent that the rulers thereof claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat. This, however, was a matter for future discussion between the parties concerned and not for the present meeting.

## THE LEGAL POSITION OF KALAT

His Excellency asked whether it was considered that Kalat's status in relation to the Crown was that of an Indian State or different.

Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan said that Kalat's position was, in his opinion, defined in the Treaty of 1876<sup>4</sup> according to which Kalat was an independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government, and did not rank as an Indian State.<sup>5</sup>

His Excellency said that he was willing to accept that position for purposes of negotiations. Mr Nishtar said that he also would not contest it.



## THE LEASED AREAS

His Excellency said that he understood that the four Leased Areas of Quetta, Nushki, Nasirabad and Bolan<sup>6</sup> were to be the main subjects of the present discussion.

He explained that the claim that these should be returned to Kalat after the transfer of power was resisted by the representatives of the future Pakistan Government. Their opinion was based on the grounds that the successor authorities in India would, in relation to foreign States, inherit all treaty obligations incurred on behalf of India; and that the Pakistan Government would be heir to the obligations (both burdens and benefits) arising out of treaties made with Kalat—as they would be, for example, to the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.<sup>7</sup>

Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan<sup>8</sup> said that Kalat submitted that the leases clearly stated that, whereas on the one side His Highness, his heirs and successors were affected, the other party was the British Government alone. There was no provision for transfer or inheritance of the leases from the British Government, to which they were personal.

Mr Nishtar said that he did not agree that these were “personal” agreements. Personal agreements were those which by their nature implied that only a particular person was involved.<sup>9</sup>

Sir Sultan Ahmed said that, as he understood it, the word “personal” had a wider legal meaning. He gave his opinion that the rights and obligations arising out of the Treaty of 1876 could not be transferred to a successor Government. This Treaty had not been made by Kalat with the Government of India, but with the British Government as such. The Kalat representatives could not accept the legal position as understood by the representatives of Pakistan.

His Excellency said that he himself had also been advised that, according to international law, treaties such as this were not invalidated by a transfer of power, but were inherited by the successor authorities. Treaties with State over which the Crown had exercised paramountcy, on the other hand, lapsed. Particular provision was made for this in the Indian Independence Bill.

His Excellency suggested that if, after further discussion, there was no agreement between the interested parties on the legal position, the case might eventually be put before the Arbitral Tribunal. Sir Sultan Ahmed suggested, and it was agreed, that the Khan of Kalat should first talk over the matter with Mr Jinnah.

Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan said that, if the eventual decision in this matter was in their favour, the Kalat representatives would



still be willing to enter into negotiations on the future of Quetta and do their utmost to meet the Pakistan Government's wishes in a reasonable manner but, with regard to the other three leased areas, they saw no reason why these should not return to Kalat without further discussion.

His Excellency pointed out that Nasirabad would be of no value if the irrigation supply was cut off. If Nasirabad was returned, some arrangements would have to be made in advance for the continuation of this supply. This was a question of mutual interest.

With regard to Nushki, Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan said that the railway facilities could continue to be used by Pakistan, whatever the legal decision.

Mr Nishtar said that he did not consider that it would be in the interest of Kalat to have a common frontier with Afghanistan.

Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan said that he believed that a vote taken among representatives of the leased areas on the issue of their joining Pakistan or going to Kalat would result in a decision in favour of the latter. A number of petitions to this effect have been received. He pointed out that previously the only issue had been as between Hindustan and Pakistan.

Mr Nishtar did not agree that such a vote was likely to have that result. He said that he considered it better, at the present meeting, not to go into the question of the petitions which had been made.

#### THE FUTURE OF KALAT AS A WHOLE

His Excellency said that he also wished to discuss the future of Kalat as a whole. He explained that he was going to see representatives of the States the following week with a view to suggesting to them that they should adhere to one or other of the Dominions. The Union of India had reduced their demands in this respect to adherence only on the three main subjects of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. In the case of Pakistan, Mr Jinnah was prepared, as there were so few States concerned, to discuss with each, individually, the question of the method and degree of adherence.

His Excellency pointed out that the British Government had been very anxious to establish the position that, on the transfer of power, paramountcy would lapse and States would *de jure* become independent; but *de facto*, very few were likely to benefit from independence. Moreover, adherence to a Dominion Government would be the only method, in the future, of maintaining some form of relationship between the Crown and the States. For Kalat, although there was complete liberty of choice, he could personally advise no course other than association on some terms with Pakistan.



Nawabzada Muhammad Aslam Khan said that the Khan of Kalat had the deepest desire to remain on friendly terms with Pakistan. He was prepared to come to an amicable settlement to mutual benefit. He had, in particular, the highest respect for Mr Jinnah.

<sup>1</sup>No. 174, *TP*, XII, 262-5.

<sup>2</sup>Adviser to the Chamber of Princes.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendices V.2, paras 3-4, V.5, para 8, VI.4, para 15, Vol. III, 926, 936 and 955, respectively.

<sup>4</sup>See PS-49, note 5, item c.

<sup>5</sup>Annex

<sup>6</sup>The terms on which these areas were leased by the Kalat State to the British Government were explained by Edward Wakefield in a note captioned "Kalat: Legal Position", which was sent to Abell on 19 July. See No. 174, note 1, *TP*, XII, 263. Also see Enclosure 2 to PS-49.

<sup>7</sup>Concluded at Rawalpindi on 8 August 1921. This treaty put an end to the Third Afghan War of 1919 and recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign state.

<sup>8</sup>Mohammed Aslam Khan in a letter to Griffin, explained the position as regards return of the leased areas of Quetta, Nushki, Nasirabad and Bolan to Kalat on the termination of its Treaty with the British Government. See Enclosure 1 to PS-49.

<sup>9</sup>Also see Appendix V. 5, Vol. III, 935.

#### *Annex to PS-54*

#### *India Office Note on Minutes of Viceroy's Meeting of 19 July 1947<sup>1</sup>*

*L/P&S/13/1846*

[INDIA OFFICE, LONDON,]  
28 July 1947

I understand that the past papers about Kalat are in the External Department, but my understanding, which Mr Donaldson<sup>2</sup> will doubtless be able to confirm, is that we have always stoutly resisted any claims by Kalat to regard itself as anything other than an Indian State. Consequently the Viceroy and the Pakistan representatives seem to me to be quite wrong in their facts in accepting the claim of the State to be regarded as a separate international entity.

Apart from this, it is quite contrary to the policy which we have been following, with the strong support of the Viceroy, of declining to recognize any Indian States as separate international entities at this stage. To do so in the case of Kalat will encourage other States to stand out from federation with one or other of the Dominions, and this risk seems to outweigh the transitory advantage which such an admission in the case of Kalat might give Pakistan in negotiations with Kalat in respect of the leased areas. There are particular dangers in making this admission in respect of a



frontier State, because it is so much easier for such a State to maintain its independence.<sup>3</sup>

I think that we ought to explain these dangers to the Viceroy. Until 15th August we cannot avoid responsibility for his actions.

H. A. F. RUMBOLD<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>No. 263, *TP*, XII, 385.

<sup>2</sup>Elon Pelly Donaldson, Assistant Secretary, External Department, India Office, London.

<sup>3</sup>Donaldson commented on this paragraph as follows: "you can't possibly press this very far with Kalat, can you?"

<sup>4</sup>Horace Rumbold, Assistant Secretary, India Office, London.

## PS-55

### RECORD OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN MOUNTBATTEN AND RULER OF KALAT<sup>1</sup>

*Mountbatten Papers, Viceroy's Interview No. 171*

28 July 1947

H. H reminded me that he had been one of my first visitors in March this year,<sup>2</sup> and was extremely complimentary about what had been achieved in so short a time, and he assured me that everyone in Kalat thought that the solution was the very best possible; they were delighted that Mr Jinnah had got his Pakistan and grateful for my help in the negotiations with Mr Jinnah.<sup>3</sup>

After this preliminary politeness we got down to business. He thanked me for obtaining recognition of the Pakistan Government that his position was that of an independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government.<sup>4</sup> He told me that he had had a long meeting with Mr Jinnah at which both had said that they wished to be friends with each other, and it looked as though a suitable treaty or agreement could be drawn up between them. But the main bone of contention was the Leased Territories.<sup>5</sup>

I explained to H. H that this was a legal question which could be settled by getting an agreed legal opinion; but that it appeared to me as though the Pakistan Government would inherit the leases in the same way as they would inherit the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.<sup>6</sup>

I also pointed out that the British and Indian Governments had sunk a lot of money in Quetta and Nasirabad, and that even if the legal opinion was that the Leased Territories reverted to Kalat, there still was the problem of how the immensely valuable fixtures were to be paid for.

H. H admitted that all this would have to be worked out with Mr Jinnah, but said that Mr Jinnah was most anxious that he should see me and report progress; and he asked if he and Mr Jinnah might come



together to see me on their proposed draft treaty and agreement. I replied, "With pleasure".

Finally he told me that he was extremely anxious that Mr Jinnah should not import a Pathan A.G.G into Baluchistan. Everybody, he said, liked Sir Geoffrey Prior and everybody hoped that he would stay and that in any case, if he left, he should be replaced by a Britisher if Mr Jinnah wanted peace.

He told me that all the Baluchis loved and trusted the British in a way they had never trusted anybody else.

I invited him to give Mr Jinnah this advice.

M[OUNTBATTEN] OF B[URMA]

<sup>1</sup>No. 258, *TP*, XII, 378-9.

<sup>2</sup>At his meeting with the Viceroy, the Khan of Kalat had mentioned the possibility of the State being granted Dominion status. See No. 59, *TP*, X, 91.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendices V. 2, V. 5, VII. 9, Vol. III, 926, 935 & 976, respectively.

<sup>4</sup>See PS-54.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, note 6.

<sup>6</sup>See note 4 above.

## PS-56

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 699/15*

HOTEL IMPERIAL, NEW DELHI,  
30 July 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am most grateful to you for your very generous hospitality<sup>1</sup> and for the kind and friendly assurances you have given me with regard to our future mutual relations.

2. Having come here at the kind express invitation of His Excellency the Crown Representative and yourself, and having in the meanwhile had the honour of seeing His Excellency once and yourself twice, I would now like to take permission of both His Excellency and yourself to return home. I will, however, provided it is agreeable to you, leave my *Wazir-i-Azam* here behind for another few days in order that he may be available to the Pakistan authorities for such further negotiations as may be considered necessary.

3. It is my earnest wish, and I pray to God to this effect, that Pakistan



and Kalat State may come to a lasting settlement with each other—a settlement that should be both honourable and beneficial to both parties.

4. Provided I am not troubling you in any way, I will be delighted to come over at any time that may suit your convenience, to say good-bye to Miss Jinnah and yourself.

Yours very sincerely,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Jinnah had invited the Khan of Kalat to dinner on 29 July 1947. See Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam, 1942-47*, Lahore, 1989, 91.

## PS-57

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat*

*Telegram, F. 699/1*

*Undated [July 1947]*

Khan of Kalat, Kalat, Baluchistan

Your message.<sup>1</sup> Your presence necessary fifth sixth. Please reach Delhi as soon as possible.

JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-58

*William Francis Listowel to Louis Mountbatten*<sup>1</sup>

*Mountbatten Papers*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

LONDON,  
2 August 1947

Dear Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of 25th July<sup>2</sup> enclosing Personal Report No. 14.<sup>3</sup>

2. I very much hope that within the next two or three days it will be possible to issue the announcement about the formal appointments of yourself and Jinnah as Governors-General and about the appointments of Governors. To-day's reference in *The Times* to the intention of the Constituent Assembly to meet at midnight on 14th/15th August and, as their first act, invite you to be Governor-General of the Dominion of India,



about which I have telegraphed to you,<sup>4</sup> is rather disconcerting but I hope it can be got round. On the whole, I think that the two new Dominions will get a good start so far as Governors are concerned. I must confess that the new Indian names for Governorships in India do not, with one notable exception, mean very much to me but the experience of Nye, Colville, Trivedi and Hyderi should prove of inestimable value. The exception among the new Indian Governors to which I refer above is, of course, Rajagopalachari whose qualities should have ample scope in Calcutta. As for Pakistan, Cunningham will, of course, be a tower of strength. It was hardly surprising that Killearn eventually was obliged to decline Eastern Bengal<sup>5</sup> and I fear that Jinnah may find it very hard to get anyone of the necessary calibre to take the job on. As regards Baluchistan, about which I telegraphed,<sup>6</sup> Weightman was quite ready to travel from the North to discuss the matter with me although he was fully convinced that he ought not to take the job on.<sup>7</sup>

3. I am having some enquiries made about providing you with a "Dominions" expert,<sup>8</sup> but I would be misleading you if I were to hold out any concrete hopes at this stage of being able to meet your need.

*[Para 4 omitted]*

5. I much appreciated what you said in paragraph 17 of your letter about the passing of the Indian Independence Act and I feel sure that all the officials and ministers concerned, to whom I have passed on your message, will appreciate it equally.

6. I must confess to having some doubts about the line which you took at your meeting<sup>9</sup> with the delegation from Kalat on 19th July. The treaties of 1854 and 1876 do not lead to the inference that Kalat is an independent and sovereign state and it has, in fact, always been regarded as an Indian State. It figures as such in Part II of the First Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, and I have no doubt that, as a matter of law, Section 7(I)(b) of the Indian Independence Act<sup>10</sup> applies to our treaties with it. Consequently, the Leased Areas' lapse to Kalat and the future is a matter for negotiation between the State and Pakistan. We have been at pains in Parliament to discourage claims by States to be regarded as separate international entities and to accept such a claim by Kalat will surely encourage other States to press similar claims. There is, moreover, particular danger in admitting such claims by Frontier States since it is easier for them to make their independence effective. Apart from the risk to the integrity of India and Pakistan, the emergence of new weak international entities is undesirable.



It seems to me, therefore, that any possible simplification of the problem of the areas leased by Kalat is outweighed by the general considerations set out above.

*[Paras 7 to 15 omitted]*

Yours sincerely,  
LISTOWEL

<sup>1</sup>No. 317, *TP*, XII, 479-83.

<sup>2</sup>No. 227, *TP*, XII, 330-2.

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix VI. 4, Vol. III, 954.

<sup>4</sup>No. 308, *TP*, XII, 461-2.

<sup>5</sup>No. 478, note 3, *TP*, XI, 853.

<sup>6</sup>No. 178, *TP*, XII, 267-8.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, note 3.

<sup>8</sup>No. 166, para 24, *TP*, XII, 254.

<sup>9</sup>PS-54.

<sup>10</sup>No. 164, *TP*, XII, 237-8.

## PS-59

*H. L. Ismay to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/2*

No. 1446/57

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,  
NEW DELHI,  
4 August 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

You will remember that at your meeting this morning with the Viceroy and the Khan of Kalat,<sup>1</sup> it was agreed that a communique should be issued defining the present situation in regard to Kalat.

Accordingly, I send you herewith the draft which was read out at the meeting, for favour of your approval or comments.

I have sent a copy of the draft to the Khan of Kalat.

Yours sincerely,  
ISMAY

<sup>1</sup>Mountbatten had a meeting with the Khan of Kalat and his Ministers and Legal Advisers on 4 August, at the end of which Jinnah and Liaquat also joined in and they agreed to a press communique being issued.



*Enclosure to PS-59**F. 14-GG/6*DRAFT COMMUNIQUE<sup>1</sup>

As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and of a series of meetings between the Crown Representative, His Highness the Khan of Kalat and Mr Jinnah, the following is the situation:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat's status as an independent sovereign State; this status is different from that of Indian States.
2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not treaties made between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
3. When this opinion has been received, further meetings will take place between representatives of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat.
4. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.
5. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.

<sup>1</sup>The draft communique was circulated by Ismay to the Khan of Kalat and Jinnah on 4 & 5 August, 1947, respectively. Both suggested amendments and after meetings and exchange of notes between Mountbatten, Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat between 6 and 9 August, 1947, an agreed version was issued on 11 August, 1947. See PS-65.

## PS-60

*Minutes of Viceroy's Twenty-Fifth Miscellaneous Meeting<sup>1</sup>**R/3/1/166**4 August 1947*

SECRET

PRESENT

Louis Mountbatten

Sultan Ahmed

H. L. Ismay

Khan of Kalat

Erskine Crum

Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan

The Viceroy said that since his last meeting with the Khan of Kalat,<sup>2</sup> he had spoken to Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Nishtar.



Mr Jinnah had explained that he was under such pressure of work at the present time that he had been unable to give his full consideration to the problems arising between Pakistan and Kalat; he was, however, willing and anxious to find an amicable solution. Mr Jinnah had told the Viceroy that he could rely on him to find, after 15th August, a solution which would suit both Kalat and Pakistan. It was his desire to live in peace and friendship with this large Muslim State.

The Viceroy said that he had proposed, and he understood that Sir Sultan Ahmed agreed (incidentally Sir Walter Monckton agreed also) that before the next series of meetings between the Khan of Kalat and Mr Jinnah took place a decision should be reached on the legal position as to whether or not treaties made between the British Government and Kalat would be inherited by the Pakistan Government. Mr Jinnah had admitted Kalat's claim to be an independent sovereign State of a status different from that of the Indian States, and was prepared to negotiate on those terms.

Sir Sultan Ahmed said that he also understood that Mr Jinnah wanted more time to study the problems between Pakistan and Kalat; and the Kalat representatives felt that this time should be given. Mr Jinnah had appeared very anxious that the correct decision should be reached and that he should not be rushed. It was certain that Mr Jinnah did not as yet realize the full complexity of the problem. Sir Sultan Ahmed suggested that if no agreement was reached on the legal question this would have to go before a higher tribunal for decision.

The Viceroy said that every effort should first be made to establish the legal position by agreement between the representatives of the two parties concerned. He suggested that Mr Jinnah himself should not be brought into these particular discussions. Only in the event of failure to reach agreement between these representatives would the matter have to be referred to a tribunal.

His Excellency said that he considered it essential that an immediate Standstill Agreement should be made between Pakistan and Kalat. The Kalat representatives agreed that this was necessary.

Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan asked that a statement should be made declaring the recognition by the Crown Representative, as well as by the Government of Pakistan, of Kalat's independent status. The Viceroy replied that the advice which he had received on this point from the Political Adviser precluded this; in any case a declaration by the Crown Representative would be of little value at the present time compared to one by the Pakistan Government.

The Khan of Kalat said that Mr Jinnah had asked him whether Kalat would be willing to send representatives to the Pakistan Constituent



Assembly. He had replied that this was not possible because of the State's independent status, but he had agreed that (? with) Mr Jinnah that it was essential that a reasonable understanding should be reached between Pakistan and Kalat on Defence, External Affairs and Communications. The Viceroy gave his opinion that agreement on these subjects was essential.

The Viceroy pointed out that, if legal opinion decided that the treaties made between the British Government and Kalat would not be inherited by the Pakistan Government, a further decision would be necessary on the financial arrangements to be made in view of the fact that much capital had been sunk into construction at Quetta on the basis of a lease in perpetuity. It would presumably be necessary to obtain a further legal opinion on this point also. With this Sir Sultan Ahmed agreed.

It was then decided that a communique should be issued outlining the negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat. A first draft was made and agreed in principle at the meeting. This was also agreed to in principle by Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, who entered at the end. The Viceroy asked Lord Ismay to clear it in detail with representatives of both parties.

<sup>1</sup>No. 330, *TP*, XII, 498-500.

<sup>2</sup>The meeting took place on 28 July. The Khan of Kalat thanked Mountbatten for getting the Pakistan Government to recognise Kalat as a sovereign State. See PS-55.

## PS-61

*H. L. Ismay to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/4*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,  
NEW DELHI,  
5 August 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

With reference to the draft communique which I sent to you yesterday on the subject of the discussions<sup>1</sup> which have taken place between the Government of Pakistan and His Highness the Khan of Kalat, I have today heard<sup>2</sup> from the latter that he agrees with the communique, with the exception of one word in clause 2. He suggests that the words "agreements for leases" should be substituted for the word "treaties", as there are no treaties with respect to Leased Areas.

Would you be so good as to let me know whether you agree with



this amendment, at the same time as you apprise me of any other comments that you may have.

Sincerely yours,  
ISMAY

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable. However, see PS-56, which refers to two meetings between Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat prior to 30 July. Also see Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam*, 92, which refers to a further meeting between them on 1 August.

<sup>2</sup>Annex.

*Annex to PS-61*  
*Ruler of Kalat to H. L. Ismay*  
*IOR, R/3/1/166*

CAMP HOTEL IMPERIAL,  
NEW DELHI,  
4 August 1947

My dear friend,

Thanks for your letter No. 1446/57, of today's date.<sup>1</sup>

With the exception of one word in clause 2, the draft communique is quite acceptable to me. The word "treaties" in the first line of that clause ought to be substituted by the words "agreements for leases". There are no treaties with respect to Leased Areas; they are "agreements for leases".

Yours sincerely,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>PS-59.

## PS-62

*M. A. Jinnah to H. L. Ismay*  
*F. 14-GG/7*

5 August 1947

Dear Lord Ismay,

I have received your two letters of 4th<sup>1</sup> and 5th August<sup>2</sup> and the Draft Communique you sent and I propose the following amendments:

- Clause 1:* after the words "sovereign State" add "as per treaties between the British Government and Kalat State".
- Clause 2:* after "treaties" add "and agreements".
- Clause 3:* at the end add the words "at Karachi".



*Clause 4:* after the words "discussion will take place between Pakistan and Kalat" add "at Karachi".

I am now sending you a fair draft in the light of these alterations.

With regard to Kalat's proposed amendment in clause 2 that "agreements for leases" should be substituted for "treaties", I suggest that after "treaties" be inserted the following words: "and agreements of Leases".

I am enclosing the fair copy for you so that you can conveniently see what my amendments are.

Yours sincerely,  
[M. A. JINNAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-59.

<sup>2</sup>PS-61.

*Enclosure to PS-62*

*IOR, R/3/1/166*

#### DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and of a series of meetings between the Crown Representative, His Highness the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah, the following is the situation:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat's status as an independent sovereign State as per treaties between the British Government and Kalat State; this status is different from that of Indian States.
2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not treaties and agreements of leases made between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
3. When this opinion has been received, further meetings will take place between representatives of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat at Karachi.
4. Meanwhile a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.
5. Discussion will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.



## PS-63

*Louis Mountbatten to Earl of Listowel*  
*Viceroy's Personal Report No. 16*

*IOR, L/PO/6/123<sup>1</sup>*  
*[Extract]*

TOP SECRET/PERSONAL

8 August 1947

*[Para 1 omitted]*

2. I had a satisfactory meeting with the Khan of Kalat on the 4th August<sup>2</sup> and with his *Wazir* and legal advisers. Towards the end of the meeting, I brought in Jinnah and Liaquat, who had arrived for a Partition Council meeting, and I got all parties to agree to the issue of a press communique<sup>3</sup> setting out the latest position on the negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat; but Jinnah and the Khan are still haggling over the precise wording.<sup>4</sup>

3. Immediately after this meeting, Jinnah told me that the Khan of Kalat would not have been so difficult if "the other side" were not encouraging him to make difficulties for Pakistan. Whatever the truth of Jinnah's allegation, I think there is little doubt that he himself has been guilty of bringing grossly improper pressure to bear on the States with Muslim rulers who are geographically linked with the Dominion of India, i.e. Hyderabad, Bhopal and Rampur.

*[Paras 4 to 60 omitted]*

M[OUNTBATTEN] OF B[URMA]

<sup>1</sup>See full text, Appendix VI. 2, Vol. IV, 477.

<sup>2</sup>PS-59.

<sup>3</sup>Enclosure to PS-59.

<sup>4</sup>PS-61.

## PS-64

*Louis Mountbatten to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/8*

[No. A] 1446/57

8 August 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I am most exercised that no agreement has yet been reached about the terms of the Pakistan-Kalat communique, and I very much hope that you will be able to accept the suggestions contained in the attached letter



by General Ismay. I myself entirely agree with them and consider that your position would be fully safeguarded. Further, I am so certain that His Highness will agree that, subject to your concurrence, I will publish the communique without further reference to him.

It will be most embarrassing for everyone if this point is not settled quickly and I am therefore sending this by safe hand of pilot. If your secretary could telegraph or telephone your concurrence, a good deal of time would be saved.

Yours sincerely,  
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

*Enclosure to PS-64*  
*H. L. Ismay to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/9-10*

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE,  
NEW DELHI,  
8 August 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

On the 5th August you were kind enough to send me a revised draft communique<sup>1</sup> on the subject of relations between Pakistan and Kalat, and I sent a copy of your draft to His Highness the Khan.

I now attach a copy of his reply,<sup>2</sup> from which you will see that he finds difficulty in accepting your amendments to clauses 1 and 2 of the original draft.

Accordingly, so far as clause 1 is concerned, would you consider the following re-draft, which accurately records the position which was agreed to by both parties at the meeting on 19th July,<sup>3</sup> which was presided over by His Excellency, and at which the Pakistan States Department was represented by Mr [Abdur] Rab Nishtar and Mr Akhtar Hussain:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an Independent Sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of Indian States.

So far as clause 2 is concerned, may I suggest that it would be as well to limit legal opinion to the specific question at issue, i.e. the position of the Leased Areas as from August 15th. If you accept this suggestion, clause 2 would read as follows:

2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.



His Highness the Khan has already left Delhi, but I believe that he would agree to the two clauses as re-drafted above, provided, of course, that you yourself feel able to accept them.

It is obviously of the first importance to get this matter settle[ed] at once since, if no Standstill Agreement is reached, the consequences might be most embarrassing to everybody.

There is a further point. Assuming that a Standstill Agreement is reached, on the above basis, it will be necessary for action to be taken which will ensure the continuance of laws at present in force in the Leased Areas. I have, therefore, drafted a notification which will, I think, achieve what is wanted, without prejudice to subsequent negotiations between Pakistan and Kalat.

I attach a copy of this draft notification<sup>4</sup> and would be glad to know whether you would be prepared to have it issued on 15th August.

I am extremely sorry to trouble you direct with this matter when you must be under tremendous pressure of work, but in view of the urgency, I have no alternative.

I have sent a copy of this letter to His Highness the Khan of Kalat, so that he may know what is afoot.

Sincerely yours,  
ISMAY

<sup>1</sup>Enclosure to PS-62.

<sup>2</sup>Annex.

<sup>3</sup>PS-54.

<sup>4</sup>See Enclosure to PS-59 & Annex to PS-61.

*Annex to Enclosure to PS-64  
Ruler of Kalat to H. L. Ismay*

*F. 14-GG/11*

*6 August 1947*

I thank you for your letter No. 1446/57 of yesterday's date.<sup>1</sup>

2. I have been somewhat surprised to see Mr Jinnah's comments on the draft communique. The addition of the words "as per treaties between the British Government and Kalat State" to my mind is unnecessary and factually wrong. It will be seen that Kalat State was an Independent Sovereign State before it entered into treaty relationship with the British Government and this fact is fully recognized in the Treaty of 1876<sup>2</sup> itself. As far as I can say (and it is on that basis that the discussions took place between the Pakistan representatives and ourselves on two days before His Excellency), there are only two outstanding questions between Pakistan and Kalat State. These are, firstly, the future of the Leased Areas and, secondly, discussions that will be



necessary between the two States with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications. The first item is governed not by any treaty but by the various agreements for leases that were executed by the Khan in favour of the British Government on certain conditions. The second item will have to be the subject matter of a new treaty that has to be concluded between Pakistan and Kalat State.

3. Thus my existing Treaty with the British Government has little to do with Pakistan, and the future relations of Kalat State with Pakistan will solely be governed by a separate Treaty.

4. I, therefore, earnestly request, and strongly hope that Mr Jinnah will agree, that there should be no mention of Treaties in the communique at all, and that the words added by Mr Jinnah in clause 1 as mentioned above, as well as the word "Treaties" in clause 2, should be deleted altogether.

<sup>1</sup>PS-59.

<sup>2</sup>Treaty between the British Government and the Kalat State, 1876, Enclosure 4 to No. 155, Vol. I, Part I, 301-03.

## PS-65

*M. A. Jinnah to H. L. Ismay*

*F. 14-GG/13*

*9 August 1947*

Dear Lord Ismay,

I have just received your letter dated 8th of August<sup>1</sup> delivered to me by hand here, and thank you for it.

Clauses (1) and (2) as finally amended and proposed by you are as follows:

*Clause 1 :* "The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign State in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of Indian States."

*Clause 2 :* "Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government."

I accept them.

I also agree with the draft notification<sup>2</sup> and you may issue it on the 15th of August 1947.



Thanking you for the trouble that you have taken, and hoping that you are well.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>Enclosure to PS-64.

<sup>2</sup>Annex II to PS-66.

## PS-66

*M. A. Jinnah to Louis Mountbatten*

*F. 14-GG/14*

*9 August 1947*

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Many thanks for your letter dated the 8th of August<sup>1</sup> along with a letter of Lord Ismay.<sup>2</sup>

I have accepted the draft agreement between Pakistan and Kalat, and you may now issue the communique<sup>3</sup> accordingly.

I am also writing to Lord Ismay<sup>4</sup> informing him that I have accepted his suggestions with regard to clauses 1 and 2. The remaining clauses will stand as amended by me to which I find that there is no objection because they merely specify the place—"at Karachi".

Also I agree with Lord Ismay that he should issue a notification on the 15th of August as drafted by him which runs as follows:

*[Omitted]*<sup>5</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>PS-64.

<sup>2</sup>Enclosure to PS-64.

<sup>3</sup>Annex I.

<sup>4</sup>PS-65.

<sup>5</sup>Annex II.

*Annex I to PS-66*

*Press Communique on Situation between Pakistan and Kalat State*

*F. 14-GG/3*

*11 August 1947*

As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States Department, presided over by the Crown



Representative, and of a series of meetings between the Crown Representative, His Highness the Khan of Kalat and Mr Jinnah, the following is the situation:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign State<sup>1</sup> in treaty relations with the British Government; with a status different from that of Indian States.
2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases between the British Government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.
3. When this opinion has been received, further meetings will take place between representatives of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat at Karachi.
4. Meanwhile a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.
5. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.

<sup>1</sup>See Annexure to Annex 1.

*Annexure to Annex 1 to PS-66*

*Memorandum by the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations*

*PRO, FO 371/F. 12773*

*[Extract]*

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,  
KING CHARLES STREET, LONDON S.W 1,

*12 September 1947*

ACCESSION OF INDIAN STATES TO THE DOMINION  
OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The India and Burma Committee may like to have the following summary of information about the progress of negotiations for the association of the Indian States with the Dominions of India or Pakistan. It is derived partly from Lord Mountbatten's reports<sup>1</sup> up to 15th August and partly from what the U.K. High Commissioners in India and Pakistan have since reported.

*[Paras 2—8 omitted]*<sup>2</sup>

9. Pakistan has entered into negotiations with Kalat on the basis of recognizing the State's claim to independence and of treating the previous agreements between the Crown and Kalat providing for the lease of Quetta and other areas, which would otherwise lapse under Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian



Independence Act, as international agreements untouched by the termination of Paramountcy. The Khan of Kalat, whose territory marches with Persia, is of course in no position to undertake the international responsibilities of an independent State, and Lord Mountbatten, who before the transfer of power, was warned of the dangers of such a development doubtless passed on this warning to the Pakistan Government. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pakistan is being informed of the position and asked to do what he can to guide the Pakistan Government away from making any agreement with Kalat which would involve recognition of the State as a separate international entity.<sup>3</sup> One consequence might well be that the Pakistan Government would be obliged to concede to Kashmir a similar recognition, although Kashmir has certainly never been independent, having been created by the British for the present dynasty on the conclusion of the Sikh wars,<sup>4</sup> and is hardly equipped to maintain the international responsibilities of an independent State *vis-a-vis* its neighbours, Russia and China.

A[RTHUR] H[ENDERSON]  
*[Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations]*

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix VI. 2, paras 26, 32 & 34, Vol. III, 943-9, Appendix VI. 4, *ibid.*, paras 15-26, 955-9 and Appendix VI, paras 41-3, 47-9 and 51, Vol. V, 626-8.

<sup>2</sup>See No. 15.

<sup>3</sup>See Annex I to PS-66. The press communique of 11 August 1947 recognized "Kalat as an Independent Sovereign State in treaty relationship with the British Government, with a status different from that of Indian States."

<sup>4</sup>The First Anglo-Sikh War was fought in 1845-6, and the Second in 1849.

## *Annex II to PS-66*

### *F. 14-GG/12*

#### NOTIFICATION TO BE ISSUED ON 15TH AUGUST 1947 BY THE HEAD OF THE BALUCHISTAN ADMINISTRATION

In virtue of an agreement reached between the Governor-General of Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat, it is hereby directed that all laws and enactments which on the fourteenth day of August 1947 were in force in the areas in Baluchistan leased by the Khan of Kalat to the British Government shall, for the time being, continue in force.



## PS-67

*Speech<sup>1</sup> by the Ruler of Kalat**[Translation]*KALAT, BALUCHISTAN,  
15 August 1947*Bismillah 'ir Rahman 'ir Rahim*

I feel proud to address you in the Baluchi language. *Insha Allah*, in the future, too, I will speak to you in this language as it is the language of our Baluch people. Continuing, the ruler observed:

It is about 15 years since God, in His Kindness, chose me to serve you. During this period, I have not been oblivious of national traditions and aspirations but, owing to expediency and the constraints of alien rule, I could not give full expression to my sentiments. *Allah* be thanked for blessing us with independence and I can now freely express my views. Since the day I was assigned the duty of serving you, I have cherished three desires:

Firstly, this land of ours that borders Afghanistan, Iran, India and the sea, and which has been under Baluch rule for five hundred years, should be rid of alien influence, slavery and indignity.

Secondly, in keeping with our past traditions, Islamic *Shari'ah* should be enforced in full and our constitution<sup>2</sup> should be predicated on the holy *Qur'an*.

Thirdly, the Baluch people be united on one platform where this freedom-loving and vibrant people should have its own government and distinct system so that, like all free peoples, they should be united and progressive. I thank God that one aspiration, that is independence, has been achieved, but the other two, viz. enforcement of *Shari'ah-i-Muhammadi* and unification of Baluch people, remain to be fulfilled. I will, *Insha Allah*, continue to strive for the attainment of these two ideals.

Now, I appeal to my dear people to continue efforts for the enforcement of *Shari'ah-i-Muhammadi* and for the unification of the Baluch. We shall not rest content till the achievement of these targets.

I may remind you that as long as we acted upon Islamic traditions, we remained united and independent; but when we ignored *Shari'ah-i-Islam* and disobeyed God, we became wretched people. As a result, we lost our freedom. If you want to progress and prosper, then you have to follow your old traditions, *Islamic Shari'ah* and commandments of God, as therein lies real salvation.

2. I want to make it clear that now our State is not what it was until yesterday when we were slaves and had no voice or policy of our own. We had to pursue the policy of those who were paramount. That is why I kept quiet. But, praise be to *Allah*, who is our real Master, I am now



accountable only to Him and then to you. It is my duty to strive for the progress of my people. I shall not hesitate to take punitive measures for maintenance of peace and for an end to oppression. To enforce Islamic principles and to preserve independence and Baluch unity, we will have to strive hard. Therefore, while appealing to you to brace yourselves for tiding over this crucial phase, without getting scared of the powers that be except God Almighty, I ask you to extend your helping hand to me. We hope that our neighbouring and other independent and peace-loving countries would render genuine assistance to us and that their people would sympathize with us now that we have been awakened from our hibernation.

I feel that some people consider me a meek person and weak at heart. Some others think that I am afraid of them. To clarify my position, it will suffice to say that a Muslim cannot deserve to be called a Muslim if he is afraid of anybody except God. I am grateful to Him that I am a Muslim because of which I fear none except Him. Hence I declare that from today I shall not tolerate any excesses against my people from any quarter, nor allow any tyrant to brutalize the weak and resourceless. Henceforth, if I come across a proven act of cruelty, bribery or violence, I will be the first to punish the perpetrator.

Here I want to make it clear that our subjects have remained loyal to us and would continue to be so. We are firmly committed to protecting their lives, religion, honour and culture. I thank God that Kalat is not affected by the communal strife that has enveloped the whole sub-continent.

3. Today, by the blessings of God, I shall hoist your Islamic and national flag atop this house of God. First of all, I shall salute it with reverence. Henceforth, I shall feel proud of it. Consider me a servant of Islam and of the Baluch people. To substantiate it, I order that all those individuals who want to serve the *millat* and the Baluch people, should remain prepared to take an oath of allegiance. At the same time, those who think otherwise should resign forthwith.

A large number of people who felicitate me through telegrams and verbally, use the titles of "King" or "His Majesty". But I declare that to be a King is no matter of pride for me. On the contrary, I am proud of being a servant of Islam and of the holy Prophet (peace be upon him). I pray to God to give me strength to strive for the noble mission of service.

I give an assurance to my beloved Baluch people that in accordance with Islamic tenets and Baluch traditions, we are all servants of God and knit together in the bonds of fraternity. We are all progeny of Adam, who was created from dust. Therefore, all are equal before God Almighty. Those of us who stand on a higher pedestal excel in piety, be he Khan of Kalat, a landlord, a labourer or a shepherd—all are equal before God. Our forefathers did not call themselves *Shah* or



*Shahinshah*. There was a will of Khan Naseer Khan in which he had advised us to be servants of the people. "If you deviate from this rightful path, you will suffer indignity and be ultimately annihilated."

There is no concept of kingship or crown in Islam. The holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and his four companions, i.e., *Khulafa-i-Rashideen*, neither called themselves kings nor ruled over the masses with a crown on their heads. They mixed with people and led a simple life, despite the fact that they ruled a vast empire and had unlimited power. *Insha Allah*, we will follow in their footsteps.

Now I raise your Islamic and national flag in the name of God and pray for the solidarity, independence, unity and greatness of the Baluch. When the gun salute is presented, you raise the vociferous slogans of *Allah-o-Akbar* (God is Great), *Islam Zindabad*, *Independent Baluch people Zindabad*, and *Islamic Baluch Government Painsdabad*.

Before I conclude my speech, I must thank God Almighty as today a State has emerged in India that is independent and sovereign, the Islamic State [of Pakistan], the fifth largest in the world, and the biggest in the Islamic world, given its area and population. Fortunately, its borders touch Kalat State. We pray for its progress and prosperity and assure it of our full cooperation.

O God, in the name of holy Prophet (peace be upon him) respond to our prayers and grant us strength to follow in Your divine path. *Aameen*

<sup>1</sup>Delivered at Jami'a Masjid, Kalat, after the Friday prayers. See *Kalat Collection*, S. No. 35, QAPP.

<sup>2</sup>It came into force on 1 August 1947. See *Constitution of Kalat State—Government of Kalat Act*, 1947, Quetta, 1947, Section 54 (1), 16.

## PS-68

*Mir Abdul Qadir to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 25 (II)-GG/153*

HAJI SHAHR, [KALAT,]  
22 December 1947

Most respected Quaid-i-Azam,  
*Assalaamo 'Alaikum*

I wish to bring to your kind notice a few facts in the following [*sic*]. I hope you will very kindly pay due attention to my letter and suggest me a definite path to adopt.

At the time of your second visit to Quetta, I was so much impressed by your public speeches that I made up my mind to work heart and soul in



the Kalat State for the cause of Pakistan. I therefore, continued individual activities till 1946 when Qazi Moh[amma]d Isa Khan, impressed by my active efforts, sent Fazal Ahmed from Karachi to me with the advice that I should establish States' Muslim League Organization in the Kalat State, and he, as President, Baluchistan Muslim League, would render all possible help to me. I was encouraged and immediately called a meeting of some notables at Mastung who unanimously agreed to my proposal of organizing Muslims of the State, and there and then we elected our office-bearers. Mr Fazal Ahmed took our letter<sup>1</sup> to you in which we had requested for affiliation and advice. In your letter,<sup>2</sup> you replied that according to rules, our organization could only join States' Muslim League and not the All India Muslim League. We did so. Since then, we have established League branches in almost all the towns of Kalat State and we have been sending monthly reports to the President, All India States' Muslim League Council at Delhi, but unfortunately riots broke out just after and in spite of several telegrams and letters to our President, Mr Manzar-i-Alam, we were at a loss to receive no replies. Now, therefore, having no knowledge of the States' Muslim League Office and its office-bearers, I have been compelled by circumstances to turn to you for help and guidance, because the state of affairs here [in] Kalat is far from satisfactory as the Ruler, ill-advised by some anti-Leaguers and fair-weather friends, are busy hatching such programmes which, I am afraid, will doubtlessly harm the Muslim cause.

My own tribe consists of 35,000 strong who are ready to face any odds in Kalat for the sake of Pakistan and Islam.

I am, therefore, sending Mr Fazal Ahmed and Mir Amir Jan, two of my sincere co-workers, to see you and apprise you in detail what is happening in Kalat, and get valuable advice on which we shall, *Insha Allah*, act with determination. I hope, you will very kindly honour these two with the interview.

Yours very sincerely,

NAWABZADA MIR MOH[AMMA]D ABDUL QADIR SHAHWANI  
*President, Kalat State Muslim League*

<sup>1&2</sup>Not traceable.



## PS-69

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat**F. 14-GG/26*CAMP DHADAR, KALAT,  
2 February 1948

My dear Khan Sahib,

I was glad to meet your Prime Minister, Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam, today when he came to talk over matters with me on your behalf. We have discussed the matter, and he will convey to you the result of our talk.

As your friend and well-wisher, I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay. I do hope that you will carefully consider the matter and let me have your final reply which you promised to do after your stay with me in Karachi when we fully discussed the whole question in all its aspects.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

## PS-70

*M. Aslam to M. Ikramullah*  
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*Telegram, F. 14-GG/27*DHADAR, KALAT,  
7 February 1948

God willing efforts coming successful and all will be O.K, *Insha Allah* during Quaid-i-Azam's forthcoming visit.

[M. ASLAM]

## PS-71

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah**F. 14-GG/28*CAMP DHADAR,  
14 February 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am feeling feverish since 2 p.m. today. Unfortunately owing to this



sudden indisposition I am unable to have the opportunity of seeing Miss Jinnah and yourself this evening<sup>1</sup> and say goodbye; but I am sure I shall be *Insha Allah* able to meet you at Karachi shortly.

With kindest regards and respects,

Yours sincerely  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Jinnah was on a visit to Sibi on 14 February 1948.

## PS-72

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/29*

*14 February 1948*

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am very much grateful to you for sending Col. [A.S.B] Shah to enquire after my health. I am now feeling much better.

I have summoned both the Houses of *Dar-ul-Awam* and *Dar-ul-Umara* to give me their final opinion on their future relations with the Dominion of Pakistan by the 21st or the 22nd of this month; and I shall be able to inform you, Quaid-i-Azam, of their considered opinion by the end of this month.

With respects and kindest regards,

Yours affectionately,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

## PS-73

*A. S. B. Shah<sup>1</sup> to Ruler of Kalat*

*F. 14-GG/30*

CAMP SIBI,  
*15 February 1948*

Your Highness,

I beg to inform Your Highness that as you were not able to meet Quaid-i-Azam on the 14th at 6.30 p.m at the Residency, as arranged, owing to your sudden indisposition, the Quaid-i-Azam deputed me to see Your Highness at your residence, at Dhadar, last evening, to enquire after your health. While I was there, Your Highness put me some questions and I gave certain explanations with regard to the draft Instrument



of Accession. After discussion and examination of the Draft Instrument of Accession, Your Highness was good enough to give me a letter<sup>2</sup> addressed to Quaid-i-Azam, and also asked me to give a verbal message to Quaid-i-Azam. I delivered Your Highness's letter the same evening and also gave Quaid-i-Azam Your Highness's verbal message which was as follows:-

1. That, after discussions and consideration of all the pros and cons, Your Highness has definitely come to the conclusion that it is in the best interests of the State and the people of Kalat to accede to Pakistan and that Your Highness has decided to do so.
2. That Your Highness has examined the terms of the draft Instrument of Accession, and after discussion of the various terms and examination, Your Highness was fully satisfied and approved of it.
3. That, as Your Highness has already summoned<sup>3</sup> the two Houses of your Advisory Legislature to meet on the 21st, you will, after consultation with them, communicate your final answer before the end of this month.

Quaid-i-Azam has asked me to thank Your Highness. He was glad to learn that you were much better and he has noted that you will now give your final answer definitely before the end of this month.

With respects and kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,  
A. S. B. SHAH

<sup>1</sup>Joint Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>3</sup>PS-72.

## PS-74

*Govt. of Baluchistan to A. S. B. Shah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/35*

SECRET

SIBI,  
26 February 1948

Kalat Lower House have adopted resolution against accession but Aslam is still hopeful of Upper House and Khan's final decision.



## PS-75

*M. Aslam to A. S. B. Shah  
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/36*

No. 92/C

DHADAR,  
29 February 1948

*Diwan-i-Khas* session ended 27th. Have full discussions with Highness 28th afternoon. His Highness asks for time for further consideration. Have clearly told him what Government think about it. Detailed report follows by special messenger tomorrow. Kindly await its arrival.<sup>1</sup>

[M. ASLAM]

<sup>1</sup>PS to GG's minute of 2 March 1948 stated: "Quaid-i-Azam has seen. May be returned to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations." M. Aslam informed A.S.B. Shah on 2 March 1948 that his report had been delayed due to interference from higher quarters. See F. 14-GG/37. Not printed.

## PS-76

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/38*

CAMP DHADAR,  
2 March 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am writing this letter to inform you of the decisions taken by the two Houses, the *Dar-ul-Awam* and the *Dar-ul-Umara*, in respect of the future relations between Kalat and Pakistan, which I had promised to convey to you by the end of February. The *Dar-ul-Awam*, in their sitting<sup>1</sup> of February 25th, 1948, unanimously upheld their previous decision given on the 14th December, 1947, which is as follows:

This House is of the unanimous opinion that our relations with Pakistan should be on Treaty basis instead of Accession.

My tribal *Sardars*, however, expressed that as the matter under consideration was of great moment [*sic*] and the time placed at their disposal was too short, especially so when, as is usual at this time of the year, headmen of their nomad tribes whom they wished to consult were scattered all over the country, including parts of Sind, they should be given an interval of at least three months before they could give a reasonable decision. I



feel their desire in asking time for this decision is natural. I have agreed to this.

You are aware, Quaid-i-Azam, that the people of my State are all Muslims, and as such are friends and well-wishers of the Muslim State of Pakistan. Of one thing I feel certain, and I also assure you, Quaid-i-Azam, that whatever be the form of their decision in this regard, they will not be lacking in extending their wholehearted co-operation to Pakistan, towards the achievement of which they feel, and are proud of it, that they did not fail to contribute their humble share.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours very sincerely,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Annex to PS-82.

## PS-77

### PAKISTAN HAS NO INTIMATION ABOUT KALAT DECISION<sup>1</sup>

Karachi, March 2: Enquiries made at the Foreign Office on Monday revealed that Foreign Office has not yet received any official intimation from Khan of Kalat regarding the decision taken by the *Aiwan-i-Aam* (House of Commons) of Kalat on the question of accession to Pakistan.

It may be recalled that the House of Commons recently passed a resolution spurning any idea of accession to Pakistan and had resolved to send a delegation to Karachi to conduct negotiation with the authorities here on the basis of a treaty.

It will also be recalled that the Khan of Kalat had promised the Quaid-i-Azam, during this recent Sibi visit,<sup>2</sup> to acquaint him of his decision on the question by the end of February. - Star

<sup>1</sup>The *Dawn*, 2 March 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Annex

### *Annex to PS-77*

#### *Summary of Note by D. Y. Fell<sup>1</sup> on Consultations between M. A. Jinnah and Khan of Kalat at Dhadar<sup>2</sup>*

I had seen a brief reference in the *Daily Telegraph* to meetings between His Highness and Mr Jinnah at Sibi *Darbar* [14 February 1948], an annual function at which the *Sardars* and the leading gentry of Baluchistan gather for a *Darbar* and for meetings and social occasions in the presence of A[gent] to G[overnor-G[eneral]]. On this occasion, Mr Jinnah had himself come in order to meet the gentry of the province and to start Pakistan's



administration there with his personal support. From Mr Ikramullah I heard more details. The gist of what he told me was that the Khan had agreed to accede to Pakistan and had discussed the details in a private meeting with Mr Jinnah at which everything was settled. Mr Jinnah had then paid a formal visit to the Khan at Dhadar, about ten miles from Sibi, where the Khan's winter capital is fixed, and it had been intended that the Khan should return the visit formally at Sibi and sign the instrument of accession. These arrangements had been made by the Prime Minister. The Khan, however, changed his mind and pleaded sickness<sup>3</sup> as an excuse for not returning the Governor-General's visit and informed Mr Jinnah that he was not able to sign the Instrument immediately, but required a period of two months to obtain the consent of the *Sardars* of the tribes of the State.

Colonel [A.S.B] Shah elaborated the account with many details as he himself had been present at all the meetings.

He told me that it had been no part of Mr Jinnah's intentions to press the Kalat issue at Sibi and that when the Prime Minister proposed to complete the business there and then,<sup>4</sup> the office had been caught so unprepared that they had even had to send to Karachi for the files. Mr Jinnah had not been particularly anxious to bring matters to a head then, but on being pressed to do so by the Prime Minister and by His Highness he had agreed and he had been most put out by His Highness's last minute change of mind which, besides being a discourtesy, made the Governor-General look "foolish" in Baluchistan.

It was made clear to me that Mr Jinnah had lost patience with the Khan over this and was preparing to take action to undermine the Khan's position and the action which he contemplated was to accept Instruments of Accession from the Chiefs of Kharan and [Las] Bela and from the Khan's brother-in-law Sardar Bai Khan of Turbat, all of whom were in Karachi with their tongues hanging out at the prospect of being recognized as independent Princes, independent, that is to say, of Kalat. I understood that I would be able to count on about a week before any decisive action was taken and that the only way of stopping a move of this sort was for the Khan to accede himself on behalf of the whole State immediately.

I was also told that the Khan had told Mr Jinnah that he had received tempting offers from Afghanistan and had given Mr Jinnah to understand that he was contemplating accepting that offer if a satisfactory settlement with Pakistan was not reached.

How much of all this was literally true, of course, it was easy not for me to judge,<sup>5</sup> but it was evident that the situation had deteriorated very badly during my absence.

I told the Foreign Secretary that in my opinion negotiations had been mismanaged and that it was a pity that threats were being used on either



side in this way. I assured him that I adhered to my view that Kalat State should link up with Pakistan and if Mr Jinnah was going to insist on accession, then accession would be acceptable to me and I would do my best to bring the Khan to this point of view if he did not already hold it. I warned the Foreign Secretary that the difficulties of the Khan's position had been underestimated and that, particularly, sufficient allowance was not made in Karachi for the genuine opposition amongst the population of the State to the policy of accession and I asked and received an assurance that if the Khan agreed to accession and was subsequently faced with difficulties as a result, that he would receive every support including military support from Pakistan in dealing with any opposition.

<sup>1</sup>Foreign Minister, Kalat.

<sup>2</sup>Fell, *Memoirs*, 61-4.

<sup>3</sup>PS-71.

<sup>4</sup>PS-70.

<sup>5</sup>Ambrose Dundas, A.G.G. confirmed Fell's account, which the latter had obtained at Karachi of the negotiations at Sibi. See Fell, *Memoirs*, 79.

## PS-78

*S. M. Yusuf to Ruler of Kalat*

*F. 14-GG/40-2*

SECRET

SIBI,

*4 March 1948*

Your Highness,

I am desired by the Quaid-i-Azam to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of the 2nd March, 1948<sup>1</sup>, in which Your Highness has communicated to him certain information about the deliberations of the two advisory legislatures of Kalat. Quaid-i-Azam does not agree that the position has been correctly stated. During his recent visit to Sibi [14 February] the Quaid-i-Azam had several discussions with Your Highness and Your Highness had agreed that Kalat should accede to Pakistan. The draft of the Instrument of Accession to be signed by Your Highness was, therefore, drawn up and it was expected that Your Highness would sign it when you met Quaid-i-Azam at Your Highness's next visit to the Residency. Unfortunately, Your Highness fell ill and the Instrument could not be signed.

2. Your Highness was then good enough to send a letter<sup>2</sup> to Quaid-i-Azam with a verbal message through Col. Shah. In Your Highness' letter, it



was stated that Your Highness would consult the two Houses of Legislature again and communicate their final decision by the end of February 1948. Instead of that, the Quaid-i-Azam now finds in Your Highness communication, a vague and indefinite resolution by the *Dar-ul-Awam*, while the *Dar-ul-Umara*, whose opinion was clearly expressed at Sibi in a deputation which waited on the Quaid-i-Azam and expressed itself unanimously in favour of Kalat acceding to Pakistan, is reported to have asked for more time. Your Highness will agree that in the result the position is most disappointing and unsatisfactory.

3. I am, therefore, to point out that this matter has been hanging fire for a long time now. As early as in the second week of October 1947, when Your Highness was staying with the Quaid-i-Azam<sup>3</sup> as his guest and had a number of discussions with him, Your Highness had promised to send him your final decision after a month or two. Many months have since passed, but nothing definite seems to have emerged.<sup>4</sup> So far, the Quaid-i-Azam has been negotiating in this matter himself but, in view of the passage of time and the indecisive and changing attitude of Your Highness, he has now decided that it would be best to terminate his personal negotiations with Your Highness and to hand over the matter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also deals with the affairs of the States.

Yours sincerely,  
S. M. YUSUF

<sup>1</sup>PS-76.

<sup>2</sup>PS-72.

<sup>3</sup>Jinnah met the Khan of Kalat on 14 October 1947. See F. 887/16, QAP. Not printed.

<sup>4</sup>The Khan of Kalat "had genuinely intended to come to an agreement with Jinnah but had at the last minute succumbed to pressure from members of his own family, especially his brother Abdul Karim". See Fell, *Memoirs*, 84.

## PS-79

### KALAT ACCESSION ISSUE: PREMIER MAY RESIGN<sup>1</sup>

Quetta, March 5: Nawabzada Muhammad Aslam Khan, Prime Minister of Kalat, who, in National Party circles is described to be strongly in favour of Kalat's accession to Pakistan, is leaving Dhadar on one month's leave on March 10, 1948, it is reliably learned here today.

That he will not return is the general belief here. Mr D.Y. Fell, Foreign Minister, or Moulvi Munir Ahmad, Home Minister, will be his probable successor, it is further learned.

The Kalat National Party<sup>2</sup> have for some time past been openly demanding the Nawabzada's resignation and several deputations of the party have waited on the Khan of Kalat and the Prime Minister



himself in this connection. - Star.

<sup>1</sup>The *Dawn*, 5 March 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Following these developments, Fell noticed a rise in the political influence of the Kalat State National Party (with roots in the Congress), which had previously been illegal. A new development was the appointment of a "number of so-called secretaries to the Ministers" from this Party in the Kalat secretariat, despite the fact that "none of them was in any way qualified to hold an administrative post". To Fell, it appeared a conscious effort on the part of Khan of Kalat to create a political base to be used if "Pakistan started making active trouble in the State." However, in the face of "real difficulties... none of these creatures proved anything but mischievous nuisances". See Fell, *Memoirs*, 91-2.

## PS-80

### KALAT ACCESSION ISSUE<sup>1</sup>

KARACHI, March 5: While the question of Kalat State's accession to Pakistan was still hanging fire, the optimism of informed circles in Karachi regarding the outcome of the issue surprisingly verges on the complacency, says the API.

The self-imposed time limit fixed by the Ruler of Kalat to inform the Pakistan Government of the decision of the State Assembly on the issue of accession by the end of February has expired and the Pakistan Government are understood to have received no official intimation.

It is stressed in political quarters that the question of Kalat's accession should be viewed under the various cross lights emanating from its queer political position vis-a-vis Pakistan after the signing of the Standstill Agreement between them in August last.

Under the Agreement, which was signed for an indefinite period, the Pakistan Government are not only responsible for the transport and communication systems of the State but are also charged with the responsibility to defend the Kalat frontiers with Afghanistan and Iran.

The declaration of independence made by the Khan of Kalat on the lapse of British Paramountcy last year is subject to the provisions of the Standstill Agreement.

### RESPONSIBILITY

In the event of an Instrument of Accession replacing the present Standstill Agreement, the only material change envisaged in the relationship of the two States is the heavy responsibilities devolving on Pakistan for the economic development of the State and the educational progress of its people.

Kalat State with its vast deserts and scanty resources lies outside the monsoon limits, with a nomadic population of over half a million people scattered over an area of nearly 90,000 square miles. The State



which comprises a number of feudatory States and the semi-autonomous marine province of Mekran guarded by the Pakistan Navy is a perplexing medley of feudal privileges and pretensions.

On the relaxing of the cohesive grip of the outgoing Imperialist Power, the various odd units, which constitute the political fabric of Kalat, are striving to do off the yoke of the Ruler and attain a more respectable status by directly acceding to Pakistan.

#### LOYALTY TO PAKISTAN

It will be recalled that during the Quaid-i-Azam's visit to Baluchistan last month, a deputation of *Sardars* of Kalat State (semi-independent tribal chieftains), many of whom were members of the Upper House of Kalat State Assembly, met the Governor-General of Pakistan at Sibi and pledged their unstained support and profound loyalty to Pakistan.

They told the Quaid-i-Azam in unequivocal terms that they were of the flesh and blood of the Pakistan Muslims and would spare no sacrifice in the interest of their newly-born Muslim State.

According to reports reaching Karachi, the Lower House of Kalat Assembly met at Dhadar last week and favoured a treaty of friendship with Pakistan instead of accession.

The Upper House, it is learned, did not endorse the proposal and demanded time to consider the vital issue in its various perspectives before finally tipping the balance either side.

And unlike the modern democracies, the Upper House of Kalat Assembly is the real custodian of power.—API.

<sup>1</sup> The *Dawn*, 5 March 1948.

## PS-81

### KALAT PEOPLE DEMAND STATE'S ACCESSION TO PAKISTAN<sup>1</sup>

KARACHI, March 7: Qazi Muhmmad Isa, President, Baluchistan Provincial Muslim League, in an interview, said that the people as well as the *Sardars* of the Kalat State were with the League and wanted the State's accession to Pakistan. "The Ruler was in fact the head of a confederacy of chiefs who could make or unmake the Ruler," he added.

Commenting on the reported decision of the Kalat Lower House in refusing to accede to Pakistan, Qazi Isa said: "We do not attach any importance to the decision of the *Aiwan-i-A'am* (Lower House) of Kalat State which is a farce based on fraudulent methods of elections.

The Baluchistan League leader, continuing, said that the Muslim League Party had boycotted the last Kalat elections and the Kalat National Party,



which occupies *Aiwan-i-A'am* does not represent even a fraction of the public opinion. It still plays to the tunes of the Indian leaders and has not yet severed its relations with the All India States People's Conference.

"Since the achievement of Pakistan, the Muslim League members have left things to the Pakistan Government, otherwise the Muslim League Party within and outside the State is strong enough to deal with such cases," he concluded. — Orient.

<sup>1</sup>The *Dawn*, 7 March 1948.

## PS-82

*A. D. F. Dundas to M. Ikramullah*

*F. 14-GG/68*

TOP SECRET

D.O. No. 153-Rsy

SIBI,

8 March 1948

My dear Ikramullah,

You will no doubt, have seen a copy of the Senior Assistant Director of Intelligence Quetta's No. PE/48/22 to the Director, Intelligence Bureau, endorsing a copy of his report on the proceedings of the *Dar-ul-Awam* and *Dar-ul-Umara*, Houses of the Legislature of Kalat State,<sup>1</sup> and also Aslam's D. O. No, 94-C. dated 3rd March. I have nothing to add to these two read together, save that the proceedings of both Houses appear to have had the inspiration and support of His Highness.

Yours sincerely,  
A. D. F. DUNDAS

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable. However, see Annex

*Annex to PS-82*

*G. Ahmed to Mohamad Ali*

*F. 14-GG/69-70*

TOP SECRET

SIBI,

10 March 1948

The following information has been received of the proceedings of the *Dar-ul-Awam* and *Dar-ul-Umara*, Kalat State, on the issue of accession:

Printed copies of the Instrument of Accession received by His Highness the Khan were distributed to members of the *Dar-ul-Awam* and the *Dar-ul-Umara*



at Dhadar for study before casting their votes. The Kalat State National Party, however, misinterpreted the terms contained in it and were propagating that accession meant restriction[s] on their Forces and armament, undesired freedom for their women [and] migration of Muslim refugees into the State which will weaken the voice of the original residents, etc., etc.

On the 25th February, His Highness made a brief opening speech in the meeting of the *Dar-ul-Awam* emphasizing the need of having friendly relations with the "*Daulat-i-Khudadad* Pakistan" and stating that the intentions of "*Ala Hazrat* Quaid-i-Azam" towards the Kalat State were good. His Highness then left the House and the *Wazir-i-Azam* stood up to explain things. He said that as the House had in a previous meeting decided that the State should remain independent and have friendly relations with Pakistan, His Highness the Khan had ordered him to proceed to Karachi for necessary negotiations. He accordingly went in January last and had been granted a 2.5 hours long interview by the Quaid-i-Azam. The Quaid-i-Azam, he continued, was prepared to help the State in every way. The independence of the State will remain intact, but a treaty could be made only between States who [*sic*] were of equal status and were in a position to yield mutual benefits. In the circumstances, the only way for Kalat was to accede to Pakistan in the matter of Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs.

Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjay argued that, in the event of accession, their independence will be jeopardized. They only want a friendly treaty. He produced a resolution in this connection of representatives of the *Dar-ul-Awam* and the *Dar-ul-Umara*, the Cabinet etc., should proceed to Karachi to surmount what difficulties lay in the way of the treaty [*sic*].

The *Wazir-i-Azam* again explained that accession in respect of the three items narrated above will not interfere with the internal independence of the State, and that the Members should consider over it and assemble again after lunch to give their opinion.

Mir Ghaus Bakhsh persisted that they were not prepared to consider accession. If Pakistan was desirous of friendship with the State, it should restore to it its leased territories as well as Kharan and Las Bela. It is sheer high-handedness, he said, to bring pressure on the State to sign the accession. The House is not prepared for this.

Maulvi Arz Muhammad wondered "why Kalat, where *Shariat* was the Law, was being subjugated to Pakistan where *Shariat* was not in force and where liquor shops, brothels and many other vices were flourishing. Pakistan should first purify itself and then seek union with the State."

The *Wazir-i-Azam* replied that the Quaid-i-Azam was not a dictator, and that he had already referred the matter to the Constituent Assembly and all will see the result in due course.



Maulvi Muh[amma]d Umar said that the *Wazir-i-Azam* was demolishing the house he had himself erected. He could not understand whether the *Wazir-i-Azam* was representative of the Kalat State or a pleader on behalf of Pakistan.

The *Wazir-i-Azam* said he was merely presenting facts.

The House dispersed without any intention of assembling in the afternoon.

The *Dar-ul-Umara* met after Friday prayers on February 27. His Highness opened the session with a brief speech stating that his relations with the Quaid-i-Azam were those of a father and son, and asked the House to consider a way of having relations of friendship and mutual help with Pakistan.

After His Highness had left, the *Wazir-i-Azam* tried to elucidate things.

Mir Nauroz Khan of Jhalawan asked the *Wazir-i-Azam* whether the assurances he was giving he had secured in writing from the Pakistan authorities. He further said that they would oppose accession as best as they could.

Nawab Muh[amma]d Khan Shahwani proposed that as they had not been able to study and digest the terms of accession thoroughly, they should be given three months time to understand its implications and be able to give an opinion. He was seconded by Nawab Raisani and most of the other *Sardars* and the House dispersed.

A day prior to the session of the *Dar-ul-Awam* on February 25th, Agha Abdul Karim, brother of His Highness the Khan, met members of the Kalat State National Party at Dhadar to discuss the State's accession to Pakistan, and it was here that a resolution was drafted rejecting accession<sup>1</sup> and emphasizing an agreement between the two States on treaty basis. This was later signed by 32 persons and presented in the House by Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjay.

G. AHMED

*Director of Intelligence*

<sup>1</sup>Fell advised the Khan that though the Baluch tribes were "legally entitled to independence, they fell very far short of any real independence". He suggested, "A legal flaw in the Instrument of Accession (with Pakistan) might be a useful card to have up our sleeves to use at a time when circumstances were more favourable than they were now". See Fell, *Memoirs*, 88.

## PS-83

*M. Ikramullah to Geoffrey Prior*

*Telegram, FOA/48*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMPORTANT  
No. C-940

KARACHI,  
18 March 1948

The Government of Pakistan are responsible for the security of Pakistan's land and sea frontiers within the territories of Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela.



They have also certain rights and obligations arising from the Standstill Agreement with Kalat in matters relating to customs, railways, landing grounds, ports, posts and telegraphs, civil supplies, food, civil armed forces etc. At present, there is no administrative link with Kalat or Kharan or Las Bela to enable the Government of Pakistan to deal with these States through an officer on the spot. Past experience has shown how it is difficult to ensure against chances of misunderstanding and friction unless there is some sort of liaison between the Chief Commissioner and Kalat State Government on one side and Mekran Levy Corps and local State officials on the other. Revival of posts of Political Agent, Kalat, and A. P. A., Mekran, is likely to be misunderstood. It is therefore proposed to appoint a Regional Commissioner with his Headquarters at Quetta and a Liaison Officer at Panjgur (the Headquarters of Mekran Levy Corps) to deal with the day-to-day problems arising from the Standstill Agreement. The matter was explained to [C.A.G] Savidge<sup>1</sup> during his recent visit to Karachi.

2. Grateful if you would put the matter to Kalat State Govt. in this light and telegraph your suggestions regarding the name[s] of officers to be appointed in [sic] these posts.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>Revenue and Judicial Commissioner, Baluchistan.

## PS-84

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F.14-GG/76-7*

IMPORTANT/CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 50-S<sup>1</sup>

QUETTA,  
23 March 1948

News of accession of three Baluch States<sup>2</sup> was received with satisfaction throughout Baluchistan except in circles close to Khan and few Congress-minded individuals.

2. Agent to the Governor-General is happy that issues are now clear and administrative and political problems will consequently become easier to deal with. In his opinion next move lies with Khan who should accede immediately if he wishes to retain goodwill of remaining principalities and tribal areas, a factor essential for future preservation of Baluch-Brahui Confederacy. A. G. G also agrees that unless Khan comes forward with a definite plan for accession we should do nothing to obstruct Baluch and Brahui *Sardars* joining Pakistan by means of separate, individual or collective agreements.

3. Aslam thinks that there is no future for him as *Wazir-i-Azam*. He strongly advises appointment of Political Agents to deal direct with *Sardars*. He thinks that creation of a Baluch States Union is only way



the States and tribes can be saved from disintegration. He has been summoned to Kalat probably to receive his orders of dismissal.

4. Khan was in Quetta preparing to send his wife to Afghanistan when news of accession of Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela first reached him. Yesterday he left for Kalat where he has summoned all his *Sardars* for the 25th. He will now endeavour to enlist their support towards his future line of action which may be as follows:

He may continue to argue that he is an independent Ruler and—

- a. appeal to UNO or H.M to settle dispute between Kalat and Pakistan, or
- b. send a protest to Pakistan with or without offer of treaty which would enable him to retain control of Mekran and secure reversion of leased areas.

5. [D.Y] Fell<sup>3</sup>, with whom I had a long talk yesterday, told me privately that he considered Makran's accession as illegal and likely to make accession of Kalat more difficult. He, however, appreciates importance of doing every thing possible to strengthen the administrative machinery particularly in Mekran and stiffening up of Chagai and Mekran Levy Corps. He seemed to think settlement with Khan was not possible except in terms of a confederacy administrative arrangement for the entire Baluch-Brahui Confederacy linked with A. G. G through political officers deriving nominal authority from Khan's suzerainty. He suggests we should reopen negotiations with Khan regarding accession and administrative problems with particular reference to question of supplies through Pasni. Fell admits Khan has no case about Kharan and Las Bela and has assured me that Khan would do nothing which might lead to breach of peace.

6. Situation is likely to deteriorate rapidly unless adequate measures are taken to enable A. G. G to discharge additional responsibilities.

7. The following steps are recommended for immediate consideration of Government:

- a. Appoint Khursheed on Special Duty under A. G. G. immediately to take over new political and administrative work arising from our relations with all Baluch-Brahui principalities and tribal areas. He can be later replaced by a Political Agent;
- b. Revive post of Assistant Political Agent, Mekran. A. G. G. has agreed to release Arthington-Davy<sup>4</sup> for this purpose;
- c. Appoint senior military officers in command of Chagai and Mekran levy Corps and authorise A. G. G to work out proposals for immediate expansion and reorganization of Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps and supplying them with modern equipment. (It is presumed that General Staff are examining the whole question from point of view of defence and security);
- d. The following additional posts are recommended for consideration:



Nawabzada Mohammed Aslam Khan be appointed Political Agent Quetta when services of Mr A. R Khan are placed at the disposal of Frontier Government to make up for withdrawal of Khursheed.

8. I had long discussion with A. G. G about Bernard Bacon. A. G. G will give you his views when he comes to Karachi.

9. No news of any repercussions in Afghanistan.

10. If Khan sends me any proposals I will let you know. Meanwhile I may be authorised to negotiate with such *Sardars* of Kalat who may wish to join Pakistan.

11. A. G. G has seen this telegram and concurs generally.

[A. S. B. SHAH ]

<sup>1</sup>Repeated to Jinnah as telegram No. 1038 on 24 March 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran acceded to Pakistan on 17 March 1948. See PS-133.

<sup>3</sup>Foreign Minister, Kalat State, up to 24 March and Prime Minister from 25 March 1948. See PS-87.

<sup>4</sup>Political Agent, Sibi.

## PS-85

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F.14-GG/78*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 53-S

QUETTA,  
24 March 1948

Following telegram from Levy Corps Mekran Panjgur to Frontier Corps Quetta seen in censorship: "Consequent radio announcement of Mekran to join Pakistan. Serious complications have arisen at Turbat specially between *Hakim-i-A'ala* and Nawabzada Hamidullah (son of Nawab Bai Khan [Ruler of Mekran]). Superintendent Post Offices has asked protection of Turbat Post Office and staff. Have detailed guards at Turbat Post Office. Risaldar Major still on Southern Circle tour. No mail lorries left Pakistan after March 12th. All important mails connected with financial year held up addressed to Corps, Mekran, Mithri repeated Frontier Corps, Quetta Corps, Mekran".

2. I have wired *Wazir-i-Azam* Kalat to withdraw from Mekran *Hakim-i-A'ala* Abdul Karim (who is a brother of Khan of Kalat and a notorious smuggler) pending final settlement of question of future administration of Mekran. I have also requested Baluchistan to:

- a. send Colonel Fitzmaurice<sup>1</sup> to Pakistan pending arrival of senior Pakistan officers to take over command;
- b. strengthen garrison at Turbat and
- c. instruct Officer Commanding of detachment to call upon Abdul Karim to leave Mekran.



I request that plans for despatch of reinforcement to Mekran and senior officers to command Mekran Levy Corps be put into operation at once. It is essential now to show force in Mekran in order to deter Khan and his officials from taking any precipitate action and to enable change-over in administration to take place peacefully.

3. I am telegraphing separately my proposals for future administrative control over Mekran.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>Deputy Inspector-General, Frontier Corps, Mekran.

## PS-86

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/92*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 54-S

QUETTA,  
25 March 1948

His Highness has sent his sister to Karachi to bring her husband to Kalat or a letter from him repudiating his accession. Bai Khan is a nice man but rather weak. There is a danger that he may succumb to his wife's appeals and threats. He should therefore be encouraged to hold his ground until the change-over in administration of Mekran is complete.

2. The key of Kalat's accession lies in Mekran. The Khan's officials have already started working against us. We cannot, therefore, afford to lose any time in taking over administrative machinery and organizing civil and military forces for security of land and sea frontiers and law and order.

3. For political reasons, it is also essential that quota of cloth previously allotted from Persian Mekran should be resumed.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

## PS-87

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/89-90*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 55-S

QUETTA,  
25 March 1948

Fell has telegraphed from Kalat that he has taken over from Aslam. He has asked me to meet him at Mastung (Kalat State) for discussion. I have



replied that if there is to be permanent change in incumbency of the office of *Wazir-i-Azam* my Government should be consulted, and have agreed to finally discuss at Quetta provided he comes with definite proposals.

2. Before proceeding to Kalat, Fell had offered his co-operation on following conditions:

- a. Pakistan should support his candidature for office of *Wazir-i-Azam* and secure for him effective control over administration and finance of Kalat State;
- b. A. G. G. should resume political control throughout Baluch-Brahui speaking areas through a Political Agent to whom *Wazir-i-Azam* of Kalat and *Wazirs* of Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela should be responsible. There should also be an A. P. A [Assistant Political Agent] Mekran looking after political problems and security of frontiers;
- c. Pakistan should abstain from taking any action for which there can be no legal or constitutional sanction as this would turn world opinion against them (meaning accession of *Sardars* of Kalat).

3. I did not comment on his proposals but pointed to weakness in his scheme arising mainly from unreliability of Khan and suggested that accession of Kalat was only safeguard against disruptionist tendencies of His Highness.

4. In his statement to Brooks of the *Statesman*, the Khan has drawn attention to possibilities of adverse reactions in Afghanistan as well as repercussions inside State affecting law and order. A party of His Highness' relations left for Afghanistan via Chaman yesterday in screened buses and station wagons under armed escort. His Highness is busy taking signature[s] of minor *Sardars* of Mekran against Nawab's accession. Reports received so far show that His Highness cannot rely on unanimous support of Jhalawan and Sarawan (Group omitted).

5. I have asked the local administration to search for incriminating document, all persons proceeding from Kalat to Afghanistan and vice versa.

6. The administrative and political arrangements envisaged in para 2(b) above cannot be implemented without having a senior Pakistani officer to assist A.G.G in dealing with major problems on policy side and to ensure uniformity of action throughout the Baluch-Brahui areas of Kalat, Kharan, Mekran, Las Bela, Chagai and Sibi Agencies, as also to supervise the work of so many *Wazirs*. It is primarily essential that Khursheed should take over at least for a short time as soon as possible. Progress towards securing Khan's accession will also be difficult without coming to some understanding with *Sardars* of Kalat and leased areas. The first thing Khursheed will have to do is to get the confirmation of *Sardars* in writing that they accede to Pakistan. If Aslam is posted in Quetta he can be of help to Kharan in securing this object.

7. Outside Kalat the weakest link in our administrative chain is the



absence of effective publicity organization which can help to keep up the morale of people and explain to them the point of view of Pakistan. For this I recommend:

- a. Appointment of Tribal Relations Officer of rank of E. A. C.;
- b. Allotment of special fund of Rs. 6,000 (rupees six thousand) per annum for organizing a whispering campaign of specially prepared written material, and
- c. Talks on radio on various problems facing us in these parts.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

## PS-88

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/95*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 56-S

QUETTA,  
25 March 1948

Following telegram from *Wazir-i-Azam* Kalat to *Tehsildar* Pasni, intercepted in censor.

*Begins:* "129-T March 24th. Please afford all possible assistance to B. I.[British India] ship *S. S. Barpeta* expected to commence preliminary survey of Pasni today. Please send by post detailed report regarding Pasni Radio Station." *Ends.*

2. Under Standstill Agreement, Government of Pakistan, are responsible for security of Pasni, also for communications throughout Kalat. Mekran has now acceded to Pakistan.

3. Grateful if Pakistan Navy could be asked to advise on the desirability of allowing B. I. Ship to carry out survey operation in Pasni. They should also take charge of Pasni Radio Station.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

## PS-89

*M. Ikramullah to A. S. B. Shah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/94*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No 1041

KARACHI,  
25 March 1948

Your telegram No. 48-S dated 22nd March.<sup>1</sup> Nawab Bai Khan of



Mekran is at Las Bela and is expected to return today. Shall contact him on return and advise him to reply as suggested by you. His wife who is sister of Khan of Kalat reached Karachi last evening.

Reports indicate Bai Khan's son declared Nawab by Abdul Karim, brother of Khan of Kalat, who took forcibly signatures of *Mo'tabers*. Also Khan of Kalat has issued instructions to his brother and other officers in Mekran to continue administration as at present without any change.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>The Government of Baluchistan informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Khan of Kalat had summoned Nawab Bai Khan of Mekran for consultation. See F. 14-GG/74. Not printed.

## PS-90

*M. Ikramullah to A.S.B. Shah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/88*

IMPORTANT  
No. 1042

KARACHI,  
25 March 1948

Reference your telegram 53-S<sup>1</sup> dated 24th March. Action taken by you in paragraph two under (a), (b) & (c) confirmed. Plans for the despatch of reinforcements to Mekran and senior officers to command Mekran Levy Corps being discussed with General Gracey and Defence Ministry today. Will wire again.<sup>2</sup>

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-85.

<sup>2</sup>PS-94.

## PS-91

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/96*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 60-S

QUETTA,  
26 March 1948

Further telegrams seen in censor show that *Wazir-i-Azam* Kalat is calling for lorries from all over the State to be sent to Kalat. He has also instructed Customs Officer, Pasni, to send 5,000 repeat 5,000 tins of



petrol to Kalat.

2. Treasury Officer Kalat has wired Sub-Treasury Officer Pasni to transfer Rs. 1 lakh to Turbat at once under proper escort.

3. Comment. There are rumours that Khan is sending his valuable property to Afghanistan. Lorries may be needed for that purpose. There are also rumours that Khan's Afghan brother-in-law has brought him a letter from Prime Minister of Afghanistan offering his good offices in representing Kalat's case to UNO. Funds required at Turbat are presumably intended for payment in accordance with arrangements arrived at Baluchistan to Mekran Levy Corps on account of payments, cost of rations, etc.

4. So far very few *Sardars* have Ansari's S.O.S. From most recent reports it appears that no Sarawan Sardar has gone to Kalat. Only a few illiterate Jhalawan *Sardars* have reached Kalat.

5. Please send a copy of this telegram to [G] Ahmad.<sup>1</sup>

[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>Director, Intelligence Bureau, Karachi.

## PS-92

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/97*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 61-S

QUETTA,  
26 March 1948

Continuation my telegram No. 56-S dated March 25th.<sup>1</sup> Following telegram from *Wazir-i-Azam* Kalat to Mackinnons, Karachi. "Begins: "Kalat Government most grateful for action taken regarding survey of Pasni and have telegraphed to *Tehsildar* to give every assistance to *S. S. Barpeta*. No information available regarding Radio Station but inquiry being made". Ends.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-88.



## PS-93

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/99*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 63-S

QUETTA,  
26 March 1948

Fell has agreed to withdraw Abdul Karim from Mekran. He has also accepted the principle that Kalat Government will always consult Pakistan Government regarding appointment of *Wazir-i-Azam*. He has promised to confirm these in writing.

2. Reference paragraph No. 2 of my telegram No. 53-S March 24th.<sup>1</sup> Fell has assured me that Khan will do nothing to obstruct Pakistan's plans for administrative and political control of Mekran. He has agreed that a senior Pakistan military officer should go to Panjgur immediately to take over command of Mekran Levy Corps. He has also agreed to Davy proceeding there as Assistant Political Agent.

3. Reference correspondence ending with your telegram No. 1042 March 25th.<sup>2</sup> Fitzmaurice has not yet returned from Fort Sandeman. When he arrives, I propose asking him to detail a senior officer from Zhob Militia or Pishin Scouts to proceed to Panjgur at once with Davy to take over command of Mekran Levy Corps, pending arrival of senior Pakistani officer. I am satisfied that present command is loyal to Pakistan and therefore might be left there as Adjutant/Quarter Master. I also propose consulting Fitzmaurice as to whether, in the event of our inability to reinforce Mekran with regular forces in immediate future, it would be practicable to send to Panjgur, for one or two months, wing of Zhob Militia now stationed at Loralai if it can be relieved by an Infantry unit from Karachi or Quetta. This may prove to be a more feasible arrangement for reinforcing Mekran pending settlement of its future civil administration than stationing of regular forces in that area in view of difficulty of rations and accommodation. As you know, at present Mekran Levy Corps depends on Khan's officials for procurement of supplies.

4 Please pass copy to Dundas.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-85.

<sup>2</sup>PS-90.



## PS-94

*M. Ikramullah to A. S. B. Shah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/101-2*

TOP SECRET  
No. 1054

KARACHI,  
26 March 1948

Prime Minister today discussed various matters connected with defence of Baluchistan with three Service Chiefs. Dundas, Iskander Mirza and myself were present.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister told us that General Gracey was sending a whole brigade to Baluchistan. This was entirely due to accommodation difficulties elsewhere and was not connected with situation in Baluchistan. After considering various recommendations made in your various telegrams following conclusions were reached:

2. Two battalions of the brigade to proceed to Quetta according to original plan but one battalion to be kept back. From this battalion one platoon will be taken by RPAF to Jiwani Airport for protection of aerodrome. One company will be taken by RPN to Pasni to take over civil administration, port administration and the Radio Station. It will send a platoon forward to Turbat. Remainder of the battalion will be kept in reserve to move by road to Mekran via Las Bela. We hope to occupy Jiwani and Pasni by Monday afternoon. Rest of the battalion will move as soon as possible. The two battalions going to Quetta are not likely to be there for another fortnight or so. They are being mentioned in this connection merely to give you complete picture.

3. Major Saadullah Khan, who you met here the other day, has been selected to command Mekran Levy Corps. Am arranging to get him to Karachi from Hyderabad (Sind) so that he could go by sea to Pasni.

4. What have you done about Fitzmaurice and Arthington Davy. Dundas does not like idea of their going to Kalat via Panjgur unless Khan accepts responsibility for their safety or other adequate arrangements are made. If necessary they should be flown to Karachi and sent to Panjgur via Pasni or Jiwani.

5. Please inform D. I. G. F. C. of Major Saadullah's appointment. Dundas hopes that Capt. Ghaus Baksh Raisani will remain on as Adjutant.

6. In order that there may be no incidents please tell Khan or his *Wazir-i-Azam* on Monday noon our proposed move in Jiwani and Pasni so that he may telegraph instructions to his officers to hand over the administration quietly. We do not want any incidents. Similarly his officers elsewhere should be ready to hand over administration and the treasuries to our officers as soon as they are directed to



do so by the latter.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>During most of March, the Khan conferred with his advisers, religious leaders, and [Brig.] Purvess, Defence Minister, as to the military action to be taken if Pakistan launched "an armed attack upon the State". Fell reported that "if the worst come to the worst, he [Khan] was in favour of evacuating lock, stock and barrel to Khuzdar". See Fell, *Memoirs*, 118-9. Pakistan authorities, apprehensive of tribal movement against them, had troops ready to deal with the situation *ibid.*, 122.

## PS-95

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/103*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 66-S

QUETTA,  
26 March 1948

My telegram No. 63-S March 26th.<sup>1</sup>

At my request Fitzmaurice has made following proposals for consideration of competent civil and military authorities and IGFC:

*First:* Fitzmaurice suggests Major Muhammad Saleem Khan, Second in Command, Zhob Militia, as temporary Commandant Mekran Levy Corps for one or possibly two months. Inadvisable to remove Commandant Baluchistan Corps. Waziristan Corps seriously short of senior officers. Propose calling of Muhammad Saleem into Quetta immediately to proceed Panjgur when road passable. Road now believed impassable due to rain. Permanent Commandant Mekran Levy Corps can be appointed later.

*Second:* Ration situation man and animals Mekran Levy Corps quite serious as Kalat State have not fulfilled obligations to supply. Fitzmaurice has called for latest report of ration situation. May be necessary to land rations by sea or air at Jiواني.

*Third:* Consider Zhob Militia more suitable than regular army for reinforcement of Mekran, if essential to reinforce. About two hundred rifles could be sent without replacement in Loralai. Army transport would be required to assist in carrying rations for the Zhob Militia detachment. This would mean big convoy through Kalat State. If the army occupied the Loralai later, further Zhob Militia reinforcements could be sent if the army transport available. Same army MT would in any case be required to remain in Mekran otherwise Zhob Militia would be immobile in Zhob and the Loralai agencies.

2. Please telegraph confirmation appointment of Major Muhammad



Saleem Khan as I am anxious to send him and Davy to Panjgur.  
[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-93.

## PS-96

*M. A. Jinnah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/106*

SECRET

No. 50-W

27 March 1948

Your telegram No. 1038 dated March 24th.<sup>1</sup> No final decision should be taken on any of the matters suggested by Shah or by you as it appears from last portion of your telegram until I reach Karachi. Few days will not in my opinion make difference.

As regards Kalat, there should be no negotiations of any kind or any further discussion to create slightest impression that anything else but accession is possible. Please instruct Shah and Dundas that they should make it clear to Kalat to give us his answer whether he is prepared to accede as promised by him more than once or not."

[M. A. JINNAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-84.

## PS-97

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/104*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 67-S

QUETTA,

27 March 1948

Following telegram received from Head Clerk Corps Mekran:

It is reported that on pressure by *Hakim-i-A'ala* and threats of serious action, Nawabzada Hamidullah, eldest son of Nawab Bai Khan, has signed to be recognized as Nawab of Mekran in place of Nawab Bai Khan, his father. The document is said to have been taken to Kalat by Syed Ahmed Shah, Personal Assistant to Hamidullah. Sardar Sarbuland Khan, *Sardar* Panjgur and Khosa Muhammad Khan were ordered day before yesterday by *Hakim-i-A'ala* to reach Turbat immediately and in compliance *Sardar*



Panjgur left yesterday by taxi/mail lorry to Turbat while Khosa Muhammad Khan (group corrupt) inability for some domestic reason.

2. I venture once again to point out importance of early decision regarding despatch of reinforcement to Mekran. Zhob Militia can be easily spared from Loralai if Army authorities agree to provide transport and rations. Danger of conflict with local mischief-makers increasing daily and it is essential that we should put ourselves in a position to prevent Mekran being left in air or becoming an item of world news. Breaches in road within Kalat territory have so far prevented me from sending Davy and present Commandant of Mekran Levy Corps (who has so far been absent on leave) with orders to take over charge of administration at Turbat and Panjgur. I am issuing orders for their journey today.

3. I have informed Fell about Davy's new appointment and of his impending departure to Mekran. Fell has raised no objection to Davy passing through Kalat territory with small escort.

4. I should be grateful for authority to appoint immediately a retired E. A. C. as *Wazir* of Mekran with headquarters at Turbat.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

## PS-98

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/109-11*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 69-S

QUETTA,  
27 March 1948

Following an appreciation recorded by Col. W. B Fitzmaurice, Deputy Inspector-General, Frontier Corps, on our military position in Mekran on the advisability or otherwise of sending a detachment of Zhob Militia to Mekran:

I. *Information*: There is no immediate (group omitted) upto the present of any disorder in Mekran but situation seems very fluid. I understand that although the accession of Mekran to Pakistan has been accepted yet officials of His Highness the Khan are still trying to influence the future. Three days ago the *Tehsildar* at Panjgur ordered all private lorries to go to Kalat, thereby depriving Mekran Levy Corps of available hired transport. *Hakim-i-A'ala* at Panjgur is giving various orders and trying to maintain his authority. The Commanding Officer of Mekran Levy Corps, Captain Ghous Baksh Raisani, was very unfortunately on leave when accession occurred. He is leaving for Panjgur



immediately. The road is clear after recent rain. This execrable road is impassable for some time after rain. I understand that Government of Pakistan are appointing an A. P. A. for Mekran and as shown in an earlier note to Joint Secretary (Colonel A.S.B Shah), I have warned Major Mohammed Saleem Khan, Second in Command of Zhob Militia, to be ready to move to Panjgur immediately as temporary Commandant. The senior officer present with Mekran Levy Corps (Risaldar Major Juma Khan) was on tour in far off southern posts of Jiwani and Suntsar when present situation arose. He is expected in Panjgur today and will have passed through Turbat. It is hoped that [sic] single available Mekran Levy Corps lorries will be available (supplemented by hired lorries of Turbat) to take Mekran Levy Corps reinforcements to Turbat. I have no knowledge of details of most recent conversations between Joint Secretary and Mr Fell or whether the latter has expressed his agreement or otherwise to despatch of reinforcements to Mekran through Kalat territory. It may be that a large convoy of reinforcements might frighten and antagonize Kalat specially if conversations are still in progress.

II. *The Mekran Levy Corps*: This Corps although not quite up to Frontier Corps standards (owing to paucity of officers) is efficient and workmanlike and should not be confused with *Khassadars* or tribal levies. The Mekran Levy Corps will, I believe, unhesitatingly support Pakistan as long as their pay and pensions remain assured and as long as they know that Pakistan will back them. But owing to possibilities of rumours and propaganda the sooner an A. P. A designate and other commissioned officers get to their posts the better. The Kalat Army cannot effectively oppose Mekran Levy Corps if commissioned officers are present.

III. *Ration*: In my previous note to Joint Secretary I stressed danger of shortage of ration and I have telegraphed for details of rations held. Kalat State is supplier and they are not now fulfilling their supply contract. Army transport may be required to supply ration by road (if available with D. F. S. Baluchistan) or alternatively sea or air supply may be necessary. A large detachment of Zhob Militia or army will accentuate ration problem. I have hoped that Mekran Levy Corps may have one month's *atta* supply if they distribute it. Camel's rations are I believe almost nil but barley crop will soon be ready. I have telegraphed to Mekran Levy Corps to conserve and cut down their men's ration.

IV. *Officers*: I have telegraphed to the Risaldar Major saying that A.P.A and officers are arriving very soon with a wireless telegraphy set and an especial escort to Z. M. Brahuis in Zhob Militia lorries.

V. *Reinforcement[s]*: A large detachment of Zhob Militia can of course get to Panjgur (weather permitting) whether or not any one foolishly tries to oppose them.



VI. *Conclusion*: All things considered and having regard to my information up to today I consider that reinforcements can await a report on situation by A[ssistant] P[olitical] A[gent] when he arrives at Panjgur. As stated in previous note, the Militia or Scouts are in my opinion more suitable than army as reinforcements in this particular case. 150 to 200 rifles could be sent from Fort Sandeman at short notice assisted by some army transport for ration from Quetta. Rather than tie up many Zhob Militia lorries in Panjgur thus affecting mobility of that Corps in Zhob and Loralai, I might have to ask for some army lorries to remain in Panjgur. Once lorries were available in Panjgur, I would hope to get petrol from Pasni and food from Jiwani. Should any situation develop requiring more troops (and I do not (repeat not) anticipate this) the Zhob Militia could send more men if army relieved them at Loralai and provided we can supply them with *atta* and minimum requirements of life they can deal with any situation which I can envisage in Mekran.

2. Hostile action of Kalat State<sup>1</sup> has exposed Mekran Levy Corps to danger of starvation due to shortage of food and transport and I am sending a strong protest to Fell. Meantime grateful if you would arrange for supplies to be kept ready for despatch to Mekran by sea or from Quetta.

[A.S.B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>Pakistan's decision to accept the accession of Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela provoked angry reaction in Kalat. Fell reported that "I spoke very strongly to the Khan of the fallacy of contemplating any kind of resistance of a military sort to Pakistan. Such a campaign could only have one ending and that quickly, the complete extinction of the State", which would cause great suffering to the people of Kalat. "If the Khan was not prepared to recognize Pakistan's supremacy," the only alternative was to send an authorized representative abroad to plead the State's case with other countries. There were a few, such as India and Afghanistan, whose general hostility to Pakistan might persuade them to take up Kalat's case, and if Kalat's case was genuinely supported, the fact of its being well-founded, both on international law and common justice, gave some hope that something might still be saved for Kalat," thought Fell. See Fell, *Memoirs*, 95.

## PS-99

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/107*

SECRET  
No. 70-S

QUETTA,  
27 March 1948

Your telegram No. 1054 March 26th.<sup>1</sup>

2. My telegrams No. 63-S<sup>2</sup> and 66-S<sup>3</sup> of March 26th, and 67-S of



March 27th<sup>4</sup> were despatched before receipt of your telegram under reference.

3. Presume all regular forces entering Mekran will bring rations. Reference Turbat detachment from Pasni presume MT will be brought by sea. No information available here about local lorries. Presume battalion ex Las Bela will move Panjgur if road passable.

4. I propose sending Davy and Raisani to Karachi by air tomorrow for despatch Jiwani. Request special arrangements be made for their onward transport to Turbat and Pasni respectively. Fitzmaurice will remain here unless situation requires his presence in Mekran.

5. Saleem, Zhob Militia, if approved, will leave with Mekran administrative staff W.T.A and two operators. I will telegraph for special plane for them, if necessary.

6. Your order regarding intimation to Kalat noted.

[A. S. B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-94.

<sup>2</sup>PS-93.

<sup>3</sup>PS-95.

<sup>4</sup>PS-97.

## PS-100

*M. Ikramullah to A. S. B. Shah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/108*

TOP SECRET

No. 1072

KARACHI,

27 March 1948

I tried to get you on the phone but you were out. Major Saadullah Khan has arrived. After consulting Dundas I have issued order appointing him Commandant of the Mekran Levy Corps. He is proceeding via Pasni tomorrow. I have also issued orders to the present Commandant to hand over the command to Major Saadullah Khan. I am also issuing orders appointing him as Adjutant but I have verbally told Major Saadullah Khan that if he feels that he ought to go back to Quetta he will be sent away. Dundas has also selected Mirza Ahmed Ali to accompany him as his Political Officer to accompany him to Pasni as a purely temporary measure. As soon as he selects some other officer he will relieve Mirza Ahmed Ali. Please do not disturb Major Saleem Khan.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]



## PS-101

*Ruler of Kalat to Louis Mountbatten**Telegram, F. 14-GG/112-14*KALAT,  
27 March 1948

This evening All India Radio announced that [V.P] Menon of States Department in interview to press stated *inter alia* that Kalat State had two months ago approached Indian Union to accept its accession to India. I am very much surprised to hear this mischievous news which I emphatically deny. Kalat Government has made no such request in any form whatsoever. I would request Your Excellency to contradict this announcement and release to press any correspondence that Indian Union may have received on behalf of Kalat Government.<sup>1</sup> Addressed Governor-General, India Rpt Governor-General Pakistan.

KHAN KALAT

<sup>1</sup>Annex*Annex to PS-101**U. S. National Archives, F. 845.00/4-248<sup>1</sup>*PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU  
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

The Prime Minister today, [30 March 1948] in reply to a short notice question in the Dominion Assembly, said:

I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up a misapprehension that has unfortunately arisen. I greatly regret that, owing to an error in reporting, the All India Radio announced on the night of the 27th March that His Highness the Khan of Kalat had approached the Government of India about two months ago, through his agents, to seek permission to accede to India but the Government of India did not agree. This statement is incorrect.<sup>2</sup> No mention has been made at any time either by the representatives of the Ruler of Kalat or by the Government of India to the accession of Kalat State to India. In view of the geographical position of the Kalat State, the question did not arise at all.

I might also add that certain reports, which have appeared in the foreign press about political negotiations between the Government of India and Kalat State, are also completely without foundation. The statement that any sum of money has been paid to Kalat State on



behalf of the Government and that the Government have sought air bases in Kalat are also wholly without foundation.

The facts are as follows: In August last, soon after the declaration of independence in India, the Government of Kalat drew the attention of the Government of India to a press communique<sup>3</sup> in which it was said that the Government of Pakistan had recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign State, in treaty relations with the British Government, with a status different from that of the Indian States. They invited the Government of India to make a similar declaration. Some time later, a request was made on behalf of the Kalat State for permission to establish a trade agency of the State in Delhi. No formal reply was sent to either of these requests. Informally the representative of the Kalat State was informed that these requests could not be considered then. No further communication of any kind has passed between the Government of India and the Government of Kalat.

<sup>1</sup>Enclosure to U.S Embassy Report No. 303 of 2 April 1948 on alleged negotiations between Kalat and the Government of India. *U.S. National Archives*, F. 845.00/4-248. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>In an *aide-memoire* on Junagadh and Kashmir, submitted on 26 February 1948, para 6, Mountbatten informed the King that "a large State which had obvious geographical compulsion to accede to Pakistan—Kalat—approached the Government of India for political relationship but was refused". See Enclosure to PS-238. Abdus Samad Achakzai, Baluchistan Congress leader, had visited India about the end of November. "I think ... he was urging the Khan to accede to India..." See Fell, *Memoirs*, 143.

<sup>3</sup>Annex I to PS-66.

## PS-102

*Louis Mountbatten to Ruler of Kalat*  
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/118*

No. 2646 ECI.

NEW DELHI,  
30 March 1948

My Government regrets that due to an error in reporting, All India Radio made the erroneous statement referred to by you.<sup>1</sup> The position has been cleared up by a statement by the Prime Minister in the Assembly today.<sup>2</sup> Addressed Khan of Kalat, repeated Governor-General, Pakistan.

[MOUNTBATTEN]  
*Governor-General of India*

<sup>1</sup>PS-101.

<sup>2</sup>Annex to PS-101.



## PS-103

*D.Y. Fell to M. A. Jinnah**Telegram, F. 14-GG/120*

KALAT,  
30 March 1948

His Highness the Khan desires me to telegraph to Your Excellency the announcement made by His Highness at Kalat on March the twenty-eighth. *Text Begins:* On night March 27th All India Radio Delhi announced that two months ago Kalat State had approached Indian Union to accept its accession to India and that Indian Union rejected the request. This news is most surprising and disturbing to me as a Muslim neighbour of Pakistan. It has never been my intention to accede to India as my Government or myself never moved Indian Union either in writing or through any agent that it should accept accession of Kalat State. A telegraphic request<sup>1</sup> was at once made to Governor-General of India to contradict the announcement or as an alternative to release to press for public information any correspondence that Indian Union may have received on this subject.

Prima facie this is nothing but a piece of false propaganda carried on by an interested section in India with two motives behind; firstly to spoil the negotiations that are at present being conducted between Pakistan and Kalat; secondly to give false impression to the world that they are right in their policy in respect of Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad Deccan. Let me make it clear in unequivocal terms that no earthly power can separate Kalat and its Ruler from Pakistan as we are all Muslims, followers of the same Prophet (peace be upon him) believing in one *Qur'an* and worshipping a single God. As such we have to live and die together. We perhaps have differences but not to the extent that may cause disunity and lead to separation. Whatever efforts during the last ten years the Ruler of Kalat has been able to put in under the guidance of Quaid-i-Azam for the achievement of Pakistan is no secret. Some time was and perhaps is still required for clarification of difference of view points existing between Kalat and Pakistan but my very first reaction after hearing the news was that no time should be lost to put an end to false propaganda and to avoid and forestall the possibility of friction between Muslim brethren in Kalat and Pakistan as result of the mischievous news. It is therefore declared that from 9 p.m. on 27th March the time I heard the false news from the A.I.R I forthwith decided to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan whatever difference of view point exists between Kalat and Pakistan



shall be placed in writing before the Quaid-i-Azam whose decision I shall accept. I trust that by grace of God my *Sardars* and people will welcome the decision taken by me. Long live Islam; Long live Quaid-i-Azam; Long live Muslim Government of Pakistan; Long live Muslim Govt. of Kalat. Khan of Kalat *Ends*.

[D. Y. FELL]

<sup>1</sup>PS-101 & PS-102.

## PS-104

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/ 116*

KALAT,  
30 March 1948

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Karachi

Quaid-i-Azam on return from Bengal must have heard with satisfaction news of Kalat accession<sup>1</sup>. Ahmad Yar Khan and his people all at disposal of Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan and awaiting orders.

[KHAN KALAT]

<sup>1</sup>Kharan State congratulated Jinnah on his "diplomatic victory in Kalat" and shared in rejoicing. See F. 14-GG/117. Not printed. Mekran also sent a message of rejoicing on this occasion and assured fullest cooperation and support to Jinnah. See F. 120-GG/244. Not printed.

## PS-105

KALAT MAY PRESS ITS CLAIM ON MEKRAN<sup>1</sup>

KARACHI, March 30: The dramatic decision of Kalat to accede to Pakistan, according to political circles in Karachi, has won him sympathy and respect of the Muslims of Pakistan.

But political observers stated that Ruler of Kalat's reference to point of difference between his State and Pakistan has thrown into bold relief question of the future constitutional status of the States of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran, writes API correspondent.

The President of the States Muslim League, Mr Manzar-i-Alam, welcoming the announcement of accession, claimed that "the real credit for the decision goes to the veteran *Sardars* of the Upper House of the



Kalat legislature [and] the workers of the Kalat State Muslim League through whose unity, co-ordination, and dedication and discipline the accession was really made possible."

He added: "With Kalat's accession a possible citadel of intrigue against Pakistan has collapsed."

Mr Manzar-i-Alam expressed the hope that "the disclaimer by the Khan of Kalat about having any truck with any foreign power will be sufficient to exonerate the past."

The *Wazir* of Las Bela, Khan Saheb Mirza Ahmad Ali, expressing his gratification over the "wise step taken by the Kalat Ruler in acceding to Pakistan", said that he was confident that the new developments would not in any way affect the separate and independent entity of Las Bela State.

He believed that the Baluchistan States of Kalat and Las Bela would be partners of equal status in the demanding of Pakistan that there would be no reversion to the "old and baseless claim by the Ruler of Kalat of suzerainty over Las Bela". Kharan State, he added, was in the same position as Las Bela.

The constitutional position of Mekran, however, is considered in political circles to be as baffling and interesting as the jigsaw puzzle. The claim of the Ruler of Kalat to Mekran and the counter claim of the Nawab of Mekran to his independence are considered to be equally strong.

The Khan of Kalat will throw some stress on his claim to Mekran which he considers to be a province of his state than on either Las Bela or Kharan, when he presents his case to the Quaid-i-Azam for arbitration. API.

<sup>1</sup>The *Dawn*, 30 March 1948.

## PS-106

### KALAT'S ACCESSION<sup>1</sup>

KARACHI, March 30: Somewhat dramatically His Highness the Khan of Kalat has taken the inevitable step and decided to bring the remaining parts of the Kalat confederacy into the Dominion of Pakistan. More than half of the territory has already acceded and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan's accession affects only residuary Kalat. His decision, because of the delay, the manner of its making, and the preceding circumstances publicly known and unknown, may not create any excess of enthusiasm but to be very welcome. It does clear the atmosphere considerably and eliminates the chance of complications which might have arisen



had His Highness continued to follow any other course. To that extent he deserves to be congratulated. A helpful factor which smoothed the path of wisdom was presumably the friendly but unambiguous exposition of what we may call the realities of the situation by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry's able representative Lt. Col. A.S.B. Shah who had gone to Quetta for that express purpose. He has been, fortuitously, assisted in his mission by a spokesman of the Indian States Ministry who, by inadvertence or design, blurted out a statement of grave import at a New Delhi press conference. One or two months ago, he said, Kalat had approached the Government of India "through an agent" with an offer of accession to the Indian Dominion. His Highness had himself categorically denied earlier unofficial reports to that effect, but this official assertion by the Secretary of the Indian States Ministry put the matter in a very different light. Happily, the Khan of Kalat was prompted in taking in the significance of the matter and decided to give the lie to the Indian assertion not by a mere counter assertion but by positive action which would show his loyalty to Pakistan. In view of this it would be in the nature of an unprofitable post-mortem to continue public speculation as to whether such an offer was or was not made to India.

Incidentally, it should be noted how naive the Secretary of the Indian States Ministry Mr V.P. Menon wanted to be when he said that "the Government of India would not have anything to do with any State within or contiguous to Pakistan." After having accepted the accession of Tripura State which is much more contiguous to Pakistan than to an Indian territory, and after having not only engineered the Maharaja's accession but also started a war of conquest of Kashmir, such a pose ill becomes India. Mr Menon, we are afraid, met with ill success in trying to make a virtue of necessity.

The Khan of Kalat refers to the existence still of "differences of view point" between himself and the Pakistan Government but gives a categorical undertaking that he will place them in writing before the Quaid-i-Azam "whose decision I shall accept". It is to be hoped that these differences are not of an insurmountable nature, especially as His Highness has now willingly transferred to the Pakistan Government a great deal of responsibility over the affairs of the State. In any case, the Quaid-i-Azam, if he agrees to view once more his personal attention to the question, can be depended upon to be fair and just in which, we imagine, would naturally take into account the situation created by the earlier trouble-free accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran.

On one very important aspect of the prevailing internal situation in



Kalat, we feel bound to address a special word to His Highness the Khan. His policy having so long been what it was, a particular political organization, the Kalat National Party, have to see much encouragement, especially in the last few months. Formerly, it was against the Khan but believing that the Khan was opposed to Pakistan, it swung over to strong support of him. This was not because they left the Khan any better than before but because they were bitterly anti-Pakistan. The so-called Kalat nationals are known to be in touch with anti-Pakistan elements in India, and for all one knows, with similar elements elsewhere. They are creating disruption and fomenting an anti-Pakistan agitation. Due to the peculiar circumstances which arose recently, the Khan perhaps thought it admissible to encourage them. For the same reason, on the testimony of an impartial British newspaper correspondent who had lately been to Kalat, the State's Muslim League has been "virtually banned" in the State. His Highness will realize that a radical change in his attitude and his Government's policy towards these political parties is now called for. Parts of its press communique announcing accession are splendidly worded, for instance where he declares: "We are all Muslims, followers of the same Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) believing in the Quran and worshipping a single God. We should live and die together". These are noble words. Therefore, His Highness's first duty, if we may venture to say so, is to put down with an iron hand the disruptors who are talking of "Baluchistan for the Baluchi", of "Baluch Nationalism", and poisoning the minds of the ignorant tribesmen by such propaganda which is the very negation of the ideal of "one God, one religion, one people".

<sup>1</sup>Editorial, the *Dawn*, 30 March 1948.

## PS-107

*Press Communique by Ministry of Foreign Affairs on  
Kalat's Accession to Pakistan*

*F. 14-GG/121*

KARACHI,  
1 April 1948

The Instrument of Accession signed by the Khan of Kalat on March 27<sup>1</sup> was placed before the Quaid-i-Azam on March 31 and was accepted.

<sup>1</sup>See *Instruments of Accession*, 13-5.



## PS-108

*C. A. G. Savidge to M. Ikramullah**F. 14-GG/129-30*CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 206-RsyQUETTA,  
2 April 1948

My dear Ikramullah,

I have today received a letter from Fell in which he gives the results of a long talk he has had with His Highness the Khan over policy. The Khan has given Fell clear and definite instructions to the effect that Kalat is now part of Pakistan and it is the first duty of the State to help Pakistan and cooperate in every way, not only in the conceded subjects but in all other matters also. The Khan wishes to put all the past behind him and to forget everything except his goodwill and desire to help. You will agree that this is most satisfactory and I have no doubt that with goodwill on all sides we shall make a rapid progress in consolidating this important corner of Pakistan.

2. You will by now have received my telegram of today (a copy of which I enclose<sup>1</sup>) informing you that His Highness would like to go abroad for some months. He is very tired and feels that he wants a rest and a real change. Fell states that H.H. is entirely sincere in this and has no political motive at all. He plans to go by Pan American Airways to Constantinople, break journey there for a few days and then go on to London. He would then spend a month or two in England quietly and have a holiday and do the usual social duties. After that he proposes to go to the U.S.A. for a month and see New York and Washington and perhaps Niagara and Maine.

3. While he is away, he wants to leave everything in the *Wazir-i-Azam's* hands to work in cooperation with Quaid-i-Azam and the Agent to the Governor-General and, if necessary, under the A.G.G.'s orders. His Highness would like to leave as soon as possible so as to get the early summer in England and avoid the rush season.

4. I consider this is all most [almost] satisfactory and we should trust him whole-heartedly and give his proposed trip our blessing. It will be of much benefit to His Highness' health and to his nerves and will broaden his outlook a lot. His Highness feels this advantage himself and has pointed it out to Fell. While he is away we should be able to get through a whole lot of work in regard to our general relations with Kalat and in seeing that the Administration is overhauled and placed on a sound basis.



5. If you will give your approval to the proposal, I suggest that the Pakistan High Commissioner in London may be instructed to give His Highness all possible assistance during his stay in England and the Foreign Office in London might be requested to arrange for any assistance necessary to be given to him through the British Embassy at Ankara while His Highness is in Turkey. It would be of considerable assistance also if the Khan could be given a general letter of introduction by you for use while he is abroad. This I believe was the practice which used to be followed in the past when distinguished Indian visitors went on trips to foreign countries. I shall be glad if you will kindly let me have urgently your reactions to the proposals mentioned above.

Yours sincerely,  
C. A. G. SAVIDGE

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-109

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/123*

2 April 1948

Thanks for your telegram.<sup>1</sup>

Extremely glad to note expression of your sentiments of loyalty and service to Pakistan and your very kind personal references to me.

[M. A. JINNAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-104.

## PS-110

*A. D. F. Dundas to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/126*

SECRET  
No. 78-S

QUETTA,  
5 April 1948

Khan has invited me to visit Kalat and I have accepted for 12th to 14th April. Visit will be of an informal nature and my objective will be mainly to consolidate by this discussion the position we have gained



as a result of Kalat's accession. I propose to discuss in general terms the administrative position of the State as an acceding unit on the lines indicated by [A. S. B.] Shah during his recent visit here. If there are any specific matters, which you wish me to take up at this juncture, please issue urgent instructions.

Khan is likely to raise question of his *Wazir-i-Azam*. I understand that Aslam will not rejoin on the expiry of his present leave and Khan desires to appoint Fell in his place.<sup>1</sup> Shah was of opinion that Fell would be best choice from the point of view of both Pakistan and Kalat, and I concur entirely with this view. I consider that he would serve loyally best interests of Pakistan and the State and his insight into political framework and administrative ability would be definite assets. I should like to inform Khan that Fell's appointment has full approval of Government. Please confirm urgently.

[A. D. F. DUNDAS]

<sup>1</sup>On 25 March 1948, Fell informed A.S.B. Shah that he had taken over from Mohammad Aslam Khan. See PS-87.

## PS-111

*M. Ikramullah to C. A. G. Savidge*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/127*

SECRET  
No. 1206

KARACHI,  
5 April 1948

Your telegram 275-S April 2nd.<sup>1</sup>

2. During his discussion with Shah, Fell had pointed to most unsatisfactory state of Kalat's finances. Our reports are that large sums of money were withdrawn from banks and treasuries after the accession of Mekran, Kharan and Las Bela. Attempts were also made to transfer valuable securities out of Pakistan. In view of this, His Highness may be requested to postpone his departure until A.G.G. has gone through the records of State with Fell and shown to His Highness the exact state of his finances.

3. Besides, in the absence of Ruler, who alone can exercise certain legal and legislative powers, it will be difficult to attend to constitutional problems. The Kalat legislature is merely an advisory body and will not be able to exercise ruling powers. The important question as to who should be vested with these powers cannot be decided without



careful consideration.

4. Apart from this, Pakistan is facing a grave situation at this critical moment both as regards its internal affairs as well as external situation. Kalat's strategic position particularly demands that His Highness should not go on a tour abroad at present but remain at the helm of affairs so as to be able to lend to Pakistan that measure of assistance and co-operation which His Highness has publicly offered a few days ago while acceding to Pakistan.

5. For your information, Dundas had informed Shah that Fell was carrying on his person Rs. 30 lakh in cash on the 21st March, and Khan has not yet formally informed us that he wishes to dispense with the services of Aslam, a Pakistani officer whose services were lent to him, nor has he consulted us about the appointment of Fell as *Wazir-i-Azam* or regarding his conditions of service. We cannot obviously permit Fell to take independent charge of the State without first putting ourselves in a position to protect him as our nominee, and without knowing how A.G.G. is going to ensure that Fell will be able to discharge his responsibilities in the best interests of Kalat.<sup>2</sup>

6. Will you kindly ensure that Fell remains in Kalat State<sup>3</sup> until a full and complete investigation has been made into Kalat's finances and these important questions are satisfactorily settled. Will you also post special guards at Chaman and on Nushki, Turbat, Pasni and Jiwani routes to see that no one escapes with Kalat State's funds.

7. Please also confirm instructions already given to Grindlays that they should not transfer any securities belonging to Kalat State outside Pakistan.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>F. 14-GG/124. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Fell noted that as Prime Minister he had "to contend with a strong prejudice against Kalat which had been deliberately stirred up in connection with the accession in Pakistan, and a strong nationalist prejudice against Pakistan in Kalat. The Khan and his family would be resentful of their arbitrary treatment and would expect some immediate and tangible return from their tardy decision to accede, while it was most unlikely that Pakistan would have the sense in their present mood to meet him half way." See Fell, *Memoirs*, 138.

<sup>3</sup>Savidge, in telegram No. 80-S, replied that "presumably Khan should remain in Kalat and not Fell." See F. 14-GG/128. Not printed.



## PS-112

*C. A. G. Savidge to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/131-32*

SECRET/IMMEDIATE  
No. 83-S

QUETTA,  
7 April 1948

Your telegram No. 1206<sup>1</sup> dated April 6th [*sic* for 5th]. I am frankly considerably perturbed by your reaction to His Highness' wish to go abroad for a short period. I have the impression that your suspicion of the proposal is partly engendered by events which took place prior to Kalat's accession and which in the circumstances then prevailing admittedly gave cause for suspicion of the Khan's intentions. These matters have since been satisfactorily explained as I shall show below and I am fully convinced that His Highness has now thrown in his lot loyally and completely with Pakistan and there are no ulterior motives behind his proposal.

2. His departure at this time will be definitely in the interest of Pakistan as well as of Kalat and will enable us more easily to overhaul the State administration and implement our policy through the *Wazir-i-Azam* who will be our nominee and will work under the close supervision and control of the Agent to the Governor General. In this regard, please see my letter No. 206-Rsy<sup>2</sup> and telegram No. 275-S of April 2nd.<sup>3</sup>

3. I foresee no difficulty regarding the exercise of His Highness' powers in his absence and it was the intention that he would, with our concurrence, confer on the *Wazir-i-Azam* by *firman* all necessary authority to act for the Ruler. Such an authority would be exercised in close consultation with the Agent to the Governor General in any matters of importance which might arise. It was on this premise that I said the proposal had my whole-hearted approval.

4. The sums of money approximately Rs. 80,000 (repeat 80,000) withdrawn at the end of last month were required for normal payment of salaries falling due and to meet current expenditure and were drawn earlier than usual before the banks closed for several days holiday at Easter. The sum of Rs. 30 lakh (repeat 30 lakh) carried by Fell was not in cash but was an old Government of India promissory note in ordinary form liable to income tax which was being handed over to the Imperial Bank for conversion into promissory notes in special form to enable interest to be drawn at Quetta Treasury free of income tax. I am fully satisfied that both the above transactions were



bona fide. The general financial position of the State will certainly be investigated and Fell has already proposed Provincial Government to carry out such an examination. This will naturally take time and I see little advantage in requiring His Highness to postpone his departure till it is done.

5. Instructions have already been given to Grindlays Bank not to transfer Kalat State securities outside Pakistan and I will take steps to see that no one escapes from Pakistan with Kalat State funds. In respect of my private letter, His Highness has pledged his full support and loyalty to Pakistan. I am convinced it would be in our interest to take him at his word now and reciprocate by showing a measure of trust improved [*sic*] on our part. To turn down his wish to go abroad for reasons such as those indicated in your telegram will undoubtedly be a great disappointment to him and will certainly arouse suspicions on his part of our real intentions. We have gained greatly through the successful outcome of our negotiations over accession and would sincerely deplore any action now which would impair the friendly relations which have been established and which we are in the process of consolidating.

I trust that in the light of what I have said your decision may be reconsidered and I may be instructed urgently to inform His Highness that his proposal has the blessings of the Government subject to the safeguards I have indicated. Dundas, whom I have asked is in full agreement with the above views.

[C. A. G. SAVIDGE]

<sup>1</sup>PS-111.

<sup>2</sup>PS-108.

<sup>3</sup>F. 14-GG/124. Not printed.

## PS-113

*C. A. G. Savidge to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/135*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 84-S

QUETTA,  
8 April 1948

Fell reports that order recently served on Grindlays Bank and Imperial Bank prohibiting movement of Kalat securities outside Pakistan<sup>1</sup> be withdrawn as it has interrupted certain normal operations in progress for reduction of State's overdrafts with these banks and that book loss to State



owing to downward tendency of Indian prices already exceeds Rs. 50,000. He assures me that no operation will be undertaken politically or financially disadvantageous to Pakistan without consulting me. I endorse his request and recommend that order be withdrawn to enable Kalat's financial business to be conducted in a changed way.

[C.A.G SAVIDGE]

Ikramullah had instructed the A.G.G. on 26 March 1948 to issue orders prohibiting banks from transferring funds or securities of Khan of Kalat out of Pakistan. See F. 14-GG/100. Not printed.

## PS-114

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs to A. D. F. Dundas*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/134*

SECRET  
No. 1283

KARACHI,  
9 April 1948

Your telegram 78-S April 5th.<sup>1</sup>

2. Government of Pakistan have sent you definite instructions vide Foreign telegram 1206 April 5th,<sup>2</sup> which seems to have crossed your telegram under reference.

3. As regards future administrative and political arrangements arising from the accession of Kalat, Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran your instructions are as follows:

- a. A.G.G's political control over Baluch-Brahui tribes and States will henceforth be exercised through a Political Agent for Baluch States and an Assistant Political Agent in Mekran. These officers will look after the interests of Pakistan in matters relevant to defence, foreign relations and communications. The Assistant Political Agent will also be in charge of political matters connected with the Mekran Levy Corps as well as arrangements for security of land and sea frontiers in that area including sea ports and landing grounds;
- b. Supervision by A.G.G. over the administration of the entire area will be exercised through *Wazir-i-Azam* of Kalat and *Wazirs* of Kharan, Mekran and Las Bela who will work under the general guidance of Political Agent in Mastung who will be responsible inter alia to see that the budgets of these States are properly balanced and their revenues are used to the best advantage of the Rulers and people;



c. At the request of the Nawab, responsibility for administration of Mekran has been assumed by the Government of Pakistan who will administer the country until such time as Nawab is ready to take over control. Assistant Political Agent Mekran will exercise general supervision over the administration. The *Wazir* of Mekran and its administrative staff will be appointed by A.G.G under the orders of the Government of Pakistan; and

d. Mekran and Chagai Levy Corps will be reorganized with a view to making them effective instruments of Pakistan's policy. They will henceforth have separate Commanding Officers of their own.

4. You should now work out details of administrative arrangements and staff in the light of these instructions and submit your proposal for the approval of the Government of Pakistan.

5. You should not go to Kalat at present. There is no objection to your sending substance of relevant portions of these telegrams to H.H the Khan and inviting him to Quetta to discuss with you if he so desires. You are, however, not to agree to or finalise any proposals received from H.H but report them to Government of Pakistan who will take such decision after considering them as they think fit.

<sup>1</sup>PS-110.

<sup>2</sup>PS-111.

## PS-115

*M. Ikramullah to A.D.F. Dundas*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/136*

SECRET  
No. 1284

KARACHI,  
9 April 1948

Your telegram 83-S April 7th.<sup>1</sup>

2. Telegram No. 1283 April 9th<sup>2</sup> and No. 1206 of 5th April<sup>3</sup> contain Government of Pakistan's instructions to you. They are, however, prepared to reconsider their decision in so far as your visit to Kalat is concerned. They are anxious not to embarrass you or His Highness in any way over this matter. If you have already finally accepted His Highness' invitation, then you should go to Kalat but in any discussion that may be held there you should adhere strictly to your instructions as contained in the two telegrams referred to above.

3. The Government of Pakistan have carefully considered the views expressed in your telegram under reference but they are unable to



accept them as your appreciation seems to be based on incomplete study of situation. You should, therefore, please adhere strictly to the instructions already imparted to you and report the results to Government. If necessary, you should be ready at short notice to come to Karachi for discussion.

4. After Government have received your reports, it will be open to His Highness to come to Karachi where you can assure him he will be welcome and any difficulty that may still remain, will be discussed at the highest level. You may assure him that arrangements arrived at will be satisfactory to both Pakistan and Kalat. Now that His Highness has already wholeheartedly and publicly announced that he is willing to serve Pakistan at this critical hour, there should be no difficulty in his personal participation in talks in Karachi.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-112.

<sup>2</sup>PS-114.

<sup>3</sup>PS-111.

## PS-116

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 14-GG/137-38*

KALAT,  
27 April 1948

My dear Quaid-[i]-Azam,

I have been helping you and the Muslim League for the last ten years to win Pakistan. During all this time, you have been like a father to me and you have been good enough to call me your son. You have been helping and advising me about my State's case during the British rule. Last year in March, when I met you in Bombay, you encouraged me to struggle for my rights and assured me your full support.

I was very grateful to you when you accepted the special position of Kalat State by recognizing its sovereign independent status in the beginning of August last year.<sup>1</sup> So long as you kept this case in your own hands, the honour of Kalat was secure and I had no fear. During all this time you were advising me to accede and assuring me that after accession Kalat's rights would be sympathetically considered by you. My policy was to bring Kalat into Pakistan in a position in keeping with the honour and traditions of the State. I was bringing the



tribes to accept this policy. It is for this reason that it took so long to complete the case between Pakistan and Kalat. Especially, when we met at Sibi, I made it plain to you that I was in duty bound to bring about the accession of Kalat to Pakistan on a firm and fair foundation. The only delay was due to the methods which I was following to secure the agreement of my people. But my and Kalat's enemies, who in reality are the enemies equally of Pakistan and Kalat, interpreted this delay as proof that I was in negotiation with some enemy of Pakistan. I trust that you will not believe this, because when we met during your visit to Sibi, you called me the best friend of Pakistan and said that I would never intrigue with any enemy of Pakistan, and, from your conversation, I was sure that you regarded me as a firm friend of Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Keeping your words in view, I agreed to the request of my *Sardars* that they should consult their tribes and give me their final reply within three months. I am very sorry that the enemies of myself and Kalat have taken advantage of this, on the one hand, to spoil our friendship and, on the other, to bring disgrace upon both Kalat and Pakistan. I can say that they have to some extent succeeded in their evil purpose. But, even now, I am not prepared to believe or listen to anyone who says that you, my old and revered friend and the well-wisher of Kalat, are really angry with me. I, on my side, am not prepared to risk annoying you. I feel it my duty to continue to serve Kalat and Pakistan in the way that you advise me is best.

Although my people have still not agreed to accept accession to Pakistan but prefer a treaty on terms, and press me for it, nevertheless, I cannot meet your wishes and remove your suspicions except by agreeing to accession.

I, therefore, confirm to you clearly that I agree to accession to Pakistan. But at the same time, I hope that you will consider all the claims and rights of Kalat which I have frequently presented to you, and which are borne out by the past history of Kalat. I am trusting in your good intentions and sense of fairness to preserve this ancient State of Kalat in same way as you have brought Pakistan into existence and, God willing, in your time Kalat will receive the position to which it is genuinely entitled. Trusting in God, I place this case in your hands and leave the decision to your judgement.

Yours affectionately,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>See Annex I to PS-66.

<sup>2</sup>On 29 April 1948, The Khan of Kalat assured Jinnah of his unquestioning loyalty, personal service, and commitment of the State resources to Pakistan. See F. 14-GG/143. Not printed.



## PS-117

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah**F. 14-GG/144*KALAT,  
4 May 1948

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

With a view to pay my respects to Your Excellency, I propose coming to Karachi for about a week, and would stay with Your Excellency and Miss Fatima Jinnah as your guest in case it is not inconvenient to you.

I wish to make it clear here that at this critical moment my heartfelt desire is only to see and try if I could be of any possible help either to Quaid-i-Azam or to Pakistan. I sincerely request Your Excellency not to worry about the affairs of Kalat at all. Kalat affairs can very well be left over for the time being, and can be discussed and decided between ourselves later on in a manner agreeable and at a time convenient to Your Excellency.<sup>1</sup>

At this particular moment, I feel that stability of Pakistan should be our first and foremost concern. I have throughout longed, strived and prayed to Almighty for the establishment and well-being of Pakistan, and now that times seem a bit hard I feel duty-bound to serve it and its architect practically to the best of my means and ability.

As it is difficult to get ample room in aeroplane these days, I intend coming by rail after the 12th instant on dates which may fit in with Your Excellency's programme and be convenient to Your Excellency.

I shall be accompanied by my *Wazir-i-Darbar* and two personal attendants.

In a day or two I shall be leaving for Quetta, and would, therefore, request for a telegraphic reply<sup>2</sup> to this letter there.

With kindest regards to Miss Fatima Jinnah and yourself,

Yours very sincerely,  
AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>See Annex

<sup>2</sup>Jinnah thanked the Khan of Kalat for his sentiments, regretting he was unable to receive him due to other commitments. See F. 14-GG/145. Not printed. However, the Khan did meet Jinnah on 28 May 1948. See PS-120 note 1.



*Annex to PS-117**Paul H. Alling to George Marshall**U. S. National Archives, F. 845.00/6-448*UNCLASSIFIED  
No. 248AMERICAN EMBASSY, KARACHI,  
4 June 1948

Subject: Political Developments in Baluchistan

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 304 of May 26, reporting the visit of the Governor-General of Pakistan to Quetta and to comment on the current political situation in Baluchistan.

As had been previously announced in the press, on May 25, Governor-General flew from Karachi to Quetta, accompanied by Miss Fatima Jinnah. It is understood that the primary reason for the Governor-General's trip is that he wishes to enjoy a rest and respite from the heat of Karachi.

As usual, Mr Jinnah and his sister are reported to have received a most effusive welcome upon their arrival at Quetta. An official press release states that over 50,000 people gathered at the airport. This would be more than the entire population of Quetta if true. There have been no reports as yet on how long Jinnah will stay at Quetta.

A secondary reason for Mr Jinnah's presence in Quetta may be the political situation in Baluchistan. A few stories have appeared in Karachi papers recently on "unsatisfactory" political conditions in Kalat State for the Muslim League. No doubt, it is also significant that Colonel A. S. B. Shah, Joint Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, has also gone to Quetta. It will be recalled that it was Colonel Shah who successfully negotiated for the accession of Kalat to Pakistan only a little over two months ago. Mr Jinnah's presence in Quetta at this time will probably be utilized to mediate between Baluchi political factions, particularly on the subject of new constitutional arrangements and tribal relations. Mr Jinnah announced in a Baluchi *darbar* in February, the Government of Pakistan interest to establish a Governor-General's Advisory Council for Baluchistan affairs of central concern.

There appear to be four principal cliques in Baluchi political circles, the court of the Khan of Kalat, the Baluchi *Shahi Jirga*, the Baluchistan Muslim League and the Kalat National Party.

The Khan of Kalat was none too anxious to accede to Pakistan, in part because of his unsettled claim to the leased district around Quetta. He received no territorial adjustments when he finally acceded on



March 27, and this may account for a certain amount of the anti-Pakistan sentiment evidenced in his State. In particular, it probably accounts for the successful "escape" of the Khan's younger brother and former Governor of Mekran, Abdul Karim, into Afghanistan (Shorawak district). Abdul Karim was known to have opposed the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. According to a May 27 A.P.I. report Abdul Karim was accompanied by "a dozen of his friends, including an editor and some customs officials" and took with him a truck load of ammunition, fire-arms, and rations. *Dawn's* Special Correspondent at Quetta on May 31 wrote that: "Knowledgeable quarters refuse to believe he could have escaped with a group of notorious anti-Pakistanis, arms, ammunition, animals, food rations, jewelry, and members of the ruling family without some official knowledge".

The Baluchistan *Shahi Jirga* or convocation is also none too satisfied with the accession to Pakistan. The tribal chiefs are worried about the evidently smaller role they will play if a constitution is adopted. They have to contend against both the Kalat National Party and the Baluchistan Muslim League, but at present they are realistically most concerned with the intentions of the Muslim League.

The Muslim Leaguers, led by Qazi Mohammed Isa, have recently taken the offensive against the *Shahi Jirga*, passing a resolution strongly critical of that institution and distributing "thousands" of copies to the public. An A.P.I. report of May 26 states: "Political observers here feel that the Muslim League wants to bring the defects of the tribal system before the public and after arousing public sentiments it wants its complete abolition."

The Kalat National Party or *Anjuman-i-Watan* is another group which opposes the Muslim League's plans for the further integration of Baluchistan into Center's sphere. In an editorial on June 2, *Dawn* complains editorially that "the Kalat National Party, a coterie of discredited political workers, known for its close associations with the Indian Congress in the past and for its more recent opposition to accession, has found favorable conditions for the continuance of its activities." The Party is said to be peddling "anti-non-mulki" (i.e. anti-foreign) slogans to rouse feelings in Kalat against Pathans and Mekranis. *Dawn* goes on to wonder if this could happen without the connivance of State officials and calls for a purging of disloyal elements from the State administration—in particular Mr D. Y. Fell, a British subject and alleged opponent of accession, who is now Deputy [*sic*] Premier and "Foreign Minister", a designation which especially irks *Dawn*.

The National Party long worked for the introduction of more responsible government in Kalat, a project which brought them into



conflict with the Khan. When the accession question came up, however, the Party and the Khan found themselves on common ground against the League. On March 15, however, even before accession had been decided upon, Khan Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, President of the *Anjuman-i-Watan* and one of the founding members of the All-Pakistan People's Party (now the Pakistan People's Organization), was arrested under the Baluchistan Public Safety Ordinance. Subsequently he had been released, subject to a five-mile restriction on his movements. He is no doubt still one of the "disruptive elements" in Pakistan against which *Dawn* has been campaigning.

So far the only announced action taken by the Government of Pakistan to counteract the operation of anti-accession forces in Baluchistan is the decision to appoint a Political Agent for Kalat to look after the three acceded subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. The post of Political Agent in Kalat has been left vacant since the end of British suzerainty, though there has been a Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan, Mr Savidge. It is reported that the Kalat Political Agent will also tend to the affairs of Mekran, Kharan and Las Bela States and will carry the anomalous designation of "President, Baluch States". Khan Bahadur Sher Zaman Khan, at present Political Agent for the Chagai District and a former Prime Minister of Kalat, is mentioned as the likely nominee to the combined posts. It appears that the revival of this device for direct outside supervision over Baluchi affairs is one result of the Governor-General's present visit to Quetta and a further example of Mr Jinnah's constant efforts to stiffen the hold of the Government of Pakistan in those very regions where provincial loyalties remain the strongest.

Respectfully yours,  
PAUL H. ALLING

PS-118

*Ruler of Kalat to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/146*

[QUETTA,]  
7 May 1948

I understand that orders have been received from Karachi that Assistant Political Agent, Mekran, should ask my *Wazir* to transfer his office to Assistant Political Agent. The transfer of administration partially



in this manner will create serious administrative and political difficulties which I should like to avoid. I, therefore, strongly request that no such proposal should be implemented<sup>1</sup> until we have discussed this matter together at the meeting proposed in my letter<sup>2</sup> dated May fourth. I assure Your Excellency that I am anxious to find a solution which will meet all the requirements of Pakistan in this region. With kindest regards.

[AHMAD YAR KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>F. Amin informed the Khan telegraphically on 11 May 1948 that Jinnah could not interfere with the policy and programme that were to be carried out. See F. 14-GG/147. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>PS-117.

## PS-119

*Announcement by the Ruler of Kalat*  
*Kalat Papers, F. 70*  
*[Original in Urdu]*

KALAT,  
 24 May 1948

Prince Mir Abdul Karim Khan has shifted his residence to Sarlath (Afghanistan) apparently under instigation of some miscreants who are certainly not the well-wishers of Kalat.<sup>1</sup>

This action on the part of the Prince is without my knowledge and is wholly unauthorized, being against the State's interest and policy. Except for impairing the State's interests it will serve no useful purpose. The State subjects are directed to keep away from him, have no truck with him, and desist to help him in any manner. Those found in league with him should be arrested forthwith and produced before the Prime Minister of Kalat.

AHMAD YAR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>See Annex. Also see Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism & Soviet Temptations*, Washington, DC, 1981, 25-6.

### *Annex to PS-119*

*Summary<sup>1</sup> of anti-Pakistan activities of Prince Abdul Karim*  
*Narrated by D.Y. Fell, Prime Minister, Kalat*

Pakistan Government reported during negotiations in March, 1948 that anti-Pakistan feelings were on the rise in Mekran.<sup>2</sup> Prince Abdul



Karim, Governor of Mekran, brother of Khan of Kalat, was quickly recalled by the Khan and replaced by Sardar Behram Khan Lahri,<sup>3</sup> Revenue Minister of Kalat. Prince Karim returned in a disgruntled frame of mind, bringing with him the contents of the Mekran treasury.

Maj. Mir Haider, Police Chief of Mekran, in Command of one platoon of the State forces, followed him. Fleeing Pakistan, he settled down along with "his followers about three miles inside the Afghan border opposite Kirdagap" and did his "best to stir up mischief." He formed a free Baluch government with cabinet ministers and officials and so on in his little camp. They attempted, though unsuccessfully, to stir up the tribes in Kalat and Baluchistan.

Quetta was particularly full of "rumours" that Abdul Karim was being instigated by the Khan or kept supplied with by him or being somehow or other instigated by Fell or anyone else prominent enough. Such "reports were skillfully used by persons high up in the Pakistan Government who were afraid of the Khan and of my influence over him to suggest to Jinnah that the Kalat Government was up to some form of mischief and the A.G.G. was unable to compete with this propaganda."<sup>5</sup>

The Pakistan Government was apparently unwilling or unable to secure Afghan cooperation in the removal of Abdul Karim from the border.<sup>6</sup> He was, however, sitting in a desert and was dependent for supplies for his camp on what he could get smuggled out for him by his sympathisers in Nuskhi, Quetta or the State itself.<sup>7</sup> For security reasons two platoons of the Zhob militia, a highly trained and efficient force of troops, were posted close to the frontier opposite to Abdul Karim's camp<sup>8</sup> which also helped in cutting out the source of supplies.

The root of the trouble was that the Pakistan Government believed the Khan supported Abdul Karim. The difficulty always was that in areas where there was virtually no Hindu-Muslim problem, such as the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, the Muslim League tended to consist of agitators and others interested in the grievances of the lower classes. It liked to kid itself that it was a universally popular movement and consequently tended to accuse<sup>9</sup> all those who showed signs of disagreeing with it of some kind of self-interest and dishonest conspiracy. It could not admit the possibility that a number of people had fled to Abdul Karim from motives of conscience. They must have been corrupted and who could have corrupted them except the Khan? From this point they said that if the Khan was loyal he should offer to prove his loyalty by recalling Abdul Karim, and this was repeatedly pressed upon the A.G.G. The fact was that Abdul Karim had crossed the border against the Khan's wishes and in rebellion against the Khan.<sup>10</sup> To suggest that the Khan could recall him by sending emissaries to Abdul



Karim was unrealistic.

The A.G.G. saw this but was eventually badgered by the Pakistan Government to insist on the Khan's sending to recall<sup>11</sup> Karim and he begged Fell not to stand any longer in the way of this move.

"The Baluchi's aspirations for independence [were] as I thought them to be impracticable and premature".<sup>12</sup> The contest was, in fact, between political extremists who desired to secure as much disorder as possible, knowing very well that such disorder would bring no benefit to the people but hoping that it would so embitter their fellows as to make orderly government difficult and finally impossible.

<sup>1</sup>See notes 4-12 below.

<sup>2</sup>PS-90.

<sup>3</sup>See F. 14-GG/142. Not printed.

<sup>4</sup>See Fell, *Memoirs*, 268.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 269.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 270.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 271.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 272.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 282.

## PS-120

*Ruler of Kalat to C. A. G. Savidge*

*F. 216 (Vol. V)-GG/4-5*

AIWAN-I-KALAT, QUETTA  
[Undated May 1948]

My dear Friend,

I have just arrived from Kalat.

I have to pay my respects to the Governor-General. Will you kindly let me know what time will it be convenient to H[is] E[xcellency] to give the honour of doing so.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
KHAN OF KALAT

<sup>1</sup>F. Amin informed the Khan on 26 May 1948 that Jinnah would be glad to receive him on 28 May at the Residency. A confirmation was requested. See F. 216-GG/6. Not printed.



## PS-121

*A.S.B. Shah to I. I. Chundrigar<sup>1</sup>**Telegram, F. 14-GG/152*

IMMEDIATE

CAMP QUETTA,  
29 May 1948My telegram No. 126-S May 29th,<sup>2</sup> Abdul Karim.

2. We are enquiring about particulars of his party which is reported to be consisting of fifteen men. We will send you this information when available. Meanwhile, please inform Afghan Government that these individuals are likely to cause mischief against Pakistan and ask them they be removed from the border and security taken from them for good behaviour.

[A.S.B. SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-122

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Kalat**F. 14-GG/151*CAMP QUETTA,  
5 June 1948

No. 73-GG (c)

My dear Khan of Kalat,

Thank you for your letter dated the 29th of May 1948.<sup>1</sup>

I thank you for your courtesy call and I was glad to see you.

Let me make it clear to you, as I did during our short interview, that neither the Pakistan Government nor I are prepared to discuss the decisions that have already been taken. They stand as they are, and I do not wish you to remain under any impression or hope that any of those questions can in any way be open to any discussion whatsoever.

I am glad that you are going back with a determination to look after your State affairs and its administration, and I do hope that you will loyally, honestly and wholeheartedly co-operate with the Pakistan



Government and Baluchistan administration which you know is under my control and directions under the existing law.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>The Khan of Kalat had in this letter thanked Jinnah for meeting him. See F. 14-GG/150. Not printed.

## PS-123

*A. S. B. Shah to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/153*

IMMEDIATE

QUETTA,  
7 July 1948

Reference Foreign Express Letter to Parep F 6(25)-F/48 June 11th regarding Shahzada Abdul Karim and party.<sup>1</sup>

2. Abdul Karim with a varying number of followers is still encamped near Samand Khan Karez in Shorawak a few miles from Pakistan border and continues to carry on objectionable anti-Pakistan activities. Effective measures have been taken to deal with any raids he might try according to information received into our districts or Kalat State and no serious difficulty is anticipated in dealing with this particular aspect of matter. His presence so near border, however, keeps even a number of our Militia tied down in the area and provokes an undesirable feeling of unrest amongst the tribes on our border and in Kalat. Coercive and other measures taken to secure his return have so far been infructuous and there is little likelihood of his coming back voluntarily in near future. Afghan authorities have apparently not given him encouragement and assistance so far but it is now essential that they should remove him and his followers to a safe distance from border and take steps to ensure that he does not disturb the peace of border. Alternatively, they should put pressure on him to return to Kalat.<sup>2</sup>


3. Grateful if further urgent and strong representations are made to Afghan Government on the lines suggested above.

[A.S.B SHAH]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>On 12-13 July 1948, after a brief military operation in which one miscreant was killed, Abdul Karim Khan agreed to accompany the *Wazir-i-Azam*, Kalat, peacefully; 50 of his followers were disarmed and taken under escort to Kalat. See F. 14-GG/160-2. Not printed.





*Jinnah, Ahmad Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat and Fatima Jinnah.*





*Jinnah with Ahmed Yar Khan, Khan of Kalat.*



KHAIRPUR STATE



## PS-124

*Mahomedali Talpur to M. A. Jinnah**F. 8-GG/1-2*

URGENT/CONFIDENTIAL

22 CURZON ROAD, NEW DELHI,  
8 August 1947Your Excellency,  
*Assalaamo 'Alaikum*

I beg to offer my hearty congratulations to you on the achievement of Pakistan and your proposed appointment as its first Governor-General. May God grant you long life and good health to guide the destiny of the Indian Muslims. I would like to see the day when Your Excellency gives a lead to the Muslims of the world.

2. The State of Khairpur is a part of Pakistan. Its Ruler,<sup>1</sup> who was not of a sound mind, has been deposed<sup>2</sup> by H.E the Crown Representative on the 19th July 1947, and his young and minor son, Prince Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur, has been installed on the 24th July 1947.

3. The Political Department has made mess of the affairs of Khairpur. The Secretary<sup>3</sup> to the Resident for the Punjab States was promised a job in the State and he has therefore been made a tool by the *Sahibzadas* who want to exploit the State. There is great danger to the life of the minor Ruler as the question of vested interests and the *Gaddi* of Khairpur is involved. I have sent a representation<sup>4</sup> to His Excellency the Crown Representative but I doubt whether the interested parties will allow it to reach him. The sympathies of the Political Dept. lie in the other direction for reasons which I cannot fully submit in this letter.

4. Your Excellency has more than once declared your policy so far as the Indian States are concerned. My enemies and their supporters want to take advantage of the situation. They want that the matter should not be reviewed until 15th August 1947, and after the paramountcy lapses, Your Excellency will not interfere in the internal affairs of Khairpur. I have now no other alternative but to appeal to Your Excellency kindly to get the unjust orders of the Political Department reversed. I make this appeal in the name of Islam and humanity. Your Excellency alone can save the life of the minor Ruler of Khairpur and save the Khairpur State from being exploited by a gang of selfish persons.

5. I had written<sup>5</sup> to Your Excellency's Private Secretary for an interview in Delhi but I think it could not be granted on account of numerous engagements and pressure of work.



6. A copy of my representation, which I have sent to H.E the Crown Representative, is submitted herewith<sup>6</sup> for favour of Your Excellency's perusal. Their Highness[es] the Rulers of Bhopal and Dholpur are fully acquainted with the affairs of Khairpur and the justice of my cause but unfortunately both of them are in hot water now on account of reasons which must be within Your Excellency's knowledge.

I beg to remain,  
Your Excellency's most obedient servant,  
MAHOMEDALI TALPUR  
*Heir-Presumptive of Khairpur*

<sup>1</sup>Mir Faiz Muhammad Khan Talpur.

<sup>2</sup>See No. 189, Vol. III, 479-80.

<sup>3</sup>Not identified.

<sup>4</sup>See F. 8-GG/3-10. Not printed.

<sup>5&6</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-125

### *Instrument of Accession of Khairpur State*<sup>1</sup>

[KARACHI,]  
9 October 1947

The Ruler of Khairpur State signed the Instrument of Accession with Pakistan on 3 October 1947 and accepted by the Governor-General of Pakistan on 9 October 1947. A Supplementary Instrument of Accession was also signed on 1 February 1949 and accepted by the Governor-General of Pakistan on 14 February 1949.

<sup>1</sup>See *Instruments of Accession*, 8-10 and 11-12.

## PS-126

KHAIRPUR STATE PEOPLE DEMAND FULL RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT<sup>1</sup>

That the people of Khairpur would not be satisfied unless full responsible Government is introduced in Khairpur State was the declaration made by Mr Ghulam Rasool Siddiqui, Joint Secretary of the Zimindars Association, Khairpur, an affiliated body of the States Muslim League, at a press conference, held in Karachi on Wednesday.

Mr Siddiqui has been sent to Karachi by the Association to seek the intervention of the Pakistan Government and the Pakistan States Muslim



League for the establishment of a democratic administration in the State.

Mr Siddiqui said that there was great dissatisfaction with the present administration which was conducted by the Regency Board,<sup>2</sup> consisting of five *Sahibzadas* and the Executive Council of three. There was corruption and bribery in the administration which, he alleged, was suppressing all popular movements.

He stated that the Ruling family had doubled its allowance and the Chairman of the Regency Board had appointed his son as the Secretary of the Executive Council, his nephew as an Inspector-General of Police and his son in law as a Sessions Judge.

Under the Registration of Association Act, the formation of the States Muslim League had been prohibited and it was not possible to form any political or quasi-political organization in the State.

He further alleged that within seven months of its taking charge the present Government had reduced a cash balance of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- into a deficit and all nation building activities had come to a stand-still. Technically, too, the State had received a set-back by the retrenchment of over 100 teachers.

The next elections in the State were due in May [1948] and though they are to be held under adult franchise, only 30,000 out of total population of 400,000 had been enrolled as voters. A number of political workers, including several League leaders, have been excluded from the electoral roll.

<sup>1</sup>The *Dawn*, 1 April 1948.

<sup>2</sup>See Annex

*Annex to PS-126*

*F. 8-GG/11-2*

*14 July 1947*

*The Khairpur State Gazette, Extraordinary issue*

The following Act passed by the Khairpur *Darbar* is hereby published for general information.

THE KHAIRPUR STATE REGENCY ACT OF 1947, ACT NO. IX OF 1947

Whereas it is expedient to provide for a Board of Regency during the inability of His Highness the Mir Sahib Bahadur, Ruler of Khairpur State, for any reason, to exercise the powers of the Ruler it is hereby enacted as follows:

1. This Act may be cited as the Khairpur State Regency Act No. IX of 1947.

2. It extends to the whole of the Khairpur State and it shall come into force on the 10th July, 1947, and continue until the Ruler is able to exercise the powers of the Ruler.



3. For so long as this Act is in force there shall be a Board of Regency consisting of the following principal *Sahibzadas*:

- a. Mir Mahomedali Khan Talpur
- b. Mir Ghulam Hasan Khan Talpur
- c. Mir Ali Dino Khan Talpur
- d. Haji Mir Ghulam Husain Khan Talpur
- e. Haji Mir Khan Muh[amma]d Khan Talpur

In case of the demise of any of the above-mentioned *Sahibzadas*, his eldest male descendant in the male line of descent shall take his place provided he has attained the age of 21 years.

4. The express approval of the *Darbar* contemplated by section 11 of the Khairpur State Government Act, 1947, shall not be accorded in regard to clause (a) and (e) of that section without previous consultation with the Board of Regency.

5. The Chairman of the Board of Regency shall be the President of the Council for the purpose of both clauses (2) and (3) of section 3 of the Khairpur State Government Act.

6. The Board of Regency shall be the legal guardian of the Ruler.

7. In case of the Ruler becoming permanently incapable of exercising the powers of the Ruler, a joint meeting of the Board of Regency and the *Darbar* shall decide the action to be taken. The meeting shall be presided over by the Chairman of the Board of Regency who will have only one vote to be exercised in case of equality of votes. The meeting shall not be adjourned without the majority of members present voting for it.

#### RULES OF BUSINESS

1. There shall be a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall be elected by rotation and shall hold office for a period of 12 months. In the absence of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman shall preside.

2. The decisions of the Board of Regency including a decision to adjourn shall be recorded by a simple majority vote. In case of a tie, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.

3. The Chairman, and in his absence the Vice-Chairman shall have power to summon the Board of Regency as and when required, to fix places and times for their sitting and to employ such staff as may be necessary for the recording and communication of their decisions to the *Darbar*.

IJAZ ALI  
President,  
Council of Administration,  
Khairpur State



KHARAN STATE



## PS-127

*Mir Nazar Khan & Others to M. A. Jinnah*<sup>1</sup>

*Telegram, F. 14-GG/18-9*

NUSHKI,  
13 August 1947

We the inhabitants of Jahawan [Jhalawan] *Niabat* of Kharan State are ready to sacrifice anything for Pakistan as an independent State. We hope that Pakistan would admit our independence. Nawab Kharan is the Nawab of the State. We do not want the slavery of anyone else.

[MIR NAZAR KHAN & OTHERS]

<sup>1</sup>The telegram mentioned a total of thirty-eight senders. See No. F. 14-GG/19-20. Not printed.

## PS-128

*Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (5)-GG/1*

NUSHKI,  
21 August 1947

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Governor-General, Pakistan, Karachi

British transferred power to Pakistan on 15th August 1947. I recently [22 July 1947] interviewed Quaid-i-Azam in Delhi regarding Kharan State's future. Called a conference today the 19th of August 1947 of all the leaders and *Mo'tabars* of Kharan State people to take their advice for the future of Kharan State. The leaders and *Mo'tabars* and all the public of Kharan State gave their written decision in final as follows: I announce on behalf of myself and my subjects that Kharan State recognizes itself as an independent State as usual and joins Pakistan Dominion as its suzerian [suzerain] and promises to serve Pakistan up to its extent [*sic*]. Request Pakistan help and cooperation for Kharan State.

[MIR MOHAMMAD HABIBULLAH KHAN]



## PS-129

*Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah*

F. 124 (5)-GG/5-6

[Original in Urdu]

KHARAN,

12 November 1947

Kind and respected Quaid-i-Azam,

It is a matter of great satisfaction for me to learn that the Pakistan Government has directed the Provincial Government of Baluchistan to issue food supplies to Kharan State directly, in line with the past practice.

The resumption of food supplies after a 3-month interruption, during which my subjects had to face hardship, is reassuring and I beg to convey my sincerest thanks. I may submit that during this difficult period, the Kalat State unsuccessfully tried to drive a wedge in our relations with Pakistan Government.

I would like to make it clear that my State will never submit to the dictates of the Kalat State and will continue to oppose any moves aimed at an interference in the State's freedom to act. *Insha Allah*, my State will accede to Pakistan independently and will be prepared to offer all sacrifices for the cause of Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,

MIR MOHAMMAD HABIBULLAH KHAN

## PS-130

*Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah*

F. 124 (5)-GG/2-4

[Original in Urdu]

KHARAN, BALUCHISTAN,

18 November 1947

Respected and kind Quaid-i-Azam,

*Assalaamo 'Alaikum*

As explained before you on several occasions and, in the light of historical reasons, it is no longer possible to bear with the undue



interference in the affairs of Kharan State from Kalat.<sup>1</sup> It is a fact that whenever Kalat has acted maliciously in the past, a befitting response from Kharan was always forthcoming. It is quite fresh in my memory that the Kalat's aggression against Kharan in 1939, in connivance with the British Government, was successfully repulsed.

However, following the lapse of the British paramountcy, Kharan repudiated the supremacy of Kalat and acceded to Pakistan. This has created an explosive situation with Kalat, and I have requested Pakistan more than once to take stern action against that State. Since Kharan is committed to maintain peace and observe patience, I have refrained from responding to the open provocation of Kalat State. As a trusted friend, I consider it necessary to inform you that Kalat has recently started arming some of the mischief-mongers among the Kharanis, besides doling out money and cloth to these elements. Apparently, the motive behind these actions seems to create law and order situation in the Pakistan-controlled areas and thus multiply the difficulties for Pakistan. But the Kharan Government is fully determined to punish these elements. However, in case of an armed clash the responsibility will squarely lie with Kalat.

The positive attitude of Pakistan has fortified Kharan's determination to contribute to the strength of Pakistan as also to seek help in case of need. Kharan enjoyed the support of entire Pakistani Baluchistan in general and the eminent *nawabs* and *sardars* in particular. I am confident that the Provincial Government of Baluchistan will also extend their full support to Kharan under a special directive of Government of Pakistan.

Hope you are enjoying good health,

Yours sincerely,

MIR MOHAMMAD HABIBULLAH KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Kalat regarded Kharan as its part since the Chief of Kharan was one of the Sardars of Kalat and, therefore, a subject of the State. However, the Chief of Kharan did enjoy a measure of internal autonomy.



## PS-131

*Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah**F. 124 (5)-GG/10-3**[Original in Urdu]*KHARAN, BALUCHISTAN,  
1 December 1947

Most gracious H. E Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan. May you live in peace.

*Assalaamo 'Alaikum*

In a meeting with the Agent to the Governor-General on 27 November 1947, although I had verbally made it quite clear that the status of Kharan State had remained that of a separate and completely independent entity and free from any sort of interference from Kalat, yet to emphasise this point further, the following is hereby submitted:

That, before the advent of the British, Kharan was under the influence of Afghanistan. It was in 1883 that it got delinked from Afghanistan and accepted the British paramountcy. Since then it continued to receive an allowance of Rs. 6,000 per year right up to 15th of August 1947, in lieu of the allowance that it used to have from the Govt. of Afghanistan. Thus for the last 63 years, Kharan continued to be an independent State under the British paramountcy.

Unfortunately, it has always been the ambition of Kalat to forcibly subjugate the Kharan State, the wish that was never fulfilled. In 1939, Kalat launched an armed attack on Kharan to force it to formally submit to Kalat's hegemony, but none of the *sardars*, including Mir Azad Khan, Nauroze Khan and Yaqub Khan accepted its authority nor will we ever do.

After 15 August 1947, Kharan is absolutely an independent State. It has decided to accede to Pakistan. However, whether Kharan joins Pakistan or remains outside, this much is clear that it will never, in any way, accept Kalat's hegemony.

After Kharan delinked from Afghanistan if it ever accepted the paramountcy of any power it was only that of the British crown. It looked absurd to simultaneously accept Kalat's *sardari* and the British paramountcy.

It is stated that a reference to Baluchistan District Gazetteer series would amply prove that Kharan had no political link with Kalat even before the advent of the British rule—it was part of Afghanistan. If at



all some change had taken place in the status of Kharan during the British rule, it did not affect the post-15 August 1947 position. I am not prepared to accept that Sardar Azad Khan had recognized the Khan of Kalat as his *Sardar* at the forum of Brohi Confederacy, during the tenure of office of Sir Robert Sandeman. Had it been so, his successors like Mir Nauroz Khan, Mir Yaqub Khan and myself would have definitely continued to associate with the Brohi Confederacy.

Today, when 10 crore Muslims of India are embarking upon writing a new chapter in history, Kalat is contemplating to become independent and the Khan is manipulating to become a king. Thus there is no logic that Kharan should be enslaved against its wishes.

Hope your kind-self is maintaining good health.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,  
MIR MOHAMMAD HABIBULLAH KHAN  
*Khan Saheb Nosherwani*

PS-132

*Ruler of Kharan to M. A. Jinnah*

F. 124 (11)-GG/17-9

[Original in Urdu]

MEKRAN HOUSE, JAMSHED ROAD,  
TATA COLONY, KARACHI,  
9 March 1948

Respected and most affectionate, His Exalted, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah,

It gave me very great pleasure to meet Your Excellency on the 4th of March. I was all the more pleased to learn that the Government of Pakistan were going to take a decision to strengthen the bonds that existed between Kharan State and Pakistan. In the course of our conversation, Your Excellency held out the hope that a decisive stage would be reached within the next four or six days.

Today, I tried to get some information about the progress of the case from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pakistan Government but their expression of ignorance about the matter caused me a lot of anxiety. Your Excellency knows fully well that I have been in Karachi for the last 1.5 months. Small-pox is raging in my State in epidemic form and two of my daughters are laid up with it. I myself am a



chronic invalid. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for me to undertake the long and tedious journey to Karachi again without much discomfort.

As desired by Your Excellency, I will stay on in Karachi up to the 12th instant and would seek your permission to return to my State on the 13th of March. It would be better if the matter is finalized during my stay in Karachi,<sup>1</sup> otherwise I would leave my Foreign Secretary at Karachi, if necessary. I have, with Your Excellency's permission, informed the Jam Sahib of Las Bela about it and I hope he would also come here in a day or two.

Hope that this would find Your Excellency in the best of health and spirits.

Yours sincerely,  
MIR MOHAMMAD HABIBULLAH KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Jinnah, while acknowledging this letter on 12 March 1948 stated: "It is receiving my attention and I will communicate with you further in the matter". See F. 124 (11)-GG/20. Not printed.

## PS-133

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Geoffrey Prior*

*Telegram, F. 20-GG/13*  
*(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*

KARACHI,  
17 March 1948

Kharan,<sup>1</sup> Las Bela and Mekran applied for accession today<sup>2</sup> and accession of all three was accepted.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For the text of Instrument of Accession, see *Instruments of Accession*, 19-21.

<sup>2</sup>See Annex

<sup>3</sup>Fell informed the Khan that "Pakistan were contemplating dismembering the State by accepting separate alliances (?) from Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran." The Khan, however, doubted that Jinnah would approve of such a move in disregard of his obligations to him. See Fell, *Memoirs*, 85-6.



*Annex to PS-133**Paul H. Alling<sup>1</sup> to George Marshall**U. S. National Archives, F. 845. 00/3-2348**[Extract]*

No. 135

KARACHI,  
23 March 1948

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch No. 113 of March 10, 1948 with regard to the opposition of the Ruler of Kalat and certain other elements in that Baluchistan State to accession to Pakistan, and to inform the Department that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on March 18 that Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran, feudatory states of Kalat, had applied for accession to Pakistan on March 17 and that the accession of all three had been accepted.

The action of these feudatory states in acceding to Pakistan reduced the size of Kalat by more than one half, cutting that State off completely from the coast and leaving it largely isolated. As mentioned in the Embassy's despatch of March 10, the Rulers of Kharan and Las Bela had for some time been toying with the idea of acceding to Pakistan irrespective of the decision of the Khan of Kalat. Apparently growing weary of the indecision of the latter, they concluded that they could tarry no longer and so, joined by Mekran, they acceded to Pakistan without further consultation with the Ruler of Kalat.

The reaction of the latter was, as might be expected, extremely unfavorable. The Khan took the position that the action of these three feudatories of Kalat was a violation of the Standstill Agreement which had been entered into with Pakistan on the creation of Pakistan in August 1947. He expressed the view that not only was the action of the three feudatories in applying to Pakistan for accession illegal but that Pakistan's acceptance of their accession was likewise illegal.

In a telegram to the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Khan stated that his Government's attention had been drawn to a Radio Pakistan report that the Pakistan Government had "accepted the accession of Kalat's two feudatories, Las Bela and Kharan and the District of Mekran" and requested "that this report should be immediately and publicly denied." The Khan said that relations between Kalat and Pakistan were under negotiation with a view to a satisfactory settlement, that a formal approach to the Government of Pakistan was under



preparation, and that the Kalat Government must protest strongly against any action in anticipation of that event. With regard to Mekran, the Khan took the position that this feudatory was in actuality a district of Kalat State and had no separate status. Las Bela and Kharan were feudatories of Kalat whose foreign policy was placed under the control of the Kalat Government by the British Government in July 1947, prior to partition. The Khan then asserted that "the Rulers of these two States have attempted to evade this control by application for separate recognition from Pakistan. Pakistan has hitherto refused this recognition and has offered to recognize Kalat control formally in consideration for Kalat's accession to Pakistan, a subject which is now under negotiation."

It was reported at that time that Kalat's British Foreign Minister, Mr D. Y. Fell, had also telegraphed to Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is now in the United States, protesting against the acceptance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran. The telegram added that "Kalat desires to reach a satisfactory solution with Pakistan by negotiation, and the Government have taken no decision for or against accession and will take no decision until you have yourself discussed the matter formally with Kalat representatives."

In a second press statement issued on March 20, the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to the protest of the Khan's Government and said that it was incorrect that the Government of Pakistan was, as alleged, bent upon taking precipitate or unilateral action. The fact was, the statement said, that the Rulers of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran had been negotiating with the Government of Pakistan for many months on the question of their accession and that the question had many times been discussed with the Kalat authorities since the creation of Pakistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Khan had indicated to Mr Jinnah during the course of the latter's recent visit to Baluchistan that he had decided to accede to Pakistan and that his decision would be formally and finally communicated by the end of February. However, on March 4, the Khan had informed Mr Jinnah that he desired more time to consider the matter. "Meantime," the statement continued, "the administrative situation was rapidly deteriorating in all of these States and trouble was being created in Baluchistan by interested persons. It was therefore considered by the Pakistan Government that further delay was not in the best interest of the people of the States or Pakistan. They therefore accepted the accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran on March 17. The Pakistan Government will await with friendly interest the proposals which Kalat State intends to send."



In an effort to arrive at a prompt and satisfactory understanding with the Ruler of Kalat, on the accession issue, the Government of Pakistan sent Col. A. S. B. Shah, Joint Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Quetta on March 21 to discuss the problem with the Ruler. It is interesting to note in that connection that Col. Shah was accompanied by Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan, Prime Minister of Kalat, who recently came to Karachi and at that time was reported as being unlikely to return to Kalat because of his disagreement with the Ruler on the subject of accession.

It was reported in the press on March 21 that the Kalat *Aiwan-i-Khas*, or "House of Lords" would probably meet on March 25 "to consider the new situation that has arisen from Pakistan's acceptance of the accession of the States of Mekran, Kharan and Las Bela". As mentioned in the Embassy's despatch of March 10, the majority of members of this House have appeared to be in favor of accession.

In an editorial on March 22 newspaper *Dawn* said that "the accession to Pakistan of the States of Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran, members of the loose Kalat Confederacy, is an indication of their rulers' sense of realism and is in complete accord with the wishes of the people of these territories." The editorial went on to say that their "patriotic act" isolates the Khan of Kalat whose delay in making up his own mind as to his State's future "has been unhelpful to all concerned, including himself. If His Highness now finds his position somewhat unenviable he has been the architect thereof." The editorial said that it would of course have been best if the confederacy as a whole had acceded to Pakistan simultaneously but that "the progress of the three States whose Rulers knew their minds could not be held up because the Ruler of the fourth State preferred to temporize." The editorial continued that the constitutional position of the latter as the nominal head of the confederacy was never recognized as being so strong as to permit it to cut through the independence of choice of the other three Rulers on the question of accession. Harping on the issue and splitting hairs about it would not help His Highness of Kalat, the editorial remarked.

In as much as the Khan of Kalat, in protesting against the accession of the three States to Pakistan, had simultaneously sent a copy of his protest to the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, *Dawn* took occasion in that connection to say in its editorial that "appeals to the British Commonwealth office and looking to such sources for inspiration will avail His Highness little. These quarters cannot possibly contemplate intervention in a sphere over which they have expressly abandoned jurisdiction." The editorial concluded with the hope that the Khan would "brush aside idle and wishful prompting by



interested persons and ask for immediate accession, thus becoming an honored partner in the free and independent life of the largest Muslim State.

Respectfully yours,  
PAUL H. ALLING

<sup>1</sup>US Ambassador to Pakistan.



LAS BELA STATE



## PS-134

*Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 286/48*

SIND SECRETARIAT, KARACHI,  
*16 July 1947*

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

The Jam Sahib of Las Bela and the Nawab Sahib of Kharan had been to me. They told me that they are prepared to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, and they wish to have an interview with you in that connection. They have also wired to you to this effect.

Kindly let me know what I should tell them as urgently as you can.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
GHULAM HUSSAIN

## PS-135

*Ahmad Khan Jamote to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 20-GG/3*

KARACHI,  
*18 July 1947*

## RESOLUTION BY THE LAS BELA STATE NATIONAL PARTY

A meeting of the Working Committee of the Las Bela State National Party, Karachi, was held on 18-7-47, where the following resolution was passed.

## RESOLUTION

This meeting views with grave concern the reported move of the Ruler of Las Bela State either for declaring himself independent or joining any of the two Dominions, without consulting the subjects and the political organization. It is also understood that he is determined to maintain his autocracy even if he joins any of the Dominions or declares himself independent.

This meeting advises the Ruler of State to consult the people before taking any such move in the matter, and also to take steps to install a



representative government in the State. This meeting also requests the two Dominions not to negotiate with the State Ruler on his own initiative, without consulting the people and the political organization's interest with [sic] the people of State.

This meeting calls upon the Agent to the Governor-General,<sup>1</sup> Baluchistan, to clarify the position of Las Bela State *vis-a-vis* the position of Khan of Kalat before parting with power.

This meeting hereby warns the State Ruler and any other authority interested into [sic] the administration of Las Bela State, to consult at every step the people of State and install a representative government in the State before 15th August 1947, else the people of the State will by-pass and ignore the authorities and fit themselves into a Constitution [sic] according to their wishes and welfare.

AHMAD KHAN JAMOTE  
General Secretary,  
Las Bela State National Party

<sup>1</sup>Geoffrey Prior.

## PS-136

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 703/4*

MAIDEN'S HOTEL, DELHI,  
28 July 1947

Respected Quaid-i-Azam,

I realize that your time is so precious that it is a crime to encroach on it.

I am [for] only one day more in Delhi and I want to go to Las Bela and tell my people that the leader of Pakistan has expressed sympathy for this small Islamic State of Las Bela.

Therefore, it is very important for me to meet you before leaving Delhi.<sup>1</sup> Fix any time you like but do kindly grant me a short interview and oblige.

Respectfully yours for ever,  
GHULAM QADIR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Jinnah had been informed by a correspondent on 19 July that the Nawab of Kharan and the Jam Sahib of Las Bela were intending to create friction between Pakistan and Kalat. See No. 200, Vol. III, 544.



## PS-137

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Las Bela**F. 703/3**28 July 1947*

Dear Jam Sahib,

I have received your letter of 28th July 1947<sup>1</sup> and I am extremely sorry that I am unable to see you again in Delhi, as you know I am very much pressed with work that is immediately in hand.

I heard all that you had to say and your position *vis-a-vis* Kalat State and I informed you that it was not possible for me to express any opinion unless I had time to examine your relationship with Kalat.<sup>2</sup> I was very glad to see you and thanked you for your good wishes for Pakistan. Beyond that I am not in a position to say anything at present.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>PS-136.<sup>2</sup>See PS-49.

## PS-138

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah**F. 20-GG/1*

ARMA-BAIL,  
GARDEN EAST, KARACHI,  
*18 August 1947*

My dear Quaid-i-Azam Sahib,

I give you my heartiest congratulation on this happy day of 'Id and extend to you congratulation[s] on behalf of my subjects of Las Bela State on the independence day of Pakistan, and we have confidence that under your leadership Pakistan will become one of the most powerful countries in the world. We assure you every sort of our help.

I know that your time is so precious that it is almost a crime to encroach on it without a good cause, but it is quite clear to your honour that Baluchistan['s] political movements are changing so rapidly that it is very essential for me to meet your honour very soon. Therefore, I shall feel highly obliged if you very kindly spare sometime for



my interview to discuss about the future of Las Bela State.

Excuse me for the trouble which I am going to give you.

Yours very sincerely,  
MIR GHULAM QADIR KHAN

PS-139

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 20-GG/4*

ARMA-BAIL HOUSE,  
GARDEN EAST, KARACHI,  
*20 August 1947*

Revered Quaid-i-Azam Sahib,

In view of the important impending changes in the political status of the nation as well as of the native States and their rulers and particularly considering the recent declaration of H. H the Khan of Kalat<sup>1</sup> and his Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government,<sup>2</sup> I am constrained to feel vitally concerned regarding my own political position as a ruler [of] virtually independent State—Las Bela State in Baluchistan. I therefore would be very grateful if your honour very kindly fix time to see you and explain all the matters connected with my State and elucidate any controversial points. I again request your honour to consider this very urgent and fix early date which is convenient to your honour, as time does not permit me to stay any longer.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,  
MIR GHULAM QADIR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>See Annex I to PS-66.



## PS-140

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Las Bela**F. 20-GG/2**21 August 1947*

My dear Jam Sahib,

Many thanks for your good wishes and greetings<sup>1</sup> on the auspicious, and this time a very happy, 'Id.

Thank you for your assurance of helping Pakistan.

When I had the pleasure of meeting you at Delhi,<sup>2</sup> I told you that I would study the question of relationship between you and Kalat and also consider your proposal of joining Pakistan, but I have not yet been able to study the actual relationship and the status of Las Bela *vis-a-vis* Kalat. I hope you do appreciate that these are very important questions, and they require a thorough examination before one can express any opinion. But you may rest assured that given reasonable time we will grapple with the question as early as possible.

I quite understand your desire to meet me very soon, but I must first examine and study the proposition before I can fully discuss the matter with you. I am sure that the Pakistan Government will take this matter up as soon as possible.

Further, I have to inform you that the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan have appointed a Negotiating Committee<sup>3</sup> and they will soon tackle the question of Indian States and other cognate matters relating to the various problems that we have to solve.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>PS-138.

<sup>2</sup>The meeting took place on 22 July. See Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam*, 87.

<sup>3</sup>On 11 August, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan adopted a resolution authorizing its President to set up a committee for negotiating representation of the states in the Assembly. See Appendix IX. 2, item 9, Vol. IV, 541.



## PS-141

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 20-GG/5-6*

ARMA-BAIL HOUSE,  
GARDEN EAST, KARACHI,  
5 September 1947

Revered Quaid-i-Azam Sahib,

I received your letter of 21st August 1947;<sup>1</sup> the question of my State relationship with Kalat cropped up and you promised to examine it later.

Since receipt of this letter much water has flown under the bridge. The State of Khan of Kalat has declared to be an independent sovereign State.<sup>2</sup>

The Khan of Kalat now arrogates to himself the position of paramount power, i.e. the British Government, [and] already the threat is held out to us that Las Bela State has no right of self-determination, nay, more we are told that we must bend knees before the Khan of Kalat or our people—men, women and children—shall die of hunger and remain naked. We are deprived of rights of drawing our supplies direct, and are compelled to apply to the *Wazir-i-Azam* of Kalat for our means of supply.

I have recently written<sup>3</sup> to Prime Minister, Pakistan Government, offering accession of Las Bela State to Pakistan Dominion, and have also agreed to sign Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement, when called upon to do so. As well, I have applied for issue of food and cloth for my people who are living in famine condition and are yet determined not to accept Kalat's subordination. Further, I most earnestly pray Your Excellency in the name of humanity, to save my people from starvation and kindly direct<sup>4</sup> Sind Supply Department that supplies may be given to us direct. I know that Your Excellency is very busy, but considering that I have been away from my State for a long time where my presence is urgently required, therefore, I request Your Excellency to grant me an interview within two or three days. If Your Excellency is unable to do so, I would like to proceed to Bela where Your Excellency can telegraphically communicate to me date and time of interview which Your Excellency [may] fix. Apologizing



for the encroachment on your precious time,

Yours sincerely,  
MIR GHULAM QADIR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>PS-140.

<sup>2</sup>See Annex I to PS-66.

<sup>3</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>4</sup>Also see PS-142.

## PS-142

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 20-GG/7-9*

BELA,  
23 September 1947

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Sahib, Governor-General,  
Pakistan, Karachi

All arable lands are irrigated but owing to famine, seeds absolutely not available in State. Pray order<sup>1</sup> Sind Supply to provide us with food-grain immediately as wheat sowing season is elapsing in fortnight. Please help your neighbouring Muslims from death by starvation. People greatly hope that Your Excellency will save their lives in time.

JAM SAHIB LAS BELA

<sup>1</sup>A copy was sent to the Food Department on 28 September 1947.

## PS-143

*Ruler of Las Bela to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 20-GG/10-11*

ARMA-BAIL HOUSE,  
GARDEN EAST, KARACHI,  
22 October 1947

Respected Quaid-i-Azam,

'Id is approaching, and I would like to begin this *murasla* with compliments of the season to you and yours [*sic*].

I had the honour of interviewing<sup>1</sup> you at Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, when I broached the subject of my State Las Bela being affiliated



to Pakistan.

Subsequently I made a formal written offer of acceding to the Pakistan Dominion.<sup>2</sup> Before I left Delhi, which was on 3rd August, and Your Excellency was pleased to inform me in your letter<sup>3</sup> that you wanted some time to study the relationship of Las Bela *vis-a-vis* Kalat. And you were pleased to suggest that I could interview you at Karachi.

During these nearly 3 months, I dare hope that you have looked into this matter. I and the people of Las Bela are anxiously looking forward to the day of our adoption [*sic*] to this great Asiatic Muslim Kingdom of Pakistan.

I arrived here night before last. And I have come to Karachi for the set purpose of meeting Your Excellency, and I earnestly pray you to grant me a very early interview<sup>4</sup> for, immediately before or after 'Id celebration, I would like to go back to Las Bela on the following day of 'Id.

Apologizing for the trouble that I am putting you to.

Believe me Your Excellency,

I remain,

Your loyal friend and well wisher of Pakistan,

MIR GHULAM QADIR KHAN

<sup>1</sup>See PS-140, note 2.

<sup>2</sup>See PS-141. However, Las Bela acceded eventually to Pakistan on 17 March 1948. For the text of the Instrument of Accession, see *Instruments of Accession*, 16-8.

<sup>3</sup>PS-137.

<sup>4</sup>On 24 October, S. M. Yusuf advised the Jam Sahib of Las Bela that he could call on Jinnah on 25 October. See F. 20-GG/12. Not printed.

## PS-144

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Las Bela*

*F. 20-GG/14*

*2 April 1948*

My dear Jam Sahib,

Thanking you for your letter dated the 19th of March 48.<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to note your enthusiasm and wholehearted support and loyalty to Pakistan.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.



SWAT STATE



## PS-145

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Swat**F. 718/3*

28 [?] July 1947

Dear Wali-i-Swat,

I am pleased indeed to hear of your wholehearted support and encouragement that you have given in our coming fight for the referendum which is to take place from the 6th July.<sup>1</sup> I pray that Muslims would stand solid and united and work as a disciplined team not only in this referendum but [also] thereafter to build up a strong nation. I am, however, grateful to you and to your Heir Apparent for having made a most handsome and generous contribution towards the Fund which is necessary for us to contest this referendum. I shall always remember that at the critical moment not only we had your heart with us but you gave us every help.

Thanking you [and] very warm *salaams* to you and your *Sahibzada*,

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>The referendum in the NWFP was held from 6 to 17 July 1947.

## PS-146

*Ruler of Swat to M. A. Jinnah**F. 6-GG/1*

D.O. No. 690

SAIDU SHARIF,  
SWAT STATE, N.W.F.P.,  
8 August 1947

Your Excellency Quaid-i-Azam,

I am writing this to explain that Swat occupies a very strategic position as would be apparent from the study of the map of the N.W Frontier. This would be in the interest of Pakistan itself to maintain it as a strong bastion. Swat is itself rather perturbed over the future. Its loyalty to the completion of Pakistan has been constant and enthusiastic but the same cannot be said of the neighbouring States or of the people of adjoining districts. Swat is cent per cent Muslim League. I understand that the battalion at Malakand is about to be moved. This might caste [*sic* for cause] difficulties for Swat



and therefore I seek your valuable help for your kind sanction for supply on payment of the following arms and ammunition:

1. 100 Bren guns with one million rounds of ammunition
2. 100 Tommy guns with one million rounds of ammunition
3. 3,000 rifles .303 army pattern with two million rounds of ammunition
4. 30 three-inch mortars with one thousand shells per mortar

This would enable Swat to protect its frontiers and, if required, to come to the help of Pakistan. I assure you that this strength would be the strength of Pakistan itself and would always be at its disposal. I, therefore, hope that you would very kindly sanction these for the Government arsenal on payment.

With all best wishes,

Your sincere friend,  
[ABDUL WADOOD]

PS-147

*S. M. Yusuf to M. Ikramullah*

*F. 124 (11)-GG/1*

KARACHI,  
8 October 1947

My dear Ikramullah,

Quaid-i-Azam desires that since the States of Swat, Amb, Dir and Phulra have expressed their willingness to join Pakistan, they may be requested to send their representatives to Karachi to go through the formalities of signing the Instrument of Accession.<sup>1</sup> As these States have been in correspondence with you in this matter, the invitations might issue from your office.

Yours sincerely,  
S. M. YUSUF

<sup>1</sup>See *Instruments of Accession*, 29-30.



## PS-148

*E. J. M. Dent to F. Amin**F. 216 (III)-GG/123*

[PESHAWAR,]

*15 April 1948*

Quaid-i-Azam receives the Wali of Swat and his son, Jehanzeb, at 12.15 P.M on Thursday the 15th. The son told me that they had no problem or question to raise.

The Wali is, in spite of his age, a very active man, climbing every day one thousand feet on mountains and is a keen *shikari*. He is alert and wide awake and keeps himself fully informed of all that happens in his State. A report of an incident in his State must reach him direct on the telephone at once. Since 1940 he has handed over the administration of the State to his son, but keeps an eye on it himself and guides his son.

Jehanzeb was educated at the Islamia College, Peshawar, from where he obtained his B.A. degree sometime in the twenties. He is a first class shot and a very good tennis player.

Besides other smaller schools, there is a high school at Saidu Sharif, capital of the State, and a very good hospital. Of the four States on the Frontier, Swat is the only State which is being efficiently and properly administered.

[E. J. M. DENT]

*Secretary to Governor, N.W.F.P*

## PS-149

*F. Amin to M. Ikramullah**F. 6-GG/2**24 May 1948*

Dear Mr Ikramullah,

I am desired by the Quaid-i-Azam to say that during his visit to the Frontier Province he was informed by the Wali of Swat<sup>1</sup> that after the establishment of Pakistan he does not wish to draw his allowance of Rs. 10,000<sup>2</sup> yearly which he gets under the Standstill Agreement. He desires that this amount should be handed over to the Quaid-i-Azam for being utilized for educational purposes or in such manner as he thinks appropriate.



Will you, therefore, please write to the Wali of Swat and confirm this and take steps to place this amount at the disposal of the Quaid-i-Azam annually.

Yours sincerely,  
F. AMIN

<sup>1</sup>On 15 April 1948. See PS-148.

<sup>2</sup>See PS-150.

## PS-150

*Ruler of Swat to Ambrose Dundas*<sup>1</sup>

*F. 6-GG/3*

DO NO. 427

SAIDU SHARIF, SWAT STATE,  
4 June 1948

My dear friend,

I greatly realize that our new Dominion of Pakistan has to face many financial problems and difficulties. I offer my full and cordial co-operation in all matters.

The Government of Pakistan gives me an annual allowance of ten thousand rupees. As a small contribution of my good faith and gesture of help, I voluntarily forego to accept this allowance of ten thousand rupees per annum for ever and request that this amount may very kindly be utilized by Quaid-i-Azam for some educational purpose for the people of Pakistan.

With all best wishes,

Your sincere friend,  
ABDUL WADOOD

<sup>1</sup>Governor, NWFP.

## PS-151

*P. C. Hailey to M. Ikramullah*

*F. 6-GG/5-7*

NO. 691-STB

PESHAWAR,  
9 August 1948

### MEMORANDUM

Please refer to memo No. D. 1003-F/47, dated the 20th October, 1947,<sup>1</sup> and connected correspondence.



2. Kalam is a valley enclosing the source and upper reaches of the Swat River and surrounded by high mountain barriers. It is rich in forests and offers a hill-station which would be superior to Gulmerg and Srinagar combined. It has one reasonable outlet to the outer world, down the river valley through Swat State. It is cut off from its other neighbours, Dir and Chitral, by snow-covered mountains through which the lowest passes are at 11,000 and 14,000 feet, respectively. Kalam is, therefore, geographically a part of Swat.

The Wali's process of consolidating and giving security and good government to the warring tribes of Swat Valley, begun in 1918, reached the border of Kalam in the autumn of 1922. As always in this part of the world, there were two factions in the country. One favoured the Wali, the other did not. During the winter when further advance was impossible, the faction which did not favour the Wali appealed to the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawab of Dir. These two Rulers, already jealous of the growth of Swat State, protested to Government, claiming that the country belonged ethnographically to themselves. The Government of India, unwilling to decide between the three Rulers and offend two of them, could think of no better solution than that none of them should have it. The area was thus condemned to a state of isolation and backwardness in which it has remained ever since.

3. To implement the Government's decision, the following action was taken:

- a. A promise from the Miangul of Swat (as he was then styled), that he would abstain from unprovoked attack in this region, was accepted and later incorporated in a clause of his agreement with Government of India.
- b. H. H. the Mehtar was informed of the promise and that no extension of his own territories in this direction would be permitted.
- c. The Nawab of Dir was told of the Miangul's promise and warned that if he gave the Miangul occasion to break his promise he need expect no help from Government.

4. The Wali's establishment of a fort in Kalam in August 1947, which is tantamount to taking the country under his sway, may now be examined against this background. There are two main questions, the first whether it is politically right that Kalam should become part of Swat State, and the second whether Pakistan is committed to taking action to prevent it.

5. As may be seen from a map, and still more clearly on the ground, Kalam is physically, geographically and economically a part of the Swat Valley. Except for the two passes mentioned above, which are covered with snow for three quarters of the year and over which there



can never be more than mule-tracks, it has no access to the outer world except through Swat State. There is no other route out for the valuable timber which the Kalam forests contain, no other way for the inhabitants to go out and earn their living, and no other way in for the cloth, tea, sugar and other commodities which Kalam requires from the outside world. Kalam has no form of Government and is desperately in need of it. The country is backward beyond belief. Though Muslims in name, the people have in many respects the superstitions and behaviour of pagans. Quite recently—it may still be the case—the inhabitants of the largest village were so much at feud with one another that they dared not sleep in the village at all, but spent the nights in little camps outside, visiting the houses only by day. In the rest of the Swat Valley the Wali has brought security and prosperity to the tribesmen through the boon of good government. No one but the Ruler of Swat can do the same for Kalam. Dir and Chitral are both cut off by mountain-barriers, and there is nothing that Govt. can do from Malakand, cut off by 100 miles of the Wali's territory. Without good government the inhabitants cannot even have the benefit of their magnificent forests, let alone the hill-station which is awaiting development. Government's one attempt to get forest-produce out under the supervision of a *Tehsildar* in Kalam, ended in failure. To sum up, there are no schools, no hospitals, no roads, no peace, [no] law [and] order or security in Kalam. Swat enjoys them all, and only Swat can give them to Kalam.

6. The feelings of the Kalamis are of course relevant. There is no doubt that majority of them have come to realize that their best interests lie with Swat State. There are of course minorities with affiliations to Dir and affiliations to Chitral, but these must give way to the needs and the will of the majority. The Wali is a good ruler and a good man by any standard and Pakistan need have no qualms that Kalam will not be the better for his control.

7. There remains the question of the extent to which Pakistan is committed to preventing the Wali from entering Kalam. This has to be considered *vis-a-vis*:

- a. The Kalamis
- b. The Mehtar of Chitral
- c. The Nawab of Dir

The question whether the Wali has violated his agreements with Government must also be considered.

8. The view of Sir Ralph Griffith, Governor of the Frontier Province from 1932 to 1937, may be quoted here. Sir Ralph wrote, "I feel that we have deeply committed ourselves to the Mehtar of Chitral, much more deeply indeed than we need have done or were justified in doing. It is



possible.... that we are inclined to acquiesce unduly in exaggerated claims on the part of the Nawab or the Mehtar, born of an unjustifiable reading of treaties, engagements and assurances". Sir George Cunningham, on handing over charge in April of this year (1948), left a note which reads "... The Wali of Swat put troops into Kalam some months ago.... My own opinion is that the Wali should be left there (I wish I had done this eight years ago)". Nevertheless both these officers did, in fact, for sufficient reason, refrain from pressing, in their own time, for any change in the arrangement whereby all three Rulers were debarred from entering Kalam. The present Governor, who has been dealing with the problem in one capacity or another since 1932, has been constantly of [the] opinion that the Govt. of India's decision of 1922 was wrong, and that the only right thing to do was to allow the Wali to take over Kalam.

9. The following are detailed comments on anticipated objections:

- a. The commitment to the Kalamis is an agreement signed with them in April, 1928. This contains five clauses of which only the last, the clause relating to interference by neighbouring chiefs, provides something which Government undertake to do for the Kalamis; the others are things which the Kalamis undertake to do for Government. All these undertakings the Kalamis completely failed to fulfil. They related to the development of the forests and were in fact the reason for Government entering into the treaty at all. It is fair to argue from this that the Kalamis have themselves torn up the treaty and that it is no longer valid. Apart from this the majority of the tribes no longer wish the Wali to be kept out, and will benefit by his entry.
- b. The Mehtar of Chitral has withdrawn his objections to the Wali's occupation of Kalam.
- c. The Nawab of Dir<sup>2</sup> has no right in the country and has registered and maintained his objections out of the jealousy of the growth of Swat State. (It should not be forgotten that the present Nawab's father at one time ruled much of the Swat Valley; he was driven out by the present Wali, who would have taken even more territory from him if he had not been stopped by Government). Nevertheless, as the Nawab of Dir has been rallying nobly to the cause of Pakistan further East, the Pakistan Government will not wish to hurt his feelings, however "dog in the manger" and unjustified they may be, without giving him some sop. This could in the past have taken the form of some honour. As it is, the only solution seems to be that whatever recognition is made of his present services, should be particularly generous.



10. As for the Wali's action in sending his troops into Kalam, there can be no doubt that, even if this was politically right and ought to have happened [ it is] contrary to his agreement with Government.

His motive was the determination that, in the confusion that was likely to follow the partition, no one should get in ahead of him. There was no fighting, and the Political Agent reported that the Kalamis, in general, seem pleased with the Wali's move. This is confirmed by later enquiries. The fact that the move was contrary to the Wali's agreement cannot be completely ignored, but has in fact already been the subject of a rebuke by Sir George Cunningham. This rebuke should be confirmed by the Pakistan Government. At the same time, for many reasons, including the interest of the inhabitants themselves, the general peace and development of the area, and the Wali's outstanding loyalty and services to Pakistan, it is the Local Administration's considered recommendation that the Wali be left in control on his own assurance that he will give the area the normal benefits of good Government—as indeed he has already begun to do—in the shape of roads, schools, hospitals, etc., and a fair share of the income from the forests.

11. Except that this Local Administration has no knowledge of any bribes offered to or accepted by members of the Muslims League or high officials of the Pakistan Government in this connection, this memorandum presumably covers the points raised in your letter No. D. 1613-F/48 dated 12th March 1948.<sup>3</sup>

12. The question of allowing the Wali to extend his influence to Kalam was last referred at length to the Govt. of India in 1938. A copy of the reference (C. Secy No. 801/54.I/CTB., dated 29th July, 1938) is enclosed.<sup>4</sup> No answer had been sent by the time the 1939-45 War broke out, after which the matter was shelved.

P.C. HAILEY  
*Chief Secretary to Government*  
*North West Frontier Province*

<sup>1,3&4</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>A.S.B. Shah's brief on Jinnah's visit to NWFP in April stated that the *Wali'ahad* of Dir State was likely to see Jinnah on 12 April and that he would raise the question of Kalam. The response suggested was that Jinnah call for a report from the local administration to deal with the matter. See. F. 820/79, *QAP*. Not printed.







# JUNAGADH & MANAVADAR STATES



## PS-152

*M. A. Jinnah to Sheikh of Mangrol**F. 89/13**4 March 1947*

Dear Nawab Sahib,

I have received your telegram<sup>1</sup> and thank you very much for it. Of course, it was not your fault, nor was it mine, as I had not the faintest idea that the ship will anchor at Mangrol, until I got on board the ship.<sup>2</sup> And as it was going to halt there for some time, I thought I might go ashore and take the chance of giving you a surprise visit but, unfortunately, you were not there. But all your people there were very nice and kind during the short stay of an hour or so. They treated us kindly and in every hospitable manner.

Hoping you are well. With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>Jinnah left Karachi on 25 February 1947 and was due to arrive at Bombay on 27 February. See No. 32, Vol. I, Part I, 34.

## PS-153

*S. M. Nasiruddin to M. A. Jinnah**F. 706/1-2*

PRIVATE / CONFIDENTIAL

THE PALACE, MANGROL,  
*3 August 1947*

My dear Janab Jinnah Saheb,

*Assalaamo'Alaikum wa Rahmatullahi wa Barakatuhu*

The force of circumstances have [sic] compelled me to approach you and seek your advice at this critical juncture. Secondly, yours would be the sincerest and the wisest advice from every point of view.

You know all the States are asked to come to an early decision as regards their future relations. As regards Mangrol, I myself find it difficult to come to any final conclusion. Mangrol has a most peculiar and unique status in the whole of India. It has all the attributes of an Indian State with plenary civil and criminal jurisdiction; still it is put under Junagadh State. In short there can be ample ground for both to



contend for their respective rights after the lapse of Paramountcy. In order to avoid this position, I have been incessantly trying for the last one year and a half for an honorable and respectable mutual settlement. But for reasons best known to Junagadh, it has not so far extended a co-operative hand.

I am enclosing a copy of the note<sup>1</sup> which I had submitted to Junagadh for consideration and mutual settlement. I shall feel most grateful if you kindly see that note, which will not take more than 15 minutes to go through, and it contains all the data that is necessary.

I am also kept in the dark and am totally unaware of Junagadh's intentions regarding its future policy. I shall feel most grateful if you very kindly advise me as to how I should conduct my affairs so that I may be able to join Pakistan and also preserve my entity from Junagadh's ambitions. Mangrol is a small State with a population of 50,000 and an income of about eight to nine lakh [rupees]. The major part of its population is Hindu but it can claim geographical contiguity with Pakistan via the sea.

I hope you will kindly excuse me for approaching you like this and giving you trouble in your already abundant anxieties. I shall be earnestly awaiting your advice and guidance.

Yours very sincerely,  
S.M. NASIRUDDIN

PS. I shall certainly like to join Pakistan<sup>2</sup> even at the cost of some sacrifice provided I can possibly do so. The present ambiguous political status of Mangrol is the result of the compulsory mediation of the British Govt.

<sup>1</sup>See F. 154/421-5, QAP. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>See PS-170.

## PS-154

*Shah Nawaz Bhutto to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/1-4*

JUNAGADH,  
11 August 1947

Your Excellency,

After you were graciously pleased to grant me an interview<sup>1</sup> on July 16, I conveyed your advice to His Highness the Nawab Saheb Bahadur<sup>2</sup> to keep out under any circumstances till August 15. If per chance we allow



our neck to be put under the guillotine, we shall be cut and finished. Your further assurance that you will not allow Junagadh to be starved out or tyrannized and that Veraval was not far from Karachi gave His Highness immense relief. He was extremely grateful to you and was very happy to receive such sympathetic and encouraging response.

We have stuck to your instruction in spite of all threats, pressure and demoralizing propaganda to compel us to succumb to machinations of the Congress High Command supported by the highest authorities, who control the destiny of States at the present moment. Your Excellency is fully aware that in the estimation of our non-Muslim people, Junagadh is considered the most sacred place after Kashi. Krishna was killed in Junagadh. The destruction of Somnath Mandir<sup>3</sup> by Mohamed [Mahmood] G[h]aznavi could never be forgotten or forgiven. And the Girnar, the sacred place with their temples, happens to be in Junagadh. Junagadh stands all alone surrounded by Hindu rulers' territories and British India Congress provinces. We are of course connected by sea with Pakistan. If geographical position by land was fairly considered, Cutch, Jamnagar and other territories adjoining Junagadh should be considered connected with Pakistan as they once in past actually formed the part of Sind.

I wish I was able to be present at Karachi on that great and auspicious day when your proud achievements could be witnessed with my own eyes. It would be a proud day for Islam all over the world to see the greatest and most powerful Muslim State set up by your effort, sacrifice and foresight. To us the position here is full of apprehensions when Baroda threatens to claim Somnath. Jamnagar is encouraging particularly our petty Muslim states attached to Junagadh who in turn receive messages of encouragement and help from Hon'ble Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel. Your Excellency will no doubt appreciate that this world is not free from fifth columnists and traitors. Our opponents want to play the same game and repeat the same tactics as were adopted by the East India Company. To create some trouble among vassals of Junagadh, to cause confusion in Muslim world, is their aim. Your Excellency may be aware His Highness and his Government have no territorial ambitions and their motives have been most honorable. All attached units have received most generous treatment at the hands of Junagadh. No States in Kathiawar and Gujarat can have such a record.

You will readily understand that at this critical moment, when one has to be guarded against any emergencies, it is impossible for me to leave His Highness and his Government even for a day. I have thus to deprive myself of my heart's desire to be present at Karachi on the day of your installation as Governor-General. We are deputing Tazimi Sardar Ismail Abrahani, Private Secretary to His Highness, with an authority letter from



His Highness to seek an interview with Your Excellency. Mr Abrahani is the most loyal and devoted servant of His Highness. It is but essential that immediately Your Excellency assumes charge of the exalted position of Governor-General of Pakistan on August 15 or latest on August 16, there should be [an] announcement<sup>4</sup> that Junagadh has acceded to Pakistan [on] the three subjects (Defence, External Affairs and Communications) or any other course which you suggest best in the interest of the State. This, I hope will stop all evil schemes of our adversaries. Though the Muslim population of Junagadh is only 20% and non-Muslims form 80%,<sup>5</sup> seven lakh Muslims of Kathiawar survive because of Junagadh. Junagadh is the premier State of Kathiawar and on it depend all the hopes of existence of our Muslim brethren around. The very survival of the ruling dynasty will be at stake. The sacrifices and charities of the Babis of Junagadh are well known to Muslims of India whose support should not be wanting at the moment. So far [sic] internal trouble is concerned we should be able to face it and maintain law and order, though unfortunately as I submitted to Your Excellency at Delhi,<sup>6</sup> we have not received the quota of arms to which we were entitled in peace time. This is not the time for me to accuse anyone of negligence. I assure you, should necessity arise, we will give a good account of ourselves. I consider that no sacrifice is great to preserve prestige, honour and rule of His Highness and protect Islam and Muslims of Kathiawar. But as I said before, we want protection against external trouble including economic pressure. We are already threatened with a customs cordon at Jetpur, a few miles off Junagadh, instead of the Viramgam line. Your help in time will solve all these problems.

Therefore, I beg of Your Excellency that in spite of your innumerable engagements to spare a little time to grant an interview<sup>7</sup> to our emissary and give him whatever advice and assurances you think best in the interest of all concerned.

With kindest regards and happy recollections of old,

I remain,

Your Excellency's most obediently ,

SHAH NAWAZ BHUTTO

*Dewan, Junagadh State*

<sup>1</sup>See Ahmad Saeed, *Visitors of the Quaid-i-Azam*, 84. S. N. Bhutto was Senior Member Executive Council, Junagadh in July 1947.

<sup>2</sup>Mahabat Khan.

<sup>3</sup>The event took place in 1024 AD.

<sup>4</sup>Annexure to Enclosure to PS-158.

<sup>5</sup>Also see Appendix VI. I, Vol. I, Part II, 143-4.

<sup>6</sup>See note 1 above.

<sup>7</sup>Jinnah acknowledged this letter on 12 August 1947 and informed the Dewan about the discussion he had with Tazimi Sardar Ismail Abrahani. See F. 124 (8)-GG/6. Not printed. Also see PS-156.



## PS-155

*Ruler of Junagadh to M. A . Jinnah**F. 124 (8)-GG/5*

THE PALACE, JUNAGADH,  
11 August 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam Saheb,

At the outset, I most cordially reiterate my congratulations of [*sic* for on] the happiest and proudest day of your life as a maker of Muslim nation [*sic*] and on your being the first Governor-General of the Pakistan Dominion, the biggest Muslim State in the world.

I convey to Your Excellency my most grateful thanks for the very encouraging message so kindly sent to me through my Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who has had the honour of interviewing you at Delhi on the 16th July last at my instance.<sup>1</sup>

On a very careful consideration, I may say, I have decided to federate with the Pakistan Dominion and make declaration to that effect before the 15th August 1947. In view of this, I send my Private Secretary, Mr Ismail H.M. Abrahani, for negotiating and settling the terms of the Instrument of Accession with the Negotiating Committee of Pakistan<sup>2</sup> or representatives of Pakistan and bring its final draft to me for my acceptance.

In the meanwhile, to fill up the void in the administrative field as a result of lapse of Paramountcy, I authorized my Private Secretary, Mr Ismail Abrahani, to discuss and settle the terms of the Standstill Agreement<sup>3</sup> with the Pakistan representatives and I further authorize him to sign it also on behalf of my State.

With very kind regards and prayers for your health, happiness and long life.

Yours sincerely,  
MAHABAT KHAN  
*Nawab of Junagadh*

<sup>1</sup>PS-154, note 1.

<sup>2</sup>On 11 August 1947, The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan adopted a resolution empowering its President to appoint a committee for the purpose of negotiating with the representatives of the Indian States, Tribal Areas, and Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas.

<sup>3</sup>See Annex II to Appendix VII. 9, Vol. IV, 501-2.



## PS-156

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Junagadh**F. 124 (8)-GG/7**12 August 1947*

Your Highness,

Thank you for your letter dated the 11th August.<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to you for your congratulations and good wishes for Pakistan and myself as the Governor-General.

I am glad that Your Highness has decided to federate with Pakistan and make declaration to the effect before the 15th of August 1947.

The Pakistan Constituent Assembly has now appointed a Negotiating Committee and I would suggest that you may make your declaration and announce that you have joined the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. After the 15th you can send your representatives for negotiating and settling the terms of Instrument of Accession with the Negotiating Committee of Pakistan, and also at the same time to discuss and settle the terms of the Standstill Agreement with the representatives of Pakistan.

Thanking you again for your good wishes,

Yours sincerely ,  
[M. A. JINNAH ]

<sup>1</sup>PS-155.

## PS-157

*Ruler of Junagadh to M. A. Jinnah**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/9*

JUNAGAD[H],  
*15 August 1947*

Quaid-i-Azam Saheb, Karachi,

Many thanks for Your Excellency 's reassuring letter of twelfth<sup>1</sup>. My Government have decided<sup>2</sup> to accede to Pakistan, join Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Shortly deputing representatives for negotiating terms of Accession



and of Standstill Agreement. Kindly arrange to confirm.

MAHABAT KHAN  
*Nawab of Junagadh*

<sup>1</sup>PS-156.

<sup>2</sup>On 22 August, Dr Thakkar of Bhavnagar telegraphed Jinnah to convey remonstrances of people of Junagadh against the Nawab's decision to join Pakistan and to request invoking the principle of self-determination, that the decision be turned down by Pakistan. See Appendix V. 20, Vol. V, 557.

## PS-158

*Shah Nawaz Bhutto to M. W. Abbasi*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/10*

JUNAGADH,  
20 August 1947

Dear Mr Abbasi,

I enclose a copy of my letter addressed to the Hon'ble Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister, Pakistan Dominion.

I felt that as His Excellency the Quaid-i-Azam is extremely busy, I should write to the Prime Minister also. I wish you could also remind His Excellency to give directions for an early answer. We are facing immense difficulties. Some kind of official announcement or answer from Pakistan Dominion is sure to smoothen matters for us here.

Sincerely yours,  
S. N. BHUTTO

*Enclosure to PS-158*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/11-2*

URGENT

JUNAGADH,  
19 August 1947

My dear Mr Liaquatally [Liaquat Ali] Khan,

His Highness the Nawab Saheb Bahadur sent the following telegram to Quaid-i-Azam His Excellency Governor-General, Pakistan, on the 15th August 1947:

*[Para omitted]*<sup>1</sup>

We are awaiting the formal acceptance of Junagadh's accession<sup>2</sup> to the Pakistan Dominion and I should be glad if you would kindly arrange to convey it as soon as possible. It is not clear whether Junagadh will be



entitled to a seat in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The State has attached to it several units which still support it even after the lapse of Paramountcy. The total population of the group thus formed is over 8 lakh. According to the Cabinet Mission Plan<sup>3</sup>, which has also been adhered to in later scheme, a unit having a population of three fourth of a million and over is entitled to separate representation in the Constituent Assembly. I should be grateful if you would kindly explain the position and also suggest further procedure we should adopt for accession purposes.

It is understood that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly has already set up a Negotiating Committee.<sup>4</sup> The corresponding negotiating committee of the Indian States<sup>5</sup> will, I presume, provide for adequate representation from Junagadh. If the Pakistan Government has already drafted an Instrument of Accession<sup>6</sup> and a Standstill Agreement<sup>7</sup> for States joining the Pakistan Dominion, I should be glad to have drafts of these agreements as early as possible. On hearing from you the Junagadh Government will arrange to send its representatives to carry on further negotiations.

I enclose a copy of the press communique released on August 15,<sup>8</sup> announcing the decision of Junagadh to accede to Pakistan.

With best regards,

Sincerely Yours,  
S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1</sup>See PS-157 for text.

<sup>2</sup>The Instrument of Accession signed by Ruler of Junagadh was accepted by Governor-General, Pakistan on 15 September.

<sup>3</sup>Appendix III. 1, para 18(a), Vol. I, Part II, 32-42.

<sup>4</sup>See Appendix IX. 2, item 9, Vol. IV, 541.

<sup>5</sup>See Appendix VII. 19, Vol. III, 997.

<sup>6</sup>See Appendix VII. 9, Vol. IV, 497-9.

<sup>7</sup>See Annex II to Appendix VII. 9, *ibid.*, 501-2.

<sup>8</sup>Annexure.

*Annexure to Enclosure to PS-158*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/13*

JUNAGADH,  
15 August 1947

#### PRESS COMMUNIQUE<sup>1</sup>

The Government of Junagadh has, during the last few weeks, been faced with the problem of making its choice between accession to the Dominion of India and accession to the Dominion of Pakistan. It has had to take into very careful consideration every aspect of this problem. Its main preoccupation has been to adopt a course that would, in the



long run, make the largest contribution toward the permanent welfare and prosperity of the people of Junagadh and help to preserve the integrity of the State and to safeguard its independence and autonomy over the largest possible field. After anxious consideration and a careful balancing of all factors, the Government of the State has decided to accede to Pakistan and hereby announces its decision to that effect. The State is confident that its decision will be welcomed by all loyal subjects of the State who have its real welfare and prosperity at heart.

Now that the Dominions of India and Pakistan have been admitted into the fellowship of independent sovereign States on an equal footing, it is to be hoped that vast avenues of progress will be thrown open to the peoples of both Dominions in every walk of life and that the peoples of both Dominions will combine to derive the fullest benefit from the opportunities which will now be made available to them in peace and cooperation with each other. The Government of Junagadh will continue to make every endeavour to secure for all classes of the people of Junagadh without distinction, in fullest measure, the blessings of security, peace and prosperity and is confident that in the furtherance of this object, it will receive the fullest cooperation from all classes and sections of the subjects of His Highness the Nawab Saheb Bahadur .

S. N. BHUTTO  
*Dewan, Junagadh State*

<sup>1</sup>The *Dastural 'Amal*, Sarkar Junagadh, 16 August 1947.

## PS-159

*Ruler of Junagadh to M. A. Jinnah*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/15*

THE PALACE, JUNAGADH,  
31 August 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam Saheb,

The reports in the press must have given you an idea that Junagadh is showered with criticism all over. Thanks to Almighty, we are firm. We expect an early announcement of the Pakistan Government regarding Junagadh's accession to it<sup>1</sup>.

I am sending Tazimi Sardar Ismail H. M. Abrahani, my Private Secretary, to meet the authorities of Pakistan Government and settle



the terms of the Standstill Agreement. I authorize him to sign the Agreement on behalf of my State Government.

With very kind regards and prayers for your health, happiness and long life,

Yours sincerely,  
MAHABAT KHAN  
*Nawab of Junagadh*

<sup>1</sup>PS-157.

## PS-160

*S. N. Bhutto to M. A. Jinnah*<sup>1</sup>

*F. 124 (8)-GG/16-8*

PERSONAL

JUNAGADH,  
*4 September 1947*

Your Excellency,

I am extremely sorry to trouble you again with a personal appeal for assistance to Junagadh in its plight. For an astute leader and man of affairs like you, it is not necessary to relate the full story of recent reactions to Junagadh's declaration of accession to Pakistan. When we met<sup>2</sup> at Delhi, we had discussed all possible sides of the question and you were then pleased to assure that Pakistan shall never allow Junagadh, or for that matter any Muslim State, to be stormed and tyrannized by its enemies.

The events of the last few weeks seem to show that the beginning of the tyranny is already being felt. Most venomous propaganda has been started by the Congress folk; senior officers have been sent by the States Department of the Indian Government to Kathiawar and these with the help of the police and other machinery still left of the old residency have bullied into submission most of the States and Estates. The press and people's organizations are being employed to insinuate and spread fantastic stories resulting from accession. People are being told that 20,000 soldiers have been stationed by Pakistan in Junagadh, and these will shortly be raised to 100,000 with a view to help[ing] the Nizam, when necessary, and, eventually, to conquer Kathiawar, Rajputana and even Bombay Presidency. We have been refused by the Government of India usual quota of food and other supplies. A telegram received from the Coal Controller only two days ago bans all coal



supplies trying to paralyze our railway communication.

Your Excellency may well imagine the effect of such attacks on the economic and propaganda fronts on the non-Muslim subjects of the State, to whom the bogey of danger to Hindu religion, shrines and institutions is also raised in many subtle ways—perhaps forgetting that Muslims in dividing the country have left behind in India, under Hindu protection, many of their most sacred places, shrines and centres of culture, including Aligarh. Both the Dominions are committed to restore peace and order in this sub-continent at all costs. In Junagadh, complete peace and harmony prevails. His Highness's Government makes no distinction between all castes and creeds. Congress activities with the support of the Indian Dominion, may result in orgy of destruction of life and property of innocent people. Exactly what has happened and is happening in the Punjab may take place also in Kathiawar and extend even to the whole of Western India.

Strangely enough, we have to contend with fifth columnists like Khan Bahadur Nabi Buksh, who was our Constitutional Adviser for a few months and whose services have been terminated by His Highness's Government. The past history of this gentleman must be well-known to Your Excellency. He, of all Muslims numbering ten crore, found himself a solitary figure to serve on the Sapru Committee and supported its reactionary recommendations to the Muslim cause. Today, he appears to play into the hands of His Highness the Jam Saheb enjoying his splendid hospitality at one of the palaces at Jamnagar.

I submit that it is time for Pakistan to lodge a strong protest with the Indian Government to end such mischievous activities as Pakistan itself has deliberately refrained from pursuing them on grounds of broad policy. Pakistan's Standstill Agreement with the Indian Union must entitle Junagadh to all existing facilities provided for the neighbouring country. Some of our present troubles could possibly have been saved if the previous administration had taken timely measures to safeguard the State's essential interests including procurement of arms to which Junagadh was entitled in peace-time.

It is, therefore, important that Your Excellency should kindly extend your powerful protection to this premier state of Kathiawar which forms almost one fourth of the Peninsula. His Highness's present health does not allow him to stand the strain of heavy worries; an open avowal or support from your end will enliven him and the lakhs of Muslims of Kathiawar who are watching the developments here with great concern and anxiety. I, myself, am prepared to meet any situation that may arise, but my effort would count little in this sea of



turmoil. Your Excellency's strong hand which has organized and built the greatest Muslim State in the world, will, I am sure, not abandon Junagadh and its people to be devoured by the wolves. Your Excellency's encouraging words at Delhi that "Pakistan will not allow Junagadh to be stormed and tyrannized and Veraval is not far from Karachi" still ring in my ear.

I remain,  
Yours Excellency's sincerely,  
S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1</sup>On 8 September 1947, Jinnah, acknowledging the letter informed S. N. Bhutto that Tazimi Sardar Ismail Abrahani had discussed various matters concerning Junagadh with Liaquat Ali Khan and M. Ikramullah and that a report with regard to the arrangements arrived at would be sent to him. See F. 124 (8)-GG/22. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>16 July 1947. See PS-155.

## PS-161

*F. Amin to S. M. Yusuf*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/19*

KARACHI,  
8 September 1947

Dear Mr Yusuf,

Will you please see the enclosed letter from Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto to the Private Secretary to the Nawab of Junagadh, which was handed over to me this morning by the latter for Quaid-i-Azam's information.

The Quaid-i-Azam has seen this and has directed me to pass it on to the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely  
F. AMIN

*Enclosure to PS-161*  
*Shah Nawaz Bhutto to Ismail H. M. Abrahani*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/20*

CONFIDENTIAL

AMAN MAHAL, JUNAGADH,  
6 September 1947

My dear Ismail,

I enclose a Police report which clearly indicates what the Congress



people are aiming at. I would like you to explain the situation to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and if necessary to Quaid-i-Azam himself, pressing them for immediate action regarding the kind of help we need from Pakistan. Any open pronouncement of support by Pakistan would have immediate effect on the Indian States Department. It is not necessary for me to explain to our Pakistan friends what steps should be necessary to meet the inroads by our opponents.

These have been trying their best to get hold of the few Muslim Units still clinging to us—Manavadar, Sardargadh, Bantwa, Chhota Majmu, etc. Kamadhia Taluka, once attached to Baroda, has now joined us. So far, these have declined the tempting offers or allowed themselves to be bullied by the Indian States Department. But our hands could only be strengthened if the Pakistan Dominion makes the India Union understand that they cannot trifle with us in the face of the support we possess from Pakistan. There should be no further delay in open avowal of support and agreements, and it is this delay that has led to many surmises in Congress circles encouraging them to proceed on the lines indicated in the Police report.

I am anxiously awaiting a full report of your progress in Karachi. I trust you have contacted Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan and pushing on the Standstill Agreement.

Sheikh Saheb of Mangrol is being put under great pressure to go over to them. The Chief of Manavadar has just left me after his visit to Rajkot where he was threatened and frightened out of his life by the Special Officer of the States Department. They have brought additional forces of Gurkhas and Sikhs and more are to follow. Banesinhji threatened Manavadar that Hindustan was very strong; it can make and unmake laws; might is right in these days. A State like Hyderabad dared not to keep out, what is Junagadh? Hindustan would never permit Pakistan to have a base in Junagadh. Hindustan forces must and will go to help their Hindu brethren in Junagadh which will be attacked from both inside and outside. You can well imagine more than what I can express in words how these activities of our opponents are calculated to create trouble. The Posts and Telegraphs Department cannot be trusted and on their account I am sending this important communication by a special messenger.

The Special Officer at Rajkot is reported to have told Manavadar that Pakistan Government has neither legislature nor a negotiating committee. They cannot accept Junagadh. Banesinhji is proceeding to Delhi on the 17th instant for final orders and thereafter people would see what would happen. The States Department would bring everybody to their knees and many such other things; those few Muslims



who have resisted so far need food, arms and rest of the commodities they received when India was undivided.

I have also received a letter<sup>1</sup> from Baroda's Dewan<sup>2</sup> who says he is moving his armed forces to Baroda, Kathiawar territory, to allay panic among Baroda subjects caused by the armed activities of Junagadh. You will very well understand the motive behind this move. You can explain it to our Pakistan[i] friends.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,  
S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1</sup>Annexure.

<sup>2</sup>Brojendra Lal Mitter.

*Annexure to Enclosure to PS-161*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/21*

SECRET

*5 September 1947*

TRANSLATION OF REPORT NO. 63

Dhebarbhai, Darbar Gopaldas, and Rasikbhai Parikh all have come over there in Rajkot . It is decided to wage a war against Junagadh according to the instructions of Sardar Patel. It is also decided to send 5,000 Gurkhas from Delhi for this purpose. Gurkha platoons are coming since [*sic*] the last two days and camping in the headquarters. They are not allowed to stir out at present. Machine-guns and tanks will also be received. The object is to take possession of Babariawad and place a *Thana* there. They will also guard the frontier according to the decision of Sangram Samiti. Suragbhai of Babariawad and others have given their signatures to join Hindustan Union and they will be taken up by the Hindustan Union in a day or two. They are only waiting for Banesinhji's arrival. The supply of petrol, sugar, kerosene, etc., to Junagadh has been stopped. Dwarkadas has stated that to watch the movements of Suragbhai, Buddhoo Khokhar has been deputed to Rajkot but we will not allow him to succeed in his mission. Farid Khokhar has gone to Rajula. It is further decided that a *thana* should be placed at Jetpur and Bilkha and no sooner trouble starts Junagadh would be attacked from all sides. Dwarkadas has invited his family to Rajkot. I had come but you were not present. I shall always be loyal to you. Banesinhji had asked me to join service but I did not accept the offer. I would seek your advice how to write letters from outside or adopt another method of correspondence. According to press report they will start their



action within a week with the intention to place all the villages of Babariawad under the management of Dedan thana.

## PS-162

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, FOA, I (1) 18/5/53*

NEW DELHI,  
12 September [1947]

We have just seen reported in the press communique issued by the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a Standstill Agreement between Pakistan and the Junagadh State was signed on September 9.

We have also seen a report<sup>1</sup> that the terms of the Instrument of Accession for States wishing to join the Dominion of Pakistan were settled by the Pakistan Government at their meeting on 9th September.<sup>2</sup>

2. On 21st August our Ministry of States addressed a letter<sup>3</sup> to the High Commissioner for Pakistan in Delhi asking for indication of policy in respect of accession of the Junagadh State. The High Commissioner was subsequently reminded on 6th September. No reply has been received so far.

3. It has all along been understood that a State is free to accede to either of the two Dominions; but the choice of a State in regard to accession must, in our opinion, necessarily be made with due regard to its geographical contiguity. Junagadh is nowhere contiguous to the Pakistan Dominion. It is surrounded on all sides by the States which form part of the Indian Dominion except where it is flanked by sea. Further there is, within the State boundaries, considerable territory which forms part of States which have acceded to the Indian Dominion. There are likewise pockets of the Junagadh territory within States which have acceded to the Dominion of India.

4. The population of Junagadh according to the 1941 census is 6.71 lakh of which no less than 5.43 lakh (or eighty per cent) are Hindu[s]; this large majority of the population of the State has made it clear to the Ruler of Junagadh in no uncertain terms that they are opposed to Junagadh acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan and that they wish that the State should accede to the Dominion of India. Even the Junagadh State itself issued notifications from time to time stating that it stands for the unity and solidarity<sup>4</sup> of Kathiawar (vide notifications dated April 11 and April 22, 1947)<sup>5</sup>. All the Kathiawar States, barring



three small ones, have now joined the Indian Dominion.

5. The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession of the Junagadh State to either of the two Dominions. They would accordingly be willing to abide by a verdict of its people in this matter, ascertained under joint supervision of Dominion of India and Junagadh. If, however, the Ruler of Junagadh is not prepared to submit this issue to a referendum and if the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and principles governing the matter, enter into an arrangement by which Junagadh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce to such an arrangement.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]  
*Prime Minister of India*

<sup>1</sup>See the *Pakistan Times*, 11 September 1947.

<sup>2</sup>The Instrument of Accession was formally signed with Pakistan on 15 September 1947. See *Instruments of Accession*, 1-3.

<sup>3,4&5</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-163

*S. N. Bhutto to Liaquat Ali Khan*<sup>1</sup>

*F. 124 (8)-GG/24-7*

TOP SECRET  
MOST URGENT

JUNAGADH,  
16 September 1947

My dear Liaquat Ali Khan,

In my letter of September 14, 1947,<sup>2</sup> sent through Tazimi Sardar Ismail Abrahani, I had warned you of the preparations made by our neighbo[u]rs to attack Junagadh. The latest reports coming indicate definite plans<sup>3</sup> of organized attack on all sides, and it is feared that at any moment a fight might begin and Junagadh territory occupied by superior forces equipped with modern arms; while our resistance, supported by a small force, mostly irregulars and policemen, armed with old type crude weapons, would be powerless to stop any invasion of this kind.

The position is this: The Indian Dominion seem to have made out a perfect plan of strangling Junagadh on all fronts, internal and external, with the help of our own feudatories and *girassias* (*jagirdars*) who have been bought over with promises of independence and aggrandisement. About 150 villages held by feudatories and *Mulgirassias* including



Mangrol have been incited to accede to Indian Dominion and revolt against Junagadh. Mangrol, a Muslim vassal of Junagadh holding 21 villages, is reported to have entered into a pact with the Indian States Department and acceded to the Indian Dominion. Having entered into an understanding at Rajkot, He [Sheikh of Mangrol] is coming back to his capital where he expects help of 300 Gurkhas from the Indian States Department, should we assert our rights over him.

A contingent of 150 men, mostly Gurkhas, well equipped, are stationed on our Babariawad frontier (in Bhavnagar territory) within 1.5 mile from our Nageshri outpost. These are intended to help the Babariawad *girassias* who have unconstitutionally acceded to the Indian Union though they are mere *jagirdars* of Junagadh. They are threatening to loot our Junagadh treasury at Bherai or otherwise occupy our local administrative units in Babariawad Mahal.

On our other borders fronting Jamnagar, Gondal, Jetpur and Porbandar, about 300 men equally equipped have been posted to enter Junagadh territory at any given moment. Vaghania Darbar, a small estate in our territory, has organized a small force of 200 men with crude weapons to join the main attack when it comes.

The attitude of Manavadar, Sardargadh and Bantwa, jurisdictional Muslim States, surrounded by our territory, is still uncertain, They are wavering between Pakistan and India awaiting developments, being terribly nervous of the high-handedness of the States Department of the Indian Union.

The enemy strategy will be plain to you. Having set up our feudatories to accede, Indian Union will come to their aid with armed strength, the moment Junagadh interferes and asserts its rights over them.

As I had mentioned in my former letter, our supplies are being cut off. Such supplies, including food and petrol, consigned to Jamnagar and other ports for onward transmission to Junagadh have been withheld, communications are being threatened on all sides. Postal and telegraph services will stop and even otherwise hostility of staff makes unsatisfactory delivery of letters and messages. A bi-weekly air service we had with Karachi has been ordered to be discontinued from Friday, September 19. We have no wireless; neither is there any regular sea communication yet between Veraval and Karachi.

Non-Muslims are leaving Junagadh territory by sheer fright of threatened conflict. Perhaps to disturb our internal economy, *Rabaris* (shepherds) and *Kharwas* (Hindu sailors) are also being induced to leave Veraval and other places. Even defection of our State services is feared.

Meanwhile, Muslim refugees from disturbed parts of upper India are pouring in, relating their harrowing tales of woe and misery. Some



were attacked while asleep and those who escaped and caught the trains, were slaughtered on the way by stopping trains in jungle places. These brother Muslims who have come here are also threatened with extinction along with the rest in Junagadh and outside, numbering about 7 lakh.

I earnestly appeal to the Pakistan Government for help. First they should lodge a strong protest with the Indian Government to prevent any invasion of any areas included in Junagadh. The disputed rights, if any, may be decided by the two Dominions constitutionally on merits. I submit, Pakistan cannot allow Indian Union to take law in its own hand. In that case the consequences would be grave, not merely to Muslims in Kathiawar but in other parts of the sub-continent. Secondly, our morale has to be raised by actual armed assistance. Immediate landing of a fighter or a bomber with a spare Dakota on our airfield at Keshod would have the desired effect and enable us to keep communications with Pakistan.

It is also necessary that a battalion equipped with modern arms should be sent by sea to Veraval and arrangements should also be made to keep our sea communications steady and free from any interference. We have no shipping arrangements of our own and we have to depend on you at the moment for contact by sea. And such contact must be direct, as calls on coastal ports outside Junagadh territory will lead to detention of assistance by Indian Union.

We are greatly concerned with the safety of the Royal family and a Dakota will not merely keep the line of communications open but help any emergent evacuation. If a Dakota cannot be spared on loan we are ready to purchase one from you immediately.

I would emphasize that your action should be prompt and immediate. If Pakistan is unable to come to our rescue at this critical moment, we shall be finished. At least, kindly let us know what help you are giving or what line of action we should follow. His Highness and myself have complete confidence in His Excellency the Quaid-i-Azam who will see that Junagadh is not lost to Muslims.

To ensure safe delivery, I am sending this letter by several channels by air, by sea and by rail. Mr Asad, our District Superintendent of Police, who flies to Karachi with this letter, will apprise you further of the situation and our urgent defence requirements. Please send wire



telling us in code "yes" or "no", details may be conveyed through our emissary who has instructions to come back at once.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours  
S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1</sup>S. N. Bhutto sent a copy of the letter to M.W. Abbasi, PS to GG for placing it before Jinnah and urging him, on behalf of Junagadh, to take immediate action, as it was a life and death struggle for the State. See F. 124 (8)-GG/23. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable . However, see PS-160.

<sup>3</sup>See PS-166.

## PS-164

*Note by H. L. Ismay for Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

MOST SECRET AND PRIVATE

[NEW DELHI,]  
17 September 1947

The following [illegible] hastily dictated note gives my views on procedure:

Great wars often grow out of very small incidents, and the origins of war are searchingly examined by history and by contemporary world opinion. It is, therefore, essential to proceed along certain recognized channels:-

- i. However small the incident which may lead to trouble with a foreign State, the whole Cabinet must be consulted and give their decision.
  - ii. This decision is then communicated to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who are instructed to put in their appreciation, their estimate of the forces required, and the broad outline of their proposed operations. When these are approved by the Cabinet, directives are issued to the Commanders who are to carry out the operations, together with full details as to how neighbouring States, civil populations etc. are to be dealt with.
  - iii. Simultaneously, a demarche is made to the foreign State against whom the action is to be taken.
  - iv. A statement is made to the world at large, couched in the most careful language, describing what has happened and what it is proposed to do.
2. All these processes may seem to be making very heavy weather



of a very small thing, but they are absolutely essential. They can, if necessary, all be compressed within the space of 24 hours.

[H. L. ISMAY]

## PS-165

*M. A. Jinnah to Louis Mountbatten*

*Telegram,<sup>1</sup> F. 124 (8)-GG/28*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 251

*18 September 1947*

Understand<sup>2</sup> that there are large troop concentrations along the borders of Junagadh and other States in Kathiawar which have acceded to Pakistan. Trust that this information is incorrect. Any encroachment on Junagadh sovereignty or its territory would amount to hostile act. Kindly ensure that Indian Dominion troops or troops of States acceding to India do not violate Junagadh territory, under any pretext whatsoever.

[M. A. JINNAH]

<sup>1</sup>Repeated to Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.

<sup>2</sup>PS-166, para 8.

## PS-166

*Note by Alan Campbell-Johnson on Junagadh<sup>1</sup>*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

NEW DELHI,  
*19 September 1947*

In the middle of all our preoccupations with the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet, the news came through that the Pakistan Government had accepted the accession of the State of Junagadh. V. P. Menon, Secretary of the States Ministry, came to see me, and it is clear that a sharp and potentially grave crisis is upon us.

Junagadh is one of the Kathiawar States with a population of a little over 800,000 and an area of 404,000 [*sic*] square miles. It has a seaboard and a number of small ports, of which Vervana [*sic* for Veraval] is the most important. Its next door neighbours are Nawanagar and Baroda.



Apart from sea communications, it is completely surrounded by States which have acceded to the Dominion of India; moreover, right in the middle of Junagadh are whole pockets of territory which are actually not State territories at all but a part of the Indian Dominion. Over half of the Railway belongs to the Dominion. 80 per cent of the State's population are Hindus. The Nawab is a Muslim Prince, and the Muslims, 18 per cent, run the Government, administrative services, the Army and the Police.

2. In the tremendous rush of business at the time of the transfer of power, we allowed August 15th to pass by without having taken any special action to secure Junagadh's accession. No accusation can be levelled at the Government of India that it put undue pressure upon Junagadh, for although it was certainly their intention to enter into negotiations, a month has gone by without their making any move. Another opportunity of putting the matter right was lost during the course of Lord Ismay's visit to Pakistan. There was no direct reference to Junagadh during his long discussions with Mr Jinnah, for Lord Ismay was firmly under the impression that this matter was being handled by the two Prime Ministers. This, however, was not so.
3. In the light of what is going on in the State and subsequent developments, it is unfortunate that we did not act earlier, for on the 10th August a virtual coup, d'état took place there. A group of Sind[h]i Muslims took over the Government and the Nawab (a weak and eccentric character) became virtually a prisoner in his own palace. His Highness's chief hobby in life is dogs: I understand he organizes dogs' weddings and State holidays are instituted on these occasions. Various communications went from the States Ministry to His Highness, but, if they got through they were not answered. The Jam Saheb was refused permission to see him.
4. In the meanwhile, a considerable nerve war was waged by Pakistan, which included such lavish and fantastic promises as an offer of 8 crores to develop Junagadh's ports and 25,000 troops to garrison and "protect" her territory.<sup>2</sup> The fact that such projects were quite beyond Pakistan's resources did not make them any the less credible to Junagadh or even to Government circles here. By the time Menon approached me with the news that Pakistan had been ill-advised enough to accept Junagadh's accession, it was clear that the Cabinet took the gravest view of the position and were ready to take the strongest measures to bring Junagadh to heel, put a stop to Pakistan's "encroachments" and protect their own nationals.



5. One of the most serious features of the situation is its effect on the whole of the Government of India's accession policy, and in particular its impact upon the other Kathiawar Princes. I myself saw the Jam Sahib on ..., and he made it abundantly clear to me that unless the Government of India had the will and the capacity to bring Junagadh into the fold, the confidence of the Princes in the value of their own accession instruments would be shattered. Both Nawanagar and Baroda forces were being put into a state of readiness and would be expecting support.
6. A further complicating factor was the effect these developments in Junagadh might have upon the delicate negotiations going on with Hyderabad. If the Government of India was unable to assert itself over Junagadh, the extremist Muslim influences in Hyderabad would obviously be greatly encouraged.
7. I have no doubt in my own mind that Junagadh, with an 82 per cent Hindu population, had no business whatever to accede to Pakistan without at least ascertaining the will of its people, and that the actions of both Pakistan and Junagadh, if legally arguable, were morally indefensible.

But my chief concern was to prevent the Government committing itself to any act of war against Pakistan. At the same time, keeping in mind the state of tension which undoubtedly exists between the two Dominions, I was anxious to make it abundantly clear that I was in full sympathy with the Government taking all the necessary military precautions to safeguard its legitimate interests.

8. The vital Cabinet meeting to decide the Government's policy took place at 5 p.m on 17th September. The Cabinet had fully prepared itself to approve military measures.<sup>3</sup> Prior to the meeting, I saw both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, with Menon present. With all the force of persuasion I could muster, I advised them to take no decision which the world could interpret as putting India in the wrong and Pakistan in the right. All the resources of negotiation should first be exhausted. As Menon had himself pointed out, it was by no means certain that the Nawab had as yet actually signed the Instrument of Accession. In particular, I emphasized the view which Lord Ismay had put forward to Menon with great force—that the project of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was so fantastic from the military point of view, and such a liability politically and economically to Pakistan, that the whole thing had the appearance of a trap, and that the Pakistan Government was deliberately teasing the Indian Government into taking precipitate and aggressive



action. (Further reflection on the general tone of his talks with Mr Jinnah had convinced Lord Ismay that this was the real motive underlying Pakistan's action.) It was in fact primarily a propagandist move and part of a wider campaign which included appeals to UNO, etc. which Pakistan might be conducting to pose as the innocent small nation—the victim of the aggressive designs of its bullying large neighbour. The likely reaction of the world's press also encouraged the need for caution. However strong the case, the fact that the Government had pressed the issue at this particular time would gravely jeopardize the chances of favourable world reaction. I therefore urged that they should stand by the principle of a referendum which would make it clear that they had no intention of annexing territory (and that they should send Menon right away to make contact with the Nawab and find out the exact position about the Instrument).

9. I am glad to say that I was able to convince both Nehru and Patel of the soundness of this line. Nehru emphatically agreed, and Patel, who had come in a more militant frame of mind, was equally convinced. Nehru went straight in and had no difficulty in carrying the Cabinet, which was, of course, taken completely by surprise by his argument. I was amused to hear afterwards that what he said was almost a word for word paraphrase of my own plea to him.

The immediate danger has thus been warded off, but the affair is symbolic of the serious decline in the relations between the two Dominions, and is just the kind of incident which, unless it is properly gripped, could end in war, or a state of affairs perilously close to it.

<sup>1</sup>The note was sent to Erskine Crum, Conference Secretary to Louis Mountbatten.

<sup>2</sup>While Alan Campbell-Johnson admits that such "projects" were quite beyond Pakistan's resources, he has opted to include misleading information to discredit Pakistan. Factually, during the first 3-4 months after independence, Pakistan's financial health was precarious. Jinnah had to make public appeal on 12 September 1947 for funds needed for food, clothing and shelter for millions of destitute refugees and had to seek 10 million dollar loan from USA for tents, medicines etc., for refugees and agricultural machinery for economic rehabilitation of the agriculture sector. The Pakistan share of military stores and troops who opted for Pakistan remained blocked by India.

<sup>3</sup>The minutes of the Cabinet meeting held on 17 September, 1947 stated:

- a. Troops of the States which have acceded to the Indian Dominion should be suitably disposed round Junagadh and in the territory of the sub-States situated in the midst of Junagadh, which have acceded to India. No troops should occupy or remain in Junagadh territory.
- b. The Secretary, States Ministry, on behalf of the Government of India, should visit Junagadh and explain to the Nawab and the Dewan of the State the implications of their proposed accession to Pakistan.
- c. Economic measures such as the discontinuance of supplies of diesel oil and petrol from the territories of the Indian dominion and of the acceding States, also to be taken. See F. 200/90-A, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.



## PS-167

*Regional Commissioner, Rajkot to Ministry of States*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

MOST IMMEDIATE/CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 11809

[RAJKOT,]  
21 September 1947

Following letter delivered from Sheikh Saheb Mangrol this morning. Begins. "On invitation from Mr Menon, I came to see you at Residency about 10 a.m September 20th. With regard to our talk it was conveyed to me that I shall get my full independence together with my sovereign rights in regard to my non-jurisdictional villages also.

"In view of new prospects, in haste, without fully considering the consequences and constitutional implications, I signed Instrument of Accession. As Mr Menon was leaving immediately, I did not even get one hour to ponder over matter. On my return to Utara, I found myself most awkwardly placed and I honestly believe that I should not have signed Instrument of Accession. I also consulted my advisers and we all fully agree that Instrument of Accession should not have been signed and we also believe it might lead to some serious and grave consequences. I hereby renounce Instrument of Accession which I have signed this morning. If Mr Menon would have been here I would have done it personally but as he is away I formally renounce Instrument of Accession before you and my signature on it may kindly be regarded as withdrawn. As the Instrument of Accession that I signed this morning is not placed before His Excellency the Governor-General for Dominion of Indian Union and Dominion of India has not accepted it I request you to kindly convey denouncement of my accession and withdrawal of my signature signed on Instrument of Accession.

The note which I have signed separately may also be kindly regarded as renounced and withdrawn." Ends.

[RULER OF MANGROL]



## PS-168

*Louis Mountbatten to M. A. Jinnah**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/29-30*CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 34-GGNEW DELHI,  
22 September 1947

Reference your [GG-Pakistan] telegram No. 251 dated September 19th [18th]<sup>1</sup> regarding Junagadh. Information about large troop concentrations around Junagadh not correct,<sup>2</sup> (group omitted) about possibility of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan Dominion in teeth of opposition from its Hindu population of over 80 percent had given rise to serious concern and apprehensions to local population and all surrounding States which have acceded to Indian Dominion. Large scale military preparations of Junagadh and supply of arms and ammunition to its Muslim subjects—as it would be obviously intention of terrorising people of States as well as surrounding States—accentuated this uneasiness; and Government of India received appeals for suitable action both from people and these States. The Government of India have, therefore, sent a small force of troops to our own areas as a very natural counter-measure, particularly as most of our acceding States in affected areas have no armed forces of their own.

2. As regards accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, your attention is invited to our telegram<sup>3</sup> addressed to Prime Minister Pakistan and delivered personally at Government House, Karachi, by Lord Ismay on September 12th [which] explains fully Government of India's position regarding Junagadh. Pakistan Government have neither acknowledged receipt of our message nor replied to this and our previous despatches on the subject. Instead, Pakistan Government have unilaterally proceeded to action which, it was made plain, Government of India could never and do not acquiesce in. Each acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with friendly relations that should exist between two Dominions. This action of Pakistan is considered by Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in integrity of India by extending influence and boundaries of Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected. In these circumstances, I hope that it will be possible for you to prevail upon Government of Pakistan to reconsider their attitude on accession of Junagadh; but if matter is not reconsidered, responsibility of consequences



must, I am compelled to inform you, rest squarely on shoulders of the Pakistan Government. The Government of India are, however, still prepared to accept the verdict of people of Junagadh in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out under joint supervision of Indian and Junagadh Governments.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-165.

<sup>2</sup>PS-166, note 3.

<sup>3</sup>PS-162.

## PS-169

### JUNAGADH ENCROACHES ON UNION TERRITORY<sup>1</sup>

60,000 Flee from State in Panic

Kathiawar Rulers Appeal to Centre for Protection

EARLY ACTION NEEDED, SAYS JAM SAHEB

New Delhi, Monday.—“Junagadh, which has acceded to Pakistan, has encroached on the territory of the Indian Dominion. We acceded to the Indian Dominion with great pleasure and pride, but if it fails to protect the acceding States then we will have to revise our attitude, which will mean that the integrity and safety of the country will be jeopardized.” This stern warning was given at a Press conference today by the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, former Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes.

The Jam Saheb stated that more than 60,000 Hindu subjects of Junagadh had already fled from the State whose armed forces were all Muslim. The various small States were in panic because, besides its own forces, the Junagadh State had been reinforced by demobilized soldiers from the Punjab and had received other help from Pakistan.

His Highness further revealed that, having failed to pull off the Bhopal-Indore plan to cut the Indian Union in two, the Pakistan leaders fell back on Junagadh. This was part of a plan he had learned of some months ago of invading India from Junagadh in the north and Hyderabad in the south.

Although he stood for princely rights he suggested that the issue of Junagadh's accession to either Dominion should be settled by a plebiscite of the people. He felt that the Nawab was a prisoner of the Sindhi Muslim Ministers, who were agents of Pakistan, and had not acted freely.

In any case, the people, of whom 80 per cent were Hindus, should decide their future nationality. The people when consulted by the Nawab, told him they did not want to change their nationality. The Jam Saheb



remarked: "It is up to us to see that their nationality is not changed".

The Jam Saheb claimed that his suggestion for a plebiscite was intended to prevent India and Pakistan from going to war on the issue. He was sorry that the Government of India had not sent their forces yet to the troubled spot. They were not doing it probably because they wished to avoid troubles with Pakistan, but if they did not act quickly it would be too late.

The Jam Saheb said that he was really speaking more as pro-Muslim than pro-Hindu because a solution of the Junagadh problem would save the lives of 500,000 Muslims in Kathiawar. He appealed to the Muslim Rulers, like Bhopal, who have acceded to the Dominion of India, to intervene in the matter.

The Nawab of Junagadh, he said, must decide within a fortnight whether he would accept the proposal of a plebiscite. The Jam Saheb stated that Junagadh and other Muslim States in Kathiawar were better armed than the Hindu States because surplus arms were passed on to them by the Political Department authorities.

Junagadh, he explained, has a population of 650,000 [800,000]<sup>2</sup> out of 3,750,000 in Kathiawar. There are 13 Salute States, 19 non-Salute States and numerous Petty States, all numbering 268. In order to protect their flank the East India Company had declared all *jagirdars* independent. The result was that all States were interlaced, and Junagadh must be passed through to contact other States, as Junagadh, too, must pass through other States to reach its various territories. They could not be part of one Union. In fact, the Prime Minister of Junagadh had stated early in August: "Anyone, who says that Junagadh will part company with Kathiawar and join Pakistan is the enemy of Junagadh and Kathiawar." That was the position until August 15 after which date the Kathiawar Princes found themselves duped.

The Jam Saheb's statement left the impression that the situation confronting the Indian Dominion is the creation of a conspiracy between Muslim League leaders and the British officers of the Political Department, and that unless immediate steps are taken to throw out Junagadh's troops from Babariawad and Mangrol and a sense of security created in that territory, Kathiawar may blow up.

When a correspondent asked whether the Jam Saheb had met Sardar Patel, he replied: "Yes, I have. They are statesmen: they say nothing."

The Jam Saheb alleged, adds the A.P.I, that Junagadh forces had already violated Indian sovereignty and territory by going into Babariawad, which State had after detachment from Junagadh acceded to and whose accession had been accepted by the Dominion of India. "If a similar encroachment takes place in Mangrol, which is another State



which has acceded to India, we shall have two cases in which Junagadh forces will have taken the offensive and violated the sovereignty of India. If in spite of these encroachments the Indian Dominion keeps quiet then further encroachments will be made and there will be no end to this process.

“By accepting accession, the Indian Dominion assured protection to the people of Babariawad and Mangrol which pledge must be redeemed. Defensive action by the Indian Government in Babariawad is really overdue showing that the Indian Government is wishing to avoid a conflict by exhausting every possible means of a peaceful settlement. Any other country, and Pakistan itself, would have acted long ago if placed in the position of the Indian Government.”

He was convinced that “this attempt at having a pocket of Pakistan in the vital flank of India is a definite attempt on the part of Mr Jinnah and his advisers to seek to disrupt the unity, integrity and security of India which, if not checked in time, will assume a proportion which would make war inevitable between the two countries. War is at present unthinkable but it seems Mr Jinnah wants to force it on the Indian Dominion.

“We are not asking the Indian Government to encroach on or grab any Pakistan territory or Muslim population, but we are asking them to defend Indian integrity and Hindu contiguous areas from these infiltration tactics of Pakistan.”

The Jam Saheb revealed that Gondal and Jetpur States had appealed to the Dominion of India and the States Department and to him for troops and that he had sent his troops to those States.

He was told that the Pakistani sloop *Godawari*, was already on its way to Veraval (Junagadh). Not a single soldier or policeman of the Dominion of India had entered Junagadh territory. The Indian Dominion had sent nearly a battalion to Rajkot. But the railway police and posts and telegraphs in Junagadh belonged to the Dominion of India.

A question which might arise was whether Junagadh or Pakistan would regard it as an act of war or not if we sent troops to Mangrol, which had acceded to the Indian Union but which was set inside Junagadh territory. “It is for them to answer. But the Dominion of India had not moved any troops so far. Its nearest police—125 men—are out at a place just outside Babariawad..... But they have not entered Babariawad even though it is our own.”

The Jam Saheb declared that from his point of view, “it will be nothing less than an act of war” if Junagadh, after its encroachment on Babariawad—where it was reported to have 400 armed police—made a similar encroachment on Mangrol.”



Asked what value Junagadh had for Pakistan, the Jam Saheb said that it might be used as a "jumping off ground" for disrupting the Indian Dominion "by drives from Sind in north and Hyderabad in the south. This plan came into my possession eight months ago but I did not believe it and like everyone else I considered it fantastic. Nobody dreamt that Junagadh could possibly join Pakistan but has done so."

He stated that a country craft laden with men and arms sent to Junagadh was intercepted by India and it had not reached the port. But two other ships had arrived. The cargo consisted mostly of coal, fuel and grain but it was reported to include arms and ammunition.

The Jam Saheb said that he had been sent here by the Kathiawar States to impress upon the Indian Cabinet the depth of feeling of the Rulers and people of Kathiawar regarding the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and the seriousness of the situation arising from the decision of Junagadh.

#### IDENTITY OF PURPOSE

Junagadh representatives were all along stressing the identity of purpose and interests of all the Kathiawar States and declaring that anyone who said that Junagadh might join Pakistan was an enemy of Junagadh and Kathiawar.

The Prime Minister of Junagadh, Mr Abdul Qadir [*sic*], and the Constitutional Adviser, Mr Abdul Qadir's brother, advised Junagadh to join the Dominion of India. But the Prime Minister, who was in America for health reasons, was dismissed,<sup>3</sup> his house searched and property confiscated. The decision to join Pakistan was taken by the acting Prime Minister [*sic*], Mr Shah Nawaz Bhutto and other Sindhis.

"The people of the State are more than 80 per cent Hindus and a not negligible portion of the Muslim population are in favour of joining the Indian Dominion. It is only the Sindhi clique which has seized power and in whose hands the Nawab is virtually a prisoner, which has forced this decision on Junagadh with the help of some Pakistan public men, who, after trying their game in Bhopal and failing there because of the shrewdness and wisdom of Nawab of Bhopal, turned their eyes on Junagadh and took advantage of the personal weakness of the Ruler.

"I myself tried to see the Nawab but did not succeed in spite of our most cordial relations extending over several generations. Mr V.P. Menon who went there on behalf of the States Department was also unable to see the Nawab."

Junagadh was not the only State which was faced by the dilemma of Hindu majority with a Muslim Ruler, the other such States being Bhopal, Palanpur, Cambay, Rampur, Janjira, Sachin, Malerkotla, Tonk,



etc. All these Rulers, notwithstanding their natural sympathy for the Muslim State of Pakistan, finally decided in favour of joining the Indian Dominion because they knew that they could not avoid geographical compulsions and were not prepared to become playthings in the hands of "Muslim careerists from outside",

#### GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION

The case of Junagadh was even worse than that of the other States because of the interlacing of Junagadh territory with territories of the Indian Dominion and its acceding States, islands of Junagadh territory within acceding States and *vice versa*. The railway system was mixed up and incapable of separation. Mere accession from the sea coast did not alter the main geographical position and other factors.

The whole country was divided on the principle of contiguous majority areas, for example partition of Bengal, partition of the Punjab, referendum in the Frontier and plebiscite in Sylhet. The same principle must apply to States.

Although it had been stated that the Junagadh Government had assured the States Department of a fair deal and proper treatment of the Hindus of Junagadh, His Highness went on, "we who know what is going on are convinced that no reliance can be placed on them and that every attempt will be made to Muslimize the Hindu population and the Hindu territory.

"Already we have heard harrowing tales of abductions, rapes, conversions, dispossession of property, removal of Hindus from services and their exclusion from the military and police, desecration of temples and partiality in the matter of business and State patronage. Even the local Muslims are not getting their share and the administration is completely ridden by Muslims from Sind, the Punjab and Balochistan.

"Businessmen and merchants are leaving Junagadh and withdrawing assets from banks and daily thousands of refugees are coming from Junagadh into adjoining territories of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar, Porbandar, Rajkot, Gondal and Baroda. Every man entering into and leaving Junagadh is searched and the strictest watch is maintained over all visitors."

#### APPEAL TO MUSLIM RULERS

The Jam Saheb begged of the Nawab of Junagadh to reconsider his decision and requested the Muslim Rulers of States which had acceded to the Dominion of India to exert themselves and see that Junagadh took the right decision so as to avoid a conflict which otherwise seemed inevitable and which would certainly deteriorate into an intercommunal conflict with disastrous consequences to all.

His Highness particularly wanted to prevent the two Dominions



from entering into a conflict with each other in the first two months of their coming into existence. "A peaceful solution can still be found by holding a plebiscite and abiding by its result."

Although his appeal seemed to be entirely in favour of Hindus, actually he was protecting the Muslims "because if communal disturbances start in Kathiawar it will be Muslims who will be wiped out. I as a Ruler have to protect both Hindus and Muslims and my appeal, which may sound pro-Hindu, is actually in its effect pro-Muslim."

The Jam Saheb mentioned that his State now had 2,000 refugees from the Punjab, 2,000 from Sind and when he left on September 19, 5,000 from Junagadh. More refugees were coming in from Junagadh.

His Highness started off by observing, as he was removing his coat: "Gentlemen you know it is time to take off our coats vis-a-vis everything. We have kept it too long."

A correspondent asked whether the Government of India to whom the Jam Saheb was appealing to act, was not committed to non-violence. The Jam Saheb remarked: "Then God help us." (Laughter.)

<sup>1</sup>The *Hindustan Times*, 23 September 1947.

<sup>2</sup>PS-166.

<sup>3</sup>Annex.

*Annex to PS-169*  
*Note by Albert A. Rabida*

*US National Archives, 845 F. 00/10-2847*  
*[Extract]*

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, BOMBAY,  
15 October 1947

RESIGNATION OF KHAN BAHADUR ABDUL KADIR MOHAMMAD  
HUSSAIN, AS DEWAN OF JUNAGADH

After several weeks of fruitless probing, I finally managed last night to acquire some reliable information about the recent resignation of Abdul Kadir as Dewan of Junagadh. Abdul Kadir, his wife, his daughter and his son-in-law departed from India several months ago *en route* to England and the United States for a vacation and for medical treatment. Several weeks after their departure, a newspaper item reported that Abdul Kadir had "resigned" as Dewan "for reasons of health". I got to know him quite well during his various visits to Bombay prior to his departure, and I know that upon leaving Bombay for England and the United States he did not harbor the slightest intention of resigning. Prior



to his departure from Junagadh, he placed most of his State and personal affairs in the hands of his brother-in-law, and he was making extensive plans for the development of Junagadh State. I have been reliably informed that it was Abdul Kadir who decided upon the policy of accession to Pakistan. This policy, of course, was put into effect by his successor even after Abdul Kadir had himself been ousted.

At a cocktail party last night, a relative of Abdul Kadir's provided me with the following information which I am inclined to accept as authoritative:

The Nawab of Junagadh is a rather peculiar character, whose life is dominated by two major obsessions, his dogs and his servants, including menials in the Palace. There have always been several elements in Junagadh currying favor and attempting to entrench themselves in power. Following the departure of Abdul Kadir, an opposition group promptly attempted to assassinate his character, and this group provided the Nawab with a constant stream of propaganda which was intended to arouse the Nawab's suspicion of Abdul Kadir, and to result in the Dewan's downfall. The group in question was led by the Private Secretary of the Nawab (whose name sounds like Abrani [Sardar Ismail Abrahani].... While the opposition element in Junagadh has undoubtedly entrenched itself by this time and has consolidated its position with the Nawab, the political developments arising out of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan may well provide an opening for Abdul Kadir whose sagacity and advice were always valued by the Nawab.

The informant who provided the above information also stated that the maintenance of a political position in Junagadh was an extremely precarious task owing to the peculiar characteristics of the Nawab.

ALBERT A. RABIDA  
*American Vice -Consul*

PS-170

*G. S. Bajpai to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. 132 PS

[NEW DELHI,]  
24 September 1947

Your telegram No. 276,<sup>1</sup> dated 22nd September 1947 on accession of Mangrol to Indian Dominion. On the lapse of Paramountcy on the 15th August, Mangrol resumed its status as a separate State and accordingly by a Gazette Extraordinary issued on 14th September



the Sheikh of Mangrol had declared himself independent of Junagadh and proclaimed an announcement about the accession of Mangrol State in pursuance of his desire to accede to Dominion of India. The Sheikh Saheb of Mangrol has now signed an Instrument of Succession [*sic* for Accession] and Standstill Agreement which have been accepted by the Government of India. We have sent to Junagadh *Darbar* informing them of this fact and asking them not to violate Mangrol territory.

[G.S. BAJPAI]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-171

*M. A. Jinnah to Louis Mountbatten*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/31-3*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. 311

KARACHI,  
25 September 1947

Please convey following message from Governor-General Pakistan to Governor-General India:

2. Reference your telegram No. 34-GG dated 22nd September.<sup>1</sup> Representations of India Dominion including the one sent to us through Lord Ismay<sup>2</sup> totally misconceived and untenable. The position of Indian States is very clearly defined and it has been repeatedly accepted that after the lapse of Paramountcy every Indian State is Independent and Sovereign and free to join Pakistan or the India Dominion. You are now trying to import fresh criteria into this matter limiting the free exercise of choice by the States.

3. The division of British India, agreed upon between the Congress and the Muslim League, has nothing whatever to do with this as the question of States was dealt with quite separately and stands on a different footing. In these circumstances you will agree that Junagadh, like any other state, was entitled and free to join Pakistan and has done so.

4. We are really astonished at the view expressed by you which contains a threat to the Dominion of Pakistan that "such acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with friendly relations that should exist between two Dominions". India Dominion has no right of sovereignty, territorial or otherwise over Junagadh. We entirely fail to understand how accession of



Junagadh to Pakistan can be regarded as an encroachment upon India's sovereignty and as inconsistent with friendly relations between the two Dominions.

5. Regarding your suggestion for a plebiscite, this was a matter between the Ruler, the constituted authority, and the people of Junagadh.

6. We note that the concentration of troops in adjacent States is only intended as a precautionary measure to meet any possible trouble that may occur in those States that have acceded to India Dominion. We are informed authoritatively by Junagadh that your allegation that Junagadh has made large scale military preparations is totally unfounded. In the very nature of things, it is absurd to imagine that Junagadh can have aggressive designs on the neighbouring States. All that Junagadh desires is to be left alone in peace.

7. On the contrary, our information is that people from outside are fomenting trouble in the internal affairs of Junagadh. The Jam Saheb's latest statement<sup>3</sup> is misleading and mischievous and in many respects devoid of truth. On the face of it, it is a piece of clumsy propaganda by him and involves a direct threat of resorting to violence against the Muslim subjects of adjoining States. As a result, panic-stricken Muslims from adjoining States, who are threatened by Hindu rulers and their Hindu subjects, are pouring into Junagadh for safety. His gratuitous advice to Muslims and Junagadh that it is in their interest that Junagadh should join the India Dominion is wholly uncalled for. There are many objectionable features of this statement by the Jam Sahib which we need not go into detail in this context. The India Government should, however, take steps to stop such incitement to violence by a State that has acceded to the Indian Dominion.

8. I am repeating separately to you copy of a telegram<sup>4</sup> received today from the Dewan of Junagadh which speaks for itself. According to my information from all sources, the account given therein is substantially correct.

9. The cumulative effect of all the facts stated above makes Pakistan Government feel that India Dominion by their policy and action are infringing the sovereignty of Pakistan.

10. Your statement that India had been sending despatches on the subject to which Pakistan had given no reply is incorrect. When the matter was last raised with the Pakistan High Commissioner he explained quite correctly to Sardar Patel the Pakistan Government policy on the subject, and no further communication was considered necessary.

11. The alleged telegram from the Prime Minister India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan dated the 11th September<sup>5</sup> was brought by Lord



Ismaïl. It does not bear any number or certificate to the effect that its issue had been authorized. Indeed, it was gathered from Lord Ismaïl that the Minister<sup>6</sup> concerned had refused to sign the telegram.<sup>7</sup> In the circumstances, it was felt that no notice should be taken of the telegram until it was formally and officially communicated to us.

[M. A. JINNAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-168.

<sup>2</sup>See para 11.

<sup>3</sup>PS-169.

<sup>4</sup>PS-172.

<sup>5</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>6</sup>Vallabhbhai Patel.

<sup>7</sup>PS-184, para 7.

## PS-172

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/34-5*

CONFIDENTIAL / IMMEDIATE  
No. 313

KARACHI,  
25 September 1947

Below is text of telegram referred to in para 8 of the telegram No. 311<sup>1</sup> sent today:

Your telegram No. 350, September 22nd to H.H. Nawab Saheb has added to our surprise. Both Babariawad and Mangrol are integral parts of Junagadh territory and their accession to Indian Union is invalid. No single case of harassment has occurred in Junagadh territory in spite of provocative means employed by neighbouring States and India States Department. Our force in Babariawad is intended to maintain law and order and to protect State property and buildings. Attitude of Indian States Department is tantamount to invasion of Junagadh which forms now part of Pakistan. Mangrol made to sign an accession on September 20 without sufficient time to consider and realising his [Sheikh of Mangrol's] position as part of Junagadh territory has renounced it within an hour on same day in writing to Regional Commissioner at Rajkot. Mr Buch as States Secretary had meanwhile left for Bombay. He withdrew accession while document was still in hands of States Secretary who was on his way to Bombay long before it reached Delhi or Governor-General. As I explained personally to Mr Menon, the question can be settled between two Dominions who are pledged to maintain harmony between themselves and in their respective territory.



Complete tranquillity prevails in Junagadh. I again repeat, unless it is intended to invade part of Pakistan, two Dominions' representatives can meet and settle disputed questions [sic]. Any impartial committee welcome to see things throughout Junagadh territory where every soul is given due protection and no harassment of any kind exists [Ends.]

<sup>1</sup>PS-171.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-173

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

CONFIDENTIAL / IMMEDIATE  
No. 302

[KARACHI,]  
25 September 1947

Following message September 22nd received from Sheikh of Mangrol<sup>1</sup> to Governor-General Pakistan. *Begins:* I was invited by Mr Menon at Rajkot at 10.30 Saturday morning 20th and he made me sign Instrument of Accession to Dominion of India within half an hour saying he had to go immediately. Realising my hasty decision with all its political and constitutional implications and the serious and grave consequences it might lead to and after consulting my Advisers I renounced and withdrew my accession on the same day. As Mr Menon had left for Bombay, I submitted my renouncement and withdrawal of my accession to the Regional Commissioner at Rajkot and also requested him to convey my final decision of renouncement immediately to His Excellency the Governor-General, Indian Dominion and the Cabinet. Also requested him that my renouncement and withdrawal should reach there before the matter is finally decided. Then on the 22nd morning at eight I sent another telegram to Mr Menon conveying my final decision of renouncement. Under the circumstances, I would request Your Excellency to use your influence and see that no high-handedness is done to me. [Ends.]

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Also see PS-167.



## PS-174

*Communique on Junagadh*<sup>1</sup>*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A**[Extract]*SOURCE OF CONSTANT FRICTION:  
JUNAGADH'S ACTION DEPLORED

New Delhi, Sept. 25—The accession of Junagadh to the Dominion of Pakistan must, because of the geographical position of the State, and the interlacing of its communications with the surrounding States which have acceded to the Dominion of India, be a source of constant friction between Junagadh and the surrounding States, between Junagadh and the Dominion of India and ultimately, between the Dominions of India and Pakistan, says a communique issued by the States Ministry of the Government of India.

*[Paras 2 and 3 omitted]*<sup>2</sup>

A representative of Junagadh was present at this Conference and participated in its discussions. In his public statements, His Highness the Nawab has adhered to the principle of the solidarity of Kathiawar. Junagadh, however, never attempted to negotiate the terms of accession with the Dominion of India. On the other hand, without any warning, it was announced that the State had acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan, and that this accession had been accepted. Prior to the announcement, there were indications that Junagadh intended to accede to Pakistan. The Government of India immediately represented to the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan that the matter should be decided according to the wishes of the people of the State. No reply was received either to this or to a subsequent communication. The Government of India, therefore, decided to depute Mr V.P. Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States, to Junagadh with a personal message to His Highness the Nawab. The Dewan conveyed to Mr Menon His Highness's inability to see him. He could only see the Dewan who made the suggestion that the matter should be discussed at a conference with the representatives of the Dominions of India and Pakistan at which Junagadh should also be represented.

## DANGER TO SECURITY

The suggestion for a conference has not been followed up, either by the Dominion of Pakistan or by the State of Junagadh. Meanwhile, the Government of India have received representations from several acceding



States and areas in Kathiawar that they apprehend danger to their security and that large number of Hindus are fleeing from the Junagadh State. In any case, it is clear that the accession of Junagadh to the Dominion of Pakistan must, because of the geographical situation of the State and the interlacing of its communications with the surrounding States which have acceded to the Dominion of India, be a source of constant friction between Junagadh and the surrounding States, between Junagadh and the Dominion of India and ultimately between the Dominions of India and Pakistan.

The Government of India are determined to find a solution of this problem. Their sole aim is to see tranquillity maintained throughout Kathiawar. This can only be achieved if relations between all States are harmonious and the relationship of Junagadh to either of the two Dominions is left to be determined by a free expression of the will of the people of the State. To ascertain these wishes, the Government of India have suggested a referendum. They adhere to that suggestion. They are and will always be willing to find a solution of this complicated and delicate problem by friendly discussion with the Dominion of Pakistan and the State of Junagadh. They have an obligation to protect the interests of the States within and around Junagadh which have acceded to the Indian Dominion. This responsibility they will fully and faithfully discharge.

<sup>1</sup>The *Statesman*, 25 September 1947.

<sup>2</sup>These paragraphs dealt with geo-political status of Junagadh which stands covered elsewhere.

## PS-175

### JUNAGADH ANXIOUS TO KEEP PEACE

#### DEWANS'S REPLY TO JAM SAHEB<sup>1</sup>

Junagadh, Sept. 23—The fear of His Highness the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar that Junagadh will be a menace to Kathiawar is ill-conceived and not based on a proper appreciation of facts, said Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Dewan of Junagadh, in a statement today in reply to the views expressed by the Jam Saheb at a Press conference in New Delhi.

He added: "Junagadh as a Muslim State flourished in Kathiawar for centuries, and as long as the neighbouring States maintain the same friendly relations, as of old, there can never be any danger to the rest of Kathiawar. Junagadh is only too anxious to keep up harmony with all Rulers around. Unfortunately, threat of stopping communications is being put into effect except so far as railways are concerned, though this is contrary to the Standstill arrangement subsisting between Pakistan



and the Indian Union [*sic*]. We are devising other means to keep contact outside and confident that the Indian Union will not be misled by the shortsighted advice.

“The object in sending military aid to *thanas* on the borders of Junagadh does not seem to be for the protection of these areas, because Junagadh has not shown the least sign of interference with their integrity or their right to option on the lapse of Paramountcy. On the contrary, my information shows that the presence of military forces has been employed to press into submission many of those who wished to stand out from the Indian Union. I am inclined to think that the Indian States Department methods in bringing about accession of small units are not far different from those used by Col. Walker in 1807.

“Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan will not in the slightest degree affect the harmonious and friendly relations between the several Kathiawar Sates unless they themselves choose to bring about disruption of friendly relations which is not in the interest of Kathiawar or for that matter the Indian Union.

“Every protection is given to non-Muslims in Junagadh and their rights and privileges are fully safeguarded.<sup>2</sup> We are maintaining complete peace in Junagadh and I am happy to note that Mr Menon, Secretary, Indian Sates Department, advised the Hindus not to leave their homes in their own interests.”—API.

<sup>1</sup>The *Statesman*, 25 September 1947.

<sup>2</sup>Jam Saheb of Nawanagar in a press statement asked the Dewan of Junagadh: “If the Hindus were as safe as he had made out, then why so many of them were leaving the State.” See the *Statesman*, 26 September 1947.

## PS-176

### DECLARATION BY THE SUBJECTS OF JUNAGADH STATE<sup>1</sup> FORMATION OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*

25 September 1947

WHEREAS the Nawab of Junagadh has, against the declared wishes of an overwhelming majority of his subjects and under the influence of the agents of the Dominion of Pakistan, executed on 15th September 1947 an Instrument of Accession whereby the State is declared to have acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan;

AND WHEREAS the Dominion of Pakistan has accepted the said Instrument of Accession in disregard of such declared wishes and in defiance of all natural ties which bind the people of Junagadh, (80% of



whom are non-Muslim) to the people of Kathiawar and to the Dominion of India and in breach of the understanding on the basis of which certain parts of India were allowed to secede and form into a separate State of Pakistan; namely, that only contiguous areas predominantly inhabited by Muslims were to be included into the Dominion of Pakistan, with the free and willing consent of the people inhabiting those areas;

AND WHEREAS by his said act of executing the Instrument of Accession the Nawab has purported to transfer the allegiance of the subjects of his State against their will to the Dominion of Pakistan so as to compel them to be nationals of Pakistan which is a State foreign to them and formed with the object of providing a national home for Muslims;

AND WHEREAS before and after the said purported accession the authorities of the State under the guidance of the agents of Pakistan, and in the name of the Nawab armed a section of the Muslims of the State with a view to terrorise the subjects of the State and to preventing them from claiming self-determination and voicing their antagonism to the accession with the result that more than a hundred thousand of the subjects have already left and many more are leaving the State every day and the State authorities are infiltrating the State territories with Muslim refugees of other areas.

WE THE SUBJECTS OF JUNAGADH STATE HEREBY DECLARE that by transferring the allegiance of his subjects against their will to Pakistan and preparing for a reign of terror to coerce them to acquiesce in such transfer, the Nawab has forfeited his claim to the allegiance of his subjects;

WE HEREBY FURTHER DECLARE that the Dominion of Pakistan in accepting the said Instrument of Accession of the Nawab has violated the principle of self-determination as also the aforestated understanding on which Pakistan was agreed to be formed and that therefore the said Instrument of Accession is null and void and not binding on the subjects of the State or the territories thereof;

WE FURTHER DECLARE in exercise of our inherent right of self-determination our decision to accede to the Dominion of India and to join the territories of Junagadh State with the contiguous territories of the Dominion of India;

WE FURTHER DECLARE our firm and solemn resolve to adopt all such means and to take all such steps as may be necessary or incidental to the State of Junagadh formally acceding to the Dominion of India and forming and remaining an integral part thereof;

In furtherance of our said solemn declaration and resolve we hereby appoint a Provisional Government consisting of:



- |   |                             |   |                          |
|---|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| 1 | Samaldas Laxmidas Gandhi,   | 4 | Suragbhai Kalubhai Varu, |
|   | (President)                 | 5 | Manilal Sunderji Doshi,  |
| 2 | Durlabhji Keshavji Khetani, | 6 | Narendra Pragji Natwani, |
| 3 | Bhawanishanker A. Oza,      |   |                          |

with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15th September, 1947, over and in relation to the said State of Junagadh and all territories thereof, and WE HEREBY AUTHORIZE our said Provisional Government to take immediate steps for implementing and carrying out our said declaration and resolve and to exercise all power, authority and jurisdiction hereby conferred upon them;

AND WE HEREBY SOLEMNLY pledge our allegiance to the said Provisional Government and through it to the Dominion of India and call upon all the subjects of Junagadh State wherever resident to carry out loyally the orders and directions of the said Provisional Government.

<sup>1</sup>On 28 September 1947, U.N. Dhebar, Secretary, Kathiawar Political Conference, Rajkot, sent this Declaration to Mountbatten.

## PS-177

### STATES FREE TO JOIN EITHER DOMINION

#### Liaquat Ali's Rejoinder to Jam Saheb<sup>1</sup>

"The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either Dominion or to enter into treaty relations with either," said Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in a statement on Thursday in reply to the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar's observations<sup>2</sup> regarding the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.

He said: "My attention has been drawn to a recent press report containing observations of the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar regarding the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. The statement is full of untruths and contains observations that are not only ill-informed as to facts and the legal position, but in view of the communal frenzy which is sweeping the country at present, full of possibilities for incalculable evil. It is, therefore, necessary to place before the public the true picture.

"Firstly, it seems that, on principle, the Jam Saheb does not like the idea of Junagadh acceding to Pakistan. He sees in it an attempt to disrupt the unity, integrity and security of India, and calls upon the Indian Dominion to defend Indian integrity from 'these infiltration



tactics of Pakistan.' The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders before August 15 and the official spokesman of the Pakistan Government thereafter, have publicly declared their agreement with this view and have since rigorously stood by. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any States acceding to the Dominion of India. The Jam Saheb has attempted to raise a smokescreen by introducing sensationalism in connection with the very first State that has acceded to Pakistan."

He added: "The statement that Indian sovereignty and territory would be violated if Junagadh attempted to exercise control over Babariawad and Mangrol is equally mischievous. Babariawad consists of a group of *jagirdars* under the undisputed sovereignty of the Ruler of Junagadh.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Mangrol has voluntarily placed itself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh and has no separate entity as a State. Under the circumstances, there can be no question of either of these two areas validly acceding to the Indian Dominion independently of Junagadh.

"The Jam Saheb states that he is in possession of a scheme which shows exactly how the Indian Dominion would be disrupted by drives from Sind in the north and Hyderabad in the south. We are not aware of any such scheme, nor have we drawn up any but we are aware of the tactics followed by our enemies, who are in the habit of circulating so-called schemes merely to excite communal passions. It seems that the Jam Saheb has fallen an easy prey to the machinations of the enemies of Muslims and Muslim States."

Concluding, the Prime Minister said: "The Jam Saheb has hinted at the possibility of an armed conflict between the two Dominions, as also the wholesale massacre of the Muslim population of Kathiawar in the event of Junagadh sticking to its decision. In other words, this is intended to be a direct incitement to the non-Muslim population of Kathiawar, and particularly the non-Muslim States in that area, to resort to violent action against Junagadh Muslims. This is the most deplorable portion of a most reprehensible statement. It is hoped that the Government of India which is now responsible for the external policy of the Indian States acceding to it, will make it clear to the Jam Saheb, as well as to other States, that the result of such pronouncements can only bring disaster to all parties."—API

<sup>1</sup>The *Statesman*, 26 September 1947.

<sup>2</sup>PS-169.

<sup>3</sup>Annex.



*Annex to PS-177**Louis Mountbatten to Vallabhbhai Patel**Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

[NEW DELHI,]

29 September 1947

I noticed in the Press a day or two ago that Liaquat Ali Khan claimed that "Babariawad consists of a group of *jagirdars* under the undisputed sovereignty of the Ruler of Junagadh", and that "Mangrol has voluntarily placed itself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh and has no separate entity as a State."

I know, of course, that we hold a very different view on both matters, and that as regards Mangrol, Sir Walter Monckton unequivocally upholds our view.

Nevertheless, I wonder if there is any method, such as reference to some impartial tribunal which could settle this matter once and for all. The reason behind this suggestion is that I feel that if we are going to put troops into either of the disputed areas, we must be sure that in doing so we are acting with unchallengeable correctitude.

I will take this up later today if we can arrange a meeting.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

## PS-178

*Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru**Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

[NEW DELHI,]

27 September 1947

No. 20/11.

My dear Prime Minister,

I enclose a copy of a signed note<sup>1</sup> from Lord Ismay referring to paragraph 11 of telegram No. 311 of the 25th September,<sup>2</sup> from the Governor-General Pakistan to the Governor-General India, in which an allegation was made on which I have already given you my opinion, merely on my relative opinion of the characters of Mr Jinnah and Lord Ismay.

With reference to Lord Ismay's paragraph 2, I consider that this



deliberate lie should be refuted, and I would be grateful if the draft of the refutation could be shown to him before it is despatched.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Deputy Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely  
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>PS-171.

## PS-179

*Paper on Projected Operations in Kathiawar*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

TOP SECRET/IMMEDIATE

[NEW DELHI,]  
27 September 1947

The Hon'ble Sardar Baldev Singh,  
Minister for Defence.

We submit herewith a paper which we request should be brought to the notice of the Cabinet.

J.T.S. HALL  
Rear Admiral,  
F.O.C., R.I.N.

R.M.M. LOCKHART,  
General,  
C-in-C, Indian Army.

S. MUKERJEE  
Air Commodore,  
for A.M.C., R. I.A.F

### *Enclosure to PS-179*

#### PROJECTED OPERATIONS IN KATHIAWAR.

We are concerned at the possible results of the military measures being planned to protect the State of Mangrol and the *jagirdars* of Babariawad.

2. We consider that whatever plan is adopted there is a very real danger of a clash between our forces and that of Junagadh especially in Babariawad where Junagadh police are known to have been posted.

3. We wish to record our view that military action in Kathiawar might



lead Pakistan to support those States who have acceded to Pakistan, however illegitimate their right to accede to that Dominion may be.

4. The Commander-in-Chief Indian Army has previously urged that:

- a. The Indian Army for a variety of reasons was in no position successfully to conduct large scale operations.
- b. It was essential with the extremely critical situation prevailing in the Eastern Punjab and Delhi—a situation which in his opinion threatens the very existence of the Government of India—that nothing should be done which might lead to further demands for troops in other parts of India.

The Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy and the Deputy Air Commander endorse these views.

5. In brief, military action in Kathiawar may lead to war between the two Dominions and, with the bulk of the Army involved on internal security, the Army is in no position to wage war.

6. We would further remind the Government of the number of Indian Units located at present in Pakistan and the effect on maintenance and supply of the presence of many Pakistan personnel in our training and maintenance installations.

7. There is one other important factor—the position of British Officers of all three Services, including the three Armed Forces Commanders, serving with the Indian Forces. These officers belong to the British Fighting Services and it would be impossible for any of them to take part in a war between two Dominions or to be the instrument of planning or conveying orders to others should the operations now contemplated result in such a war, or appear likely so to do.

8. We therefore earnestly urge that the movement of Armed Forces for the projected operations be stopped and that the dispute regarding Junagadh be settled by negotiation.

J.T.S. HALL  
*Rear Admiral,  
F.O.C., R.I.N.*

R.M.M. LOCKHART,  
*General,  
C-in-C, Indian Army.*

S. MUKERJEE,  
*Air Commodore,  
for A.M.C., R.I.A.F.*



## PS-180

*Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

[NEW DELHI,]  
28 September 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I feel I must answer Gandhiji's letter. I have tried to do so without in any way involving you in attempting to turn down his enthusiasm for his new idea.

I believe I mentioned Liaquat's statement to me that night after you left, but I do not think I ever gave you my written version. So far as I can remember I have correctly reproduced his words.

When I remember how hotly I denied that any Indian leaders would ever start threatening Pakistan, you can imagine what cold shivers I got when I read Gandhiji's words, which so nearly fulfilled Liaquat's prophesy.

Do you think that it would be ill-advised of me to send the letter in its present form to Gandhiji? I would not like him to think I was criticizing him, and yet, it would be unfair to let him pursue a line which Liaquat and his friends would undoubtedly have been prophesying to as many of their foreign friends as they can reach, since his very fluent remarks to me gave me the impression that he had repeated them many times before.

I might add that he independently told me that India might well commit an act of war in Junagadh before any threat of war was actually mentioned by any of the leaders. In fact, he said to me (as I reported to you at the time) 'Let India go ahead and commit her act of war in Junagadh'.

I cannot conceal from you that in my opinion any continuation of Gandhiji's line about war,<sup>1</sup> or aggressive acts in disputed territory, brings war immeasurably nearer, and with it, the extinction of Indian culture for at least a generation. What would happen to the four and a half crores of Muslims in India if there were to be a war between the communities, as exemplified by India and Pakistan?

Forgive my writing so frankly, but Gandhiji's utterance and the



Junagadh situation me [*sic*] more than any other matters at present.

Yours very sincerely,  
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

<sup>1</sup>"If Pakistan persistently refused to see its proved error... the India Government would have to go to war against it". See No. 316, Vol. V, 347-8.

*Enclosure to PS-180*

*M. K Gandhi to Louis Mountbatten*

*26 September 1947*

Naturally, whatever suggestions I make, you are always free to share with the whole Cabinet. This is meant, however, for action by you not as Governor-General of the Union but as an English sailor of highest distinction, a successful statesman or diplomat in the true sense of the term and, what is perhaps the most important, as one belonging to the Royal family.

First suggestion is that Mr Attlee should ascertain in the best manner he knows who is overwhelmingly in the wrong and he should then withdraw every British officer in the service of the wrong party. Before this step is taken naturally many preliminaries will have to be gone through, none of which should occupy more than a few days. Naturally too, the two Dominions will have to agree to the procedure.

If the above step does not prove effective for the purpose, the second step will deliberately exclude the wrong Dominion from the Commonwealth. I know that none of the steps suggested by me will follow any precedent. Precedents are good only upto a certain point. They must be set aside when they defeat the ends of justice and equity.

In my opinion, nothing short of these steps, which may be falsely considered drastic, can deal with the drastic disease of the two parts of India. Here, there is no arrogation of piety or perfection. However, he claimed for the Union Government which has frankly and frequently admitted absence of hold on the people of the Union [*sic*]. It is contended that the Pakistan authorities have advanced the plea of non peccavi. If such is not the general case, my suggestions fall to pieces.

I am sorry I was unable to reach this in the morning as I had



intended to do. A stream of aggrieved people came including the *Maulanas* whom I was bound to see. Then came Pandit Kunzru and General Thimayya, who took between them two hours. These were followed by others. Hence I was able to reach this only after 5. 30 p.m. If there is any obscurity about my presentation I would gladly come.

[M. K. GANDHI]

## PS-181

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

SECRET AND PERSONAL

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI,  
28 September 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter<sup>1</sup> of the 28th enclosing a draft of a letter to be addressed to Gandhiji.

2. I have nothing to say about your draft. I am not quite sure, however, that you have got Gandhiji's meaning correctly. I have an idea that he meant something somewhat different from what you have suggested.

3. What Gandhiji said in one of his prayer meetings about war appears to have been misunderstood. I imagine he was giving a warning.

4. We had a long meeting of the Cabinet tonight lasting over 3.5 hours in which we discussed the Junagadh affair. There is considerable feeling over this matter. But what rather upset the Cabinet was a joint letter<sup>2</sup> from the Commander-in-Chief, the Air Marshal and the Flag Officer Commanding, the Indian Navy. This letter seemed to us very extraordinary. In effect it was an announcement that they could not carry out Government's policy in case they didn't agree with it. That is a position which hardly any Government can accept. The expert opinion of military commanders is of the utmost value in coming to any decision. But where questions of policy are concerned the decision must rest with the Government. The mention of British officers as such also creates a difficulty if they are to function only when they approve of the action taken by the Government.

5. We are having another Cabinet meeting tomorrow evening at 6 to



which we are inviting the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Hall and Air Marshal Elmhirst.

Yours sincerely  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

<sup>1</sup>PS-180.

<sup>2</sup>Enclosure to PS-179.

## PS-182

*Minutes of Cabinet Meeting of 28 September, 1947*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

SECRET

Case No. 296/51/47

NEW DELHI,  
28 September 1947

### JUNAGADH SITUATION

The Secretary, States Ministry, read out the telegram dated 25th September<sup>1</sup> of the Pakistan Government on Junagadh. This telegram repeated the assertion that Junagadh had every right to join Pakistan regardless of its territorial location, alleged that Junagadh had only peaceful intentions and argued that India should stop what it called incitement to violence from States that had acceded to India. It contained a petty and indeed frivolous legalistic argument about the message carried by Lord Ismay, attributed to the latter a statement which had been refuted by him as a mischievous lie, and referred to conversation between the Pakistan High Commissioner and the States Minister, which had never in fact taken place.

The Secretary, States Ministry, read out a draft reply which refuted the two untrue statements on questions of fact and, regarding Junagadh, referred to the press statement issued by India, on the 26th September,<sup>2</sup> [sic] which expressed fully India's views on the subject. The draft reply was approved by the Cabinet after discussion.

The general situation in Junagadh was also discussed. The Cabinet agreed to consider it further at a subsequent meeting.

<sup>1</sup>PS-171.

<sup>2</sup>PS-174.



## PS-183

*Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

[NEW DELHI,]  
28 September 1947

I have been thinking over the question of Junagadh which you told me last night was going to be discussed at a special meeting of the Cabinet at 5/30 p.m today, Sunday. You know the basic principle on which I am working, which can be quickly restated as follows:

"In the present inflamed condition of India and Pakistan any act taken by either Dominion which would involve soldiers of the two Dominions shooting against each other might well start a war which would be the end of India during our life time. Further, India's international position and prestige demands that she should not commit an act that might be regarded as responsible for precipitating this war.

"I have however a corollary to state, which I think I did not make clear last night. If any part of Indian territory, including of course Indian States, who have acceded to the Dominion of India, and whose accession is not in dispute, consider their security threatened by a State which has acceded to Pakistan, then the honour of India demands that this [sic for these] State[s] should be granted the protection to which their Instrument of Accession entitles them".

The difficulty in the case of Junagadh is the fact that some of the small Indian States which have acceded to us can only be reached by crossing Junagadh territory. Fortunately, some of Junagadh territory can only be reached by crossing Indian territory. I would consider it a perfectly proper proceeding if a military column were to proceed across Junagadh territory to provide a garrison for Indian territory which was inside Junagadh, provided that two conditions were fulfilled:

- a. that the column moved under the white flag of truce, carrying written instructions, which could be shown to Junagadh officers, that they were to proceed only to Indian territory, and on no account to violate Junagadh sovereignty. Furthermore, that the column received orders on no account to open fire, except in the final case of self-defence.
- b. that due notification was sent to the authorities, in this case the



Government of Pakistan and Junagadh, and I strongly recommend that a copy of this notification should be forwarded either through the various High Commissioners to the other dominions of the Commonwealth<sup>1</sup> or, if the Cabinet prefer, to UNO. In the latter case, it is well to remember that there are countries like Russia who always seem to delay matters. In this connection, it should be remembered that there are a lot of nations in UNO who might wish to take this opportunity of fishing in troubled waters. On the other hand, I do feel that our position would be strengthened if some other authorities were also informed of this notification and on the whole I personally think the other members of the Commonwealth would be best. I suggest that in this notification, a full admission should be made of the reciprocal rights of Junagadh (and Pakistan) forces to cross Indian territory if they wish to proceed to outlying Junagadh territory.

As regards the disputed states of Mangrol and Babariawad, I personally have no doubt that we are legally entitled to accept their accession to India, but it must be realized that this has been publicly disputed by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in his recent statement.<sup>2</sup> I therefore suggest that we should notify Pakistan and Junagadh that we are prepared to go to arbitration in the case of these two States, but that in the meanwhile to ensure that their inhabitants are not improperly interfered with, they should withdraw all Junagadh and Pakistan forces forthwith.

Personally, I entirely agree with the continuation of the military plans and precautions which we have had under discussion. I also renew my recommendation that we should make every endeavour to set up an adequate intelligence organization in that area forthwith, and that up to a dozen intelligence officers or agents should be sent to the area to make sure that we are furnished with reliable and up-to-date information.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>PS-177.



## PS-184

*Louis Mountbatten to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/36-7*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

No. 8093

NEW DELHI,

29 September 1947

Your telegram No. 311 dated September 25th [containing] message from Governor-General Pakistan to Governor-General India regarding Junagadh.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Government of India take strong exception to tone of message. Discourtesy neither resolves differences between governments nor is it compatible with established diplomatic usage.

3. The position of Indian Dominion in regard to accession of Junagadh is clearly set out in Government of India's press statement, text of which was telegraphed to you on September 25th<sup>2</sup> and they have nothing to add to it.

4. As regards your reference to press conference held by His Highness the Maharaja of Nawanagar, it may be mentioned that he was only voicing the sentiments of Rulers of Gujerat and Kathiawar. In a conference held in Bombay on September 26th these Rulers wholeheartedly endorsed the views expressed by His Highness the Jam Saheb in his press conference.

5. Government of India must point out that report of situation conveyed in paragraph No. 7 of your message is totally incorrect. They have made very careful enquiries into position in Junagadh and have unimpeachable evidence that not only have a large number of non-Muslims left Junagadh on account of insecurity of conditions there but also that there has not been single instance where a Muslim from adjoining States had to move to Junagadh for reasons of safety.

6. With reference to paragraph No. 10 of your telegram, I am to point out that States Ministry had, on September 6th, enquired from your High Commissioner here whether any reply had been received to their letter of August 21st regarding Junagadh. The High Commissioner replied on September 12th that he was awaiting your instructions. The Pakistan High Commissioner then went to Karachi and only returned on September 26th. Your High Commissioner never discussed and, indeed, owing to his absence, could not have discussed this question with Sardar Patel.

7. As regards paragraph 11 of your telegram, the facts are these. Lord Ismay was going to Karachi. The message from the Prime Minister India to the Prime Minister Pakistan, which would otherwise have



been telegraphed, was given to him to ensure safe and speedy delivery. It needed neither number nor certificate. Had Lord Ismay been able to deliver it to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in person, he would have explained how he happened to be entrusted with it. Since Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had left Karachi for Lahore before Lord Ismay could see him, message in question could not be delivered to Prime Minister of Pakistan personally. Lord Ismay has seen paragraph 11. He totally denies having said that the "Minister concerned had refused to sign the telegram" and says that from the time he left New Delhi until his return to this city, the word "Junagadh" did not cross his lips. The statement attributed to him is, therefore, devoid of foundation. The Government of India can only express their profound surprise and regret that the honour of a person of his integrity and long record of distinguished public service should have been impugned.

[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-171.

<sup>2</sup>PS-174.

## PS-185

*R. M. M. Lockhart to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW DELHI,  
29 September 1947]

My dear Prime Minister,

The Governor-General invited Rear-Admiral Hall, Air Commodore Mukerjee and myself to an informal meeting this afternoon, and read out paragraph IV of your letter of 28 September.<sup>1</sup>

Let me say at once that my colleague[s] and I are truly distressed that our joint memorandum<sup>2</sup> of the 27th on the subject of the Junagadh affair should have been so phrased as to convey the impression that we, your Military Advisers, were attempting to trespass outside our proper sphere. We have no doubt, on re-reading our letter, that it lends itself to misinterpretation, but assure you that nothing was farther from our intention. We accordingly desire to withdraw the letter.

At the same time, we feel that you should have our explanation of the circumstances in which it came to be written.

We had a talk with the Hon. Defence Member on morning of the 27th, and were left with the impression that he himself had already represented



to you, on lines similar to those expressed in our memorandum, the military aspects of the Junagadh preparations, and would welcome, if we thought fit, a joint paper on the subject.

I would add that this paper was written in a great hurry, and we were actuated by no other motive than a desire to do our duty, as Military Advisers, for the good of India.

There is a further point. We realize that our reference to British officers might more appropriately have formed the subject of a separate paper. The point that we were anxious to make was that at the present time all the British officers serving in India, whether at Supreme Headquarters or in the Armed Forces of India or Pakistan, are on a single list. We felt it incumbent on us to represent this.

The position will, of course, be entirely different when the two Governments have entered into new contracts with those officers whom they wish to retain.

This letter has been written in consultation with my colleagues who agree with it.

Yours sincerely,  
R.M.M. LOCKHART

<sup>1</sup>PS-181.

<sup>2</sup>See Enclosure to PS-179.

## PS-186

*Notes by Louis Mountbatten on Junagadh Crisis*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

TOP SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]  
29 September 1947

Mr V.P. Menon came to see me, while I was dressing, to inform me of what he considered the most serious crisis which had yet arisen. He told me that a complete split had occurred between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister over the policy about Junagadh.

I expressed my amazement, as I thought I had put up a policy which was agreed to by both and had even written a letter to them both which I thought they had accepted.

He told me that they had accepted it and in fact when they went to the Cabinet meeting at 5.30 p.m the previous day he thought all was going to be well. Unfortunately, however, at this meeting a letter was



produced which had been signed by the three service Commanders<sup>1</sup> (copy attached) which brought forth an absolute storm of protest on all hands, and caused consternation even among members like Mr Gopalaswami [Ayyangar]<sup>2</sup> who had been completely backing me over the need to support British officers after the Kunzru episode.<sup>3</sup> The Cabinet meeting had continued until 9.15 p.m. without any clear conclusion being arrived at.

Mr Menon informed me that it was the intention to hold a series of meetings later in the day (29th Sept.) with selected Members of the Cabinet and with the Commanders of the Armed Forces, which he thought would be very dangerous and might very well end in complete split and the resignation of the Deputy Prime Minister.

He explained to me that although he agreed that Pandit Nehru's reputation stood higher than ever before in the eyes of the world for the statesmanlike and unbiased policy he was following with such courage, in the communal state of mind that Hindus and Sikhs were now in, he was very unpopular in his own country and had lost all his following and might not even get in himself if there were another election.

Conversely, Sardar Patel, who had gone completely communal, was the embodiment of the feeling of the Hindu/Sikh majority, and his stock was now higher than it had ever been and he alone could really hold the Cabinet.

It followed that if Sardar Patel resigned, Nehru would be unable to carry on for long successfully and would bring about the fall of the Government.

I pointed out that if Pandit Nehru resigned, Sardar Patel's extreme communalism would soon plunge India into an untenable position; in fact we agreed that only the combination of these two could save India and that therefore everything must be done to try and avoid a split between them.

I saw Pandit Nehru at the meeting of the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet and the East Punjab Governor. He immediately told me briefly what had occurred and informed me that he had sent me a letter (copy attached)<sup>4</sup> explaining what had happened. I begged him to cancel all the meetings he had called and to put the matter completely in my hands which he gladly did.

I then saw Sardar Patel and asked him to come and see me at 6.30 p.m.

I asked Sardar Baldev Singh (who was at the meeting) to come and see me at 4 p.m.

I asked the Prime Minister to come and see me at 5.30 p.m and I



asked the C-in-C Indian Army (Sir Rob Lockhart) to see me immediately after the meeting.

General Lockhart came to see me at 11.40 when the meeting was over, and, on reading the Prime Minister's letter,<sup>5</sup> admitted that the paper signed by the three Commanders might easily be misread in the way the Prime Minister had misread it; but he pointed out that the Commanders had no intention whatever, either to offer political advice or to threaten the withdrawal of British officers.

I asked him to go away and think matters over during lunch as I had the Governor of East Punjab<sup>6</sup> to lunch. He came back at 3.15 when Lord Ismay and I persuaded him to write a letter to the Prime Minister on behalf of his colleagues asking for permission to withdraw their paper.

At 3:40 the other two Commanders, Rear Admiral Hall (F.O.C, R.I.N) and Air Commodore Mukerjee (representing A.O.C, R.I.A.F) joined the party and all three admitted their error and explained that this came from the great pressure they were working under without adequate staff and arrangements; and they agreed that a letter should be written asking that the paper should be withdrawn.

General Lockhart went away with Lord Ismay who drafted a letter, which General Lockhart signed and handed to me to give to the Prime Minister.<sup>7</sup>

When Sardar Baldev Singh arrived he told me how serious the situation was, and that he himself entirely agreed with the paper<sup>8</sup> put up by the Commanders, which he considered had to be said.

I pointed out to him that if he agreed with the paper, then he was the person who should have said it as his own thought and not the thought of his Commanders, since it was his business to put the political objections of committing an act of war against Junagadh to the Cabinet. He admitted this and agreed to my delivering the letter to the Prime Minister asking for the withdrawal of the offending paper.

After the Defence Minister left, I asked Mr V.P. Menon to come and see me. He told me that the worst had happened and that, before he had been able to prevent it, Sardar Patel had told Pandit Nehru that he intended to resign unless the Cabinet backed his aggressive policy against Junagadh.

I found Mr Menon himself in an emotional state, since he said that he shared Sardar Patel's view (although he was not a Gujarati like Sardar Patel) that the honour of those who had negotiated the Instruments of Accession with Indian States was at stake; "for", said he, "we have accepted the Instruments of Accession from Mangrol, Babariawad and some of the small States inside Junagadh. When they came to me for advice as to whether it was safe for them to accede, I naturally told



them that the Dominion of India would protect them. Now you tell me that I cannot use troops to protect them, and we are going to let them down."

(I should add here that a day or two ago, Mr Menon wanted to resign since he considered he was about to be dishonoured by the Cabinet policy, and that he should go and offer himself as a volunteer with a *lathi* to fight on behalf of the wronged States inside Junagadh against their oppressors. I offered to join him since I considered that I was in the same boat as he was; but I had great difficulty in cheering him up.)

I had a long talk with Mr Menon in the course of which I gradually brought him round. He pointed out to me that unless I were able to pull off another miracle (as he put it) the Government of India would split within the next 24 hours and disaster would overtake the country.

I admitted that I saw that the overriding necessity was not so much how to treat Junagadh but how to prevent the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister from breaking up at this vital juncture in the history of India.

On Mr V.P. Menon's advice I put off the Prime Minister at 5.30, and he came back at 6.30 with the Deputy Prime Minister. Thus I saw them both together in the presence of Mr V.P. Menon, and had nearly two hours of steering the situation round into safe waters.

In the course of a length[y] discussion where everybody spoke out freely, it became established that Sardar Patel's minimum requirements for remaining within the Government would be that strong line should be taken up in Kathiawar to show that the Dominion of India was not afraid of Pakistan or their machinations and did not intend to be bluffed by Mr Jinnah.

I pointed out that if the strong line included entering Junagadh (i.e. Pakistan) territory, then instead of defeating Mr Jinnah, Mr Jinnah would have defeated us; for surely it was exactly what he wanted that we should fall into the trap of committing a senseless act of aggression for which he could haul us before UNO. I said that all the high international prestige which India had achieved, all the ambassadors and embassies we had established abroad, and all the Corps Diplomatique which we were so assiduously collecting in Delhi, would become a liability instead of an asset; for we should assuredly lose our international position if we were to prove ourselves to be nothing more than out and out aggressors against international law.

Sardar Patel pointed out that the country that had lost its national position need not bother about her international position, and that the



Government would be for ever dishonest if they let down their own nationals in Kathiawar.

And so we went on fencing and manoeuvring and gradually pulling the position round, until finally with the assistance of Pandit Nehru, who no longer insisted on taking the case to UNO, we succeeded in reaching a compromise.

It became clearly established that Sardar Patel would not expect the armed forces or even the police forces of India to be sent into Junagadh territory. Pandit Nehru agreed and went so far as to say that he thought that the armed forces of India should not even cross Junagadh territory to get to some of the "islands" of Indian territory to protect them, not even under a flag of truce. I welcomed this declaration and said I supported it.

Sardar Patel, however, was still anxious that we should send forces to Babariawad and Mangrol, which he said were legally part of the Dominion of India now.

I pointed out that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had publicly declared that these two States were legally part of Pakistan through their not having the right to secede from Junagadh which had acceded to Pakistan.

I suggested that this case might be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal or to HMG, or to a Commonwealth conference, or to UNO, or to the Privy Council. But Sardar Patel said that he would in no circumstances lower the position of India by going to any court as a plaintiff. His view was that possession was 9 points of the law and that we should enter these territories and then defend our position at UNO if Mr Jinnah took us there.

I pointed out that since the legal opinion we had received showed that it was almost certain that international authority would uphold the accession of Mangrol and Babariawad (indeed Sir Walter Monckton had personally given me this view in his capacity as constitutional adviser to Mangrol of 10 years standing), we should have a good case at UNO; but I personally thought the case would be better if we brought it as plaintiff rather than have to defend ourselves on a charge brought by Mr Jinnah.

Sardar Patel would not agree; in fact he categorically said that he would never be the first to go to an outside authority in this matter.

I asked him if he was prepared to take the risk of an armed clash in these two territories, leading to war between the two Dominions if Mr Jinnah preferred this method rather than take us to UNO. Sardar Patel said he was ready to take this risk but that he thought it was very slight, since Pakistan was in no position to wage war.



I told him that my opinion of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's mental condition, when I saw him last, was that he was convinced in his own mind that India meant to make war and that it would be ready to take up the challenge and fight; and this was precisely the opinion that Lord Ismay had formed of Mr Jinnah after he had visited him in Karachi. In other words, however crazy it might seem, there was a good chance that Pakistan might fight.

I asked them both to consider the effect of a war between these two Dominions. They would be regarded as traitors by their respective Dominions if they diverted, to the purpose of prosecuting a senseless war, all the effort and the organized authority of the two Governments which was being concentrated on trying to stop the massacre and slaughter of women, children and old men now going on.

Not only would all the refugees in the East and West Punjab, who could not for several weeks cross the boundary, be massacred, but the millions of Hindus and Sikhs in East Bengal would probably fall victims to the Muslim majority; and 45 million of Muslims inside the Dominion of India would presumably be finished off sooner or later by the infuriated majority populations.

In fact, history would say that Hitler had a civilized war compared with such a war between the two Indian nations.

Pandit Nehru agreed and said that such a catastrophe was unthinkable; but Sardar Patel was firm and steady that although he agreed that it might be a disaster for India, it was better to face up to such a disaster than that the Indians should lose their honour.

I then said that I was sure that an intermediate course could be found. I suggested that we should continue loading tanks into the L.C.T at Bombay and to continue embarking the soldiers into sloops; but that this force, instead of being despatched to Veraval, where the risk of armed strife existed, should be despatched to the neighbouring State of Porbandar which had acceded to the Dominion of India and whose territory was not in question. I also suggested that the troops which it had been intended to send into Babariawad should be held back on Indian soil. I said I saw no objection to building up a strong force to the strength of a Brigade Group which would completely surround Junagadh, but remain on Indian territory. In fact I reluctantly agreed to a strong show of force provided no part of Junagadh territory and neither Mangrol nor Babariawad were invaded.

Sardar Patel said he would accept this provided the position of Mangrol and Babariawad could be reviewed a little later.

I deplored this and said that I considered they should pin their hope on the People's Provisional Government of Junagadh which



Mr Menon had so ably formed in Bombay under the leadership of Mr Gandhi's nephew, and which I understood had that day arrived at Rajkot in a beflagged special train.

Pandit Nehru entirely agreed. He said that this was a matter for the people, and that they should quickly establish their reign over those "island" territories in Junagadh within the Dominion of India, and later decide how to go into the other territories.

It was pointed out that funds, arms and volunteers were not likely to be lacking to help this rising in Junagadh.

I urged the Prime Minister to inform the Prime Minister of Pakistan of the impending movement of these forces to Kathiawar and to explain that there was no aggressive intention in them. I also urged him to make a statement of policy that in cases of States whose accession was disputed by the people or who had not yet acceded, the Dominion of India would accept a clear indication of the will of the people. I pointed out that this clearly applied in particular to States where the great majority of the population was of the opposite community to the Ruler, his Government, Police and Army. I told him that I thought such a declaration would help me in my negotiations with Hyderabad. But Pandit Nehru (revealing his well known emotional streak concerning Kashmir) said that he could not bring himself to frame a statement of policy in this form, since it might be taken to indicate that they were trying to discourage Kashmir from joining India. He told me that with the dismissal of the late Prime Minister of Kashmir, Pandit Kak, and the release on the previous day (28th September) of his friend Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the Nationalist Party, there was every indication that Kashmir wanted to accede to India.

I begged him not to consider accepting their accession unless it followed a really fair plebiscite or referendum; for I prophesied that there would be nothing but trouble in Kashmir and incidentally the Dominion of India if we did a sort of Junagadh with Kashmir on Pakistan.

He was prepared to make a statement about accepting a referendum or plebiscite, but not to include the remarks about the Ruler being of the opposite community, etc.; since he thought that so many of the Kashmiri Muslims were really disgusted with Pakistan.

I then referred to the unfortunate paper put in by the three Commanders, and freely admitted that I considered it to have been a most improper paper to have been submitted to the Cabinet. I then handed to the Prime Minister letter<sup>9</sup> from General Lockhart asking for the original paper to be withdrawn. This gave great pleasure to both the



Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who were much relieved at this particular impasse being broken.

I also explained to them that it was not a question of British officers as such refusing to carry out the Government policy if it did not suit them; but that the position at the moment was a very special one. On my own advice, the British officers of all the Indian Services had been transferred to their corresponding British Service and had been lent by the United Kingdom to the sub-continent of India. Some were serving both Dominions in the Supreme Headquarters and in joint establishments; others had been lent to the armed forces of Pakistan or of India. This arrangement, which was the only sensible way of carrying out the partition and reconstitution of the armed forces, was based on the assumption that the two Dominions would not be fighting each other. Now that the threat of war was actually being considered, it was more than ever essential that fresh contracts should be produced by the two Dominions to be entered into with those British officers whom they wished to retain and who were prepared to serve under the terms of those contracts. Even then, I warned them that most officers might want to make a clause allowing them to withdraw if their Dominion fought another member of the British Commonwealth; but that other officers might be prepared to stay on and throw in their lot with the Dominion of their determination.

I pointed out that I did not regret the present arrangement, since it was the fact that the armed forces of both Dominions were commanded and so largely officered by the British that was the final barrier against the two Dominions being drawn into a war against each other. But in the hysterical state that the leaders of both sides appeared to be in, this was no longer outside the bounds of probability.

I pointed out that the reason that this paper had gone forward direct to the Cabinet in its half-baked form was the same as had caused the delay and messiness about producing a prior military appreciation of the Junagadh situation and a directive for the Brigade Commander.

The only solution to my mind was to set up without delay a Defence Committee, and a Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the usual subordinate committees such as Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee.

Both the Ministers thought this was a grand idea and I arranged for Lord Ismay to draft a paper to be considered at a meeting of the Provisional Defence Committee to be held after the Emergency Committee of Cabinet meeting on the following day.

Mr V.P. Menon remained behind to express his great relief that the impasse had been resolved and the split in the Cabinet averted; though



I pointed out to him that the price we had had to pay was to bring appreciably nearer the danger of war.

In this connection two remarks which Mr Menon made to me at a previous discussion are worth recording. (i) That the Prime Minister had said that if the Cabinet at any time over-rode my advice, he himself would resign, (ii) That the Deputy Prime Minister had said that he had eaten out of my hand from the day I had arrived, and that, if I wished him to continue to do so, I must appreciate how seriously his honour was involved over the question of Junagadh.

<sup>1</sup>PS-179.

<sup>2</sup>Minister without portfolio.

<sup>3</sup>Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, Member, Council of State, was informed by Indian Defence Force officers that "British officers were going round their men painting gloomy pictures of what would happen after the British left". This question was discussed during an interview of Field Marshal Auchinleck with Mountbatten on 14 April 1947. See No. 138, *TP*, X, 226. Not printed.

<sup>4</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>5</sup>PS-181.

<sup>6</sup>Chandulal M. Trivedi.

<sup>7</sup>PS-185.

<sup>8</sup>See note 1 above.

<sup>9</sup>See note 7 above.

## PS-187

*Note by Jawaharlal Nehru on Projected Operations in Kathiawar*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-A*

SECRET/ IMMEDIATE

[NEW DELHI,]  
30 September 1947

It was decided at the meeting of the Cabinet on the 28th September, 1947 to hold another meeting the next day to which the Commander-in-Chief, the Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Navy and the Air Marshal should be invited. On further consideration of this matter and in consultation with some colleagues, it was felt that it would be better for me to meet the Commander-in-Chief separately first before asking him and the other Commanders to come to the Cabinet meeting. A Cabinet is a formal affair and it would be easier to discuss the various matters at issue informally first.

2. I wrote a letter to the Governor-General informing him that we have discussed at great length the Junagadh issue and that we have been considerably upset by the matter that the Commander-in-Chief and others had sent. The Governor-General requested me to postpone



the meeting of the Cabinet for a day or two to enable him to speak to the Commander-in-Chief and others by himself.

3. For these reasons the meeting of the Cabinet was postponed. The Governor-General met General Lockhart and, as a consequence of their meeting, General Lockhart sent me a letter dated the 29th September, 1947,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which I enclose. Subsequently, I met General Lockhart also. I have also discussed the matter at issue with General Cariappa.

4. As there is going to be a weekly meeting of the Cabinet tomorrow, I did not think it necessary to have a special meeting today.

5. After the Emergency Committee's meeting today a meeting was held at which the Governor-General, the Defence Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, the Vice Admiral and Commodore Mukerjee were present. I was also present. General Ismay, at the suggestion of the Governor-General, had prepared a note on the subject of a Defence Committee being constituted. This note was considered and generally approved and will be placed before the Cabinet tomorrow.

6. The situation in Junagadh was also fully discussed by me and the Deputy Prime Minister with the Governor-General yesterday. It was further discussed at the small Committee meeting referred to above. Provisional directions have been given in accordance with the general sense of the Cabinet meeting held on the 28th September, 1947. A fuller account will be placed before the next Cabinet meeting.

J[AWAHARLAL] NEHRU

<sup>1</sup>PS-185.

## PS-188

*Vallabhbhai Patel to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*

NEW DELHI,  
1 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten

Please refer to Your Excellency's letter dated the 29th September 1947<sup>1</sup> regarding Babariawad and Mangrol. Although Liaquat Ali Khan claims that "Mangrol has voluntarily placed itself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh and has no separate entity as a State", the facts are quite the reverse. The Sheikh of Mangrol himself issued a Gazette



Notification on the 15th September stating unequivocally that he was independent of Junagadh and that his State was quite distinct and separate from Junagadh. He further went on to say that he would announce his policy regarding accession shortly. He followed up this Notification by sending his Legal Adviser to Delhi to negotiate accession to the Indian Dominion. On advice being telegraphed by him to the Sheikh Sahib at Mangrol, the latter went to Rajkot, had further a full discussion with Menon and eventually signed the Instrument of Accession. All this would not have happened if it was true that Mangrol had "voluntarily placed himself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh." We have accepted the accession of Mangrol and it is Junagadh and Pakistan who claim that Mangrol had no right to accede apart from Junagadh. Thus, if I may say so, the boot is on the other leg, and it is really for Pakistan to seek arbitration in support of its claim against Mangrol. I do not see how, after having accepted the accession of Mangrol, we can ourselves suggest arbitration, an implication of which would be that we have accepted accession without being quite sure as to the correct status of Mangrol. The same principle applies to Babariawad.

2. If, however, Pakistan wishes and suggests arbitration, we shall be prepared to consider the request, but I am quite clear in my mind that the approach for arbitration must in both cases be made by Pakistan and not by us.

Yours sincerely,  
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

PS-189

*Note By Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*  
[Extract]

[NEW DELHI,]  
1 October 1947

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTERS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN  
BEFORE AND AFTER LUNCHEON

[Paras 1 to 3 omitted]

I drew Pandit Nehru aside and urged him to raise the question of



Junagadh with his opposite number at their discussion after lunch. Pandit Nehru politely declined and no amount of pressure would make him change his mind, since he said that Pakistan were so flagrantly in the wrong that it was for them to approach India and not vice versa.

I seized a fleeting moment before lunch to try and persuade Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to raise the subject of Junagadh. He was non-committal. "Why should I? We have done nothing wrong; if India are worried, let India raise it."

In this unsatisfactory frame of mind we all went into luncheon. This was fortunately a very fairly cheery meal.

*[Two paras omitted]*

I then went on to Junagadh. "Will you believe me that it is in your interest to raise the question of Junagadh yourself. Junagadh is being dealt with at present by the States Department. I leave it to you to consider which Minister in the present juncture is likely to be the most helpful and sympathetic. If you can introduce the subject now, I am confident that progress can be made." Liaquat finally assented somewhat grudgingly and said "If you really think it vital, I do not mind mentioning it."

*[Two paras omitted]*

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had taken my advice, and raised the matter, for it was my dearest wish, and ever since this subsidiary but extremely dangerous bone of contention has appeared, I have been doing everything in my power to get the matter discussed between the two Governments, and not left to unilateral action interspersed with angry telegrams.

We both stopped work and listened to the two Prime Ministers, and when they had got well launched on the subject, I drifted over casually and sat down with them. I was able to throw in my weight, I hope to some effect, on the question of Mangrol. I shook the Prime Minister of Pakistan visibly when I told him that no less a legal authority than Sir Walter Monckton had been the constitutional adviser of Mangrol for ten years, and that he had personally told me that for ten years he had held the view that until the removal of paramountcy, it would not be possible for Mangrol to cease being a vassal of Junagadh. Only recently he had told the Sheikh Sahib of Mangrol that with the removal of paramountcy, he would be as independent as Junagadh itself, and could sign any Instrument of Accession he wishes.

Sir Walter Monckton had told me he was not afraid of this information being challenged in any quarter of the world, and that he considered



it a crystal clear case.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan countered by saying that since the Ruler of Mangrol had, within an hour of signing the Instrument of Accession, sent a telegram withdrawing his signature, that this was bound to have reached me before I had accepted the Instrument of Accession, which was therefore null and void. I replied that so far as I remembered this telegram had not been received in Delhi before the return of Mr V.P. Menon with the Instrument of Accession, acceptance of which had been immediately authorized. In any case, the question of duress must be considered. The statement issued by the Nawab of Junagadh implied that the Sheikh Saheb of Mangrol had been forced to sign under duress. This could very easily be disproved by the fact that local Mangrol Constitutional Adviser had been sent to Delhi, and had been negotiating the question of accession to India, and had in fact telegraphed to his Ruler advising him to accede. The Ruler had brought two of his Ministers or Advisers with him. He would have been prevented from coming to see Mr V.P. Menon in Rajkot as Junagadh State authorities would not let his car travel across their territory, but the Jam Sahib had arranged for a motor car with Nawanagar number plates to take him, and it was by this means he had been enabled to come. The Sheikh Saheb did not sign the Instrument until after two and three quarter hours discussion, and had done so expressing the utmost satisfaction of being at last rid of Junagadh's shackles.

It was quite clear that he was way-laid on his way back, and it was under duress that he had been made to issue the telegram renouncing his accession. This would not be a pretty story if it came into court, and Pakistan's protege would have put his Dominion Government in a most awkward position.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that he had been told by Sir Zafrulla Khan that Mangrol could not secede from Junagadh otherwise they would never have accepted that position. In the light of what I told him about Sir Walter Monckton, he would have to consider the position.

Pandit Nehru then pointed out that the case of Babariawad was very similar, and that here again high legal opinion was to the effect that they had the right to accede to the Dominion of India, and leave all connections with Junagadh.

He called upon Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to order the withdrawal of Junagadh troops from Babariawad. At this moment, by a curious coincidence, a telegram was handed to me saying that Junagadh troops had entered Mangrol territory, and so Pandit Nehru added to the request that Junagadh troops should also be withdrawn from Mangrol territory.



He gave an undertaking that no troops of the Indian Dominion would be sent to Mangrol or Babariawad, until their legal position had been clearly established by some higher authority, provided that Junagadh troops were withdrawn.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan promised to give this matter his earnest consideration and seemed quite sincere about the way he spoke. He hastened to add that the Pakistan Government had no intention of complying with the request of the Ruler of Junagadh for Pakistan Dominion troops to be sent to the State.

Pandit Nehru expressed his satisfaction at this statement and assured Mr Liaquat Ali Khan that no troops of the Dominion of India (including of course Kathiawar States) would be permitted anywhere on Junagadh territory, nor even in Mangrol or Babariawad until their legal position was cleared.

I thought it politic at this stage to inform the Prime Minister of Pakistan that a company of soldiers accompanied by four tanks were being sent to Porbandar, and that other troops and forces were being gathered on Indian soil near Junagadh.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said rather bitterly "That savours of pressure and the intent to commit a hostile act". Pandit Nehru said very vehemently "Not at all, we have no intention of committing a hostile act, but we are protecting all peoples of this State whom Junagadh's action had frightened so much.

I added "The Government of India intend to set up a brigade headquarters to control not only our troops but those of the Indian States round Junagadh, to make quite certain that no unfortunate incident occurs.

Pandit Nehru added "Yes, we are determined that no hostile act should be committed by any Indian troops, but we also consider the whole question of Junagadh must be reviewed."

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that they had spent more than a fortnight considering whether to accept Junagadh's offer to accede, since they realized the various difficulties that this would raise. However, in view of the fact that the Government was a Muslim Government, and that Junagadh was such a short distance from Pakistan, and that the ports of Veraval and Karachi were within easy reach of each other, they felt that they should not turn down the Nawab's offer.

I admitted the legality of their acceptance of this Instrument of Accession, but said "You may have been legally in the right, but morally you are in the wrong; your action is ethically indefensible."

Pandit Nehru said that he considered that in difficult cases like this,



the will of the people should be ascertained, and that India would always be willing to abide by a decision obtained by a general election, plebiscite or referendum, provided it were conducted in a fair and proper manner.

I went on to stress the importance of this statement of Pandit Nehru's which, I assured Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, was a statement of Government policy by which they would abide. I said I was sure that Pandit Nehru would agree that this policy would apply to any other State, and that India would never be a party to trying to get a State to join their Dominion against the wishes of the majority. Pandit Nehru nodded his head sadly; Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's eyes sparkled; and there is no doubt that the same thought was in each of their minds "Kashmir."

At this moment, Lord Ismay brought the revised version of the Government statement which was agreed to by both Prime Ministers. Fortunately he was present throughout most of the discussion, and I hope heard the salient things that were said, but in case there was any doubt about this, I informed Mr Liaquat Ali Khan that Lord Ismay would be proceeding to England at the end of the week and would be spending a night at Karachi. That in my view there was no doubt that Mr Attlee and H.M.G. would question him closely on the Junagadh affair, and that I would like to summarize the position briefly for him. I did this, and asked the two Prime Ministers whether they agreed with my summary. They both agreed. Lord Ismay then pointed out that the situation by Friday might be greatly changed, and suggested that if it were agreeable, the latest information might be telegraphed to him at the end of the week through Sir Terence Shone. Both Prime Ministers agreed to this.

Although nothing concrete was achieved at this meeting, we have started to take the first steps away from the brink of war which we have been gradually edging up to until today.

PS-190

*S. N. Bhutto to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/38  
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*

SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE

JUNAGADH,  
1 October 1947

Situation very serious.<sup>1</sup> Please send immediately aeroplane and suitable



naval ship to evacuate Royal Family.

S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1</sup>PS-165.

## PS-191

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/42*

CONFIDENTIAL / IMMEDIATE  
No. 323/72-Primin

NEW DELHI,  
2 October 1947

In conversation yesterday<sup>1</sup> regarding Junagadh and connected matters, I informed you that it was our intention to issue a communique to public and that we were anxious to find a peaceful and amicable solution of this problem. I pointed out that presence of Junagadh forces in Babariawad was an act of aggression and a constant irritant to the people of neighbouring States which have acceded to the Dominion of India. It appears that Junagadh troops have also gone to Mangrol and thus a further act of aggression has been committed. It is difficult for any conversations to be carried on in a peaceful atmosphere if armed forces occupy disputed territories. I have urged upon you, therefore, to have Junagadh forces both in Babariawad and Mangrol withdrawn immediately. I trust steps will be taken to this end without delay. This will relieve the present tension and enable us to proceed towards finding an amicable solution in consonance with wishes of people of territories affected. As I have already informed you, a detachment of troops is being sent by us to Porbandar in response to requests made by our acceding States in Kathiawar for protection. Certain State Forces in Kathiawar will also guard frontiers. They have instructions not to enter the territory of Junagadh. I shall be grateful for early reply. I shall await your reply before issuing a press communique.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-189.



## PS-192

*S. M. Yusuf to M. Ikramullah**F. 124 (8)-GG/41**2 October 1947*

My dear Ikramullah,

Please refer to your letter dated the 2nd October 1947,<sup>1</sup> regarding Junagadh. The Quaid-i-Azam approves the draft telegram sent by you but commends for your consideration the addition of the following at the end of the telegram:

Besides Lord Ismay was not an authorized agent or representative of the Govt. of India. He really came to Karachi as it was understood that, if and when necessary, he would act as liaison officer between Governor-General of India and the Governor-General of Pakistan and, therefore, as between the two Governments he was not in a position to discuss the subject matter, but merely handed over the message entrusted to him.

Please don't hesitate to redraft the above in case you think it necessary to incorporate it in the telegram.

Yours sincerely,  
S. M. YUSUF

<sup>1</sup>See F. 124 (8)-GG/39. Not printed.

## PS-193

*M. Ikramullah to G. S. Bajpai**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/43-6*

KARACHI,

*2 October 1947*

No. 411

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 8093,<sup>1</sup> dated the 29th September 1947.

2. We regret to note that you have taken exception to the tone of our message and consider it discourteous. We have carefully examined the message and have failed to find in that communication anything to which you could justifiably take exception and we regret that you have not pointed out the portions to which you object. In our opinion our message contained nothing but a free and frank statement of facts.<sup>2</sup>

3. *Paragraph 3* of your message. We have already replied to your message which you issued to the press regarding the accession of



Junagadh and have stated that we totally disagree with you.

4. *Paragraph 4.* Your statement that Jam Saheb was expressing the sentiments of the Rulers of Kathiawar in the press statement objected to by us in no way meets our point. Whether Jam Saheb was expressing his own views or was voicing the sentiments of others, the fact remains that it was a most objectionable statement and likely to lead to trouble; and since Nawanagar has acceded to India, we expect India Dominion to see that such statements are not made.

5. *Paragraph 5.* We regret to have to say that your statement regarding the position in Junagadh is wholly incorrect. In one of his letters the Dewan has stated as follows:

But strangely enough the Musalmans from the neighbouring States entering Junagadh are not allowed to bring anything with them except their clothes, and the movements of the Muslim subjects of Junagadh in the neighbouring States are being watched and in Gondal some were actually killed.

Following are extracts from message in yesterday morning's teleprinter:

The Provisional Government of Junagadh struck its first blow against Junagadh's authority when members of the volunteer corps accompanying the Provisional Government took possession of the Junagadh State House in the centre of Rajkot this afternoon. Armed young men are now guarding the entrances and exits to Junagadh House over which the tricolour flag flies.

A few hours after the Junagadh House was taken over, the Provisional Government renamed it as Azad Junagadh House and announced that the House would be their headquarter.

When youthful volunteers of the Provisional Government scaled the walls of the Junagadh House this afternoon they had in their possession a letter from the President of the Provisional Government Mr Samaldas Gandhi, asking those in charge of the House to surrender peacefully. There were, however, only some servants taking charge of the House—some ten of them—who were taken into custody.

In the absence of Mr Samaldas Gandhi who was held up in Jamnagar, Mr Durlabhji Khetani, Vice-President of the Provisional Government, unfurled the flag. Following him other ministers of the Provisional Government—Bhawanishankar Oza, Natwani and S. K. Varu Balwantrai Mehta, Vice-President of the All India States People's Conference and Mr Jethalal Joshi, President of the Rajkot Praja Mandal, told the gathering that the people of Kathiawar who had always been at the helm of struggle for freedom must not now lag behind in this struggle.

This attempt to set up a parallel government for Junagadh in your territory cannot but be described as an unfriendly act towards Pakistan. It is regrettable that subversive activities against Junagadh State are not only being carried out but actually encouraged by certain authorities. Crimes



against person and property of Junagadh State subjects are being committed in adjoining areas of India Dominion. To permit your subjects or subjects of any State which has acceded to the India Dominion to carry on these subversive activities constitutes a breach of the constitutional and international obligations imposed on the India Government. We may also point out that some of the actions of the India Government to harass the Junagadh State have emboldened such people, e.g., in clear violation of the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, the India Government has stopped all communications, mail, telegraphic and telephonic, between Junagadh State and the outside world and an attempt is being made to starve the State into submission. We trust that with a view to avoiding further deterioration in the situation, India Government would take immediate action not only to restore the Junagadh property which has been usurped at Rajkot but would also lift the boycott of Junagadh territory.

6. *Paragraph 6.* There seems to be some misunderstanding. Mr V. P. Menon, Secretary, States Department of the India Government, wrote a demi-official letter<sup>3</sup> to our High Commissioner on the 21st August 1947. On the same date our High Commissioner met Sardar Patel and held discussions with him about Junagadh. Our High Commissioner explained the point of view of the Pakistan Government with regard to the legal and the constitutional position regarding accession of States to either Dominion, as laid down in authoritative public statements. He subsequently informed us of this. As the position explained by the High Commissioner to Sardar Patel was in accordance with the oft-declared policy of the Pakistan Government, it was not considered necessary to send further confirmation. At that time, Junagadh had not acceded to Pakistan. A number of States including Junagadh were negotiating with Pakistan. They were told of the constitutional position and no attempt was made by us to persuade them to join one or the other Dominion. Besides, it would be improper to negotiate with the India Dominion the question of accession of Junagadh without Junagadh being a party to it. The moment Junagadh, freely and of its own accord, decided to join Pakistan Dominion, official communications to that effect were sent by us to your Government but not until then.

7. *Paragraph 7.* It was never intended to impugn the honour and integrity of Lord Ismay, who is held in high esteem by everyone. In fact we were making use of his authority to explain what actually had happened. The fact that the message that he brought was un-numbered and un-attested, was noticed and he was naturally questioned about it. In reply he said that the Minister who had handed it over to him did not sign it. We merely conveyed these facts to you and do not



see any ground for accusing us for impugning the honour and integrity of Lord Ismay.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-184.

<sup>2</sup>PS-171.

<sup>3</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-194

*S. N. Bhutto to M. Ikramullah  
(Copy to M. A. Jinnah)*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/47*

SECRET

AMAN MAHAL, JUNAGADH,  
3 October 1947

My dear Mr Ikramullah,

I enclose a copy of the telegram<sup>1</sup> which I have sent you this morning by wireless. It briefly summarises the position as it stands today. My repeated messages must have given you clear idea that the situation here has completely deteriorated. Unless the Pakistan Government sends us some assistance it will be difficult to keep up the morale of our people. It is reported that an attack is imminent on the Babariawad frontier. If this takes place as it follows the forceful possession of our Junagadh House at Rajkot by the agitators, you can well imagine how the events are affecting our prestige and may even lead to an armed conflict which we are anxious to avoid. The Indian Union has taken the [*sic* for to] aggression already this morning, forcibly entering Sardargadh Taluka with Military and Police and imposing management. I have already sent you a telegram, copy attached.<sup>2</sup> Sardargadh had already signed Accession Instrument on 26th September and because of the unsafe transport by post, I had to hold up the documents to be sent by a special messenger. Mr Asad, the bearer of this note, brings you these four Instruments of Accession of Sardargadh, Sultanabad, Bantwa, Chhota Majmu and Kamadia. He will personally explain to you our entire situation and our immediate requirements which I have repeatedly mentioned in my telegrams. It is essential that we should have aeroplanes at our disposal and also an armed force. I only trust, before this messenger reaches you, we are not overwhelmed by superior forces hanging over us.

Yours sincerely,  
S. N. BHUTTO

<sup>1&2</sup>Not traceable.



## PS-195

*H. L. Ismay to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*  
[*Extract*]

[NEW DELHI,]  
3 October 1947

The following are the salient features of a very long talk that I had with Pandit Nehru this morning.

[*Items 1-3 omitted*]

4. *Junagadh*

Mr Nehru said that although Junagadh was legally entitled to accede to Pakistan, the Government of India were not prepared to accept this accession, owing to the geographical complications caused by the fact that the other Kathiawar States and Junagadh were inextricably interlaced. Thus there were Junagadh islands in Indian territory and Indian islands in Junagadh territory. In addition, there was the complication of Mangrol and Babariawad, both of whom the Nawab of Junagadh claimed to be his feudatories. The Government of India, after consulting legal opinion, did not accept this claim. Junagadh had put troops into both these States, and the other Kathiawar States had thereupon demanded the protection to which they were entitled from the Government of India.

He (Nehru) had had a long talk with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan about this. They had both expressed their determination to settle the matter amicably. Mr Nehru had suggested that the Junagadh troops should forthwith evacuate Mangrol and Babariawad, and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had said that he would consider doing so. Mr Nehru added that the Government of India proposed to send troops to Porbandar to assure the neighbouring States of their safety. It had originally been their intention to announce the despatch of these troops to Pakistan [*sic*] and to the world at large, but on further consideration he (Mr Nehru) had decided that, as a first step he would send a telegram to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan reminding him of their conversation and asking him to expedite the withdrawal of Junagadh troops from Mangrol and Babariawad.



## PS-196

*Buch<sup>1</sup> to Secretary, States Department*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*

MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. RS-45.

RAJKOT,  
3 October 1947

Following telegram received from Dewan Gondal: *Begins*. His Highness Maharaja Saheb of Gondal has issued the following communique: The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan has become question of grave concern to all the States and their people in Kathiawar and especially to the neighbouring States. Some of the villages of Gondal State as well as other States are situated in the midst of Junagadh territory and it is feared that the safety of these people will be jeopardized. Moreover the happy relations of the Hindus and Muslims which have been very cordial up till now will also be marred by this accession. The geographical position of Junagadh in the peninsula of Kathiawar is such that its accession to Pakistan will endanger the peace and tranquillity of the whole of Kathiawar. It is earnestly hoped that all possible efforts will be made by the Dominions of India and Pakistan to restore Junagadh to its proper and legitimate place as an integral part of Kathiawar. *Ends*. Please arrange publicity through radio and otherwise.

[BUCH]

<sup>1</sup>Regional Commissioner, States Department, India.

## PS-197

*Minutes of Second Defence Committee meeting*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*

[*Extract*]

TOP SECRET

[NEW DELHI,]  
4 October 1947

Item 1: *Junagadh*

The Paper<sup>1</sup> before the meeting, which had been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff in accordance with decision reached at a previous meeting, contained:

- a. An appreciation of the situation involving the despatch of forces



to Kathiawar for the purpose laid down by the Cabinet.

- b. A directive to Brigadier Gurdial Singh, Indian Army, who had been selected to command the Kathiawar Defence Force.
- c. A draft press communique to be issued to the press on the 4th October, 1947.

All the members of the Committee remarked on the excellent standard of preparation and presentation of this Paper.

Minor amendments to the communique were suggested and agreed. It was decided that this should be issued that evening.

It was agreed to make the following amendments to the appreciation:-

- (i) The words "from Junagadh State" should be deleted from paragraph 1 (a).
- (ii) Appendix B should be amended to show that Sardargadh and Bantwa were among those States which had acceded and were friendly; and by adding reference to the disputed States of Mangrol and Babariawad.

#### *The Contiguity of Porbandar and Mangrol*

The Chiefs of Staff stated that they had been informed by the ex-Dewan of Mangrol, who was now State Advisor, that Mangrol was not contiguous to Porbandar; the two States were six miles apart via the coast[al] road. On the other hand, Mr Menon said that the Ministry of States had received a telegram from the Maharaja of Porbandar to the effect that the two States were contiguous. The importance of discovering which of these two views was correct was emphasized; the Officer commanding the Porbandar detachment should be asked to find out and report.

#### *The Prime Minister's Conversation with the Prime Minister of Pakistan*

The Prime Minister recalled that it had been intended that the Government of India should issue a further statement on the Junagadh position, four or five days previously. However, the matter had been discussed<sup>2</sup> between himself and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on 1st October and the draft statement, together with a telegram which it had been intended to send to the Government of Pakistan, were now somewhat out of date. He had suggested to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan at this meeting that the disputed territories of Mangrol and Babariawad should be free from aggression from either side. On the same day, however, news had been received that Junagadh forces had entered Mangrol. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had promised to look into this.

The Governor-General said that he had thought that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, in the course of his conversations with the Prime Minister, had appeared visibly shaken when told that Sir Walter Monckton, who



had been Constitutional Adviser to Mangrol for some years, had given his view that the State was free to accede to India. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had said that he would have to consider the legal position afresh. The Prime Minister had suggested the possibility of a plebiscite in Junagadh to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, and the latter had given the impression that he would not be altogether averse to one taking place so long as this was made a generally accepted principle.

The Governor-General also confirmed that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had, during the course of these conversations, declared that it was not the intention of Pakistan to send troops to Junagadh.

*Telegrams between the Governments of India and Pakistan*

The Prime Minister stated that he had, the day after seeing Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, sent him the following telegram:<sup>3</sup>

The Prime Minister went on to say that he had just received a further telegram from the Government of Pakistan, which was not in reply to the one above but which dealt with a previous one sent by the Government of India. This reply from Pakistan reiterated the opinion that the speech made by the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar was objectionable; alleged that Muslims entering Junagadh were not allowed to take in their belongings with them; described as an unfriendly act the setting up of a Provisional Government at Rajkot; regretted what were described as "certain subversive activities"; referred to an alleged stoppage of telegraphic and telephonic communications from Junagadh; asked that any boycott in force should be lifted and that the property of Junagadh in Rajkot should be restored; referred to a letter which Mr Menon was alleged to have sent to the Pakistan High Commissioner on 21st August,<sup>4</sup> and a supposed interview between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Pakistan High Commissioner that day; and finished up by saying that it had never been intended to impugn the honour and integrity of Lord Ismay.

The Governor-General said that he understood that Lord Ismay, who had spent the previous night in Karachi, had intended to take up this latter point himself. He pointed out that this latest telegram from Pakistan was not based on the conversations which the Prime Minister had had with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, who had probably not been consulted in the drafting of it.

Two further telegrams from the Pakistan Government were then considered. One asked that there should be immediate retrocession by the Government of India of their jurisdiction over the railways in Junagadh State territory. The other asked that the Posts and Telegraphs of the State should be handed over immediately to the Pakistan Government.



The Governor-General pointed out that under Clause 7 of the Indian Independence Act, either the Ruler of Junagadh or the Government of India had the right to denounce the Standstill Agreements over communications which had been made. The Minister Without Portfolio<sup>5</sup> said that the sense of the proviso to sub-clause (b) of this clause was that agreements in force before 15th August should be given effect to the maximum extent possible until they were denounced by the Ruler of the State or by the Dominion concerned. He pointed out that, if it was agreed to hand over the Posts and Telegraphs to Pakistan, this would be tantamount to recognition of the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan by India.

The Prime Minister said that the Government did not admit Junagadh's right to accede to Pakistan, and could not therefore agree to handing over the Posts and Telegraphs to Pakistan. He mentioned that there was also a Meteorological Station in Junagadh from which the Government of India personnel had been withdrawn and which had been handed over to Junagadh by error.

During further discussion [on] the replies to be sent to the various telegrams from the Government of Pakistan, the following points were made:-

- a. The Government of India was not interfering with the Provisional Government; the Government of Pakistan should not interfere either; the issue should be left to the people of Junagadh to decide;
- b. The Government of India should again insist on the withdrawal of Junagadh forces from Babariawad and Mangrol; if this demand was finally refused, it would have to be decided what action India was to take.

Mr Menon undertook to draft, for despatch by the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, a reply to the three telegrams from Pakistan under discussion.

*The Grounds for Challenging the Accession of Junagadh to Pakistan*

The Prime Minister reiterated that the Government of India's policy was not to recognize the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. The main ground on which this policy was based was that the accession had not been in accordance with the will of the people.

The Minister Without Portfolio said that he did not consider that the language used in the Indian Independence Act necessarily admitted even the legal right of Junagadh to accede to Pakistan. At any rate it was possible to argue that it did not. It was to be noted that the word "States" rather than "Rulers of State[s]" was used in the relevant part Clause 2 (4) of the Act.



The Deputy Prime Minister said that he agreed that the main ground for challenging Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was that it was in violation of the will of the people. But there were other strong factors—for example, the geographical situation of the State and the fact that it was interlaced with territory belonging to India and to States which had acceded to India. Furthermore, the accession did not fit into the general principle on which the division of India had been effected. The relevant Clause of the Indian Independence Act should be interpreted in the light of that background.

The Governor-General suggested that the grounds for challenging the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan should be made the subject of a note by Constitutional lawyers.

#### *Referendum in Junagadh*

The Prime Minister stated that the Government of India held the view that the correct solution for Junagadh was to find out the desire of the people of that State by a free expression of their will.

The Deputy Prime Minister pointed out that the Provisional Government had declared their willingness to abide by the result of a referendum in Junagadh. He also recalled that the Dewan of Junagadh had given his personal opinion in favour of a referendum in the presence of Mr V.P. Menon and two other witnesses. But the present Government of Junagadh had never claimed that it represented the will of the people.

The Prime Minister pointed out that a referendum could only be held under the authority which was in control of Junagadh.

#### *Legal position of Babariawad and Mangrol*

Mr Menon gave his view that the accession of both Babariawad and Mangrol to India were founded on a strong legal case. In the case of the former, the lapse of Paramountcy had involved the lapse of the whole of the treaty which had been in force between Junagadh and Babariawad, and the position had reverted to what it had been in 1863.

The Governor-General recalled that Pakistan still challenged the legal basis for these accessions; he asked whether the question could be referred to any court for decision.

The Deputy Prime Minister gave his view that, if the Government of India supported Babariawad and Mangrol militarily, the question of Junagadh itself would speedily be settled.

#### *Military action to be taken in certain contingencies*

- a. The Minister Without Portfolio suggested that the possibility of interference by Pakistan, in the event of the Provisional Government obtaining control of parts of Junagadh territory, must be



reckoned with. The acceptance by Pakistan of Junagadh's accession implied that Pakistan had undertaken responsibility for the defence of the State.

During discussion, it was considered unlikely that there would be any interference by Pakistan so long as only the nine pockets of Junagadh territory surrounded by other territory were concerned; and that some time would elapse before the Provisional Government might start to move into the main Junagadh territory itself. No decision on the action to be taken if Pakistan interfered in the latter circumstance could be taken at the present stage.

- b. The Committee considered that, if Junagadh forces were sent to the "outlying" pockets of Junagadh territory, it would be best not to stop them: but to let them go through, and isolate them in these pockets. The Commander of the Kathiawar Defence Force should then refer to the Chiefs of Staff for further orders.
- c. Mr Menon asked what action it was considered should be taken if Junagadh troops forcibly occupied post offices, etc. The Governor-General suggested that any attempt at such action should result in communications being immediately cut off.
- d. The Governor-General proposed, and it was agreed, that the Chiefs of Staff should direct the Commander of the Kathiawar Defence Force to formulate a plan to occupy Babariawad and Mangrol with the object of avoiding an exchange of shots, as far as possible.
- e. The Committee considered that it was highly improbable that the Company Group being sent to Jafarabad would be attacked by Junagadh forces. It was pointed out that Jafarabad was a dependency of a State which had acceded to India. If Junagadh were to attack it, there would be every justification for taking full measures.

#### *Main Kathiawar Defence Force*

The Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, reported that the Brigade Group was likely to be in position within 10-14 days.

It was agreed that the Chiefs of Staff should draft a further press communique concerning the command and concentration of this force.

The Committee directed the Chiefs of Staff to instruct the Commander, Kathiawar Defence Force, to prepare a plan for the occupation of Babariawad and Mangrol, in case this was ordered, with the object of reducing to a minimum any exchange of shots with Junagadh



forces in these territories;

<sup>1</sup>Annex.

<sup>2</sup>PS-189.

<sup>3</sup>For text, see PS-191.

<sup>4</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>5</sup>Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

*Annex to PS-197*

JOINT APPRECIATION ON THE SITUATION IN KATHIAWAR  
BY CHIEFS OF STAFF ARMED FORCES, INDIA

TOP SECRET  
Cos-1 / 47

NEW DELHI,  
3 October 1947

We submit for the consideration and approval of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet:

- a. An appreciation of the situation involving the despatch of forces to Kathiawar for the purpose laid down by the Cabinet.<sup>1</sup>
- b: A directive to Brigadier Gurdial Singh, Indian Army, who has been selected to command the Kathiawar Defence Force.<sup>2</sup>
- c. A draft press communique to be issued to the press on the 4th October 1947.<sup>3</sup>

J.T.S. HALL  
Rear-Admiral  
*Flag officer Commanding,*  
*Royal Indian Navy*  
R.M.M. LOCKHART  
General  
*Commander-in-Chief,*  
*Indian Army*  
T.W. ELMHIRST  
Air Marshal  
*Air Marshal Commanding,*  
*Royal Indian Air Force*

<sup>1</sup>Annexure I to Annex entitled Joint Appreciation on the Situation in Kathiawar, dated 2 October 1947, along with Appendix B: List of Friendly States around Junagadh which have offered assistance to India, and those who are unfriendly or Indifferent. Appendix C: Rail and Road Communications in Kathiawar. Appendix D: Junagadh Forces. Appendix E: Forces Available to India from Friendly States and the Crown Representative Police (C.R.P). Appendix F: Political Map of Kathiawar. See F. 200/90-B, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Annexure II: Composition of Forces to be allocated to the Commander, Kathiawar Defence Force. See *ibid.* Not printed.

<sup>3</sup>Not traceable.



*Annexure to Annex to PS-197*

## A NOTE ON JUNAGADH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA

The situation in Junagadh has become serious because of its accession to Pakistan. We do not agree to this accession because of the various reasons. But the strict legal fact of accession in terms of HMG's statement certainly gives a certain advantage to Pakistan in regard to Junagadh. Any steps that we may take in or around Junagadh thus might affect Pakistan. The conflict is, therefore, between India and Pakistan. It would be easy to deal with Junagadh separately or with Mangrol or Babariawad. But the intrusion of Pakistan creates difficulties and complications.

2. There is a three-fold aspect to this question;

*Junagadh, Mangrol and Babariawad.* Our position is that both Mangrol and Babariawad have acceded to the Indian Union and no other authority has any right to intervene there. Our case in regard to both these territories is legally and constitutionally strong, and from other points of view also it is good. As regards Junagadh, the strictly legal position may not help us greatly at present. But otherwise it is entirely wrong for Junagadh to accede to Pakistan with which it is nowhere in touch. Geographically it must belong to the Indian Union and so far as its population is concerned there can be little doubt that over 80 per cent desire union with India. Accession to Pakistan is thus an outrage on the sentiment of this 80 per cent and an affront to geography.

3. Pakistan claims that both Mangrol and Babariawad are, in some ways, in a subordinate relation to Junagadh and therefore they become automatically parts of Pakistan when Junagadh acceded to it. This claim has little basis in law. But the fact that it is made means that any action that we might take in regard to Mangrol and Babariawad may be described by Pakistan as aggression on Pakistan territory.

4. Mangrol, after acceding to the Indian Union, tried to resile from it. This it could not do in law. Now the Ruler has declared that his Sate is independent, whatever that might mean.

5. Babariawad has been occupied recently by some Junagadh forces or military police in order to justify the claim that this little State is subordinate to Junagadh. According to us this is clear aggression on the territory of an acceding State to the Indian Union. This act of aggression has been deeply resented not only by the people of Babariawad but by the other acceding States in Kathiawar, and the



Government of India have been asked to render them assistance in resisting this aggression and protect them in every way.

6. It is clear that the Government of India must, in honour, bound [to] give the protection which it has undertaken to provide. If this is not done and Junagadh's aggression is tolerated, then the prestige of the Government of India suffers greatly with disastrous results in Kathiawar and in other States. This is likely to affect the position of Hyderabad (Deccan) also. It may be followed by other acts of aggression by Pakistan authorities. Each particular act may be relatively small. But it will help in breaking up the States acceding to the Indian Union. Thus it is clear that we cannot accept or tolerate the aggression of Junagadh in Babariawad.

7. The question arises as to what steps the Government of India should take to meet this aggression. We have asked the Pakistan Government and Junagadh to withdraw their forces from Babariawad. But they have refused to do so. These forces are small in numbers and there is no difficulty, from the military point of view, in pushing them out. The only difficulty that arises is the possibility of conflict with Pakistan leading to some incident which might provoke a war.

8. The Government of India does not want a war with Pakistan or anyone else and would like to avoid it at almost every cost. War at any time is to be avoided. At the present juncture there are three additional reasons for it to be avoided:

- a. The Government of India, in its present form, is a new State which has had no time to settle down.
- b. The army is in a process of reorganization and any warlike adventure may delay this process and do grave injury to the army in India.
- c. The grave crisis through which we are passing, more especially in the Punjab and in Delhi.

9. Any war with Pakistan would undoubtedly end in the defeat and ruin of Pakistan provided no other nations are dragged in. At the same time it may well mean the ruin of India also for a considerable time. A war with Pakistan at this juncture would necessarily lead to very grave consequences. The non-Muslim refugees in the West Punjab would remain where they are and the danger to their lives would increase very greatly. The process of bringing them over to India would stop. This means putting a million or two million people in peril of their lives. This also means a far greater number of Muslims in India being put in peril of their lives. In the existing temper of the



country, Muslims are unsafe in some parts of India. With war being declared, people's minds will be still further inflamed and it might be impossible for the Government of India to protect Muslims all over India.

10. The fate of these vast numbers of Muslims in India and non-Muslims in West Punjab, Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind might well be a terrible one and might horrify the world. Our international position, such as it is, would disappear.

11. It is exceedingly likely that Pakistan also does not want war, and has taken the steps it has, chiefly to irritate us and to make us take some false step so that they can appeal to UNO or some other international authority. They have gambled on the off-chance of the Government of India accepting their aggression as inevitable in their desire to avoid armed conflict. Nevertheless, when two countries come into conflict in this way, shooting may well take place and this leads to war.

12. We have thus to keep in mind two major factors:

- a. The necessity of taking speedy and effective action to give protection to the people of Babariawad and to make the Kathiawar States as well as other States realize that we propose to give them protection when necessary;
- b. To avoid being drawn into a war or into an unfavourable position in the U.N.O.

13. What then is to be done? For the present it would be desirable not to deal with Mangrol separately. There are no Pakistan troops there. Nor need we take up the bigger Junagadh problem in a military sense. The Babariawad question we have to tackle soon. At the same time we have to keep in mind that the main issue in Kathiawar for us today is that of Junagadh. The rest flows from this.

14. In Junagadh an important development has taken place. A provisional Government has been established by Junagadh subjects and this Government has already reached Rajkot. How this Government will function, it is not known. But there can be little doubt that it will make the position of the Ruler of Junagadh difficult in the extreme. It will probably function in many parts of Junagadh territory, more specially the "islands" which are cut off from the main bloc. If these "islands" have to be reached by passage through Indian Union territory, then they will be completely isolated from Junagadh itself. One immediate result of this popular movement in Junagadh will be the employment and dispersal of Junagadh forces.

15. It is proposed that the following immediate steps be taken:



- a. India forces, including tanks, etc., should be sent immediately from Bombay to Porbandar in Kathiawar. They will land there and await further orders.
- b. The forces of other States in Kathiawar, which have acceded to the Union, should be employed in guarding the frontiers between Junagadh and other States.
- c. Some forces or military police should be sent by the Government of India to the borders of Babariawad. They should go via India territory and must not pass through Junagadh territory without special orders.

16. This disposition of India forces all round Junagadh and at the very borders of Mangrol and Babariawad will necessarily produce a powerful impression [on] the parties concerned. Public opinion in India will be satisfied that something at least has been done. Public opinion in Kathiawar will be reassured.

17. Our naval sloops and some airplanes should also be kept handy for such use as may be necessary in Kathiawar. All these arrangements will indicate to all concerned that we mean business. At the same time the movement led by the Provisional Government of Junagadh would also have a very sobering effect on the Nawab of Junagadh and an exhilarating effect on other States. No one will be able to say that the Government of India has not come to the assistance of Babariawad. At the same time, we will have avoided any act which may be described as aggressive and leading possibly to armed conflict.

18. What our next step is going to be will depend largely on developments, more specially the future of the Provisional Government of Junagadh. The Government of India will remain in constant touch with the situation and will issue orders and directions in regard to the steps to be taken from time to time. Till definite orders are received from the Government of India, there should be no entry into Babariawad or Mangrol. Our forces must remain near the frontiers of these States.

19. The forces we gather in Kathiawar should be enough to deal with the whole Junagadh problem if necessary.

20. This course of action will give immediate protection even to the people in Babariawad. It will shake up the security of Junagadh and be a continuous danger to Pakistan in Kathiawar. If any further aggressive step is taken by the Pakistan authorities in Kathiawar, we must immediately counter it. It may be that circumstances may compel us to march our troops into Junagadh town itself. That will have to be



decided later according to developments. But it must be remembered that the essential problem before us is that of Junagadh, and Mangrol and Babariawad are just off-shoots of it. Our policy must be based on this fact. What has been suggested above fits in with this policy and at the same time avoids war unless Pakistan Government desire to force the issue. In this event, of course, we have to deal with them in every way we can.

21. It is conceivable that at some stage Pakistan may appeal to U.N.O. and U.N.O. might issue some directions or suggestions. If so, we shall naturally abide by these directions. There appears to be no particular reason why we should go to the U.N.O. direct on this issue. The policy outlined above will keep the initiative in our hands, will exercise a strangling pressure on Junagadh State, will make people in Kathiawar and elsewhere realize that we are actively dealing with the situation, and at the same time avoid an armed conflict leading to war.

22. The Cabinet or the Defence Committee will, of course, remain in constant touch with the situation and will issue orders from time to time about future steps to be taken by our forces.

23. It is desirable that the Pakistan Government as well as the public generally should be informed .

- a. that we do not accept, in the peculiar circumstances, the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan;
- b. that we entirely disagree with the claims and contentions of Pakistan in regard to Mangrol and Babariawad;
- c. that the Pakistan Government must withdraw Junagadh forces from Babariawad;
- d. that in response to requests made we are sending our troops to Kathiawar—both to Porbandar and other places;
- e. that we are entirely opposed to war and wish to avoid it. We want an amicable settlement of this issue and we propose, therefore, that wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be as it is our desire that decision should be made in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned. We invite the Pakistan Government, therefore, to submit the Junagadh issue to a referendum of the people of Junagadh under impartial auspices.



## PS-198

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/50-2*CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 243-Primin 90NEW DELHI,  
5 October 1947

Reference correspondence resting with your telegram No. 411 dated October 2nd<sup>1</sup> Junagadh. We regret that we cannot accept either your arguments or your conclusions regarding accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.

2. You have suggested that since Nawanagar has acceded to India, India Dominion should control the utterances of the Ruler of State. The Junagadh issue has aroused wide public interest and we do not see why Ruler of a State directly interested in future of Junagadh should merely by reason of his accession to Indian Dominion be restricted from giving free expression to his views.

3. As regards Provisional Government of Junagadh, we wholly deny suggestion that it has been set up or encouraged by Government of India or any authority subordinate to them.<sup>2</sup> This Provincial [*sic* for Provisional] Government appears to be the spontaneous expression of popular resentment against Junagadh's accession<sup>3</sup> and proper way to deal with it is to have a referendum as we have repeatedly suggested.

4. Factual as explained in paragraph No. 6 of your telegram of October 2nd does not appear to us an answer in any way the point made in paragraph No. 6 of our telegram 80 [8093] dated September 29th.<sup>4</sup> We are glad to note that Pakistan Government never intended to impugn honour and integrity of Lord Ismay. The facts set out in paragraph No. 7 of our telegram of September 29th appear to us to have fully justified our protest.

5. We shall now deal with main issue. In your telegram No. 14-B dated September 30th,<sup>5</sup> Pakistan Government state that they have been and still are willing to enter into negotiations for a satisfactory solution of the problem of Junagadh. We regret to say that requests of Pakistan Government which we specify later and entry of Junagadh troops into Mangrol are not in harmony with the desire for friendly negotiation. Entry of Junagadh forces into Mangrol constitutes a unilateral act of aggression. The requests of Pakistan Government that we should arrange immediately for retrocession of jurisdiction over railways within Junagadh State to authorities of that State and for immediate issue of instructions handing over Junagadh Posts and Telegraphs system to



Pakistan authorities prejudge the whole issue of validity of accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.

As we have repeatedly stated, we do not recognize this accession. We cannot, therefore, but protest against the entry of Junagadh forces into Mangrol and decline either to retrocede jurisdiction over Railways to Junagadh or to hand over our Posts and Telegraphs system to Pakistan authorities. The only basis on which friendly negotiations can start and be fruitful is reversion, in Junagadh, Babariawad and Mangrol to status quo preceding the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. The alternative to negotiation[s] is a referendum or plebiscite by people of Junagadh. This method was accepted to determine the fate of parts of British India, there is no reason why it should not be applied to settlement of future of Junagadh.

6. In my telegram No. 72 Primin<sup>6</sup> dated October 2nd, we have asked that forces which had occupied Mangrol and Babariawad should be withdrawn immediately. We have received no reply to that telegram. The situation is fraught with dangerous possibilities and we must once again press for withdrawal of those forces. In the meanwhile, we consider it necessary to make without any further delay a public statement explaining position and a press communique will be issued tomorrow. In this communique, we are reiterating our desire for an amicable settlement of this issue in accordance with wishes of people who should be the final arbiters in the matter.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-193.

<sup>2</sup>See PS-197.

<sup>3</sup>PS-176.

<sup>4</sup>PS-184.

<sup>5</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>6</sup>PS-191.

## PS-199

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/49*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 442

KARACHI,  
5 October 1947

*Begins:* Reference our discussion in Delhi on 1-10-47 regarding Junagadh. We are prepared to ask Junagadh to withdraw troops from Babariawad and not to send any troops to Mangrol on assurance that,



firstly, India or any State that has acceded to Union of India will not send troops into Junagadh, Mangrol and Babariawad and similar *talukas*, such as Sardargadh and Bantwa, and when such troops have been sent, they will be withdrawn simultaneously with the withdrawal of Junagadh forces, and secondly that question whether Mangrol and Babariawad are free to accede to either Dominion, notwithstanding Junagadh's claim to suzerainty over them, would be referred for independent legal opinion to a counsel whose name may be agreed upon between the two Dominions. If this is acceptable to you, we shall issue instructions to Junagadh immediately on receipt of your confirmation. This would, I hope, pave the way for a satisfactory and amicable settlement of various outstanding questions relating to Junagadh. I hope we shall be able further to discuss conditions and circumstances in which plebiscite should be taken by any State or States at our next meeting. *Ends.*

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

## PS-200

*Press Communique by Government of India<sup>1</sup>*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*

[NEW DELHI,  
5 October 1947]

The effect of the accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan and the policy of the Government of India to deal with the situation thus created were set out in a press communique, dated September 25, 1947.<sup>2</sup>

The Government of India remain of the opinion that, in the circumstances in which it was made, they cannot accept the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. They disagree entirely with the claims and contentions of Pakistan in regard to Babariawad and Mangrol. They consider that the stationing of Junagadh Forces in Babariawad and Mangrol, both of which have acceded to the Indian Dominion, is an unjustified and provocative act of aggression, and must ask that these forces be withdrawn.

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have declared their determination in the joint statement issued on September 20, 1947,<sup>3</sup> to rule out war, and the Government of India, true to this declaration, have no desire to take any steps which might aggravate an



already difficult situation. It is their wish to find a solution of this problem by friendly discussion with the Dominion of Pakistan and the State of Junagadh. That solution must necessarily be one which enables the Government of India to discharge their responsibilities to the States acceding to the Indian Dominion.

#### OBLIGATION TO STATES

The Government of India have an obligation to protect the interests of those States which have acceded to the Indian Dominion and this responsibility they shall fully and faithfully discharge. In view of the policy adopted by the Junagadh State and in particular the acts of aggression in relation to Babariawad and Mangrol, a number of States in Kathiawar which have acceded to the Indian Dominion have specifically asked for help and protection from the Dominion of India.

In response to these requests the Government of India have decided to send a detachment of troops of [*sic* for to] Kathiawar. These troops will proceed immediately to Porbandar. Other armed forces belonging to the States acceding to the Dominion of India will also be employed for guarding the frontiers between Junagadh and other States. The purpose of this despatch and allocation of Dominion troops is to reassure the people of the States which have acceded to the Dominion of India and to convince them that the Government of India will do all that lies in their power to protect their legitimate interests.

The Government of India are most anxious that all possibility of conflict between their forces and the forces of the States co-operating with them on the one hand, and the forces of Junagadh on the other, should be avoided. It is, therefore, necessary that Junagadh forces should at once be withdrawn from Babariawad and Mangrol. It is also necessary that these forces should make no attempt to reach islands of Junagadh territory by passing through the territories of States which have acceded to the Indian Dominion.

#### NEED FOR REFERENDUM

As a reciprocal measure of precaution the forces of the Dominion of India and the acceding States have been instructed not to enter the territory of Junagadh, or to seek passage through Junagadh territory, even to reach those States within Junagadh which have acceded to the Indian Dominion. Instructions have also been issued not to enter, for the present, Mangrol or Babariawad territories, although the Government of India hold that these territories belong to the Indian Dominion and have to be protected.

The Government of India wish to reaffirm that all they seek is an



amicable settlement of the Junagadh issue and of the connected issue of Babariawad and Mangrol. Any decision involving the fate of large numbers of people must necessarily depend on the wishes of these people. This is the policy which the Government of India accept in its entirety and they are of the opinion that a dispute involving the fate of any territory should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. This is a method at once democratic, peaceful and just.

They suggest, therefore, that the issues regarding Junagadh should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people of the State. Such a referendum or plebiscite should be held under impartial auspices, to be determined by the parties concerned. The Government of India, therefore, invite the Pakistan Government to comply with their suggestion and the deadlock that has arisen in regard to Junagadh should be resolved by a plebiscite or referendum of the people of the State.

<sup>1</sup>The *Statesman*, 6 October 1947. A copy of the communique was provided to Mountbatten by Nehru on 5 October 1947. See F. 200/90-B, *Mountbatten Papers*.

<sup>2</sup>The *Pakistan Times*, 27 September 1947.

<sup>3</sup>See Annexure I to No. 316, Vol. V, 348-50.

## PS-201

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/56-7*

IMMEDIATE/CONFIDENTIAL

No. Primin-98/258

NEW DELHI,

7 October 1947

*Begins:* Many thanks for your message of October 5th.<sup>1</sup> You will have seen from Press Communique issued by us on October 5th<sup>2</sup> that clear instructions have been issued to forces of India and our acceding States not to enter Junagadh territory or to seek passage through Junagadh territory, even to reach States within Junagadh, which have acceded to Dominion of India or to enter Babariawad or Mangrol. We hope you will now ask Junagadh to withdraw at once its forces from Babariawad and Mangrol which have acceded to Indian Dominion.

2. You have put forward a suggestion for resolving position of Mangrol and Babariawad whose right to accede independently is questioned by you, but you have not touched main issue of Junagadh itself. In our opinion it is essential to reach a settlement on this fundamental issue first. We are glad that you are agreeable to our discussing conditions



and circumstances under which a plebiscite or a referendum should be held to ascertain wishes of people. Once this is settled in Junagadh it would be comparatively an easy matter to dispose of subsidiary issues of Mangrol and Babariawad.

3. The case of Sardargadh and Bantwa to which a reference has been made in your message is quite separate from that of Junagadh. These two Estates previously came under Attachment Scheme of 1943. The Attachment Scheme came to an end with lapse of Paramountcy on August 15th 1947. In deference to generally expressed desire of *Talukadars* and people of these attached States, including Sardargadh and Bantwa, the Scheme of Attachment was replaced by a system of direct relationship with Government of India. This decision was announced in Government of India's communique of August 13th 1947. *Ends.*

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-199.

<sup>2</sup>PS-200.

## PS-202

*Press Note by Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

*F. 124 (8)-GG/54-5*

KARACHI,  
7 October 1947

[JUNAGADH]

Government of Pakistan have carefully studied the two Press Notes<sup>1</sup> recently issued by the Government of India on Junagadh State's accession to Pakistan and regret to note that the case has been misunderstood both as to legal position and facts. As the public in Pakistan have lately shown a great deal of interest in this matter, it is desired to state the correct factual position.

The authentic constitutional pronouncement on the position of Indian States after the lapse of British Paramountcy is contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of States' Treaties and Paramountcy dated 12th May 1946.<sup>2</sup> According to this document, on the lapse of Paramountcy, every Indian State becomes independent and sovereign and free to join either Pakistan or India. This position has throughout been accepted by the Pakistan Government, both in theory and practice, as the



cornerstone of its policy with regard to States. This policy has been publicly announced by the Quaid-i-Azam and repeatedly re-affirmed by Cabinet Ministers and never once has it been departed from. The Dominion of India, however, appears to hold the view that it has the right to influence the choice of the States by various methods.

Junagadh and other smaller Kathiawar States, such as Manavadar, Sardargadh, etc., which have acceded to the Pakistan Dominion, have done so voluntarily and freely. They had full legal right to do so and Pakistan Government cannot recognize anybody's right to interfere with their free exercise of this right. Certain interested parties are however determined to force these States to change their decision and to that end have used and are using all possible weapons at their command. For nearly one month Junagadh and other States have been the victims of a complete economic "blockade" including stoppage of essential food supplies, coal, petrol and postal and telegraphic communications. Troops have also been sent to the borders of the State and simultaneously attempts are being made to disrupt Junagadh administration from within. All this is being done on the ground that the accession of Junagadh is a threat to other Kathiawar States. This proposition is patently absurd and does not bear examination.

The Government of India claim that Mangrol and Babariawad have acceded to India and therefore they have a right to protect their interests. The correct legal position is that neither Mangrol nor Babariawad have any independent constitutional status and therefore are not free to accede to any Dominion on their own initiative. In fact both are part and parcel of Junagadh State. Apparently, the sole object of the attempt to rope them in is to provide a semblance of justification for interference of the Indian Dominion in the matter of accession of Junagadh.

The Government of Pakistan have made it quite clear that there can be no argument in regard to the legal right of Junagadh and other States to accede to Pakistan. In the interest of the maintenance of good relations between the two Dominions, however, this Government have offered to help in finding a solution to the situation which has been created in Kathiawar by the various measures undertaken by the Government of India. Accordingly, the Government of Pakistan have informed the Government of India of their willingness to refer for legal opinion such subsidiary matters as the legality or otherwise of Mangrol and Babariawad's accession to the Indian Union and to concert measures for allaying the apprehensions of both sides regarding the security of their respective frontiers. They have, however, pointed out that a condition precedent to any attempt at amicable settlement is the



immediate withdrawal of all troops by the Government of India from Sardargadh and Bantwa and other small *talukas* in the area. Pakistan undertake on its side to advise Junagadh to withdraw simultaneously such Junagadh Forces as may be present in Babariawad and not to send any troops to Mangrol, without prejudice to the claim of suzerainty which Junagadh has over them.

The Pakistan Government have also informed the Government of India of their willingness to discuss conditions and circumstances in which plebiscite<sup>3</sup> should be taken by any State or States.

<sup>1</sup>See PS-174 and PS-200.

<sup>2</sup>No. 2.

<sup>3</sup>PS-203.

## PS-203

### THE FUTURE OF JUNAGADH—PAKISTAN AGREES TO PLEBISCITE<sup>1</sup>

[*Extract*]

The stage is now set for the third act of the serio-comic drama of Junagadh, which should decide the fate of this Kathiawar State of 800,000 people, and which may supply a formula to determine the political destinies of the States which have yet to join India or Pakistan. The arrival of the Pakistani ship<sup>2</sup> off the port of Veraval and India's counter-measure of moving troops into Rajkot, nearby, immediately after its refusal to accept the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, formed the basis of the plot. Its development was not unfamiliar to students of power politics. Economic "sanctions" were applied, notes exchanged, and a "provisional government" set up in Bombay. Only a resistance group is missing. Pakistan claimed that there could be no argument in regard to the legal right of Junagadh to accede to Pakistan. In India it was declared that Junagadh never possessed sovereign rights. By treaty of the year 1817 the British acquired from the *Peshwa* (the head of the Maratha confederacy) paramountcy over Junagadh, subject to the existing rights of Baroda State. Junagadh, it is argued, thus remained a tributary of the Baroda *darbar*. The dramatic curtain for the second act was supplied by the statement of the Indian Government of October 4 that in response to an appeal from neighbouring States an amphibian force was being landed in Porbandar nearby, and suggestion was made that the issues be decided by a plebiscite.

### FOREGONE CONCLUSION

Yesterday, Delhi was surprised by a statement issued to the press<sup>3</sup>



in Karachi expressing willingness to discuss the conditions and circumstances in which a plebiscite should be held. More than 80 per cent of the population of Junagadh is Hindu; therefore, the result of the plebiscite seems to be a foregone conclusion. In a statement to the press, a Government official described Mr Jinnah as "a superb tactician," and expressed the belief that a solution of the Junagadh issue might easily create a precedent for States such as Hyderabad and Kashmir, which have yet to join India or Pakistan.

*[Last 3 paragraphs omitted]*

<sup>1</sup>*The Times*, 10 October 1947.

<sup>2</sup>PS-190.

<sup>3</sup>PS-202.

## PS-204

*M. Ikramullah to G.S. Bajpai*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/60*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. 510

KARACHI,  
11 October 1947

Please refer paragraph 5 of our immediate telegram<sup>1</sup> 411 October second in which we had detailed certain illegal activities of the so-called "provisional government of Junagadh." Regret to say that further reports of unlawful and subversive activities including physical violence to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Junagadh, have been received. We strongly protest against Government of India's indifference to such subversive and unconstitutional activities going on in the territory of State which has acceded to them. Continuance of an organization of this character in the territory of a State which has acceded to the Indian Union is contrary to all international usage. We hope therefore Government of India take immediate and strong measures to suppress the so-called "provisional government."

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-193.



## PS-205

*Minutes of 5th Meeting of Defence Committee*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-B*  
[Extract]

NEW DELHI,  
15 October 1947

Item 3. *Junagadh*

In accordance with a direction given at a previous meeting, General Lockhart stated that the Commander of the Porbandar detachment had reported that Porbandar was not contiguous to Mangrol. There was an intervening territory of 15 miles, including a 4-mile pocket of Mangrol.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that his information that Porbandar and Mangrol were contiguous had, on the other hand, been confirmed.

A draft press communique on the intended landing at Jafarabad was handed round.

## The Committee

- i. directed the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, to instruct the Commander, Porbandar detachment, to get into touch with Mr Buch at Rajkot and send a further report on the contiguity of Porbandar and Mangrol, agreed with him;
- ii. approved the draft communique handed round at the meeting and directed the Ministry of Defence to issue it to the Press the following day.

*Enclosure to PS-205*

## DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

In pursuance of their policy of locating units of the Indian Defence Services in Kathiawar a company of Dogras of the 25th Kumaon Regiment with detachments of the Royal Indian Engineers, Indian Corps of Signals and Indian Army Medical Corps, under the command of Major Shyam Rattan is being landed at Jafarabad from ships of the Royal Indian Navy on the 17th October 1947. The ships taking part are the sloops HMIS *Kistna* (Commander R.D Katari, RIN, Senior Officer) and HMIS *Jumna*, the fleet Mine Sweeper HMIS *Konkan* and tank landing craft Nos. 1358 and 1360.

2. After the troops have been landed courtesy visits will be paid by HMIS *Kistna* to Mul Dwarka near Kodinar (Baroda territory) and



Bhavnagar. Visits by ships of the Royal Indian Navy to other Kathiawar ports are also being arranged.

3. The Government of India have also decided to locate Brigade Group at Rajkot. This formation will consist of units of the Indian Army and troops of Baroda, Bhavnagar, Nawanagar and Porbandar States, the whole being commanded by Brigadier Gurdial Singh.

4. As previously announced No. 8 Squadron Royal Indian Air Force composed of Tempest aircraft under the command of Squadron Leader P. S. Gill, RIAF, is now located in Kathiawar.

## PS-206

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT,  
NEW DELHI,

No. 76

15 October 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

You will remember that when Liaquat Ali Khan came here last we discussed the Junagadh matter with him and pressed upon him to withdraw the troops from Babariawad and Mangrol. He was more or less agreeable to this. We assured him, at the same time, that we did not wish to cross the Junagadh territory, as we were anxious to avoid any possibility of conflict. In order to settle this question of Junagadh, we invited Pakistan to agree to a referendum or plebiscite.

The next day I sent him a telegram<sup>1</sup> to this effect and urgently asked for the withdrawal of the Junagadh troops from Babariawad and Mangrol. This was two weeks ago.

On the 5th October we issued a press statement<sup>2</sup> which you will remember. In this it was clearly stated that our forces were not to enter Junagadh territory or to seek passage through that territory or to enter Babariawad or Mangrol. We sent another telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan again asking for the withdrawal of Junagadh forces from Babariawad and Mangrol. No answer to this has come yet. It is exactly two weeks today since this proposal was put to Liaquat Ali Khan and approved of by him.

Meanwhile we are informed that the Junagadh troops have crossed the territory of another acceding State of ours in order to go to some



other place. This is not only a further act of aggression, but also, in the circumstances, appears to be a deliberate flouting of our proposals.

All this is rather difficult to swallow and we can hardly sit by watching these developments. The smaller States of Kathiawar are getting nervous and rather frightened and have appealed to us for help. None of them is safe from this kind of aggression.

This matter will have to be considered by us very soon. I am, meanwhile, sending a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan, a copy of which I enclose.

Yours sincerely  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

<sup>1</sup>PS-191.

<sup>2</sup>PS-200.

## PS-207

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/61-2*

SECRET/IMMEDIATE  
No. 332/Primin/162

NEW DELHI,  
16 October 1947

When I met you in Delhi on October 1st we discussed the Junagadh affair and I suggested that the first thing we should do is to keep away troops of both parties from disputed territory in order to avoid any possibility of conflict. I informed you that we proposed to instruct our forces not to enter Junagadh territory and I suggested to you that Junagadh forces should be withdrawn immediately from Babariawad and Mangrol. You appeared to agree to this proposal. The next day I sent a telegram<sup>1</sup> to this effect to you. On October 5th we issued a press communique in which it was clearly stated that we had issued clear instructions to our forces not to enter Junagadh territory or to seek passage through Junagadh territory even to reach States within Junagadh which have acceded to Dominion of India or to enter Babariawad and Mangrol. On our part we have fulfilled the undertaking we gave you. We asked you again in that telegram to have the Junagadh forces withdrawn from Babariawad and Mangrol.

To that telegram we have had no answer and Junagadh Government have not yet withdrawn their troops from Mangrol and Babariawad. Today we have received a report to the effect that Junagadh troops have made another incursion into Indian Dominion territory at



Jetpur. Jetpur State, which has acceded to Indian Dominion has drawn our attention to this and protested against aggression.

You will appreciate that 15 days is a long time to wait for a reply to an urgent request and fact that meanwhile further incursions take place does not encourage the conclusion that you desire an amicable settlement. An immediate reply is requested as to whether Junagadh troops are going to be withdrawn from Mangrol and Babariawad and further are going to refrain from any incursions on Dominion territory. The understanding we gave not to enter Junagadh territory was based on reciprocal action on the other side.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-191.

## PS-208

*Louis Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*

[NEW DELHI,  
18 October 1947]

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter No. 76<sup>1</sup> of the 15th October. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan informed me that he had sent you a telegram on the 6th or 7th October,<sup>2</sup> and had not received any reply from you. I handed him a copy of the reply which you had enclosed with your letter.<sup>3</sup> He said that he was prepared to ask Junagadh to withdraw their troops from Babariawad and Mangrol on condition that we disbanded our concentration of troops in Kathiawar. I made it very clear that we were fully entitled to put any troops where we liked on India territory, and I told him I considered his request ridiculous. He said "How would you like it if I sent a lot of Pakistan troops into Junagadh by air or sea?" I replied, "I should laugh myself sick at any such unstatesmanlike move, and I should think your Commander-in-Chief would think you quite mad at offering such a hostage to fortune."

I told him that the condition for Junagadh withdrawing their troops from Mangrol and Babariawad was that we would not send India Dominion troops into those States, until the matter of their accession was settled.

I urged on him the absolute need for his Government to agree to



Junagadh holding a plebiscite or referendum to ascertain the will of the people as to which Dominion they should accede to. He replied that he might consider that if the same general principle was to apply in other cases. I told him that from my knowledge of you and the Minister of States, I was confident that neither of you would ever wish to accept the accession of a State against the wishes of the people.

He said he was quite prepared to discuss the question of a plebiscite with you whenever you liked, but as he had been ordered to bed by his doctor for high blood pressure, he would not be able to come to Delhi for some time.

Yours very sincerely,  
M[OUNTBATTEN] OF B[URMA]

<sup>1</sup>PS-206.

<sup>2</sup>PS-199.

<sup>3</sup>PS-207.

## PS-209

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/63-4*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 601

KARACHI,  
18 October 1947

Your telegram No. 332/Primin/162 dated 16th October regarding Junagadh.<sup>1</sup> It seems you did receive our telegram No. 442 dated 5th October which dealt with the issues raised in your telegram under reply. For your information it is reproduced below:

*[omitted<sup>2</sup>]*

You will see from this telegram that a prompt answer was actually given and we were in fact on the point of reminding you that you had not sent a reply to it. You will also notice that we agreed to ask Junagadh to withdraw troops from Babariawad and not to send any troops to Mangrol on assurance that India or any State that had acceded to the Union of India will not send troops into Junagadh, Mangrol and Babariawad and similar *talukas* such as Sardargadh and Bantwa and where such troops have been sent they will be withdrawn simultaneously with the withdrawal of Junagadh forces. On presumption that the conditions in our telegram will be acceptable to you we did actually advise Junagadh accordingly. We are now making enquiries to find out what action



Junagadh has taken. We trust that you will take immediate reciprocal action to withdraw your forces from Sardargadh, Bantwa etc. and not occupy areas from which Junagadh withdraws its forces.

With regard to the alleged incursion of Junagadh troops into Jetpur, we have no information whatsoever and we are making immediate enquiries.

We also would like to know if you agree to refer the question raised in our telegram quoted above whether Mangrol and Babariawad are free to accede to either Dominion notwithstanding Junagadh's claim to suzerainty over them for independent legal opinion to a Counsel whose name may be agreed upon between the two Dominions. We share with you your desire for an amicable settlement of the various questions relating to Junagadh.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-207.

<sup>2</sup>PS-199.

## PS-210

### *Minutes of 6th Meeting of Defence Committee*

#### *Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI,  
21 October 1947

#### Item 1. *Junagadh*

##### *The Legal Position of Babariawad and Mangrol*

The Governor-General stated that Sir Walter Monckton, who happened to be staying at Government House, and who had been legal adviser to Mangrol, had obliged him the previous evening by giving him his views on the legal position of both Mangrol and Babariawad. Mr Brunyate, who had been legal adviser to Junagadh, was also, by chance, in Delhi at the present time. Sir Walter Monckton had stated that the legal position with regard to Babariawad was very nebulous; with regard to Mangrol, he considered that there was also a degree of uncertainty as to the position. Mr Menon had pointed out that this was largely affected by an amendment which had been made to the 1935 Act.

Mr Menon explained that, when the question of Mangrol acceding to the Federation had arisen, it had been open to doubt whether



Junagadh could accede on Mangrol's behalf. The 1935 Act had, in fact, been amended in order to permit this. The ultimate amendment had been to the effect that only those States, the Rulers of which were recognized by His Majesty, were capable of acceding themselves. His Majesty had not recognized the Ruler of Mangrol. The fact that this amendment had been necessary showed that the legal position had not been clear previously. Now, however, the particular section of the Act had been abolished; paramountcy had lapsed; and legally in his view, Mangrol was an entirely separate entity to Junagadh for the purposes of accession.

Mr Menon said that, on the question of Babariawad, Sir Walter Monckton had pointed out that 100 years' of practice could not be ignored. During this period, Babariawad had always been treated as part of Junagadh and had had no independent status. On the other hand, there had been a treaty with the paramount power which had compelled Babariawad to form part of Junagadh. It had been made clear in this treaty that, if the paramount power was not satisfied about the way that Junagadh was treating Babariawad, the position would have to be reconsidered. The treaty had now lapsed with paramountcy. In his view, the lapse of the treaty must be taken as complete and Babariawad was also free to accede separately to Junagadh.

The Governor-General gave his view that the legal position in both cases was not absolutely water-tight, although it was probable that India would be successful in any reference to arbitration in this regard. He stated that he had asked Sir Walter Monckton whether he considered that it would be better to found India's case before world opinion on the legal question, or on the will of the people. Sir Walter Monckton had replied that, providing there was a sufficiency of legal basis—which he had no doubt that there was—it was indisputable that to found the case on the will of the people was preferable.

#### *Telegrams Exchanged with Pakistan*

Extracts from a number of telegrams exchanged between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Pakistan were read out. The main points in these telegrams were that the Prime Minister of Pakistan had expressed a hope that the question of conditions under which a plebiscite could be held in States would soon be discussed between the two Prime Ministers; and had stated that Pakistan had asked Junagadh to withdraw their forces from Mangrol and Babariawad territory.

The Governor-General said that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had informed him, when he had seen him at Lahore on 16th October, that he would be perfectly prepared to consider the principle of ascertaining the will of the people of a State by plebiscite when the correctness of the action



of the Ruler in acceding to one or other Dominion was in question. He pointed out that at the present moment only Junagadh fell within this category. The Prime Minister said that this principle had been enunciated several times in the course of correspondence. However, he had no doubt that the present stand being taken by Pakistan in connection with the Junagadh issue was based on their hopes as to the future of Kashmir, which was Pakistan's main objective at the present time.

The Governor-General said that he considered that it was most unfortunate that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was confined to bed with blood pressure at Lahore, and that it was beyond his ability to travel by air at the present time. He suggested the possibility of Mr Menon flying up to see Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.

The Prime Minister undertook to send a further telegram to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. This would include the suggestion that Mr Menon might visit him at Lahore if he was unable to come to Delhi for consultations.

#### *Military Action in Babariawad and Mangrol*

The Deputy Prime Minister pointed out that the prolongation of delay in taking any action in Babariawad and Mangrol was placing the Government in serious difficulties.<sup>1</sup> Certain States which had acceded to India were now saying that, unless they were protected, they would send back their Instruments of Accession. The Government was giving a general impression of weakness to States over the whole of India, and was getting into the position where it would be unable to take any action against recalcitrant States. The whole object of sending Indian troops into Babariawad and Mangrol would be to enable plebiscite to be taken. He was suggesting no action which might come in the way of final decision.

Mr Menon pointed out that, even if Junagadh's forces were withdrawn from Babariawad, the Junagadh Government would continue to exercise authority over that State. They might leave Police forces behind. They were at present collecting the harvest from Babariawad. Unless action was taken by 10th November, the whole harvest would have been removed.

The Prime Minister pointed out that any further delay in settling the question of Babariawad and Mangrol was to Pakistan's advantage. He emphasized that if forces were sent into these two places the governmental apparatus of Junagadh would have to be withdrawn completely. There would, however, be no objection to the Junagadh officials returning to take part in any agreed joint scheme of administration.

It was agreed that action in Babariawad was more urgently necessary than in Mangrol, and should be taken as soon as possible, with a



view to preventing the present Junagadh administration from continuing to function there, and with the eventual purpose of ascertaining the will of the people as to which Dominion they wished to accede.

The Governor-General gave his view that, if Indian Forces entered Babariawad, they should go in with such superiority of equipment that efforts to resist them would not be worthwhile. If a small force was sent a pitched battle was much more likely to result. Tanks would be particularly useful. He considered that they should be sent in under a flag of truce with a loud hailer over which it would be made clear to the people that they had no intention of opening fire. At the same time, a press statement should be issued putting forward India's case.

#### *Military Forces Available*

The Governor-General recalled that the Chiefs of Staff had been directed to instruct Commander, Kathiawar Defence Force,<sup>2</sup> to prepare a plan for the occupation of Babariawad and Mangrol. He asked whether this plan was yet ready.

General Lockhart stated that a detachment of Babariawad Infantry was stationed on the borders of Babariawad. Other detachments of State Infantry were nearby. The Brigade Headquarters and one Infantry Battalion were concentrated at Rajkot, together with a Field Company and a Field Ambulance. It was hoped that the concentration of a further Infantry Battalion would be completed the following day. The tanks had been held up on the railway and were due to arrive at Rajkot on 25th October. The bulk of the vehicles for the force had also been held up and their concentration was not likely to be completed before 28th October. In Porbandar was one Company and a troop of Tanks. There was a squadron of States Forces in Jafarabad.

General Lockhart said that he would have to consult Brigadier Gurdial Singh before committing himself as to when an operation against Babariawad and Mangrol could be mounted.

Mr Menon said that the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar had said that he was prepared to protect Babariawad with two companies "in order to save the name of the Indian Government".

The view of the Committee was that, if States Forces were used for this purpose, they should be under Brigadier Gurdial Singh; but that it would be preferable to use Dominion Forces.

#### *The Contiguity of Porbandar and Mangrol*

General Lockhart stated that he had received information from military sources confirming that Mangrol was not contiguous to Porbandar. He understood that Mr Buch had not yet committed himself as to his views on this matter.



The Deputy Prime Minister and Mr Menon said that the information available to the States Ministry was still to the effect that the two definitely were contiguous.

Rear-Admiral Hall said that he understood that a small isolated part of Mangrol territory was contiguous to Porbandar, but not the main part of Mangrol.

The Governor-General suggested that if the two were not contiguous, L.C.Ts [Landing Craft Tanks] should be used to carry troops from Porbandar to Mangrol. Rear-Admiral Hall said that there would be no difficulty about this although the L.C.Ts. had at the moment returned to Bombay. General Lockhart said that he would look into the question whether it would be possible to provide more tanks for such a force direct from Bombay; or whether those in Porbandar would have to be re-embarked and used.

#### *Air Action*

Mr Menon quoted a report that Pakistan aircraft had reconnoitred the airfield at Khambaliya where aircraft of the Royal Indian Air Force were stationed. Air Marshal Elmhirst said that these were reported to be civil aircraft—Dakotas and Vikings.

It was confirmed that it was not the wish of the Committee that R.I.A.F. aircraft should carry out close reconnaissance of Junagadh. There would, on the other hand, be no objection to flights over Junagadh, and discreet reconnaissance from a high level.

#### *Possible Repercussions*

The Finance Minister drew attention to the necessity for being prepared for any contingency, in the event of Pakistan considering India's action in Babariawad and Mangrol an act of aggression.

<sup>1</sup>Annexure.

<sup>2</sup>PS-197.

#### *Annexure to PS-210*

*Note by Conference Secretary to Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*

TOP SECRET

[NEW DELHI,  
20 October 1947]

The Governor-General has told me to inform you of the latest developments in the Junagadh situation. He says that he has been trying to contact you since 8 p.m last night so as to put you in the picture, but without success.



2. The Deputy Prime Minister has asked for a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to be held tomorrow evening, 21st October. This is being arranged separately.

3. The following are the main developments in the situation during the last few days, which are causing concern to the Deputy Prime Minister:

- a. The fact that Junagadh has not yet withdrawn its troops from Babariawad and Mangrol, although Mr Liaquat Ali Khan seemed to agree that this would be done over a fortnight ago.
- b. The fact that Junagadh officials are collecting rents from the people of Babariawad and Mangrol. This is, however, at the moment in order because the rents being collected are those for the period before the transfer of power which they are perfectly at liberty to consider theirs.
- c. Fines have been imposed on either Babariawad or Mangrol or both; and collected by the Junagadh officials.
- d. The Instrument of Accession of Babariawad to India has been returned (or threatened to be returned) on the grounds that Babariawad sees no point in acceding to a Dominion which is not prepared to give it armed support.

4. Patel is therefore pressing very strongly that Indian forces should enter Babariawad and Mangrol forthwith. H.E thinks that this can be done in one of two ways, either

- a. by sending in only police forces, or
- b. by sending in overwhelming military force.

5. H.E thinks the course in 4(a) above would be likely to lead to considerable fighting; in connection with course 4(b) above, he suggests that the force might go in with full publicity under a flag of truce; and that by this means there would be less fighting.

6. H.E drew attention to the fact that the Defence Committee had, in Item 1 of the 2nd Meeting:

directed the Chiefs of Staff to instruct the Commander, Kathiawar Defence Force, to prepare a plan for the occupation of Babariawad and Mangrol, in case this was ordered, with the object of reducing to a minimum any exchange of shots with Junagadh forces in these territories. He therefore hoped that a plan of some sort would be ready.

7. H.E also said that he intended to ask you at the Defence Committee Meeting tomorrow when you intended to leave for London in connection with the terms and conditions of service for British Officers.



## PS-211

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/65-6*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 358-PS

NEW DELHI,  
21 October 1947

My telegram No. 254 dated October 19th.<sup>1</sup> Your message October 5th was received and replied to in my telegram No. Primin-98 dated October 7th<sup>2</sup>.... Will be grateful for urgent reply.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable.

<sup>2</sup>PS-201.

## PS-212

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, 200/90-C*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. Primin-193

NEW DELHI,  
22 October 1947

Please refer to my telegram No. 358-PS dated yesterday<sup>1</sup> as well as my telegrams No. 90 dated 5th October<sup>2</sup> and 162 dated 16th October.<sup>3</sup> Position now as I understand from our correspondence as well as from what the Governor-General has told us is that you agree to a plebiscite or a referendum in Junagadh subject to details being settled between us. As regards Mangrol and Babariawad it is also agreed that Junagadh troops should be withdrawn. We undertook not to send Indian Union troops to Junagadh territory or to Mangrol and Babariawad pending final decision.

In your telegram No. 601 dated 18th October<sup>4</sup> you stated that you will advise Junagadh accordingly. The position as regards Sardargadh and Bantwa is completely different as we have pointed out to you previously.

It appears that your directions to Junagadh have not been carried out and Junagadh troops and police are still in position in Mangrol and Babariawad. Further reports show that Junagadh authorities have been taking oppressive action against people of Babariawad. They are



commandeering crops, issuing exacting orders in respect of other property, reaping harvests, breaking open into houses and looting property. Rations and other necessities of life have been stopped. Attempt is being made to force the Chief of Babariawad to renounce accession to Indian Union and substitute it by accession to Pakistan. You will appreciate that it is impossible for us to tolerate any longer such acts of aggression and oppressive action and we have been urgently asked by the Chief and people of Babariawad to protect them. We are, in honour, bound to give this protection by such action as may be considered necessary.

We would have welcomed your presence in Delhi in order to discuss details regarding plebiscite in Junagadh and other connected matters. If it is possible for you to come here soon we shall be grateful. I understand however from Governor-General India that your health is not good. I am sorry to learn this and trust that this is not serious. In case you are unable to travel I propose to send our States Secretary V.P. Menon to meet you at Lahore. An immediate answer will be appreciated.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-211.

<sup>2</sup>PS-198.

<sup>3</sup>PS-207.

<sup>4</sup>PS-209.

## PS-213

*M. Ikramullah to G. S. Bajpai*

*Telegram, F. 124 (5)-GG/67*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 625

KARACHI,  
22 October 1947

Your telegram<sup>1</sup> No. 358 PS dated October 21st.

The legal position of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan on which you invited our views in your telegram Primin 98 dated October 7th<sup>2</sup> has already been fully stated in our press note<sup>3</sup> published on 8th October 1947 a copy of which was sent to your High Commissioner in Karachi.

2. Your statement in connection with Sardargadh and Bantwa does not explain the reason why your troops have occupied these two *talukas* and why they have not been withdrawn as requested by us.



3. Recent reports from Junagadh show that Indian troops are still being moved about in Junagadh territory over Junagadh railways causing great deal of panic among peaceful population. It is further reported that India is increasing strength of Dominion police forces on railway stations within Junagadh territory causing serious embarrassment to administration. This is clearly contrary to your promises and subsequent assurances that your forces will not seek passage through Junagadh territory. Our protest that the administration of all the communications in Junagadh should now be transferred to Pakistan has not been heeded.

4. We have already asked Junagadh to withdraw its forces from Babariawad. As regards Mangrol, the Sheikh who was here recently has personally confirmed our previous information that no Junagadh forces are posted on Mangrol territory.

5. With regard to the question of plebiscite the Prime Minister of Pakistan told you that he was going to discuss this matter with you at his next meeting. He is at present at Lahore and your telegram is being referred to him.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-211.

<sup>2</sup>PS-201.

<sup>3</sup>PS-202.

## PS-214

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/68*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 649

KARACHI,  
23 October 1947

Your telegram 364-Primin of 21st October<sup>1</sup> received yesterday. The position as summed up by you in regard to a plebiscite or referendum in Junagadh appears to be due to misunderstanding. Our position was and still is that we are prepared to discuss conditions and circumstances in which a plebiscite or referendum should be held in any State or States. You must have, no doubt, realized that Junagadh is not the only State regarding which this question arises and that is why we advisedly said "any State or States". We suggest therefore that Menon should come to Karachi for a preliminary discussion with Ikramullah, Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and States, to be followed subsequently if necessary by



a discussion at Cabinet level.

2. We strongly repudiate that any aggressive action against the people of Mangrol or Babariawad has been taken by Junagadh. Your blockade of Junagadh despite our protests has driven people to verge of starvation and they have been in some cases reduced to cutting unripe crops to feed themselves.

3. No attempt has been made to force the Chief of Babariawad to renounce his alleged accession to Indian Union. Our case is that Babariawad like Mangrol has no right of accession at all. Latest reports from Junagadh indicate that not only you have not evacuated Sardargadh and Bantwa but have sent your troops to occupy Manavadar which has already acceded to Pakistan. Surely you would not deny that we are also honour bound to protect the States which have acceded to us but in view of your assurances that you would like to have a peaceful settlement of the whole thing we have refrained from any act which might make such a settlement difficult. If the press reports are to be believed you have put in a whole brigade in Kathiawar and round about Junagadh. It may interest you to know that we have not sent a single soldier. A peaceful settlement is only possible if you give up your present aggressive attitude and withdraw your forces from the territories in question in order to restore the state of affairs which prevailed when Junagadh acceded to Pakistan.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Not traceable. However, see PS-211.

## PS-215

### *Minutes of Seventh Meeting of Defence Committee*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*

[*Extract*]

NEW DELHI,  
23 October 1947

#### Item 1. *Junagadh* *Communal Disturbances*

General Lockhart read out a telegram from Headquarters, Kathiawar Defence Forces, which had been received that morning, stating that the Regional Commissioner had requested the provision of a company of troops to act in aid of the civil power in the area of Sardargadh,



where communal disturbances were apprehended.

It was agreed that there was no objection to the despatch of these troops because Sardargadh, Bantwa and Manavadar are *Thanas* which were brought under the general control and supervision of the States Ministry in accordance with the decision announced in the Communique of August 13, 1947.

Mr Menon said that the company would probably be required for ten days—over the period of the *Dusera* festivals.

#### *Naval Support to Projected Operations*

The Committee considered an appreciation on the naval support<sup>1</sup> which it would be possible to afford to the projected operations in Kathiawar. The Governor-General remarked that this paper showed that naval forces would be able to give useful assistance.

#### *Draft Army Instruction*

[Omitted]

#### *Mangrol*

Mr Menon recalled that it had been decided at the last meeting that action should be taken in Babariawad before Mangrol. He advocated the desirability of simultaneous action in both places, if possible, pointing out that if action was taken in Babariawad first, Pakistan and Junagadh might appreciate that the next objective was Mangrol and take measures such as the stationing of a sloop outside that territory.

After discussion it was agreed that the two operations should be carried out simultaneously, if possible; and that it was acceptable, in order to achieve this object, that action in Babariawad might be delayed for two or three days. It was agreed that 1st November was the last date by which the operations must take place.

It was stated that assurances had now been received from the Maharaja and the Government of Porbandar that Mangrol was indeed contiguous to Porbandar. The Committee decided to accept, and act on, these assurances. It was, however, pointed out that the land in this area near the sea coast was under water and that it might not be possible to send tanks direct from Porbandar to Mangrol. In view of this it was agreed that a force, including tanks, should, if possible, be mounted in L.C.Ts at Bombay, to enter Mangrol from the sea at the same time as, or just after, parties of Infantry entered by the over-land route. The latter parties might be used to secure the landing places.

#### *Kathiawar Defence Force*

Brigadier Gurdial Singh stated that the surfaces of the roads leading from Porbandar to Mangrol were very bad and only fit for light vehicles. More 15 cwt. vehicles and jeeps were required. The land near



the sea coast which was under water in this area was not likely to dry out for at least another fortnight. He went on to say that he had been ordered to assume command of the Kathiawar Defence Force forthwith. He was deficient of essential staff, including a Brigade Major and a Staff Captain, and Signals Operators. The force was not yet concentrated, and the Units composing it were very much under strength.

General Lockhart stated that delays in rail movement had held up the concentration of the force. It was hoped that it would be sufficiently concentrated to take action by 28th October, on which day the tanks were due to arrive. He had given instructions that the force was to be concentrated by that date, notwithstanding any difficulties.

Lieutenant-General Goddard pointed out that the target date previously decided upon for completion of concentration was 28th October.

Brigadier Gurdial Singh said that, of the Unit provided by Baroda, 50% of the officers and 25% of the men were Muslims. This Unit had no motor transport. General Lockhart stated that Headquarters, Indian Army, would be able to provide motor transport. The Prime Minister said that the question of for what purpose the Baroda unit should be used must be left to the discretion of the Commander on the spot.

Brigadier Gurdial Singh said that the Nawanagar Battalion was three companies strong but had no M.T. He was also going to take command of a company of Porbandar Infantry, 80 strong, and a company of Bhavnagar Infantry. Both these were of Garrison Battalion standard.

General Lockhart pointed out that full scale war equipment was in no way necessary for all Units which it was intended should partake in the coming operations. He also confirmed that an adviser on States Forces was going to be attached to his headquarters.

Brigadier Gurdial Singh requested another Harvard aircraft for communications purposes. Air Marshal Elmhirst said that he would try to provide this. Brigadier Gurdial Singh said that he considered that the conditions under which the troops of the Kathiawar Defence Force were operating justified the provision of the field service scale of rations. He also said that he considered that the provision of a strong reserve battalion and squadron of tanks was necessary. General Lockhart said that these points were under examination.

#### *The Strength of Junagadh Forces*

Mr Menon said that information had been received that 500 Crown Representative's Police had been sent to Junagadh from Pakistan. This would bring the strength of the total force available to Junagadh up to 1,500 men.



It was pointed out that, although the Crown Representative's Police were a fine force, they had no automatic weapons.

*Draft Directive to the Regional Commissioner*

A draft directive, prepared by Mr Menon, to the Regional Commissioner, was considered. It was pointed out, in connection with the third paragraph of this, that the invitation would not be to the Government of Junagadh to nominate observers but rather to Junagadh officials themselves to stay on as observers.

*Draft Press Communique*

In consideration of a draft press communique, it was pointed out that an amendment similar to that made to the directive to the Regional Commissioner would be required in the fourth paragraph of this [draft]. Amendment would also be required by the insertion of a new sentence at the beginning of the third paragraph, to the effect that the Prime Minister of India had already informed the Prime Minister of Pakistan that India could no longer tolerate the oppressive action being taken against the people of Babariawad and Mangrol.

It was also reported that Junagadh forces had crossed Indian territory to reach Jetpur. In view of this, a paragraph might be added to the draft communique to the effect that India could no longer consider themselves bound by the previous agreement that the troops of one side should not cross the territory of the other.

*The Use of Aircraft*

The Committee agreed that any aircraft employed in connection with the projected operations should not be armed; and should take no offensive action unless they were attacked.

*Military Chain of Command*

General Lockhart raised the question of whether the chain of command should not be altered, to bring in Headquarters, Southern Command between Headquarters, Indian Army, and the Kathiawar Defence Force.

<sup>1</sup>Annexures concerning the Naval appreciation dated 13 October 1947; Draft Instruction 2 for Army H. Q. India, dated 22 October 1947; and Appendix A: Situation in Kathiawar. Appendix B: Instructions for Detachment Commanders. Appendix C: Inter-Service Communications. See F. 200/90-C, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.



## PS-216

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/70*

CONFIDENTIAL/MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. Primin-226

NEW DELHI,  
26 October 1947

Your telegram No. 649 of October 24th<sup>1</sup> It is and always has been our view that where there is a dispute plebiscite or referendum should be held in any State or States in order to ascertain the wishes of the people. Our suggestion that Menon should go to Lahore was meant only to explain this to you and was influenced solely by consideration of your health. The holding of such referendum or plebiscite in Junagadh is matter of practical urgency because of circumstances which we have already fully explained to you. We are prepared to discuss with you at any time conditions and circumstances in which plebiscite or referendum should be held. We do not think that visit by Menon to Karachi for preliminary discussion with Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and States will be very helpful as this important matter can be settled only at Ministerial level.

2. As regards paras 2 and 3 of your telegram we do not agree with your statement. As already stated difficulties have arisen owing to Junagadh's aggressions. We have desired and still desire to settle Junagadh issue by peaceful means and a reference to the people of Junagadh.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-214.

## PS-217

*Minutes of 10th Meeting of Defence Committee*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*  
[Extract]

[NEW DELHI,]  
30 October 1947

THE JUNAGADH SITUATION IN RELATION TO KASHMIR  
The Governor-General pointed out that the decision to take military



action in Babariawad and Mangrol had been taken before the recent serious deterioration in the Kashmir situation. He said that he felt it his duty to draw the attention of the Ministers to the desirability of considering the overall situation, in the light of this new factor which had arisen. He pointed out that the Government of India had declared their intention of ascertaining the will of the people of Kashmir on final accession as soon as the law and order situation in that State allowed this. He gave his view that it must automatically follow that Pakistan would accept a similar procedure for Junagadh. Therefore, India was, at the present moment, in a very strong position. He recalled that careful arrangements had been made for the forces entering Babariawad and Mangrol to move under a flag of truce, with loud-speakers accompanying them. He considered that, if these arrangements failed (as they had failed, in similar circumstances at Oran, Casablanca and Algiers during the war), the present strong position would be imperilled; and there might result a flare-up due to what, in proportion to Kashmir, was a relatively small matter. The Governor-General also said that he understood that the Sheikh of Mangrol had declared that there were no Junagadh troops in his State. Mr Menon said that this was not in accordance with the information available to the Government of India, which was to the effect that the outside forces in Mangrol included *Goondas* from Karachi; but the Sheikh of Mangrol would not admit this.

The Prime Minister said that normally there would be no reason why the decisions already taken about Junagadh should be varied in any respect. He considered, however, that the question of action in Babariawad and Mangrol must be judged by the effect which it was likely to have on the Kashmir situation. There were four possible aspects of this effect—the military, the psychological, world opinion and the legal. Of these, the military aspect was by far the most important. If there was any chance of developments in Junagadh militarily affecting the position in Kashmir or elsewhere, the matter would have to be reconsidered. If this risk existed, it might be better to deal with the major problem—Kashmir—first. The psychological aspect was mainly in connection with the effect that would be produced on the States as a whole. This position would improve enormously if things went well in Kashmir, and would be correspondingly weakened if there was excessive delay in clearing up Kashmir and if India became entangled there for a long period.

The Deputy Prime Minister gave his view against any change in the plans which had been made for Babariawad and Mangrol. He based his opinion on the fact that India was, in this matter, in the right. He



pointed out that other States had now been informed of India's intention to assist those States, the accession of which had been accepted. So far as world opinion was concerned he considered that the longer the Junagadh situation was prolonged, the bigger an issue and the more insoluble it would become. In connection with public opinion in the United Kingdom, he said that he considered that the Conservative group of newspapers, which represented the large majority, were carrying out a double line of attack, against His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by taking advantage of the situation, and against the Government of India. Whatever the Government of India did would be attacked by these Conservative newspapers. The manner in which their propaganda was carried on bore no relation to fairness or conscience. They would try to prejudice world opinion whatever was done. They were obsessed by the idea that Pakistan was a small new State and that India was large. They were destroying the truth in their efforts to prove that everything that happened was India's fault. The Deputy Prime Minister added that, in any case, he had no doubt whatsoever that not a shot would be fired in Mangrol and Babariawad.

The Minister of Finance pointed out that world opinion unusually ended up on the side of the victorious party in any clash. He had no doubt that, at the present time, the true facts of the situation were being submerged by preconceived views but this did not mean that efforts should not continue to give to the world a correct picture of what was happening. He said that he considered it possible that India's action in Junagadh might give Pakistan a "handle" for action in Kashmir, but he pointed out that the former had much more justification than the latter. India's action in Junagadh could surely not alone be the excuse for Pakistan to send troops to Kashmir, but it might be linked up with a call that the Muslims in Kashmir were being butchered. In fact he did not consider that India's attitude towards Junagadh should change; but he did advocate that military preparations should be made in Kashmir for any hostile action on the part of Pakistan.

Sir G.S. Bajpai pointed out the political advantages which India enjoyed in Kashmir, as compared with Pakistan in Junagadh, in the setting up of a popular Government and the promise that the will of the people on the question of final accession would be ascertained. From the military point of view, he pointed out the danger of forces being scattered and engaged simultaneously at two points.

Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar said that he considered that India's case, in both Kashmir and Junagadh, was very strong from a political point of view. He did not consider that the action which it had been decided to take in Babariawad and Mangrol should be stopped unless



it was likely to jeopardize the military position in Kashmir. He could not himself conceive that this was likely to happen in any way.

General Lockhart pointed out that the more commitments the armed forces were given, the greater was the strain imposed upon them. The Army, though big, was not mobilized. As he saw it, Kashmir might develop into a very big commitment indeed. In fact it was doubtful whether it would be in the power of the Indian Army to restore law and order in the whole of Kashmir, if it became a question of that. In comparison, the Junagadh commitment was not very big and in any case troops could not be moved away from there yet—not indeed until the end of the whole Junagadh incident.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the task of eventually clearing Poonch was likely to be a terrific job. It could probably not be taken up at all until the winter was over.

The Governor-General pointed out that British Officers would not be available to help in a plebiscite in Kashmir the following spring. He suggested that the United Nations Organization or His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom might be asked to send out officials to help with this plebiscite. The same applied to the plebiscite in Junagadh.

Mr Menon pointed out that the two were not identical problems. Junagadh was a comparatively straight issue, whereas Kashmir had relations with both Dominions and frontiers with other countries. The best solution in the end might be for Kashmir to remain independent.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that he considered that, if Pakistan accepted an immediate plebiscite in Junagadh, the military action due to take place on 1st November in Babariawad and Mangrol should be cancelled. The Committee agreed with this view.

#### *Meeting at Lahore*

The Governor-General stated that the Supreme Commander had conveyed to him, over the telephone, an invitation from the Governor-General of Pakistan to himself and the Prime Minister to attend a meeting at Lahore the following day. It was agreed that this invitation should be accepted. The Governor-General said that Mr Jinnah had also asked that representatives of the Kashmir Government should come. In connection with this, it was pointed out that Pakistan had themselves insisted that negotiations concerning Junagadh must be carried out on a Dominion level; and the same applied to Kashmir.

#### *The Committee*

- i. took note with approval of the military and air action which had been taken and which it was intended to take in Kashmir;
- ii. decided that the proposed action in Babariawad and Mangrol



should take place, as planned, on 1st November, unless Pakistan agreed to an early plebiscite in Junagadh; and directed the Chiefs of Staff to ensure that arrangements were made which would enable this action to be called off up to midnight 30th October/1st November.

## PS-218

### *Minutes of 11th Meeting of Defence Committee*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-C*  
[Extract]

SECRET

NEW DELHI,  
30 October 1947

#### Item 3. *Junagadh*

The Governor-General raised the question of the desirability of the action which it was intended to take in Babariawad and Mangrol being carried out by the Central Reserve Police rather than by soldiers. He said that, as a result of discussions which he had had with the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister the previous day, preliminary orders to this effect had already been sent out.

The Deputy Prime Minister said that he saw no objection to the use of Armed Forces for this purpose. He added that he was much opposed to any further delay taking place.

During discussion the following points were made:

- a. There was little doubt that the Central Reserve Police would be able to carry out the action successfully;
- b. There might, however, be more opposition if the Police, a weaker force, was used, in comparison to the two Battalions of Infantry and Squadron of tanks which had been made available for the purpose;
- c. It would make little difference, in connection with possible repercussions on world opinion, whether Police or soldiers were used.

The Deputy Prime Minister stated that there would be no objection to the Governor-General informing Mr Jinnah about the action which was being taken by India in Babariawad and Mangrol. It was pointed out that, if this was not done, accusations of bad faith, similar to those which had been made against Mr Liaquat Ali Khan for not having disclosed his intention of appealing to the Governments of the Commonwealth, might



well be levied.

The Committee

decided that the projected action in Babariawad and Mangrol should take place as planned, and be carried out by Armed Forces rather than by Police.

## PS-219

*Note of Discussion of Mountbatten with M. A. Jinnah*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*  
[Extract]

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,  
1 November 1947

### INTRODUCTION

In the course of three and a half hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation, Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well as talking about the overall policy affecting States. I have divided this note into four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the subjects were discussed nor of course were all the remarks made consecutively.

### PART III. JUNAGADH

I read out to Mr Jinnah the following extract from a statement made by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, which had been published in the *Statesman* of Friday, 21st September:

“The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders, before August 15th and the official spokesman of the Pakistan Government thereafter, have publicly declared their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the Dominion of India”.

I asked Mr Jinnah if he still stood rigorously by his Prime Minister's statement. He looked somewhat uneasy but admitted that it represented the legal position. I told him I would revert to this when talking



about Kashmir, but in the meanwhile wanted to know what he proposed to do about Junagadh.

He admitted that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, and said that he had been most averse from [*sic* for to] accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for a long time, but had finally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan.

I told him that in the case of Babariawad and Mangrol, it was clearly the wish of the people that they would be in the Dominion of India, and that they had in fact signed Instruments of Accession to that effect. How then could he refuse them the right of accession? He said that Mangrol's accession had been forced on him, and withdrawn almost before the ink was dry. In any event, he had persuaded the Nawab of Junagadh to accept legal arbitration.

I told him that the Government of India would not have minded the position so much if Junagadh had played the game and not interfered internally in these small States; but that they were oppressing the people, imposing fines and removing their grain. I pointed out that repeated telegrams had been sent protesting at this. Mr Jinnah denied this, and stated categorically that neither Pakistan nor Junagadh had sent any soldiers or armed police into these States.

I told him that we had definite information that Junagadh had sent armed police into both of them, and that they were oppressing the people. Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan about this, and the latter had undertaken to ask Junagadh to withdraw their forces.

When they had failed to do so, the Government of India had telegraphed, a few days back, saying that we would have to protect the interests of these States if the Junagadh forces were not withdrawn. Since they had not been withdrawn, India were going to put in forces to protect their interests, subject to a plebiscite being subsequently held in these States about final accession. They would go in under a flag of truce, with loud hailers and inviting the co-operation of Junagadh authorities.

Mr Jinnah lamented that the Government of India had not invited the co-operation of Pakistan beforehand. I pointed out that they had in fact been unable to enforce their own orders, and that so far as I was aware, Indian forces had been sent into these two States that very day.



## PS-220

*M. Ikramullah to Liaquat Ali Khan*<sup>1</sup>

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/73*

SECRET/IMMEDIATE  
No. 738

KARACHI,  
2 November 1947

Following telegram has been sent to Foreign, New Delhi.

*Begins:* "We are astounded to see reports of occupation of Mangrol and Babariawad by your troops yesterday.

The reasons for occupation given in your official communique released today are absolutely untenable and no one can regard them as otherwise in the light of the explanations already provided by us in our telegram<sup>2</sup> No. 649, Oct[ober] 23rd. You mention in your communique that the occupation was peaceful. Surely it could not have been otherwise as we have already assured you that there were no troops of Junagadh in these areas.

From the circumstances of the case it is quite clear to us that you have performed this clear act of aggression against Pakistan territory deliberately and in full knowledge of the situation. This Government strongly protest against unwarranted violation of its territory for the second time in this week, the first being military occupation of Manavadar State which had duly acceded to Pakistan—*Ends.*

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>He was at that time in Lahore.

<sup>2</sup>In another telegram the same day, M. Ikramullah reported the situation in Junagadh as desperate and sought the advice of Liaquat Ali Khan for protecting the lives of Muslims. See F. 124 (8)-GG/72. Not printed.

## PS-221

*Shah Nawaz Bhutto to Louis Mountbatten*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*

JUNAGADH,  
9 November 1947

Our Representatives waited on Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel on October 31 and November 1 for suitable solution of Junagadh issue particularly to avoid bloodshed. It was suggested that Nawab would



come back from Karachi to introduce suitable reforms in administration.

Unfortunately we have not been given sufficient time to act. Because of danger from outside and in order to maintain peace have decided to request Regional Commissioner, Rajkot to assist Junagadh in preservation of law and order without prejudice to honourable understanding that may be arrived at by all concerned. We stand by advice given to our representatives by Mahatmaji and Sardar Patel. Meanwhile His Highness has wired me from Karachi to avoid bloodshed of his beloved subjects, invited me to Karachi to discuss situation.

[SHAH NAWAZ BHUTTO]

## PS-222

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/76*

NEW DELHI,  
9 November 1947

No. T.C. 926<sup>1</sup>

Our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot was approached yesterday by Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council and Member-in-charge of Junagadh State Forces with a letter from Junagadh Dewan Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, appealing to the Government of India to take over Junagadh administration. This request was made in order to save State from complete administrative breakdown and pending honourable settlement of several issues involved in Junagadh accession. Sir Shah Nawaz stated in his letter that he had already telegraphed to you to this effect. We have considered his request and with a view to avoiding chaos in the State and its repercussions have agreed to take over administration of Junagadh with immediate effect. We have issued instructions to that effect to our Regional Commissioner, Rajkot, text of which runs as follows: "Buch from Menon. Letter of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto of Junagadh dated eighth November,<sup>2</sup> addressed to you and brought personally by Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council offering immediate handing over Junagadh administration has been considered by the Government of India. They consider that in view of the unanimous request of the Junagadh State Council, supported by public of Junagadh, whose views were ascertained by the Council at a meeting held in Junagadh on seventh October<sup>3</sup> and also in view of the complete breakdown of the administration resulting in



chaotic condition in the State, you should take over the administration forthwith and ensure peace and order at the earliest possible moment. Pakistan Government is being informed from here.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>Probably refers to PRIMIN-322.

<sup>2</sup>PS-224.

<sup>3</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-223

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/77*

No. PRIMIN 324

NEW DELHI,  
10 November 1947

Continuation my telegram<sup>1</sup> Primin 322 of November 9. In view of special circumstances pointed out by Junagadh Dewan our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot has taken temporary charge of Junagadh administration.<sup>2</sup> This had been done to avoid disorder and resulting chaos. We have, however, no desire to continue this arrangement and wish to find a speedy solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Junagadh. We have pointed out to you previously that final decision should be made by means of referendum or plebiscite. We would be glad to discuss this question and allied matters affecting Junagadh with representatives of your Government at the earliest possible moment convenient to you. We propose to invite the Nawab of Junagadh to send his representatives to this conference.<sup>3</sup>

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-222.

<sup>2</sup>Annex.

<sup>3</sup>This last sentence was deleted by Indian Prime Minister vide telegram No. Primin-335 of 11 November 1947. Not printed.

### *Annex to PS-223*

INDIA TAKES CONTROL IN JUNAGADH<sup>1</sup>

[*Extract*]

Delhi, 9 Nov. Indian Dominion troops, comprising a battalion with a few medium tanks, entered Junagadh city at 6 p.m on Sunday according to information available in Delhi, says the Associated Press



of India. Brig. Gurdial Singh and Mr Buch have also arrived in Junagadh.<sup>2</sup>

The troops, who were received at the State frontier by Maj. Harvey Jones and other high officials of the State and prominent non-officials, were welcomed by the local population. They have taken over Veraval airport. The State forces are being disarmed, it is learnt. Indicative of the utter civic dislocation in the State was the empty treasury—there was not a rupee in it.

The negotiations between the Junagadh authorities and “the Provisional Government of Junagadh” have ended and the Junagadh Ruler has agreed to join the Indian Union, according to reports current in Rajkot, the news agency adds.

Maj. Harvey Jones has had consultations with Mr Samaldas Gandhi, head of the “Provisional Government” and conveyed to him the decision of the State Council that, in order to avoid a serious situation that was developing, the Indian Dominion should take over Junagadh’s administration. It is stated that the decision has the support of the Muslim Jamiyat, an influential organization in the State.

The agitation against Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan resulted in the formation of a “Provisional Government” at the end of September. The “Provisional Government’s” forces have, in the last five weeks, been marching towards Junagadh and have taken a number of villages.

A communique was issued by India’s States Ministry.

<sup>1</sup>*The Statesman*, 10 November 1947.

<sup>2</sup>PS-222.

## PS-224

### JUNAGADH ADMINISTRATION HANDED OVER TO INDIA<sup>1</sup>

#### ACCESSION ISSUE TO BE SETTLED THROUGH FURTHER TALKS

KARACHI, Nov. 10: Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the Dewan of Junagadh, told the API here this morning that “the administration of Junagadh State had been handed over to the Indian Union pending negotiations, but this did not mean that Junagadh had joined the Indian Union”.

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who flew to Karachi on Saturday [8 November] for important consultation with His Highness the Nawab of Junagadh said that the Regional Commissioner of the Indian Union at Rajkot, Mr Buch had been asked to give his assistance to the administration particularly “with a view to preserving law and order, which is threatened by aggressive elements from outside”.



He added that the arrangement had been sought "pending an honourable settlement of the several issues involved in Junagadh's accession".

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had discussion with Mr Samaldas Gandhi at Rajkot on October 8. Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council, brought certain proposals for the consideration of the Council.

He continued: "The Council was prepared to accept them under protest but before a final decision could be given to Mr Samaldas Gandhi, it was thought necessary to ascertain the opinion of the leading members of the public.

A meeting was held and the view of the leaders was unanimously expressed that instead of handing over the administration to the Indian Union through the so-called Provisional Government it should be directed [to be] given over to the Indian Government through the Regional Commissioner of Rajkot."

He explained that the Junagadh Government, therefore, (in order to avoid bloodshed, hardship, loss of life and property and to preserve the dynasty) approached the Regional Commissioner of the Indian Union at Rajkot, Mr Buch, to give his assistance to the administration, "particularly with a view to preserve law and order which is threatened by aggressive elements from outside".

He stated: "This arrangement has been sought pending an honourable settlement of the several issues involved in Junagadh's accession".

The Dewan of Junagadh said: "From the very beginning His Highness the Nawab of Junagadh has been giving me definite orders that there should be no bloodshed among his beloved subjects and that the issue of Junagadh should be decided constitutionally between the two Dominions, if there were any differences".

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto is expected to leave for Lahore by air in the nearest future, where he will hold consultations with the Governor-General and Prime Minister of Pakistan. From Lahore it is likely that he will fly to New Delhi for consultations with the Indian Government there before returning to Junagadh State.

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Dewan of Junagadh, has released the following letter sent by him to the Regional Commissioner of the Indian Union at Rajkot on November 8:

"Dear Mr Buch,

After discussions with Mr Samaldas Gandhi at Rajkot on October 27, Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council, brought certain proposals for the consideration of the Council who were prepared to accept them under protest, but before a final decision



could be communicated to Mr Samaldas Gandhi, it is thought necessary to ascertain the opinion of the leading members of the public.

A meeting was therefore held this evening and the view of the leaders was unanimously expressed that instead of handing over the administration to the Indian Union through the so-called Provisional Government, it should be directly given over [to] the Indian Union through the Regional Commissioner at Rajkot.

The Junagadh Government has therefore requested that in order to avoid bloodshed and to preserve the dynasty, you should be approached to give your assistance to the administration, with a view to preserving law and order which is threatened by aggressive elements from outside. This arrangement is sought pending an honourable settlement of the several issues involved in Junagadh's accession.

We have already wired to Lord Mountbatten, Mahatmaji, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Indian Union, the Honourable Abul Kalam Azad, the Governor-General Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

I hope you will kindly respond to this request.

Yours sincerely,  
DEWAN OF JUNAGADH"

The above letter was sent by him on the receipt of the following telegraphic message from Karachi from the Ruler of Junagadh: "You are already in possession of the instructions from Authorities, so better act on them using your judicious discretion as situation demands to avoid bloodshed of my beloved subjects. I appreciate your sense of duty and pray Almighty give you strength."—API.

<sup>1</sup>The *Pakistan Times*, 11 November 1947.

## PS-225

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/78*

MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 396-G

LAHORE,  
10 November 1947

Your telegram No. Primin 322 of November 9th<sup>1</sup> and the subsequent telegram of 10th November<sup>2</sup> informing us that your Government had taken charge of the administration of Junagadh were received by me on November 10th.



You are aware that Junagadh has duly acceded to Pakistan Dominion. It would therefore have been clear to you that neither the Dewan nor, for that matter, the Ruler himself can negotiate any settlement either temporary or permanent with the India Dominion. Pakistan Government has given no authority to the Dewan to negotiate with you and we emphatically challenge India Dominion's right to enter Junagadh territory. Your action in taking over the State administration and sending Indian troops to the State without any authorization from Pakistan Government and indeed without our knowledge is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International Law.

2. India Govt's activities on the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have all been directed to forcing the State to renounce the accession, and all kinds of weapons have been used by you to achieve this end.

Conditions have carefully and deliberately [been] created by your Government in and around the State which have made the running of administration impossible. In the circumstances your plea of having taken over Junagadh administration in order to avoid disorder and the resulting chaos cannot be accepted.

3. With regard to your suggestion of a conference between the representatives of the two Dominions and the Nawab of Junagadh, you know fully well that we have always been prepared to discuss these and other matters arising out of the problems of accession to either Dominion. It is obvious, however, that there is no point in having a conference when you have already occupied our territory by military force. The only condition under which we can usefully attend the discussion would be immediate withdrawal of Indian troops, reinstatement of Nawab's administration and the restoration of normal conditions in and around the borders of Junagadh, including the stoppage of the activities of the so-called Provisional Government.

4. We consider your action in taking charge of Junagadh Administration and in sending Indian troops to occupy Junagadh to be a direct act of hostility against Pakistan Dominion. We demand that you should immediately withdraw your forces, relinquish charge of the administration to the rightful Ruler and stop people from Union of India invading Junagadh and committing acts of violence.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>Probably refers to PS-222.

<sup>2</sup>PS-223.



## PS-226

*M. Ikramullah to G. S. Bajpai*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/81*

SECRET  
No. 832.

KARACHI,  
12 November 1947

Repeated Prime Minister Pakistan, Lahore,

Bank of India Ltd. Karachi has informed Dewan of Junagadh that Government of India Ministry of States have issued orders saying that they have appointed an Administrator who will operate all accounts of Junagadh State standing in the name of His Highness the Nawab Saheb or Dewan or any other State Office and no one else. This order is wholly illegal and unconstitutional and should be withdrawn forthwith. We protest most strongly against it. Nawab Saheb and his Dewan are both here and they have in no repeat no way authorized the so-called Administrator to operate these accounts. Orders are being issued to all the banks to whom your message has been addressed that if they carry out the orders of your Ministry they will be guilty of a criminal offence and will be dealt with accordingly.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

## PS-227

FINAL ARBITERS ARE THE PEOPLE<sup>1</sup>  
SARDAR WARNS PAKISTAN

Rajkot, [Nov. 12]: "Despite the attempts of Pakistan to avoid commitment in the case of Hyderabad, and despite their attempts to avoid facing facts in Junagadh, the will of people will have its way. If Hyderabad does not see the writing on the wall, it goes the way Junagadh has gone," said Sardar Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister addressing a largely attended meeting here.

"I assure you that we are not going to let the grass grow under our feet. Even if all these troubles come at the same time we have got resources which would enable us to stand up to all them at the same time," he added.

Visiting Rajkot after nine fateful years during which India has marched through many a vicissitude of fortune to its goal of independence, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was welcomed at the airport by a large crowd representing Princes and peasants, businessmen and students, and bearded Rajputs and women in *saris* of variegated colours.



Recalling how the Nawab of Junagadh had left the State 'without a shot being fired', Sardar Patel maintained that the trouble had been brought upon the Nawab's head by the wrong advice which he received from the people, who were bent upon mischief by machinations of the Pakistan Government itself.

#### NO RIGHT

Pakistan had no business, he said, to meddle with Junagadh. "When we accepted partition we did so in the hope of a final settlement of a brotherly dispute. We felt that satisfying the obstinate demand of a brother who had been a part of the joint family we would bring peace to both of us and prosperity to all.

But hardly had partition been effected when the Punjab disturbances engulfed us. Nevertheless, we took particular care to avoid creating any obstacles in the way of Pakistan's relationship with the States with whom such relationship was quite natural. We did not attempt to seduce any of their States into our fold. But it was they who throughout made it a business to create difficulties and obstacles for us as much and as often as possible.

"Rampur which was the first to declare its accession to the Indian Dominion witnessed the first fruits of Pakistan's malevolence. We met this challenge resolutely, and the [local] resistance collapsed. Then they sought a foothold in Junagadh. We warned them, we begged them. We reasoned with them, but obstinacy was not conquered. We could not naturally be blind to the consequences which this interference with our affairs entailed, and the States which had acceded to us long before they took the final plunge in Junagadh...

#### GAME UP

"Even then we had no intention of marching our troops<sup>2</sup> into the Junagadh territory, but then the Provisional Government led by Mr Samaldas Gandhi took a hand. They took village after village and reached Kutiyana. It was then that the advisers of the Nawab, who had already fled, realized that the game was up. They left leaving the people, who had financed them, in utter predicament."

Sardar Patel emphatically repudiated Pakistan's contention that the Dewan had no authority to take the action that he did. He had the assent of the Nawab of Junagadh and backing of the people. What other authority under any conception of sovereignty did the Dewan need in support of his action? It was, however, Pakistan's practice to use all sorts of devices in order to call in question anything that the Indian Dominion did. They would cry or use threat, sometimes they would blow hot and sometimes cold.



The Dewan in a more congenial atmosphere in Karachi had suddenly realized that he had not handed over the administration completely to the Indian Dominion. But his letter is crystal clear and he cannot naturally expect us to hand over the State on a plate after all the misdeeds of himself, and his other officers and the desertion of the Nawab. We have said more than once that the final arbiters on this issue are the people, and it is by their verdict that we shall be guided. I can assure everybody that the verdict would be a real verdict ascertained in a truly democratic manner. We cannot imitate the methods which Pakistan utilized in forcing decision in Kashmir.

#### KASHMIR

Sardar Patel also recounted the recent events in Kashmir where again Pakistan had intervened in the crudest and worst form that any foreign power could have done in the affairs of a neighbouring state. But the future of Kashmir like that of Hyderabad rests with the people.

Despite the attempts of Pakistan to avoid this commitment in the case of Hyderabad, and despite their attempts to avoid facing facts in Junagadh, the will of the people will have its way. If Hyderabad does not see the writing on the wall it goes the way Junagadh has gone.

Finally he felt he should make it clear to the audience that there was no question of India being unable to face up to the threats which had been held out. Pakistan's actions were probably prompted by the feeling that India was in trouble, and therefore fomentation of trouble in the States would make matters worse.

"I bear Pakistan no ill-will, I wish them Godspeed. Let them only leave us to pursue our own salvation, and stop meddling in our affairs even in places like far off Tripura....

<sup>1</sup>The *Free Press Journal*, 14 November 1947. The press cutting was forwarded by Charles D. Withers, American Vice Consul, Bombay to George Marshall. See *US National Archives*, F. 845.00/11-1747.

<sup>2</sup>Annex to PS-223.

## PS-228

*Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola to M. Ikramullah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/82*

LONDON,

15 November 1947

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

No. 255

Muslim students at Cambridge have suggested an official statement<sup>1</sup>



by you demanding United Kingdom and United States of America intervention in Kashmir and Junagadh before it is too late.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The statement was issued on 16 November. See PS-229.

<sup>2</sup>The Foreign Ministry, Camp Office, Lahore, informed Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola and Hassan Ispahani that the statement was being telegraphed to them separately and that it be given wide publicity. See F. 124 (8)-GG/83. Not printed.

## PS-229

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, FOA, S-6/2*

LAHORE,

16 November 1947

IMMEDIATE

No. 00021/50

I am issuing the following statement to the press today:

I have seen the press report of the speech made by the Deputy Prime Minister of India at a public meeting at Rajkot on November 12<sup>1</sup> and his subsequent speech at Junagadh<sup>2</sup> in the course of which he made various unfounded allegations against Pakistan, tried to justify the acts of aggression committed by the India Government in Manavadar, Junagadh and Kashmir and threatened Hyderabad with similar aggression. I do not propose to emulate Mr Patel by indulging in vituperative invective or boastful threats. My firm and undeviating objective, as also the objective of the Pakistan Government, is to eliminate by peaceful and honourable means all existing causes of friction between the two Dominions and to establish conditions which would enable ourselves and our Indian neighbours to live in friendliness and amity.

### ACCESSION OF STATES

Hundreds of States, including a State such as Kapurthala which had a Muslim majority in the population acceded to the Indian Union, but in no case did the Pakistan Government interfere in any way. Junagadh was the first State to accede to Pakistan and at once the India Government started on a campaign of vilification, threats and economic blockade. When these weapons did not succeed in intimidating Junagadh State a "provisional government of Junagadh" was set up on Indian soil and its first act was to occupy the Junagadh State property in Rajkot which is the seat of India Government's Regional Commissioner.

By infiltration tactics and other aggressive means the "Provisional Government" proceeded to violate the territory of Junagadh with the help of troops many of whom were drawn from the Indian Army. Conditions were created in which it became impossible for the Junagadh



administration to function. Finally on the alleged request of the Dewan, the administration was taken over. Junagadh was occupied by the Armed Forces of India.

The indisputable legal position is that in view of the State's accession to Pakistan the Dewan had no right to proffer and the India Government had no right to accept the so-called invitation to the India Government to take over the administration of the State.

#### RESTRAINT SHOWN

In spite of the gravest provocation, we have refrained from any action which should result in armed conflict. We could with full justification and legal right, have sent our forces to Junagadh but at no time since the accession of the State was a single soldier sent by us to Junagadh and our advice throughout to the State authorities was to exercise the greatest restraint. Manavadar, another State which had acceded to Pakistan and Mangrol and Babariawad have also been occupied by India troops.

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-227.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable.

## PS-230

*Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/84-6*

CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE

No. Primin-350

Repeated Foreign Karachi

NEW DELHI,

17 November 1947

Your telegram No. 396-G dated November 11th<sup>1</sup> [*sic* for 10] Junagadh.

At the outset we wish to make it clear that we dispute the statements and allegations contained in your telegram. The facts are these: On admission of Sir Shah Nawaz and his colleagues, which our own Regional Commissioner has since corroborated, the administration in Junagadh had completely broken down. The Junagadh Council, therefore, considered only two alternatives namely whether to hand over Junagadh administration to Provisional Government or to the Government of India. In the end, they decided upon the latter course. If the



Government of India had not intervened, the whole of Junagadh State would have been left in utter chaos with the consequent repercussions on the whole of Kathiawar. Further it was certain that the Provisional Government would have taken charge of the State in conditions of chaos that prevailed there; this would undoubtedly have involved bloodshed. In these circumstances, the Government of India had to make up their mind quickly and had no alternative but to accede to the request of Junagadh State Council and take over its administration. The Senior Member of Junagadh Council was waiting in Rajkot to receive the decision of the Government of India and it was he who on the 9th took the Regional Commissioner as Representative of the Govt. of India to Junagadh to hand over the administration. The Senior Member of the State Council also undertook to disarm all police and military before he handed over the administration. He fulfilled this undertaking. The Regional Commissioner took a detachment of the force only as a precaution and the administration of Junagadh State (except portions occupied by the Provisional Government) was taken over by us without any incident and without any dissentient voice. This shows that we acted just in time and succeeded in precluding disorder.

2. In our view it is not correct to say that Pakistan had no knowledge of what was happening in Junagadh. Before opening negotiations with the Provisional Government the Senior Member of Junagadh Council went both to Karachi and Lahore. He must have held consultations with the Nawab and you or/and your colleagues. On his return he negotiated with Mr Samaldas Gandhi to hand over the administration to the Provisional Government.

In his letter to the Regional Commissioner, Rajkot, dated November 8, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto has stated that he had already telegraphed to the Governor-General and Prime Minister, Pakistan, intimating Junagadh Government's decision to ask the Government of India to take over the administration of the State. The Nawab himself was in Karachi and Sir [Shah] Nawaz was acting under his orders as Prime Minister of the State. Further, Sir Shah Nawaz took this decision with the unanimous approval of the State Council and of leaders of public opinion in Junagadh. He himself reached Karachi on the 8th and must have acquainted the Pakistan Government with the situation the same day. On the other hand, Regional Commissioner did not take over the administration till the evening of November 9.

3. You have asked that Indian troops and presumably Indian administration should be immediately withdrawn from the State.



We regret we are unable to do so. This situation would at once leave the way open for the Provisional Government to take charge of the entire administration and if any attempts were made at this juncture to restore the Nawab it would inevitably lead to conflict and result in bloodshed and anarchy which neither you nor we can view with equanimity. In this connection, it may be recalled that it was this very consideration which led the Nawab to instruct his Dewan to make over the administration to Indian Government.

4. We have not recognized the Provisional Government. But the fact cannot be ignored that the Provisional Government consists of Junagadh's subjects with very large stake in the State who command considerable public support and who have occupied a large portion of Junagadh's territory of which they are now in charge. The Government of India cannot be expected to promote a situation in which they would come into conflict with the people of the State fighting for their elementary rights.

5. To stabilize the situation swiftly and promptly is, therefore, the essence of Government of India's policy and for this purpose we wish to settle the issue with the least possible delay by a plebiscite as already conveyed to you in my telegram No. Primin 324 of November 10.<sup>2</sup> This seems to us the only way in which this issue can be settled satisfactorily.

[JAWAHARLAL NEHRU]

<sup>1</sup>PS-225.

<sup>2</sup>PS-223.

## PS-231

*Liaquat Ali Khan to Jawaharlal Nehru*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/89*

KARACHI,  
22 November 1947  
CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. 922

Your telegram Primin 350 dated 17th November<sup>1</sup> evades the main issue which is that India Government deliberately created conditions which brought administration in Junagadh to the verge of breakdown.



Our instructions to Junagadh State were that on no account should they do anything which lead to disorder or bloodshed. Similar instructions were given by His Highness the Nawab to the Dewan.

Junagadh administration followed those instructions strictly and the non-Muslims in the State were perfectly safe. Nevertheless, the India Government persisted in their activities directed against the administration of Junagadh.

2. It is true to say that Pakistan Government knew of the activities of your Government and of the Provisional Government directed against Junagadh administration and in fact protested against them several times but it is wholly incorrect to suggest, as you do, that it was as a result of consultations with Pakistan Government that Mr Harvey Jones, Senior Member of Junagadh Council, negotiated with Mr Samaldas Gandhi to hand over administration of State to Provisional Government. We had no knowledge that any such scheme was afoot or that any negotiations with Mr Samaldas Gandhi were contemplated. We could not possibly recognize that the Provisional Government has any *locus standi* in affairs of Junagadh. Incidentally Mr Harvey Jones never went to Lahore.

3. The telegram by Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto addressed to Governor-General and Prime Minister, Pakistan was received by us on the 9th November after the India Government had already occupied Junagadh by force. The insinuation that, because of the Nawab's presence in Karachi, action of the Dewan of Junagadh had the approval of Pakistan Government is wholly unfounded. We repeat that the Pakistan Government only knew of the occupation of Junagadh by Indian troops after the event. Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto reached Karachi on the 8th but did not call on Foreign Office until the 10th.

4. We note that you insist upon keeping your troops in Junagadh and on the continued occupation of the State. If your troops withdraw and if you restore the administration to the rightful Ruler, as you should, we see no reason why this should lead to anarchy and conflict. In fact reports are pouring in that your troops are behaving in a most high-handed manner which had resulted in serious loss of Muslims lives.

5. The fact that you have not formally recognized the Provisional Government does not alter the basic position that it was formed and functioned on Indian territory and that but for your support and encouragement there would have been no such thing as a Provisional Government for Junagadh. We cannot possibly recognize either your occupation of Junagadh or the plebiscite which you appear to contemplate. A free and



fair plebiscite can only be held after your forces are withdrawn and administration of the Ruler restored and normal conditions prevail.<sup>2</sup>

[LIAQUAT ALI KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-230.

<sup>2</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru responded on 30 November 1947 by stating that India had already indicated her position in a telegram on 17 November 1947, see *ibid.* India "have not only done nothing to undermine Junagadh administration but they have taken control of situation to prevent administration from collapsing". See F. 124 (8)-GG/91. Not printed.

## PS-232

*Faiz Muhamad Khan and Others to Louis Mountbatten*

*Telegram, Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*

JUNAGADH,  
28 November 1947

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had sent two deputationists to Mahatmaji and Sardar Patel with consent of Muslims of Junagadh to devise ways and means to prevent bloodshed in Junagadh State. In consequence Indian Union was invited to assist Junagadh authorities to maintain law and order in the State. Indian troops entered Junagadh on the evening of ninth November and took over administration of Junagadh State. Disturbances started in the State after that date until today when looting [and] plundering to the extent of crores of rupees, arson, murders, rape, abductions and unimaginable wrongs were committed in Kutiyana, Ghedbagasra, Balagam, Ratva, Shapur Vanthali, Agatrai, Dhandhusar, Keshod, Bamnasa, Ajak, Vadla Wadhavi, Zariawada, Ijali, Bhanduri, Dudhala, Prabwaspatan etc. Notwithstanding guarantees and assurances given by Sardar Patel in unequivocal terms that if Muslims will remain loyal even a child's hair of Muslims will not be touched. Muslims of Junagadh State dissolved Jami[y]at here and joined Congress and pledged themselves to communal harmony all over the State, even entirely giving up celebrations of *Moharram* voluntarily to help ensure peace and tranquility; yet the mosques, saints' tombs have been ransacked and holy *Quran* torn. Muslims are robbed in day time by military under the instigation of communal elements all over the State. Let it be remembered that there was no single case of loot, arson, rape or murder prior to Administration and all properties of Hindus were untouched and safe during their exodus. Black Hole of Calcutta was repeated. At Kutiyana where seven hundred were locked up for



days, where seventy persons could hardly be accommodated. We pray you to come here personally to witness; fair name of our Kathiawar so shamelessly smeared and then support our demand of independent public inquiry to redress the wrong which has no parallel. Muslims are arrested and put behind bar. All this has naturally resulted into making the life of the Muslims intolerable in the State and they are compelled to forsake their dear homes and hearths. Kindly take immediate steps as you are the only hope for minorities either here or all over India.

Signatories:

FAIZ MUHAMAD KHAN, MUSSABHAI DERBAN,  
ABDULHUSEN, MULLA JIVAJEE, MUHAMMAD BAJUD,  
PIRZADA SAYED MUHAMMED ISMAIL KHOKHAN;  
MUNSHI ABDUL KADIR

PS-233

*Ruler of Palanpur to Louis Mountbatten*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL      ZORAWAR PALACE, PALANPUR,  
10 December 1947

My esteemed Lord Mountbatten,

With great hesitation I have decided to write this letter to Your Excellency. It is confidential and is intended for Your Excellency's personal consideration only. It relates to a question which seriously concerns our Order. I am sure the matter could not have escaped your serious and sympathetic consideration. Your Excellency must have already endeavoured and must be endeavouring to bring about as best a solution of it as may be possible. This is about unfortunate Junagadh.<sup>1</sup> I have no intention to write or to say even a word about anything which has already happened in Junagadh. I may just mention here that my son and my *Wazir* who attended the Princes' Conference addressed by Your Excellency on 26[25] July last narrated to me in detail the most sympathetic as well as tactful manner in which Your Excellency tackled the questions relating to Indian States vis-a-vis the new Dominions. They also repeated to me the silly utterances of the representative of Junagadh at that Conference and the firm and perhaps almost prophetic manner in which Your Excellency tried to warn him against a step which would be ruinous. I only want to say one



word about Junagadh and that is that I hope Your Excellency will very graciously do your best and see that the dynasty will not be wiped out. I am trying not to believe the rumours which are afloat. But the world in which we are living today, anything and everything is possible. Your Excellency has been a great and an old friend of Princes and I am certain that during your tenure in India as the Head of the Government no catastrophe resulting in a total annihilation of an ancient dynasty will befall our Order, whatever may be the faults or however grievous may be the error on the part of its Head. I will not write long or more; I only hope that the solemn and judicious promise of gracious and good Queen Victoria made in 1858 on the assumption of the Government of India by the Crown and that great document, namely the proclamation issued on the occasion, will not only be honoured, but upheld by the Government of the India Dominion in their spirit as well as word. I am certain that the people of the Junagadh State have no intention of doing away with the Ruler of the ruling family and to take an extreme step. Fortunately a man like Sardar Vallabhbhai is in charge of the portfolio and I know he will never resort to an extreme policy. I am fully aware of his difficulties and I have my sympathies for him. But he is able enough to grapple with any situation, however insurmountable and however serious it may appear for the moment. I may also add here that I am not writing this letter because Junagadh is a Muslim State; nor have I any relationship with the ruling family of Junagadh. I am only prompted to do so on account of my concern regarding a matter of principle which affects the whole Princely Order in India. I know it well how much Your Excellency has done for the Princely India and how Your Excellency has saved a premier State like Hyderabad from a fate which would have resulted in nothing short of a disaster. It was most fortunate, if I may say so, both for England as well as for India, that Earl Mountbatten came to India at this critical time. God bless you, Sir, and all happiness, prosperity and still greater fame may come to you in future.

We are both tremendously looking forward to meeting Your Excellency again sometime, I hope, at the end of January or beginning of February and I hope Palanpur will have the honour of welcoming Your Excellencies next year.

With respectful regards to both Your Excellencies from us both,

Yours very sincerely,  
TALEY MUHAMMAD KHAN

<sup>1</sup>In his reply of 4 January 1948, Mountbatten informed the Ruler of Palanpur that he had done all that was in his power to save the Ruler of Junagadh from "a catastrophic course", and nothing could be said about the future of the dynasty unless the issue of accession was settled on the basis of a plebiscite. See F. 200/90-D. *Mountbatten papers*, Not printed.



## PS-234

*M. Ikramullah to G. S. Bajpai*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/95*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 1279

KARACHI,  
30 December 1947

Since Indian Dominion's forcible occupation of Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Bantwa, Sardargadh, etc. reports of eye witness accounts have been received from ever-increasing number of refugees here indicating prevalence of virtual reign of terror throughout these areas. Massacre of innocent Muslims, molestation of Muslim women and wholesale looting of Muslim property has apparently become the order of the day. In Bantwa alone Muslim property worth several crores is reported to have been looted and respectable and peaceful families deliberately dishonoured.<sup>1</sup> All Muslim institutions are reported to have been closed down and a number of mosques and tombs desecrated.

Khan Saheb of Manavadar and Sheikh of Mangrol are both reported to have been placed under humiliating detention and their personal property has been looted. Most of the gazetted and non-gazetted Muslim officers have been relieved of their duties or forced to retire.

You will appreciate that Pakistan Government cannot but regard these happenings with the gravest concern. If we have not so far made detailed representations to you regarding these it is because India Government possesses no constitutional *locus standi* in these States. As tempo of atrocities shows no sign of decreasing we must request you to take immediate and effective steps to put an end to what looks like a determined effort to annihilate the Muslims of Kathiawar.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]

<sup>1</sup>PS-232.



## PS-235

*G. S. Bajpai to M. Ikramullah**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/93-4*CONFIDENTIAL/IMMEDIATE  
No. Primin-527NEW DELHI,  
6 January 1948

Your telegram No. 1279 dated December 31st.<sup>1</sup> We are constantly in touch with situation in Junagadh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Sardargadh, Bantwa and other places and are in a position to affirm that accounts given to you about conditions there are wholly untrue. There were sporadic disturbances in Junagadh when it was under Nawab's administration but within 48 hours of our taking over at request of Nawab our Regional Commissioner was able to restore peaceful conditions. Large quantities of hidden arms have been and are still being recovered from some of Muslim population of Junagadh. There was one communal disturbance on December 17th when 26 people were admitted to hospital, most of whom were Hindus. Some Muslims made a determined attack on a police station on December 26th and hacked to death 5 Hindu policemen and injured some others but order was quickly restored and there was no retaliation. Bad characters are of course being rounded up in order to prevent repetition of such lawlessness. In Bantwa nothing happened to disturb peaceful (group corrupt; conditions?) except a small incident by Hindus who had been subjected to oppression by previous administration but this was brought under control in a few hours. There were no loss of Muslim life, incident and damage to property was negligible. In fact Muslims of Bantwa themselves have sent telegrams thanking Regional Commissioner for effective action and protection afforded to them. It is true that alarmist reports were sent by persons interested in fomenting trouble. One of these reports said that Ismail Khokhar, a close relation of Nawab of Junagadh, was killed but he is still alive and he, with six other Muslim leaders of Junagadh, was given facilities to verify for themselves what actually happened. After satisfying themselves they have publicly stated that most of the allegations were wholly false and frivolous and that there were altogether only two murders, slight damage to property and no verifiable reports of rape or abduction. Investigation and punishment of offenders, whether Hindu or Muslim, have been prompt. There is absolutely no truth in allegation that a number of mosques and tombs have been damaged or desecrated. The Khan of Mangrol [*sic* for Manavadar] is in Jamnagar with His Highness Jam Saheb of



Nawanagar and Sheikh of Mangrol is with His Highness of Porbandar in Porbandar. They have gone there at our instance as their presence at present in Manavadar and Mangrol is likely to create difficulties in the way of reorganization. They are staying as guests and are being provided all comfort and facilities. Their property has not been looted and is quite safe. There has been some reorganization of administration with a view to removing corrupt, inefficient and unreliable staff of previous regime.

2. Situation in Junagadh and (group corrupt) Kathiawar is quite peaceful and we regret that on the basis of false and irresponsible reports Pakistan Government should have brought such unfounded charges against this Government which has gone all out to protect Muslim life and property notwithstanding gravest provocation.

[G. S. BAJPAI]

<sup>1</sup>PS-234.

## PS-236

*Complaint to the U. N. Security Council*

*FOA, SA (4)-1 (1)-10/28*

KARACHI,  
15 January 1948

While tragic events were going on in Junagadh, the accession of Kashmir was also in dispute. The Government of India took up the Kashmir case before the United Nations Security Council on 1st January 1948. Pakistan, however, had several complaints to make against India and these cases, including the Junagadh dispute, were placed before the Security Council by the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations on the 15th January 1948. The Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan opened proceedings in the Security Council with a speech on the 18th February 1948 and fuller discussions took place in the Security Council on the 26th February and 8th March, 1948.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Annex.



*Annex to PS-236**Security Council Report on Junagadh Question<sup>1</sup>*

At the 250th and 257th meetings on February 18 and 26, the Council heard statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

The representative of Pakistan<sup>2</sup> charged that when the Dominion of India had perceived that Junagadh was contemplating accession to Pakistan, India had not only protested to Pakistan, but had taken various steps to make life intolerable within Junagadh for its people. In violation of the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan, the Indian Government had cut off all communications and supplies.

In the meantime, while exchanges had been taking place between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, a so-called provisional government of Junagadh had been set up on Dominion of India territory and had taken possession of certain Junagadh property in that territory. Under the leadership of the so-called provisional government, raids had taken place on Junagadh territory, culminating in an ultimatum which had compelled the State Prime Minister of Junagadh to ask the Regional Commissioner of the Indian Dominion for assistance in keeping law and order.<sup>3</sup> Thereupon, the forces of the Dominion of India marched into and occupied Junagadh State<sup>4</sup> they had been in possession since that time. The Government of Pakistan regarded this as a direct act of hostility on the part of the Indian Government against Pakistan; as Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan, the Government [of India] had no right to intervene in the territory.<sup>5</sup> A plebiscite which the Government of India had held in Junagadh had not in fact been free, the representative of Pakistan declared.<sup>6</sup> He further stated that on October 22, 1947, Indian Dominion troops had occupied the neighbo[u]ring State of Manavadar and had removed the ruler.

Pakistan desired that the Government of India should, of its own accord or through some action or agency of the Security Council, withdraw Indian forces from Junagadh and restore the rulers of Junagadh and Manavadar to their States so that normal administration should be restored. The Pakistan Government desired, in addition, that such people in Junagadh as had suffered at the hands of the military forces or officials of the Dominion of India should be restored to their homes and property and be compensated for any losses.

The representative of India<sup>7</sup> stated that the Government of India had undertaken that, if circumstances required, a new and free plebiscite could be arranged under suitable auspices in Junagadh. He stated that it had always been understood that in assuring the option of accession to either Dominion, the Indian States concerned would not



take an arbitrary decision, but would take into account considerations such as geographical contiguity. By all rules of reason, Junagadh and the other States, whose accession was in dispute, ought to have acceded to the Indian Union.

Reviewing the situation in Junagadh after its accession to Pakistan, he said that the Ruler and his Prime Minister had fled to Karachi,<sup>8</sup> the administration had soon collapsed, and the so-called economic blockade had been nothing more than the chaos resulting from the breakdown of the administration of Junagadh. Though Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan, the Government of India had been the only party in a position to render prompt and effective assistance in maintaining order; this was clear evidence of the lack of wisdom of Junagadh's so-called accession to Pakistan. With regard to the occupation of Manavadar by Indian troops,<sup>9</sup> he stated that the Government of India, because it had had reliable reports that the Khan of Manavadar was importing Muslim refugees from the Indian Union with a view to setting up Muslim domination in Manavadar and to terrorizing the Hindu population, and because the situation had so developed that a communal flare-up was almost imminent, had interfered to prevent such a development.

The position of the Government of India was that, far from occupying Junagadh unlawfully, it had endeavored to settle the question of accession by peaceful means, but had received no co-operation at all from Pakistan. Even so, it had not taken over the administration or interfered with the affairs of Junagadh, or sent its forces into the State until a formal request had been received from the Prime Minister of Junagadh. He maintained that the Government of India, in all matters relating to the accession of Indian States, had throughout followed a very consistent policy—namely, that the option of accession should be exercised by a State with due regard to its geographical position and with due regard to the wishes of the majority of its people.

In a further statement the representative of Pakistan<sup>10</sup> called for the same action in the case of Junagadh as in that of Kashmir—namely, to agree upon the conditions under which a plebiscite was to be held and to implement the agreement as early as possible.

At the 264th meeting, on March 8, 1948, the representative of India remarked with regard to the restoration of the administration of the State of Junagadh to the ruler, which he considered to be the main demand made by Pakistan, that there was no remnant of the old administration to be restored in Junagadh. In view of recent political developments in Kathiawar, he considered that there could not be serious talk of such a restoration.



If the Security Council had no objection, a new plebiscite might be held, however, to decide not only the question of accession, but also the questions of the restoration of the ruler and the incorporation of Junagadh in the United States of Kathiawar.

At the 289th and 290th meetings on May 7, the Council continued its consideration of the dispute over Junagadh and other States.

The representative of Pakistan drew the Council's attention to a scheme addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Pakistan delegation on April 26. This proposal, he stated, was much the same as that adopted by the Security Council with reference to Kashmir, except that the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator were to be given the widest possible powers. He again requested the restoration of the rulers of the States concerned to their positions.

The representative of India stated that the Security Council should consider seriously whether the United Nations should undertake the trouble and expense of holding another plebiscite so that practically the same result could be obtained.

<sup>1</sup>The *Year Book of the United Nations*, 1947-48, 400-01. Pakistan had made a reference on Junagadh to the UNO on 15 January 1948; Document No. S/646 refers.

<sup>2</sup>For text of Mohammad Zafrulla Khan's speech of 18 January 1948, See FOA, SA (4)1 (1)-10/28. Not printed.

<sup>3</sup>PS-224.

<sup>4</sup>See Annex to PS-223.

<sup>5</sup>See PS-229.

<sup>6</sup>PS-237.

<sup>7</sup>For text of speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar, see Security Council Official Records 264th meeting, 44-65. Not printed.

<sup>8</sup>See note 3 above.

<sup>9</sup>PS-248.

<sup>10</sup>As the dispute relating to Kashmir was of greater importance and constituted a more immediate threat to international peace, the Security Council, on 20th January 1948, formed a Commission to deal with the Kashmir question first. The consideration of other issues, like Junagadh would be postponed until consideration of the Kashmir question had been completed. See KR-484, Vol. IX, 487.



## PS-237

*A. S. B. Shah to S. M. Yusuf**F. 124 (8)-GG/96-9*

SECRET

[KARACHI,]  
24 February 1948

## JUNAGADH PLEBISCITE

Mr Douglas Brown of the *Daily Telegraph* has now become very friendly. He rang me up this morning to say that he had just returned from Junagadh and asked whether I would like to know something about the plebiscite held there. I asked him to come round and this is what he told me:

- a. First of all, Mr Brown narrated the story of Mr Samaldas Gandhi, the head of the "Provisional Government" of Junagadh. This man according to Mr Brown used to be the Editor of a Bombay newspaper called *Bande Matram*. He is a nephew of the famous saint. Mr Brown said that Samaldas himself related his story of the "freedom" of Junagadh as follows:

Soon after the partition, Samaldas "inner voice" told him that he must liberate Junagadh from the yoke of the Musalmans. He at once started raising subscriptions in Bombay and wrote to his friends elsewhere. As a result of this he was able to purchase 700 pistols in Bombay. His friends started recruitment of Sikhs in Lucknow, Cawnpore and Allahabad. In the meantime, he went to Delhi to consult Mahatamaji. He told the saint quite plainly that his methods were quite different to those preached by the saint. He was a believer in violence. To this his august uncle replied: "You must do what your conscience tells you is right. I quite agree that you should liberate Junagadh". Having received this back hand blessing from his uncle Mr Samaldas Gandhi came back to Bombay. By this time about 900 armed and trained Sikhs had reached Rajkot. With this force he first occupied Junagadh House in Rajkot. The guards had taken shelter in a cellar from where they were soon seized and put to sword. A few Junagadh policemen wandering in the streets of Rajkot civil station were also killed. After that he marched at the head of his army towards Junagadh State. The only place where they met with any resistance was Kathari (a town where the majority of the people are Musalmans). But he had no difficulty in capturing



- this place and in looting it, putting the inhabitants to sword and burning the town. When this happened, the Nawab and his Prime Minister, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, fled from the State, leaving behind an Englishman called Harvey Jones. The State had already been surrounded by Indian troops. When Mr Harvey Jones saw no hope of success against the armed band of Sikhs he sent word to Mr Gandhi that he was ready to capitulate but later he changed his mind. He thought it would be safer to capitulate to Indian troops. As this suited Mr Gandhi's purpose equally he agreed that Harvey Jones should surrender the State to the Indian Army.
- b. Mr Brown then told me the story of the plebiscite. He had arrived in Junagadh two days before the event was scheduled to take place. He found Junagadh full of red flags and red-painted lorries with loud speakers and red placards on the walls, all exhorting the people to vote for India. The person in local charge of the plebiscite was called Shwashvalkar. This gentleman informed the foreign correspondents (Messrs. Josslyn, Henessy and Douglas Brown) that the main political party in the State was called Praja Mandal, which was affiliated to the States Congress Party. He had also taken care to inform these correspondents that there were also Muslim members in Praja Mandal. The correspondents later contacted the Muslim members and found them in a very frightened state. They told the correspondents in confidence that they were going to cast their votes for India because they were afraid of their lives but they added that actually their hearts were in Pakistan. They also said that when the trouble started in Junagadh they had sent a telegram to Mr Gandhi and had sought his help. But later under pressure of the Indian military, they sent another telegram saying that the first telegram was not true and that it has been sent at a time when their minds were slightly agitated by the happenings in Junagadh. These Muslims then gave the correspondents the addresses of about 100 mosques which had been destroyed or desecrated. The correspondents then went and saw some of these mosques and found them to be in the condition described by these Muslims.<sup>2</sup>
- c. On the evening before the plebiscite, a large meeting was held under Mr Gandhi who spoke with great eloquence and called upon the people to vote for India. In his speech, Mr Gandhi said that the people of Junagadh were not afraid of U.N.O. or Pakistan. He hurled abuses at Mr Jinnah and pointed to the fact that some foreign correspondents were present amongst the audience. He



was not afraid of what they were going to report [to] their newspapers.

- d. Then came the actual date of voting. Many polling booths were organized. There were red boxes for India and green boxes for Pakistan. The polling was under the charge of the Commissioner of Rajkot (?) Each voter was given a voting slip. The correspondents observed that each slip had a number and the name of the voter recorded on it. These numbers and names corresponded with similar numbers and names entered on the counterfoil of the books left in the hands of the polling officer. The correspondents were surprised to see this. So they went up to the Presiding Officer and pointed out that this could hardly be called secret voting because any one putting his slip in the green boxes could be easily identified by checking his name and number with the counterfoil. To this, the Presiding Officer replied that there was a mistake in the printing of the polling slips. He explained that this was the first election in the history of Junagadh. The printers thought that it would be a good thing, as in the case of cheque books, to have numbers on the voting slips as well as on the counterfoils. Actually, the Presiding Officer said, no one was going to bother himself about checking up those names. At the end of the polling, the correspondents were told that over 80% of the population had participated in polling.
- e. The points noted by the correspondents in connection with this polling was that there was too overwhelming a majority in favour of India and very few in favour of Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> For instance in Majmu Bara there were in all 1432 votes. Of these India had polled 1,402 and Pakistan nil. In Mangrol the total number of votes were 12,947. Of these, 11,833 were polled by India and only 8 by Pakistan. The results in Manavadar, Sardargadh and Babariawad were on similar lines. Outside Junagadh, the total number of votes were 31,297. Out of these Pakistan had polled only 39. The results in Junagadh were to be announced on Monday (yesterday). All this according to Mr Douglas Brown rather significant [*sic*] of the manner in which the plebiscite had been arranged. It had given the correspondents their feeling that India need not have taken so much trouble about a plebiscite the results of which were so obvious from the outset.

2. There was some talk about asking the Ruler to come back so that the State could fit in with the federation of States in Kathiawar. They could not obviously have one republic affiliated to so many kingdoms! There is going to be another referendum about the Ruler and yet one



more about joining the Kathiawar States Federation.

3. Mr Brown told me that he was giving me this news in confidence and asked that his name should not be quoted. I promised that his name will not be divulged.

A. S. B. SHAH  
*Joint Secretary*

<sup>1</sup>Copies of the note were forwarded to Liaquat Ali Khan and Mohammad Zafrulla Khan.

<sup>2</sup>PS-232.

<sup>3</sup>The plebiscite results showed 190,779 votes in favour of accession to India and only 91 for union with Pakistan. See *Keeising's Contemporary Archives, 1948-50*, Vol. VII, 9154.

## PS-238

*Louis Mountbatten to King George VI*

*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*

NEW DELHI,  
26 February 1948

Sir,

With humble duty I beg to submit to Your Majesty copies of two Aide Memoires which I have had prepared on

(a) Junagadh and Kashmir<sup>1</sup>

(b) India and the Commonwealth<sup>2</sup>

And which are being taken home to the Prime Minister by Mr Gordon Walker who leaves Delhi today.

I have the honour to be, Sir,  
Your Majesty's Humble and Devoted Servant  
[LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN]

<sup>1</sup>See Enclosure to KR-479, Vol. IX, 474-9.

<sup>2</sup>Not traceable

*Enclosure to PS-238*  
*Aide-Memoire by the Governor-General of India*  
*Junagadh*

### INTRODUCTION

I have been given to understand, from conversations I have had with various persons, that three major misunderstandings exist in connection with the Government of India's policy and actions in Junagadh and Kashmir. These misunderstandings are, I am told, current among responsible opinion in the United Kingdom. It is with the



object of clearing them up that I am writing this aide-memoire, which will set out the history of the various events concerned.

2. The three misunderstandings to which I refer are:-

*First* That the Government of India took possession of Junagadh State by force,<sup>1</sup> after its legal accession to Pakistan, and has largely vitiated its case in Kashmir by its actions in Junagadh.

*Secondly* That the Government of India brought pressure to bear, at various times, on the Maharaja and Government of Kashmir in order to induce that State to accede to the Dominion of India.

*Thirdly* That the Government of India planned the despatch of Indian forces to Kashmir some time in advance of the date on which these forces were sent.

3. None of these statements is true; I shall deal with them one by one from my personal knowledge—for I was present at all the meetings at which the various decisions were taken.

#### JUNAGADH

##### *The Right of States to Accede to Either Dominion*

4. On 25th July, 1947, I addressed, in my capacity as Crown Representative, a special full meeting of the Chamber of Princes.<sup>2</sup> At this I informed the Ruler[s] and their representatives of the policies of the future Governments of both India and Pakistan, which I had worked out with them, with regard to the formulation of Instruments of Accession and Standstill Agreements by and with States.

5. I made it clear that all the States were theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they wished or even to remain independent. I pointed out that separate States Departments had been set up for each future Dominion Government. But I added the following words:-

“When I say that they are free to link up with either of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded.”

6. I made my views on these geographical compulsions clearer whilst I was answering questions at the end of this conference. I hoped that both the future Governments of India and Pakistan would take note of and agree with the principle I had enunciated. In the case of the Government of India, this was openly done, and the principle was scrupulously followed. A large State which had obvious geographical compulsions to accede to Pakistan—Kalat—approached the Government of India for political relationship, but was refused; and unofficial overtures from Bahawalpur were similarly discouraged.

7. I also gained the impression from various conversations, which I



had with leaders of the future Pakistan, that they too intended to recognize this principle and not to enter into a 'competition' with India in obtaining accessions. Indeed, Sardar Nishtar, the States Minister of the future Pakistan Government, minuted his agreement with the principle on a file, and it was in pursuance of this agreed policy that the offer of Kalat was turned down. The leaders of India naturally assume that this principle would be as scrupulously adhered to by Pakistan as by themselves.

#### *The Geographical Position of Junagadh*

8. Of the 300 odd States in Kathiawar, Junagadh was the premier and the largest, with a population of 700,000 (82% Hindu), an area of about 3,500 square miles, and a geographical position that makes it an essential factor in the unity of Kathiawar. It has a seaboard and ports, which are not, however, open regularly during the monsoon. It is inextricably mixed up with Kathiawar States which had acceded to the Dominion of India. In the middle of Junagadh were pockets of territory belonging to other States; similarly, pockets of Junagadh territory were to be found in the middle of surrounding States. The railway and posts & telegraphs services of Junagadh were an integral part of the Indian system. The railway, police, telegraph & telephones were administered by the Dominion of India, and under Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act continued to be the concern of the Dominion until renounced by the State.

9. I trust that these facts will support the theory that the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan would be in violation of the basic principles of accession which had been agreed, at least tacitly, between future Ministries of India and Pakistan. Junagadh is, furthermore, linguistically, culturally, economically and strategically linked with the territories surrounding it and with India.

#### *The Intention of Junagadh to Accede to India—April to September [1947]*

10. At the conference held on 25th July 1947, to which I have referred above, the Junagadh representative, Mr Nabi Bakhsh, asked me a series of questions. But I did not detect from these any intention on his part that his State should accede to Pakistan. Indeed he told me, when I met him privately afterwards, that he had every intention that it should accede to India. Furthermore, I understand that he gave the same impression to the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar and to Sardar Patel.

11. Both before and after 25th July, authorities on behalf of the Junagadh Government, including the Nawab himself, made repeated declarations to the effect that Junagadh stood for the unity and solidarity of Kathiawar and that the State would make common cause with the other Kathiawar States to maintain peace and security in that area. The first of the



declarations was contained in a press statement issued by the Nawab's Government as early as 11th April 1947, in which the need for the solidarity of Kathiawar was emphasized and the formation of a self-contained group of Kathiawar States was favoured.

12. The failure of Junagadh to accede to India by 15th August, therefore, caused some surprise to my Government, but no special action was taken to secure Junagadh's accession. My Government put no pressure whatsoever upon Junagadh, for, although it was certainly their intention to enter into negotiations, they were careful to avoid any action likely to give cause for any accusation of coercion being leveled against them.

*Approaches by Pakistan to Junagadh—August and September 1947*

13. As soon as the possibility of Junagadh acceding to Pakistan became clear, the Government of India pointed out to Pakistan the patent impropriety and injustice of accepting Junagadh's accession, and made two formal efforts to obtain a declaration of the intentions of the Pakistan Government in regard to this matter: but there was no response.

*The Accession of Junagadh to Pakistan*

14. The news of Junagadh<sup>3</sup> accession to Pakistan, in mid-September 1947, came as a very considerable shock to the Government of India. It was felt that it might have a serious effect on the whole of the Government's accession policy. For example, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar made it clear to me personally that unless the Government of India had the will and the capacity to prevent Junagadh from going over to Pakistan, the confidence of the Princes as a whole in the value of their own Accession Instruments would be shattered; and the position of the Kathiawar States would be particularly seriously jeopardized.

15. The Government of India, besides making further representations to Pakistan that the issue should be decided according to the wishes of the people of the State, sent the Secretary of the States Ministry to Junagadh with a personal message to the Nawab. He was refused permission to see the Nawab, but the Dewan admitted to him, at that early stage, that he was in favour of a referendum.

16. I will not try myself to analyse Pakistan's purpose in accepting the accession of Junagadh. But I would like to quote the opinion which Lord Ismay put forward to me. That the project was so fantastic from the military point of view, and such a liability politically and economically to Pakistan, that it had the appearance of a trap: and that the Pakistan Government were deliberately teasing the Government of India into taking precipitous and aggressive action. Lord Ismay was



convinced that this was the real motive underlying Pakistan's action, as a result of talks which he had had with Mr Jinnah. It appeared to be primarily a propagandist move and part of a wider campaign in which Pakistan was posing as the innocent small nation—the victim of the aggressive designs of its large, bullying neighbour. It was also considered, as subsequent events confirmed, a convenient bargaining-counter for Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir.

17. During the two months which followed the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, the Government of India made no attempt to challenge the accession; although they remained of the opinion that, in the circumstances in which it was made, they could not themselves recognize the accession.<sup>4</sup> They reiterated their wish to find a solution of the problem by friendly discussions with representatives of Pakistan and Junagadh; and repeated their policy that any decisions involving the fate of large numbers of people should depend on the wishes of those people.

#### *Babariawad and Mangrol*

18. Among the large number of states in Kathiawar which had acceded to India were Babariawad and Mangrol. Mangrol was a separate entity, which had declared its independence on the lapse of paramountcy. Similarly, the *mulgarasis* of Babariawad declared their independence.

19. The legal right of Babariawad and Mangrol to accede on their own was questioned by the Government of Pakistan<sup>5</sup>. In view of this, the Government of India refrained for long from ordering Indian armed forces to take over from the Junagadh armed forces which had taken possession of these parts of Indian territory. The Prime Minister of Pakistan undertook, but failed, to induce Junagadh to withdraw these forces. On 1st November Indian troops entered these two States under a flag of truce without a shot being fired in order to give them that protection, which their signatures of the instruments of accession demanded, against the increasingly oppressive action of the Junagadh authorities.

#### *The Provisional Government of Junagadh*

20. On 25th September the "Provisional Government" of Junagadh was formed.<sup>6</sup> It moved from place to place and ejected the forces and officials of Junagadh. But the Indian Government did not recognize the "Provisional Government". The real cause of the breakdown of the State's administration was undoubtedly the fact that the Nawab emptied the treasury when, soon after the accession to Pakistan, he fled to Karachi.

#### *The Entry of Indian Troops into Junagadh.*

21. On 9th November a telegram was sent by Pandit Nehru to



Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. This sets out so clearly the reasons for the entry, the following day, of Indian troops into Junagadh that I will reproduce it in full. It read as follows<sup>7</sup>:-

22. It has subsequently transpired that, before sending his letter of 8th November, the Dewan of Junagadh had obtained the consent of his Ruler, who had fled to Karachi. The new administrator naturally brought in some Indian troops. As they entered Junagadh they were met and led in by Harvey Jones himself. Junagadh was taken over at their request and without a shot being fired.

#### *The Junagadh Referendum*

23. At the time of the preparation of this paper a referendum has just been held in Junagadh, under a senior judicial officer, who is neither a Hindu nor a Muslim. It resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of India.

24. I have reason to believe that the Government of India will be prepared, if requested, to hold another referendum at a later date under U.N.O. or other suitable auspices.

#### *The Final Opinions of the Pakistan Leaders on the Accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.*

25. When I saw Mr Jinnah at Lahore on 1st November, he gave me his view that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, and that he had been most averse to accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for a long time, but had finally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan.

26. I am credibly informed that Ministers of the Government of Pakistan have expressed similar views to either Ministers or officials of the Government of India.

<sup>1</sup>It may be of interest to note that the following measures of the Indian government to pressure Junagadh into submission were overlooked by Louis Mountbatten: (i) Indian Cabinet decided on 17 September, 1947 that troops should be suitably disposed around Junagadh. The Secretary, States Department should visit the Ruler of Junagadh and explain the implications of their accession to Pakistan. Discontinue POL supplies to Junagadh. See PS-166, note 3. A comprehensive military action plan for Junagadh prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces of India was submitted for approval of the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet. Indian troops forces attacked and occupied the State on 9 November 1947. See Annex to PS-223.

<sup>2</sup>No. 14.

<sup>3</sup>PS-162.

<sup>4</sup>PS-168.

<sup>5</sup>PS-202.

<sup>6</sup>In a note on Junagadh of 29 September 1947, Mountbatten stated that a provisional Government of Junagadh had been formed by V.P. Menon under the leadership of Mr Gandhi's nephew. See PS-186.

<sup>7</sup>For text of telegram, see PS-222.



## PS-239

*E. C. Donoghue to All Ministers*  
*Mountbatten Papers, F. 200/90-D*

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CABINET SECRETARIAT,  
 No. 257/C.F/47 NEW DELHI,  
 9 March 1948

Under Sub-rule I of rule IV of the Rules of Procedure the undersigned is directed to circulate to Ministers for an expression of their opinion on summary from the Ministry of States proposing to replace the Junagadh Administration (Property) Ordinance, 1947, by an Act of the Legislature.

If no comments are received by 10 a.m on Saturday, the 13th March, 1948, it will be assumed that Ministers agree to legislation being undertaken as proposed in the summary.

E. C. DONOGHUE  
*for Joint Secretary to the Cabinet*

*Enclosure to PS-239*

SUMMARY

In November 1947 the administration of the Junagadh State was handed over to the Government of India. Shortly before the administration was so handed over, the Nawab had left the State and taken away with him considerable property belonging to the State. Included in such property was:

- (i) a deposit amounting approximately to forty seven lakhs of rupees in the Karachi Branch of the Bank of India, Ltd.,
- (ii) Securities of the Government of India of the face value of Rs. 1,29,00,700, and
- (iii) certain shares in joint stock companies incorporated in India.

In December 1947, the Pakistan Government promulgated an Ordinance the effect of which was that the Bank became liable to make over the deposit, securities and shares to the Nawab personally notwithstanding any claim to the property by the State. The securities and shares as well as certain bank deposits in Bombay are the property of the State and not the personal property of the Nawab, and to remove all doubts as to the State's title to the said securities, shares and deposits, it became necessary to promulgate an Ordinance (being Ordinance No. XXX of 1947) to vest the same in the Administrator of the State and



to make certain incidental and consequential provisions. A copy of the Ordinance is annexed.<sup>1</sup>

2. Under section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, the Ordinance will expire on the 24th June 1948.

<sup>1</sup>See F. 200/90-D, *Mountbatten Papers*. Not printed.

## PS-240

*M. Ikramullah to G. S. Bajpai*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/101*

No. C-1252

KARACHI,  
8 April 1948

We have seen press reports of proceedings of Indian Parliament of Monday last which passed a Bill to provide for vesting of certain property belonging to Junagadh State in the name of Administrator. Junagadh has lawfully acceded to Pakistan and the two Dominions have not so far reached any agreement about the future of the property belonging to this State or its Ruler. The whole case is under the consideration of the Security Council. In the circumstances Pakistan Government must reserve its right to repudiate this unilateral action by Indian Parliament which has no legal basis and which in fact is tantamount to seizure of property standing in the name of the Ruler in a territory which is a part of Pakistan. The action of the Indian Parliament is apparently intended as a measure of coercion and retaliation against the Ruler. If any securities or other valuable property stand in the name of the Nawab, they must be assumed to be his personal property until the contrary is proved.

2. Pakistan Government strongly protest against this high handed action.

[M. IKRAMULLAH]



## MANAVADAR

PS-241

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah**F. 124 (4)-GG/1-2*THE PALACE, MANAVADAR,  
19 August 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

May I take this opportunity of congratulating you on your appointment as the Governor-General of Pakistan which has come into being solely by your constant efforts and sacrifice. I wish you and the Dominion of Pakistan a very very bright future. Under your leadership, there is no doubt, the new Dominion will protect peoples of all caste[s], creed[s] and nationalit[ies] and give chance to the Muslims who have upto now missed it.

My State is contiguous to the State of Junagadh which acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan and I understand you have very kindly accepted its accession. I have also decided to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan and am deputing my two representatives, Mr Abdul Kadir Quraishi, my Private Secretary, and Mr Mohammed Husain, District and Sessions Judge, to convey this decision of mine to you personally. I shall be very grateful if you would very kindly accept my accession to the Dominion of Pakistan.

I hope this finds you in the enjoyment of excellent health.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,  
GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN

PS-242

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah**F. 124 (4)-GG/5-6*THE PALACE, MANAVADAR,  
21 September 1947

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

*Allah* be thanked, my State has acceded<sup>1</sup> to the Dominion of Pakistan. I





*Mahabat Khan III, Nawab of Junagadh, the first State Ruler who signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan on 14 September 1947.*



feel proud and confident to belong to a fold, the foundation of which is laid on the principles of equality, fraternity and liberty as preached by Islam and put into practice by our illustrious predecessors and your greatself. With these principles, the establishment of Pakistan, the fifth largest state in the world and an unparalleled event in world chronicles, is both a glory and source of strength to the Muslim nation and the world at large. A worthy scion of Islam, your untiring efforts and selfless devotion to the sacred cause has culminated in the vindication of right and justice which the Islamic people are truly proud of.

Your installation, Quaid-i-Azam, at the helm of affairs of the Dominion of Pakistan is a further guarantee for the vindication of those principles for which you have so vigorously fought and a security for the new State of Pakistan—the State despite impediments, trials and tribulations will emerge out triumphant and will stand consolidated to fulfil its glorious mission of peace and prosperity.

I am fully alive to the present day situation which confronts the Government of Pakistan. In this hour of trial, I take pride to place my personal services and all the resources of my State at the disposal of the Government of Pakistan. It is my sincere prayer that may *Allah* the Almighty strengthen your hands with all resources of Providence to steer clear through the forces of evil.

It is also my sincerest prayer that may *Allah* in His mercifulness bestow on you long life and full health to continue to guide the Muslim nation to its destined goal and to captain the ship of the State to the haven of peace, prosperity and true greatness. Pakistan, *Insha Allah*, with your help and guidance and in co-operation with other peace-loving nations of the world, will contribute its mighty share in the building of a happy and prosperous world, worthy to live in and worthy to be proud of.

With kindest regards,

Yours very sincerely,  
GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN

<sup>1</sup>The Instrument of Accession was signed by the Ruler of Manavadar on 21 September 1947, and accepted by Governor-General of Pakistan on 24 September 1947. See *Instruments of Accession*, 31-3.



## PS-243

*M. A. Jinnah to Ruler of Manavadar**F. 124 (4)-GG/8**26 September 1947*

My dear Nawab Sahib,

Many thanks for your letter dated the 21st of September,<sup>1</sup> and for all your good wishes for Pakistan.

I am sure that with your sympathy and support for our people, and with unity, discipline and help of friends, we shall be able to build up Pakistan in a way that it will be equal amongst all the peace-loving nations of the world.

With very kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH

<sup>1</sup>PS-242.

## PS-244

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah & Others**Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/48*

MANAVADAR,  
*3 October 1947*

Governor-General of Pakistan

Regret to inform you that today at 3 p.m. Mr Baneshinji, Deputy Regional Officer, States Department, Dominion of India, with armed force numbering about 300 in motor lorries drove through Manavadar State territory to Bantwa and imposed management on Bantwa Bara Majmu Taluka. K.S Himat Khan, the present representative Talukadar of Bantwa Chhota Majmu and K.S. Sher Khanji, ex-Talukadar, were taken away from Bantwa by force in their car. Please note that Manavadar State has got fifty per cent share in Bantwa Majmu Taluka and sixteen share holders out of 2,222 of Bantwa Chhota Majmu Taluka have to join Manavadar State after 15 August for administrative purposes and have also applied for accession to Pakistan through Manavadar State as per letter of 25 addressed to Secretary, Foreign Affairs. We are also negotiating with Government of Pakistan for accession of Bantwa Majmu Taluka to Dominion of Pakistan. We strongly condemn the unconstitutional action of States Department of Dominion of India. Requesting you to take immediate action in the matter.



Kindly advise of action to be taken by us.

[GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN]

## PS-245

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram<sup>1</sup>, F. 124 (4)-GG/15*

SECRET/MOST IMMEDIATE  
M. 003

MANAVADAR,  
4 October 1947

Governor-General of Pakistan, Karachi

It is learnt that States Department of Dominion of India is preparing to impose management on Manavadar State and they are making necessary preparations for this action by force. They have threatened Manavadar State directly and indirectly. Safety of Manavadar State and its Muslim subjects is in danger if Dominion of India adopts unconstitutional methods of coercion. Strong note of Government of Pakistan to Dominion of India regarding aggressive attitude of States Department towards Manavadar State is very essential. I earnestly hope Pakistan-Government will kindly make immediate arrangements for the protection of Manavadar State and its subjects. We are greatly handicapped without arms and ammunition for our defence and maintaining security. Our requirements of arms and ammunition may kindly be supplied in full immediately. Under these circumstances wireless station at Manavadar is very necessary. Hence some suitable arrangements at Manavadar proper may kindly be made so that we may have immediate contact with Pakistan Government and Junagadh in case of emergency.

[GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>An identical cypher message was also sent by Dewan of Junagadh to Jinnah on 3 October 1947. See F. 124 (4)-GG/10. Not printed.

## PS-246

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/53*

SECRET

MANAVADAR,  
5 October 1947

Referring my wireless telegraph message<sup>1</sup> regarding Bantwa affairs, I further say that unnecessary and excessive harassment is caused to



Muslims of Bantwa.

Muslims have been forced to surrender arms and ammunition in their possession. Muslims of Bantwa are in great danger. Situation might deteriorate further and endanger safety of life and property of Bantwa Muslims. Muslims form majority of population of Bantwa. Valuable assertion [*sic* for assets] of wealthy Memons amounting to crores of rupees are unsafe in Bantwa at present. Requesting Pakistan Government to save the situation by some constitutional method. Anxiously awaiting advice in the matter. Kindly let me know whether States Department of Dominion of India is legally and constitutionally justified in imposing management on Bantwa Bara Majmu *Taluka* and Bantwa Chhota Majmu *Taluka*.

[GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>PS-244.

## PS-247

*Begum Himat Khan to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (8)-GG/58*

SECRET/IMMEDIATE

MANAVADAR,  
9 October 1947

My husband Himat Khan shareholder of Bantwa *Taluka* was taken to Rajkot from Bantwa under armed escort for signing Instrument of Accession to Dominion of India under coercion on 3rd October. He has [been] wrongfully confined at Rajkot and is being forced to sign. High-handed and unconstitutional policy of State[s] Department of India has shocked me and his mother deeply. Earnestly appeal Your Excellency to take necessary and prompt action.<sup>1</sup> Bantwa *Taluka* is negotiating with Pakistan Government for Accession.

[BEGUM HIMAT KHAN]

<sup>1</sup>In another telegram the same day, the *Darbar* of Bantwa *Taluka*, Manavadar, appealed to Jinnah to take immediate action for release of Himat Khan from unlawful custody. See F. 124 (8)-GG/59. Not printed.



## PS-248

*Ruler of Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah**Telegram, F. 124 (4)-GG/11-2*MOST IMMEDIATE  
No. 97/10MANAVADAR,  
23 October 1947

His Excellency the Governor-General, Pakistan, Karachi

Manavadar State most strongly objects to unauthorized, forcible and unwarranted imposition of management over Manavadar through Govt. of India troops with a show of force, resulting in death of one Manavadar Arab sepoy. Taking up matter with both Dominion[s] of Pakistan and India Union. Manavadar accession to Pakistan is well known and established fact having taken place almost a month ago which was published in all leading newspapers, also broadcast from Pakistan Radio Station and announced by His Royal Highness in a public meeting of Manavadar and urban population. Earlier withdrawal would rectify grievous error and prevent any untoward incidents.

[GHULAM MOINUDDIN KHAN]

## PS-249

*A. K. Quraishi<sup>1</sup> to M. A. Jinnah**F. 124 (4)-GG/13-4*

VERY IMMEDIATE

MCLEOD ROAD,  
GRAND HOTEL, KARACHI,  
24 October 1947

Your Excellency,

I beg to inform Your Excellency that last night I received a wireless message<sup>2</sup> from the Nawab Saheb of Manavadar that the armed forces of the Dominion of India have entered Manavadar on the morning of 23rd October and the States Department of India has imposed unwarranted and illegal management on Manavadar State. One Arab sepoy of Manavadar State has been killed by the Indian troops in the process.

Manavadar State has already acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan and announcement to this effect has already been made by the Government of Pakistan and the Ruler of Manavadar State. Manavadar State apprehended such high-handedness of the Dominion of India



and had forewarned the Government of Pakistan by the wireless message of the 4th October and sought the protection of the Dominion of Pakistan. I am herewith enclosing the copy of the same.<sup>3</sup>

It may be noted that there was no controversy about the accession of Manavadar State to the Dominion of Pakistan and the Dominion of India never challenged the action of Manavadar State.

It is also feared that the State Department of India may even go further and arrest the Ruler of Manavadar to break his morale and steadfast decision to stick to his accession to Pakistan and they may also force him to sign the accession to the Dominion of India.

Besides, the members of the ruling family, including the Heir-Apparent are at present at Manavadar and they are virtually under the custody of the Indian troops. It is quite possible that the States Department of India may take coercive measures to overawe and intimidate the Ruler into submission to the accession to India. I may also add that the Ruler and his family are without safety and protection and if immediate help is not rushed to them for their protection from the evil hands of the States Department of India, they will have to undergo all sorts of harassment. I, therefore, humbly beseech Your Excellency to be pleased to take most immediate and effective measures for the protection of the Ruler and his family. This is a matter, very urgent and serious and I fervently hope it will receive earnest attention of Your Excellency.

The Ruler and his family are held in high esteem by his loyal subjects who would not brook or tolerate any act of domination over them. Besides, Manavadar State Police Force consists mostly of Muslims from Punjab who would not flinch an inch to defend the person and honour of the Ruler and integrity of the State and this is likely to create friction with the Indian troops in Manavadar.

It is apprehended that such aggressive and hostile acts of the States Department of India might aggravate the situation which has already become tense. Before it is too late, all possible and effective aid and assistance should be rendered to Manavadar State by the Government of Pakistan so as to save the critical situation from further deterioration.

The present situation has created a panic in Manavadar and it is feared that Indian troops will deliberately terrorise our subjects, specially Muslims, and thereby demoralize them to achieve their heinous object of getting Manavadar State into the fold of the Dominion of India.

We have been often assured by the Government of Pakistan that they are responsible for the defence of Manavadar State and its subjects. It will



not be out of place under the circumstances if I humbly appeal to Your Excellency kindly to render all possible help, even to the extent of rushing the aid of the armed forces of Pakistan, so as to check the unwise, ill-advised and wrongful action of the States Department of India. The Quaid-i-Azam being at the helm of the Government of Pakistan, we are fully confident that Manavadar State will emerge out triumphant from the present struggle and will ever remain in the fold of Pakistan.

In view of the urgency of the matter, an interview with Your Excellency at the earliest is solicited so that I may be able to apprise Your Excellency of the whole situation personally and to seek Your Excellency's valuable guidance and directions in the matter.<sup>4</sup>

I have the honour to be,  
Your Excellency's most obedient servant,  
A.K. QURAISHI

<sup>1</sup>Private Secretary to the Ruler of Manavadar.

<sup>2</sup>PS-248.

<sup>3</sup>PS-245.

<sup>4</sup>F. Amin while acknowledging the letter advised A. Q. Quraishi to see the Foreign Secretary. See F. 124 (4)-GG/16. Not printed.

## PS-250

*Begum Manavadar to M. A. Jinnah*

*Telegram, F. 124 (4)-GG/19*

IMMEDIATE

MANAVADAR,  
29 October 1947

Ever since Manavadar placed under management by State Department movement of myself and children completely restricted. Not permitted to leave palace. As I am unwell having heart trouble I wish leave Manavadar with children for holiday. Management of any State even if legal cannot reasonably involve incarceration of Ruler's family. Treatment of this kind to womenfolk never known in annals of former paramountcy. Grateful if you would issue instructions that members of Manavadar Ruler's family be given complete freedom of movement.

[BEGUM MANAVADAR]



## PS-251

*Note by M. H. Memon<sup>1</sup> on  
Accession of Manavadar State to Pakistan  
Its Justification with a Resume of Events  
before and after 15 August  
[Extract]*

*F. 124 (4)-GG/22-32*

*Undated [April 1948]*

*[First 3 paragraphs omitted]*

After the lapse of Paramountcy on August 15, all States without any distinction whatsoever, automatically regained their full sovereign and independent status and were free to join either of the two Dominions or to remain independent. Lord Mountbatten in his address to the Princes on July 25 at Delhi said "Now the Indian Independence Act releases the States from all obligations to the Crown. The States have complete freedom—technically and legally they are independent."<sup>2</sup>

The accession of Manavadar State to either of the two Dominions was a vitally important matter concerning the safety, integrity, independence and ultimate existence of the State and also the safety and prosperity of its subjects. The Ruler dispassionately considered a course that would lead to the permanent welfare and prosperity of his subjects and help to preserve the integrity of the State and the dynasty of the Ruler and also safeguard the independence of the State and arrived at a final decision to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan formally accepted the accession of the State<sup>3</sup> and officially announced the same in press and [on] radio on September 25. The Ruler publicly declared the accession of the State to Pakistan and the same was enthusiastically welcomed by all classes of his subjects.

In view of the contiguity between the States of Manavadar and Junagadh, and the situation of the former within the territory of the latter, it was imperative that both the States should accede to the same Dominion. If Manavadar State had not acceded to Pakistan, it would have created numerous difficulties regarding administrative and economic matters. It would have also created an enclave within Junagadh State territory and would have complicated its Railway administration. The same would have been the case with regard to the movement of persons and goods and various other matters.

It is significant to note that there was no controversy raised nor the validity and propriety of the accession challenged by the Indian Government but, for no reasons whatsoever, the accession of the State aroused bitterest ill-feelings and hostility of the Dominion of India as well as the Hindu



States of Kathiawar which have become tools in the hands of the Indian Government. The accession of Manavadar is proper, legal and constitutional and within the rights and competency of the Ruler and it has in no way affected Indian Union or the Hindu States of Kathiawar.

The States Department of India directly and indirectly resorted to the coercive methods of all sorts of threats and intimidation to compel the Ruler of Manavadar to submit to their domination and this object was aided and abetted by words and actions through the Hindu States of Kathiawar as is manifestly clear from the statements of the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar published in press.<sup>4</sup> The whole object of the unholy alliance between the Indian Government and the Hindu States of Kathiawar was to weaken the morale of the Rulers of the Muslim States of Kathiawar and their Muslim subjects and thereby compel them to surrender to the Indian Union and accept their creed.

The Ruler of Manavadar was fully alive to the evil designs of the Indian Government and apprehended the hostile and aggressive action of the States Department of India. The apprehension was fully borne out in landing of the Indian armed troops in thousands with modern equipments of warfare within Kathiawar under the false pretext of protecting the Hindu States forming overwhelming majority in Kathiawar where Muslims were in minority. These Indian troops contaminated the peaceful atmosphere with the germs of disruption and communal spite and gravely endangered peace and tranquillity prevailing in Kathiawar and created unprecedented havoc for which India is held responsible in the public opinion. The Government of India are bent upon creating disorder and disharmony in Indian States so as to weaken them to fall an easy prey to their ignoble tactics. It is an open secret that India is all out to fulfil the long cherished and avowed aim of the Indian National Congress to liquidate feudal aristocracy and sovereignty of the Rulers of the States and to exterminate from the very root the Princely Order in India.

At last, all the machinations and manoeuvrings of the States Department of India under the Hitlerite guidance of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India, and his henchmen, culminated in sudden and cowardly attack on Manavadar State. The Indian armed troops together with armed forces of Nawanagar State wrongfully and deceitfully rushed into Manavadar on October 23, besieged the Palace of the Ruler early morning and took forcible possession of the State without any resistance being offered.<sup>5</sup> The brutal conduct of the Indian troops was marked by killing of one Arab guard of the State during the process of seizure. The Ministry of States, Government of India, at the point of bayonet, imposed illegal, unconstitutional and unwarranted management on the State, depriving the Ruler of all ruling powers and other privileges. The Ruler was taken to Rajkot and then to Jamnagar with a heinous object to obtain his forced



consent to accede to India. He has wrongfully been detained, since then, under surveillance and custody at Jamnagar and his movements and other liberties are strictly restricted so much so that he cannot have any contact with his family.<sup>6</sup> The deplorable, despotic and anti-Muslim actions of the Government of India stand condemned by all civilized nations of the world. This was hardly the way for any responsible Government to handle the situation arising out of mere constitutional differences.

By forcibly occupying Manavadar State which is legally and constitutionally an acceded unit of Pakistan, the Government of India have taken International Law in their own hands and clearly violated the territorial integrity of Pakistan. It is really surprising that Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, has deliberately connived at the Himalayan political blunder of the Ministry of States, knowing fully well that India will be held responsible and liable for the wrong and unlawful actions in the international opinion. This is not a minor matter but a major issue which could have been right and justifiable cause for Pakistan even to declare war against India but Pakistan has shown great forbearance by not taking any unpleasant, aggressive and stern steps so as to avoid friction being created between the two Dominions. Any sane Government would urge amicable settlement of a disputed matter in a friendly and peaceful manner.

It is totally wrong to assume that all Attached States automatically acceded to the Dominion of India after the lapse of Paramountcy on August 15. The Attachment Scheme did not curtail the inherent rights of the Rulers of the Attached States nor did it affect the integrity of their States. The smaller States were attached to the bigger States for administrative purposes only and the Attaching States were required to be mere *via media* for the Attached States to approach Political Department with certain rights of general supervision subject to appeal to the Political Agent in case of any difference of opinion. While discussing the Bill of Attachment of States in the British Parliament, the Government Members gave assurances that the scheme did not involve any deprivation of the rights of the Rulers of the Attached States. On the lapse of Paramountcy the Attachment Scheme ceased to operate and all Attached States were free from Attachment and at the same time they regained their sovereign and independent status like any other State and were legally and constitutionally fully entitled to exercise their rights to accede to either of the two Dominions. It should be noted that the independent and sovereign status of the smaller States was not a qualified one. Legally and constitutionally the Government of India are absolutely wrong in asserting that after the dissolution of the Attachment Scheme, all Attached units revert to the



Indian Dominion Government, as under administration of Political Department before Attachment, as declared by the States Department of the Government of India on August 13. Any communique issued by the Government of India before August 15 cannot legally and constitutionally affect the rights of the Ruler of Manavadar which has become free from Attachment and has regained its sovereign and independent status after lapse of Paramountcy on August 15. The Government of India had, on August 13, no right to make pronouncements about the States which were exclusive concern of the Crown Representative. The Indian Government adopted illegal and unconstitutional methods to grab the smaller States by hook or crook. This is how India distorts the legality of the constitutional issue and twists the matter to their selfish end. Why Attached States were debarred by India from acceding to either of the two Dominions by their free choice? What made the Indian Government to make pronouncements concerning the States on August 13? On what grounds India made distinction between larger and smaller States in the matter of accession? These are the questions which India cannot reply.

It may be noted that the Hindu and Muslim subjects of Manavadar State lived in absolute harmony with each other and were commonly bound by the ties of love for and loyalty to the Ruler and have had no occasion for the creation of political parties or agitations of any kind. It is a remarkable record in the history of Manavadar that there were never any communal disturbances in any part of the State and Hindus and Muslims enjoyed the same confidence of the Ruler who treated them with love and kindness and by his impartial and just treatment he won allegiance and respect of Hindus and Muslims alike. In the State service Hindus were given their due rights to their entire satisfaction and they had absolutely no grievance in this matter.

After August 15, the Government of India discontinued the supply of essential commodities including foodgrains, sugar and petrol to Manavadar State because it did not decide to accede to India. Postal and telegraphic arrangements were deliberately paralysed and there was complete deadlock of these arrangements connecting Muslim States of Kathiawar for some time. India issued private instructions to Air Services of India Ltd., to discontinue their air service at Keshod (Junagadh) on Bombay-Karachi route. This was the only airport for the Muslim States of Kathiawar. Thus India created economic blockade to harass these Muslim States.

After the occupation of Manavadar by Indian Union, the Armed Forces of India and Indian States began terrorising the Muslim subjects with the show of arms. Safety of life and property of the Muslims was in grave danger. The Hindus with the backing of the Indian



troops started their nefarious game of intimidating and humiliating Muslims who were openly taunted and jeered at for having even sympathy for Pakistan. They were harassed and threatened by the Indian troops who hardly feared the controlling authority of the State. They were forced to surrender arms and were rendered defenceless and put in a state of utter helplessness. Local Muslim leaders were harassed and persecuted, arrested and imprisoned for no offence. Muslims were removed from the State service. The illegal occupation of Manavadar by India was a calamity for the Muslims of the State. It deprived them of their happy and peaceful life. Hindus were actuated by anti-Muslim spirit, communal bias and hatred for Muslims. Sikhs were deliberately included in the Indian troops to terrorise Muslims. Under such adverse circumstances most of the Muslims left the State for Pakistan and the remaining few may also leave the place if they are not assured full protection by the Indian management.

Soon after the members of the ruling family left Manavadar, the Palace was looted by the Indian troops who took away all valuable articles including precious ornaments amounting to lakhs of rupees but no action was taken by the authority to recover the stolen property. The Palace was used as a dwelling house for the Indian troops who used the place mercilessly and filled up their trunks with the valuable articles from the Palace. Even the safes were broken open and contents stolen. The Palace mosque was desecrated by the Indian troops and the *Imam* of the mosque was severely maltreated. Volumes of the holy *Qur'an* were torn and strewn on the roads.<sup>7</sup> Such ugly incidents shocked the religious sentiments of the Muslims and tremendously injured their feelings. All this has happened as inevitable consequences of the occupation of the State by India.

The Government of India have stopped maintenance allowances and other stipends of the Heir-Apparent, the Begum Saheba and other members of the family of the Ruler of Manavadar since the occupation. This has been done with the object to put the family in monetary difficulties and thereby weaken their morale which is so strong and unshakeable. The personal accounts of the Ruler in Habib Bank Ltd., at Bantwa have been illegally attached by the Regional Commissioner, Western India States. All the personal arms of the Ruler have been unlawfully seized by the Agents of the Indian Government and taken away to Rajkot. Not a single arm was left with the family of the Ruler and they were purposely rendered defenceless and without protection too. As it was surmised that under this state of helplessness they might be caught unawares, they thought it unwise and very risky too to continue to stay at Manavadar any longer and hence all the members of



the ruling family rushed to Karachi for safety and protection.

Recently some allegations, regarding hoarding of arms for misuse against the Hindus, were cast against the Ruler of Manavadar. They were false and without any foundation and were fabricated with the object of justifying the wrongful actions of India to occupy the State. The Ruler being an all-round sportsman was very keenly interested in shooting and hence he collected some very fine sporting rifles and guns for his personal use. All these arms were purchased before August 15. He possessed these arms not with the cruel idea of killing innocent human beings as some of the Sikh and Hindu Rulers have recently done in India but with the object of killing ferocious animals who kill human beings. The Ruler had a hobby of collecting some very fine specimens of sporting arms for his personal use but it was suspected that the Indian Government will concoct false statements about the arms possessed by him and misuse thereof. Every Ruler of the States possessed certain number of arms for his personal use but this did not mean that these arms were meant for terrorising the people. The States Department of India mischievously tintured the possession of the arms by the Ruler of Manavadar for misuse of the same. There is absolutely no truth in the official communique of the Government of India, stating that the Ruler of Manavadar imported arms and ammunition for terrorising Hindus and endangering the peace of the State. Under such lame excuses the Indian Government cannot justify their high-handed and imperialistic actions.

It is also wrongly alleged by India that Muslims were being imported in the State with the intention of terrorising the local population. It is absurd to cast such false and fabricated allegations against the Ruler who is perfectly peace-loving and generously kind to his subjects without any distinction of caste and creed. It is really very difficult to understand how India could invade Manavadar, an acceded unit of Pakistan, with military force and could take forcible possession of the State under the false pretext that the Ruler possessed some personal arms and imported Muslims to terrorise the Hindus. Is this the right justification for the Dominion of India to violate the territorial integrity of the Dominion of Pakistan against the canons of International Law?

After formally acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan by free and unfettered choice and without coercion from any side, it is legally and constitutionally beyond the power of the Ruler of Manavadar to withdraw the accession as pressed by India. It is disgraceful and unfair on the part of the Indian Government to adopt aggressive and hostile methods to coerce the Ruler to undo what he has already rightly done in the matter of accession. It can be emphatically asserted that the



Ruler has done nothing wrong in acceding to Pakistan as he had a legal and constitutional right to do so.

It is deeply deplored that the Indian Government, after the occupation of Manavadar, have kept the Ruler under detention at Jamnagar as a virtual prisoner. There is no justification for their aggressive action to capture Manavadar and to violate the territorial integrity of Pakistan. There is neither any propriety in captivating the Ruler who has done only right thing in the best interest of his subjects. The Government of India are surpassing Hitler who, through his monstrous methods of throwing people into concentration camps, has not only earned a bad name for his misdeeds but has also been responsible for his own destruction and the devastation of his people and country. Any civilized government will look down upon such mean action to violate the person of a Ruler which only Government of India dare do. The Indian Government have put the Ruler of Manavadar to this maltreatment only because of their hostility to Muslims and to their newly founded State, Pakistan.

By formally accepting the accession of Manavadar State, the Government of Pakistan have solemnly pledged to defend the State from external aggression but to our surprise and disappointment, they have apparently ignored their legal and moral responsibilities and obligations to defend the State from the aggressive actions of India for the reasons best known to them. Now, it is to be seen how Pakistan Government safely rescue the State from the clutches of India and fulfil their obligations to stand by its side. It is fervently hoped that under no circumstances would Pakistan Government violate the solemn pledge and desert their acceded unit, leaving it to its fate in the hands of the Indian Government. Some effective measures should be taken to redress the wrong done to the State and to lift it up from the quagmire. To be more optimistic, we should earnestly hope that the Government of Pakistan will not sit at rest till it is proved that Pakistan is not undone in Manavadar by undoing what has already been illegally done by India. Failing all other efforts 'Reference to UNO' was the only course left to Pakistan for an amicable settlement with India.

<sup>1</sup>Pamphlet published by M. H. Memon, Secretary, Manavadar State Muslim Committee, Karachi, 1948.

<sup>2</sup>No. 14.

<sup>3</sup>PS-249.

<sup>4</sup>PS-169.

<sup>5</sup>See note 3 above.

<sup>6</sup>PS-235.

<sup>7</sup>PS-232.





*Ghulam Moinuddin Khan, Nawab of Manavadar in ceremonial Dress.*



# Glossary

<i>Aameen</i>	So be it (said at the end of a prayer)
<i>Ahraris</i>	Members of Ahrar Party
<i>Aiwan-i-Aam</i>	Lower House
<i>Aiwan-i-Khas</i>	Upper House
<i>Ala Hazrat</i>	Honorific High
<i>Allah</i>	God
<i>Allah-o-Akbar</i>	God is great
<i>Ameer</i>	Leader; Title of Ruler of Bahawalpur
<i>Assalaamo 'Alaikum wa Rehmatullahi wa Barakatuhu</i>	Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you (Muslim salutation)
<i>Atta</i>	Flour
<i>Azad tribes</i>	Independent tribes
<i>Azad</i>	Independent
<i>Bara</i>	Big, Large
<i>Bismillah 'ir Rahman 'ir Rahim</i>	In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
<i>Bande Matram</i>	Salutation to Mother (India). Also a Bombay newspaper
<i>Beglar Begi</i>	Khan of Khans
<i>Chhota</i>	Small
<i>Dar-ul-Awam</i>	Lower House
<i>Dar-ul-Umara</i>	Upper House
<i>Darbar</i>	Princely court
<i>Dastural 'Amal Sarkar</i>	Order of the State
<i>Daulat-i-Khudadad</i>	God-given wealth
<i>Deodar</i>	Cedar tree
<i>Dewan</i>	Chief Minister of the State
<i>Diwan-i-Khas</i>	Upper House; Upper Chamber of Kalat State Assembly
<i>Dusera</i>	Hindu Festival, observed on the 10th of <i>Asuj</i> or September-October, symbolizing the triumph of good over evil
<i>Firman</i>	Order
<i>Gaddi</i>	Throne
<i>Girassias</i>	Jagirdars
<i>Goondas</i>	Hooligans
<i>Hakim-i-A'ala</i>	Administrator-in-Chief
<i>Havildar</i>	Indian Army non-commissioned officer, corresponding to an army sergeant



<i>'Id</i>	Muslim festival
<i>Imam</i>	Muslim spiritual or religious leader
<i>Insha Allah</i>	God willing
<i>Islamic Shari'ah</i>	Islamic code of law
<i>jagirdars</i>	Landlords
<i>jagirs</i>	Fiefs; lands
<i>Jam</i>	Title of Ruler of Las Bela
<i>Jamadar</i>	The lowest rank of commissioned officer in the Indian army
<i>Jirga</i>	Council of tribal elders
<i>Khan</i>	Title of the Ruler of Kalat
<i>Ka-i-nat</i>	Universe, also a weekly published from Bahawalpur in 1947
<i>Kharita</i>	Charity
<i>Khassadars</i>	Collectors of allawance (Khassadari) in tribal areas
<i>Kharwas</i>	Hindu sailors
<i>Khulafa-i-Rashideen</i>	Righteous caliphate
<i>lakh</i>	One hundred thousand
<i>lashkar</i>	Band, Army Contingent
<i>lathi</i>	Heavy stick
<i>Maulanas</i>	Title of respect accorded to Muslim judges, heads of religious orders and persons of great learning
<i>Meer</i>	Title of Ruler of Nagar State
<i>Mehtar</i>	Title of Ruler of Chitral
<i>Millat</i>	Nation
<i>Mo'tabars</i>	Worthy of trust; elders
<i>Moharram</i>	First month of Islamic calender
<i>Mujahideen/Mujahidin</i>	Muslim warriors in defence of faith
<i>Mulgirassias</i>	Sub-Jagirdars
<i>Murasla</i>	letter
<i>Mushrikeen</i>	Polytheists. Those who deny the unity of God
<i>Nawab</i>	Title denoting a Muslim ruler or noble
<i>Nawabzada</i>	son of a nawab
<i>Niabat</i>	The territory in charge of a naib or deputy-governor
<i>Nizam</i>	Title of the Ruler of Hyderabad State
<i>Patidars</i>	Vallabhbhai Patel's Cast
<i>Praja Mandal</i>	People's Association; political party of Junagadh



<i>Paindabad</i>	May live for ever
<i>Peshwa</i>	Spiritual leader
<i>Pugris</i>	Turban
<i>Qur'an</i>	Holy Book of Muslims
<i>Rabaris</i>	Shepherds
<i>Rabi</i>	The spring harvest
<i>Rais</i>	Chief
<i>Raja</i>	Ruler
<i>Risaldar</i>	An officer of cavalry; the commander of a squadron
<i>Sahibzada</i>	Prince
<i>Sajjada Nashin</i>	A spiritual superior attached to a religious endowment
<i>Salaams</i>	Muslim salutation
<i>Salamat Bashad</i>	Wish you well
<i>Sardari</i>	Chiefship
<i>Sardars</i>	Chiefs
<i>Saris</i>	A female (unstitched) dress
<i>Shah'</i>	King
<i>Shahi Jirga</i>	Highest council of tribal elders
<i>Shahinshah</i>	Emperor
<i>Shari'ah/Shari'at</i>	Islamic code of law
<i>Shari'ah-i-Islam</i>	Islamic code of law
<i>Shari'ah-i-Muhammadi</i>	Muhammaden code of law
<i>Sheikh</i>	Chief
<i>Shikari</i>	Hunter
<i>Subadar</i>	A junior commissioned officer in the army
<i>Taluka</i>	estate
<i>Talukadar</i>	Landlord; owner of an estate
<i>Talukas</i>	estates
<i>Tehsildar</i>	Officer of the Revenue department
<i>Thana</i>	Police Station
<i>Wali</i>	Title of Rulers of Swat and Dir States
<i>Wali'ahad</i>	Heir; Crown Prince
<i>Wazifa</i>	Scholarship, stipend
<i>Wazir-i-Azam</i>	Prime Minister
<i>Wazir-i-Darbar</i>	Court Minister
<i>Wazirs</i>	Ministers
<i>Zamindar</i>	Landlord; Owner of an estate
<i>Zindabad</i>	Long live!



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